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This thesis is concerned w ith  rectifying a  largely  unexplored aspect o f  Restoration
Ireland— that o f  h ow  politics conducted betw een all three Stuart kingdom s w as seen
from  the perspective of, and im pacted upon, the Irish governm ent. It accom plishes
*
this in three w ays: first b y  using the discovery o f  several C atholic p lots and the 
resultant political instability in England and Scotland to expose the tensions inherent 
in the duke o f  Orm ond’ s position as lord lieutenant o f  Ireland; second b y  highlighting 
the dynam ics o f  instability that distorted his position during such periods and finally  
by outlining h ow  the duke o f  Orm ond undertook to m anage such tensions and re­
establish his position in  the Stuart political nation. In so doing this thesis arrives at a 
more representative picture o f  the role and position o f  the Irish governm ent and 
kingdom  w ithin the Stuart m onarchy before the accession o f  James, duke o f  Y ork . It 
begins w ith  the political fallout o f  Titus O ates’ s discoveries in Septem ber 1678 before 
detailing the fragility o f  Orm ond’ s position because o f  the political upheavals in 
England and Scotland. B y  early 1680 grow ing anim osity betw een the crow n and the 
W higs com pelled the latter to use unconstitutional m eans to assert their position and 
embarrass the duke o f  Y o rk  b y  proving that his key  a lley  Orm ond had suppressed 
evidence about an Irish Catholic plot. In late 1680 the W higs brought this p lot before 
parliament to prepare the ground for the duke o f  Y o rk ’ s exclusion. H ow ever at this 
moment o f  crisis and despite his dire financial straits Charles II refused to have the 
institution o f  m onarchy circum scribed by  parliament. From  this point onwards 
Orm ond’ s position strengthened gradually culminating in his arrival in London to 
participate in the overthrow  o f  the W h ig  political ascendancy in  London.
S u m m a r y
TABLE OF CONTENTS
P age
A b b revia tio n s iv
Introduction 1
C h a p te r  O n e O rm on d  an d  the orig in  o f  the 18
P op ish  P lot, 1678-79.
C h a p te r  T w o  T h e  realign m en t o f  th e  S tu a rt 64
p olity, 1679.
C h a p te r  T h re e  O liv e r  P lu n k ett an d  the P op ish  107
P lot, 1679-80.
C h a p te r  F o u r T h e  Irish  P lo t an d  14 7
p arlia m e n ta ry  p olitics, 1680-81.
C h a p te r  F ive R o ya list  resu rgen ce  an d  190
reaction , 1681-82.
C on clusion  222
B ib lio grap h y 229
A c k n o w le d g e m e n ts  i i i
ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I w ish  to express m y gratitude to a number o f  people for their help in the com pletion 
o f  this thesis. Professor R. V  Com erford and the staff o f  the Department o f  M odem  
History, N . U. I., Maynooth. M y supervisor Dr. Raym ond G illespie for his patience, 
encouragement and direction. The suggestions and criticism  o f  those w ho sacrificed 
their time and expended m uch effort in reading drafts o f  this w ork, Thom as Luke 
Bym e, John Bradley, M ichael Geary, Paddy Gallagher, Andreas Boldt, Feichin 
M cDerm ott, Austin Stewart, and Catriona O ’ Loughlin. M y friends and colleagues on 
the staff o f  Deansrath Com m unity College, Clondalkin. I w ould also like to thank m y 
fam ily in particular m y brothers and sisters, Patrick, M ichelle, Shane and N iâm h and 
also Elizabeth N olan for their patience and support over the past tw o years.
ABBREVIATIONS
Abbreviations used in the footnotes and bibliography are listed below . T hey consist o f  
(a) the relevant items from the list in Irish H istorical Studies, supplement I (Jan. 
1968) and (b) abbreviations, on the same m odel, for sources and w orks not included 
in the Irish H istorical Studies list.
Bodl. Carte MS 
Cal. S. P. dom.
D . N .B
E . H . R  
Egmont MSS
Fortescue MSS
Hastings MSS
History
Hist. Jn.
H.M.C
I. E. R.
Carte Manuscripts in the Bodleian Library, Oxford
Calendar o f the state papers, domestic, 1547-1695 (81 
vols, London, 1867-77)
Dictionary o f National Biography 
English Historical Review (London, 1886-)
Reports on the manuscripts o f  the earl o f  Egmont (H. 
M. C., 2 vols, London, 1905-9)
The manuscripts o f  J. B. Fortescue, Esq., preserved at 
Dropmore (H. M. C., 10 vols, London, 1892-1927) 
Report on the manuscripts o f the late Reginald 
Rawdon Hastings, esq. (H. M. C., 4 vols, London, 
1928-47)
History: the quarterly journal o f the Historical 
Association (London, 1916-)
The Historical Journal (Cambridge, 1958- )
Historical Manuscripts Commission
Irish Ecclesiastical Record (171 vols, Dublin, 1864-
1968)
I. H . S.
Ormonde MSS
Oxford D.N.B
Portland MSS
Seanchas Ardmhaca
Irish Historical Studies: the joint journal o f the Irish 
Historical Society and the Ulster Society fo r  Irish 
Historical Studies (Dublin, 1938-)
Historical Manuscripts Commission, Calendar o f the 
manuscripts o f  the marques o f Ormonde, preserved at 
Kilkenny castle (new ser., 8 vols., London, 1902-20) 
Oxford Dictionary o f National Biography (60 vols, 
Oxford, 2004)
The manuscripts o f his grace the duke o f Portland, 
preserved at Welbeck Abbey (H. M. C., 10 vols, 
London, 1891-1931)
Seanchas Ardmhaca: journal o f the Armagh Diocesan 
Historical Society ([Armagh], 1954-)
Stylistically spellings from contemporary sources have been modernised and dating is 
according to Old Style or Julian calendar for the day and the month but according to 
N ew  Style or Gregorian calendar for the year beginning on the 1 January.
CONVENTIONS
I  w ou ld  like to dedicate this thesis to my loving parents, Tom 
and Colette Doyle.
INTRODUCTION
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The aim o f  this thesis is to exam ine and clarify the position o f  Ireland w ithin the 
com posite Stuart monarchy during the period 1677-82 by focusing on the position o f  
its viceroy at this time, James Butler, first duke o f  Ormond. A t  the outset how ever, it 
is necessary to briefly outline Orm ond’ s career in the years preceding 1677.
The histo y  o f  seventeenth-century Ireland cannot be written or understood 
without taking full account o f  one o f  its most dominating and enduring figures, James 
Butler, duke o f  Ormond (1610-88). He w as bom  in C lerkenw ell, M iddlesex, on 19 
September 1610, the eldest son o f  Thomas, Viscount Thurles and Elizabeth P oyntz . 1 
In 1619, after his father w as drowned in the Irish Sea, James w as declared a royal 
ward and put into the hands o f  George Abbot, archbishop o f  Canterbury, as James I 
was determined to promote the Protestant interest in Ireland by raising the children o f  
prominent recusants in that faith wherever he could .2 In 1633, upon the death o f  his 
grandfather, W alter Butler, he becam e the tw elfth earl o f  Ormond. H ow ever unlike 
his predecessors, it was im possible for Ormond to play the role o f  a typical feudal 
overlord. His Protestant upbringing and debts o f  over £45,000, accrued by his 
grandfather in his efforts to reunite the Butler lands, dictated from  the word go that it 
w ould be to his advantage to serve the crown and the Protestant interest in Ireland 
over any local interests.3 During the 1630s, Ormond actively supported the efforts o f  
the lord deputy o f  Ireland, Thom as Wentworth, to consolidate royal pow er through 
plantation, the enforcement o f  religious conform ity w ith the Church o f  England and 
the enlargement o f  the Irish arm y .4 During the fractious period o f  the 1640s when 
civ il war engulfed all three kingdom s o f  the Stuart polity, Ormond led the kin g’ s
1 Toby Barnard and Jane Fenlon (ed.), The dukes of Ormonde, 1610-1745 (London, 2000), p. xi; J. C. 
Beckett, The cavalier duke: a life o f James Butler, T‘ duke o f Ormond (Belfast, 1990), pp 6-7.
2 Ibid., p. 8.
3 David Edwards, ‘The poisoned chalice: the Ormond inheritance, sectarian division and the emergence 
o f  James Butler, 1614-42’ in Toby Barnard and Jane Fenlon (ed.), The dukes o f Ormonde, 1610-1745 
(London, 2000), pp 63, 70-1, 82.
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forces in Ireland and in 1644 he w as appointed lord lieutenant o f  Ireland, the first 
Irishman to hold the position in over one hundred years .5 W ith the collapse o f  the 
royalist cause in Ireland, Ormond was forced into exile on the continent together w ith 
the displaced Stuarts and their adherents, where he becam e one o f  the principal 
advisors to Charles I’ s eldest son, Charles .6 W ith the Restoration o f  the Stuarts in 
1660, Orm ond’ s loyalty and service w as w ell rewarded: he w as made lord high 
steward o f  England, lord steward o f  the k in g’ s household, lord lieutenant o f  Somerset, 
high steward o f  Westminster, Kingston, and Bristol, Baron Butler o f  Llanthony, earl
• • 7  •
o f  Brecknock in the English peerage and promoted to a duke m  the Irish peerage. His
estates, w hich had been confiscated during the Interregnum, w ere restored and in
• 8 • 
N ovem ber 1661, he w as appointed lord lieutenant o f  Ireland for the second time. His
subsequent administration o f  Ireland can be noted for his attempts to com e to grips
with the aftermath o f  the 1640s and ’ 50s, the deeply d ivisive issues o f  land and
religion, and a shattered econom y .9 On 14 February 1669, tw o years after the
banishment from England o f  his key ally, Edward H yde, earl o f  Clarendon, Orm ond
h im self w as rem oved from  office, not because o f  a hostile court, but as Ronald Hutton
contends, because Charles II wanted more com pliant ministers. This was in order to
pursue policies opposed by Ormond such as a more liberal religious policy  in Ireland
and, externally to promote close relations w ith France . 10 Out o f  office and out o f
favour, the early 1670s were a particularly difficult period in Orm ond’ s career. His
incom e was substantially decreased before he had been able to reduce the m assive
4 S. J. Connolly (ed.), Oxford companion to Irish history (Oxford, 2002), p. 438.
5 Ibid.
6 Beckett, The cavalier duke: a life ofJanies Butler, T' duke o f Ormond, pp 57-9.
7 Leslie Stephen, Dictionary o f National Biography (London, 1886), viii, p. 57.
8 Ibid.p.57; J. E. Aydelotte, ‘The duke o f  Ormonde and the English government o f  Ireland, 1677-85’ 
(unpublished Ph. D dissertation, University o f  Iowa, 1975), pp 19-20.
‘7 Ibid., pp 19-20; David Dickson, New foundations: Ireland 1660-1800 (new edition, Dublin, 2000), pp 
3-10.
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debts he had incurred in the k in g ’ s service and, as i f  things w ere not bad enough, he 
narrowly escaped assassination and impeachment. 11 A s  the decade progressed, his 
luck changed. In 1674, an Anglo-French alliance against the Dutch collapsed when 
Charles II w as com pelled by financial worries and parliamentary pressure to m ake 
peace. B y 1676, he was eager for a war against his form er ally, Louis X IV , in order to 
re-establish his position in regard to the Stuart political nation and gain parliamentary 
subsidies . 12 Charles’ s ambitions were being hampered by the actions o f  Arthur Capel, 
earl o f  Essex, the lord lieutenant o f  Ireland at this time. W ith the Irish army on the 
brink o f  mutiny and the country’ s forts and defences utterly run down, E ssex w as 
determined to bring Richard Jones, V iscount Ranelagh, the fraudulent controller o f  
the Irish revenues to book . 13 This w as disastrous as far as Charles II w as concerned. 
To paraphrase Ronald Hutton, an investigation into R anelagh’ s accounts w ould have 
revealed his collusion in the misappropriation o f  Irish revenues at a tim e when he w as 
desperate to obtain public support. 14 It w as therefore decided to replace Essex w ith 
someone who w ould turn a blind eye to Ranelagh’ s activities . 15 This w as James 
Butler, duke o f  Ormond, and in April 1677 he w as reappointed viceroy o f  Ireland for 
the third and final time in his career.
To date this period o f  Orm ond’ s career (1677-85) has been approached in 
three ways. The first consists o f  biographical studies pertaining to the life o f  James 
Butler. In the last three hundred years there have been three such studies, the first in
10 James McGuire, ‘Why was Ormond dismissed in 1669?’ in /  H. S., xviii (1972-3), pp 311-2; Ronald 
Hutton, ‘The making o f  the secret treaty o f Dover, 1668-70’, Hist. Jn., xxix (1986), pp 309-11.
11 Beckett, The cavalier duke: a life o f James Butler, 1st duke o f Ormond, pp 101-5; Anon, Remarks on 
some eminent passages in the life o f the famed Mr. Blood... (London, 1680), pp 8-9; Winifred Gardner, 
The life o f James Butler first duke o f Ormonde, 1610-88 (2 vols, London, 1912), ii, pp 169-72.
12 John Cannon, Oxford companion to British history (Oxford, 1997), pp 136-7; Barry Coward, The 
Stuart age, England 1603-1714 (3ld ed., London, 2003), pp 323-5.
13 Dickson, New foundations: Ireland 1660-1800, pp 15-6; Ronald Hutton, ‘The triple-crowned islands’ 
in Lionel. K. J Glassy (ed.), The reigns of Charles 11 and James VII and II (London, 1997), pp 82-3.
14 Ronald Hutton, Charles the Second, king o f England, Scotland and Ireland (Oxford, 1989), p. 339.
15 Hutton, ‘The triple-crowned islands’, p. 83,
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1736 by Thom as Carte, a Jacobite in the service o f  the second duke o f  O rm ond . 16 In 
1912, W inifred Gardner, Lady Burgclere utilised many o f  the H. M . C  calendars o f  
manuscripts that were available in an attempt ‘ to rem ove the veil betw een Ormond 
and the truth ’ . 17 Finally, J. C. Becket in 1990 brought out a short study o f  O rm ond’ s 
life, w hich adopted modern perspectives but remained im pressionistic in many 
areas. 18
The second area o f  research comprises studies pertaining to Restoration Ireland 
and the life and career o f  the first duke o f  Ormond. Sean E gan’ s PhD thesis provides 
an accurate picture o f  the financial state o f  Restoration Ireland to em erge . 19 In a 
related vein James A ydelotte’ s PhD thesis exam ined Orm ond’ s final viceroyalty in 
regard to how  he administered the governm ent o f  Ireland. He focused on three 
changes that Ormond tried to bring about in order to im prove the standing o f  the Irish 
polity. These were military improvement, fiscal solvency and stability in land 
tenure .20 Another study o f  Ireland during the Popish Plot is at present being 
undertaken by John G ibney (Trinity C ollege Dublin) whilst the activities o f  the W higs 
in Ireland during the Exclusion Crisis w ill be touched upon by Tom  Byrne (NUI 
Maynooth) in his study o f  Nathaniel Hooke. Finally, a collection o f  essays edited by 
Toby Barnard and Jane Fenlon has recently exam ined a number o f  perspectives on
Ormond with G. E Aylm er, for exam ple, critically addressing Orm ond both as a
21patron and administrator.
16 Thomas Carte, An history of the life of James duke o f Ormonde from his birth to his death in 1688 (3 
vols, London, 1736).
17 Winifred Gardner, The life o f James first duke o f Ormonde, 1610-88 (2 vols, London, 1912).
18 J. C Beckett, The Cavalier duke: a life o f James Butler, Ist duke o f Ormond (Belfast, 1990).
19 Sean Egan, ‘Finance and the government o f  Ireland, 1660-85’ (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, 
University o f  Dublin, 1983).
20 Aydelotte, ‘The du A  o f  Ormond and the English government o f  Ireland, 1677-85’.
21 G. E. Aylmer, ‘The first duke o f  Ormond as patron and administrator’ in Toby Barnard and Jane 
Fenlon (ed.). The dukes of Ormond, 1610-1745 (London, 2000).
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The third approach centres on the idea o f  constructing a new B ritish history. 
This is best emphasised by J. G. A . Pocock w ho in 1974 called for a more integrated
• 99  ■ »
reading o f  Irish, Scottish and English histories. Recently several histories such as 
Conrad R ussell’ s The fa ll  o f  the British M onarchies have been criticised for being 
Anglo-centric .23 One such critic, Jane Ohlm eyer, argues that British history should not 
just cherry-pick events in Ireland and Scotland to enrich English history. Her book, 
A w kw ard neighbours: the Stuart kingdoms in the seventeenth century  can be seen as 
an attempt to utilise the new  British theme to enhance the histories o f  both Ireland and 
Scotland .24
In consideration o f  what has been done, this thesis w ill take on board particular 
aspects o f  all thre. approaches. It w ill focus on the final viceroyalty o f  the first duke 
o f  Ormond in regard to his dealings and interactions within all three Stuart kingdom s. 
A s such it w ill not result in another history o f  the three kingdom s seen from London; 
rather it w ill shift the perspective and allow  many o f  the issues relating to the British 
theme to be understood from the view point o f  Dublin.
The significance o f  this project lies in its shift o f  perspective. M ost histories 
o f  the relationship and interaction o f  the three kingdom s o f  the Stuart m onarchy have 
been from the view point o f  London. This thesis on the other hand intends to exam ine 
this interaction through the eyes o f  James Butler, duke o f  Ormond. In taking this 
route, the author subscribes to the original ideas o f  the new British historians  w hile at 
the same time taking on board the criticism  that this v iew  o f  history has recently 
received, most notably that it needs to adopt different perspectives, and not focus
22 Jane Ohlmeyer, ‘Seventeenth century Ireland and the new British and Atlantic histories’ in American 
Historical Review, civ (1999), pp 446-62; J. G. A. Pocock, ‘The new British history in Atlantic 
perspective: An antipodean commentary’ in American Historical Review, civ (1999), pp 490-500.
"5 Conrad Russell, The fall o f the British monarchies, 1637-42 (Oxford, 1991).
■ ' Jane Ohlmeyer and Allan I. Machines (ed.), Awkward neighbours: the Stuart kingdoms in the 
seventeenth century (Dublin, 2002).
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exclusively on London. The end-result w ill provide a more accurate picture o f  the role 
and position o f  Ireland within the Stuart monarchy during the period 1677-85.
This w ill be accom plished in three w ays; first by analysing a series o f  plots, 
both Catholic and Presbyterian, to expose the tensions inherent in the duke o f  
Orm ond’ s position as lord lieutenant o f  Ireland in a three kingdom s context; second, 
by showing the mechanisms o f  instability that distorted his position during such 
periods o f  tension; and, thirdly, by mapping out how  the duke o f  Ormond undertook 
to manage such pressures and re-establish his position vis-à-vis the Stuart political 
nation.
The tensions and problems affecting Orm ond’ s position em erge from 
Catholicism , the court, parliament and the king in London, and Protestant non­
conformity. In regard to Catholicism , Ormond, despite many protestations o f  loyalty 
to the established church, could never fully escape the accusations o f  being pro-papist 
or a crypto-papist.25 He had been a Catholic for the first ten years o f  his life and most 
o f  his fam ily continued in that religion. M ost o f  his supporters were O ld English 
Catholics, the order Ormond saw as the natural nobility o f  Ireland and during the 
Restoration he restored many, like his relative Colonel John Fitzpatrick, to their 
former eminence. This left him open to the charge o f  favouring popery; how ever, this 
only became a political banana skin for him at times in his career when anti-Catholic 
sentiment was in the ascendant in London. The Popish Plot w as one such period. It 
highlighted his relationship w ith various Catholic notables such as his nephew 
Colonel Justin M acCarthy and others accused o f  conspiracy in the plot such as 
Richard Talbot. It presented his opponents within the Irish kingdom , such as Roger 
Boyle, earl o f  Orrery, with a perfect opportunity to attack his person and position, by
7
using two o f  his weaknesses against him: his perceived partiality to Catholicism  and 
his distance from the corridors o f  pow er in London.
Ormond, like many viceroys before him, found it im possible to avoid becom ing 
involved in the cross-currents o f  English politics. J. C. Beckett noted in his study o f  
the Irish viceroyalty during the Restoration period ‘ that the appointment o f  a lord 
lieutenant, his security in office and his final recall were often and more directly 
influenced by the state o f  conflicting groups and policies in court than by regard for 
the immediate problem s o f  Irish administration’ ,26 In London, Ormond had to contend 
with three interrelated and interacting problem s, court, parliament and the king. The 
court in London was riven with faction, and complaints regarding Orm ond w ere w ell 
received in som e quarters. The deepening atmosphere o f  anti-Catholicism  during the 
plot, com bined with distrust o f  James, duke o f  Y ork, did little to help Orm ond’ s cause 
as Y ork  had endorsed his reinstatement as viceroy. M any other courtiers were made 
suspicious and re eptive to such complaints and accusations by the contemporary 
atmosphere o f  fear, distrust and uncertainty in England. A fter all, the previous 
existence o f  such upheavals in England had precipitated a rebellion in Ireland in 1641 
that had disastrous implications for the English nation. Parliament, w hich in many 
w ays was an extension o f  court politics, was another problem for Ormond, as he had 
no control over when it met and what it w ould do, especially i f  his enemies were in 
the ascendant at court. The main strength o f  Orm ond’ s position in London w as that it 
rested w holly  and directly upon the king, Charles II, for w hom  he had been a loyal 
servant since the 1640s. This how ever w as also his biggest weakness as C harles’ s 
position was fundamentally unstable. L ike Ormond in Ireland, he w as burdened by
25 The most valuable and comprehensive study on Ormond’s religion is Raymond G illespie’s article 
‘The religion o f  the first duke o f  Ormond’ in Toby Barnard and Jane Fenlon (ed.), The dukes o f  
O rm onde (London, 2000).
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problems emanating from before the Restoration and throughout his reign he was 
plagued by religious, financial and political problems, w hich forced him to 
countenance figures and groups he norm ally w ould not have. The plots exam ined in 
this thesis effectively  placed Charles in a sim ilar position.
Finally, Ormond, like previous viceroys, was faced w ith the com plicated 
problem o f  how  to maintain law  and order in Ulster in light o f  its intimate and 
extensive links w ith Scotland. The vast m ajority o f  the population o f  northeast Ulster 
were Scottish Presbyterians; therefore this region was heavily affected by religious 
and political upheavals in Scotland. Ormond, like previous, viceroys attempted to 
uphold the established Church w hilst at the same time maintaining what could be 
called a w orking relationship w ith dissent. This stance w as prompted by several 
reasons, firstly it was impossible to clamp down on the activities o f  itinerant 
Presbyterian ministers let alone make dissenting communities conform  as the local 
governm ent structures in these area w ere rudimentary and usually in the hands o f  non­
conformists. Secondly the Irish law s w ere w holly  inadequate to deal w ith  the issue o f  
dissent.27 Thirdly, on various occasions throughout the Restoration, soldiers had been 
sent to enforce the laws and w atch the harbours, but the governm ent w as unable to 
maintain such policies for long without overburdening the Irish treasury or alienating 
powerful Presbyterian notables such as Arthur Forbes, earl o f  Granard. The escalation 
o f  tension between Episcopalians and non-conformists in Scotland prior to the 
Bothw ell Brig rebellion in June 1679 and the Tory reaction follow ing the dissolution 
o f  the O xford parliament in M arch 1681 thus occasioned a great deal o f  m isch ief for
26 J. C. Beckett, ‘The Irish viceroyalty in the Restoration period’ in Trans. Royal. Hist. Soc., 5th Ser., xx  
(1971) p. 56.
27 Toby Barnard, Cromwellian Ireland (2nd edition, Oxford, 2000), p. 148, Raymond Gillespie, 
‘Dissenters and nonconformists’ in Kevin Herlihy (ed.), The Irish dissenting tradition, 1650-1750 
(Dublin, 1995), pp 13-4; Patrick Adair, A true narrative o f the rise and progress o f the Presbyterian 
church in Ireland (ed.), W. D. Killen (Belfast, 1866), p. 293.
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Ormond. He w as com pelled to regard Presbyterians as a threat to the state and 
therefore forced to implement measures, w hich he knew  w ould be counteiproductive 
to his ow n interests.
During the plots (Titus O ates’ s discoveries, the M eal Tub plot and finally the 
Irish plot) there were three mechanisms by w hich O rm ond’ s position w as 
destabilised: the machinations o f  politicians, rumour that had hitherto been contained 
to bookseller’ s shops, taverns, the royal exchange and the court in London, and finally 
and most importantly print. Sir Francis G w yn, one o f  Orm ond’ s adherents in London, 
justifiably called the period between 1679 and 82 the ‘ age o f  printing’ as there w as an 
explosion in political printing. M ark Knights has recently estim ated that between
• • • • o n
1679 and 1681 there were between five  and ten m illion printed items in circulation. 
The reason for this was the expiration o f  the Licensing A ct in 1679, w hich  w as the 
means by which the printing trade had been policed since 1662. This w as disastrous 
for Ormond. He now  had to contend with the implications o f  rumours and accusations 
not only at W hitehall but throughout all three kingdom s as pam phlets, printed in 
London concerning the plot, found their w ay to Ireland and in some cases were 
reprinted, w hilst w  Ulster, his authority was undermined by a constant flo w  o f  radical 
Protestant tracts emanating out o f  Scotland and Holland.
It is only by exam ining these plots com prehensively that the methods by 
w hich Ormond managed the tensions inherent in his position emerge. In so doing, this 
thesis w ill arrive at a more accurate picture o f  the role and position o f  the Irish 
government and kingdom  within the Stuart polity in the period before the accession o f  
James, duke o f  York. What follow s is a brief outline o f  some o f  the stratagems 
applied by Ormond which w ill be exam ined throughout the main body o f  this thesis.
28 Francis Gwyn to Ormond, 27 N ov. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 543-4.
29 John Miller, ‘Public opinion in Charles II’s England’ in History, lxxx, (1995), p.363.
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In London, he packed the court at W hitehall with his supporters in order to 
neutralise insinuations and rumours dispersed by his enemies. He prudently integrated 
all their actions b} establishing what could best be described as a ‘ supporter’ s club ’ , 
where narratives legitim ising his proceedings in regard to the plot in Ireland were 
made available. Ormond availed o f  many o f  the same methods in regard to his 
dealings with parliament. He also took care to have pow erful and w ell informed 
figures from the Irish kingdom  present like his son Richard Butler, earl o f  Arran, to 
m obilise support amongst parliamentarians and, i f  need be, answer queries or refute 
accusations. Ormond managed Charles II in many w ays during this period; he had his 
supporters represent his grievances and seek Charles’ s advice in regard to the 
intrigues o f  his enemies. A t times when his position vis-à-vis the Stuart political 
nation w as distorted and when Charles was forced to countenance Orm ond’ s 
opponents, Ormond w ould attempt to offer him advice; i f  Charles failed to heed this, 
Ormond w ould request perm ission to travel to London to defend his actions or 
position in person against the expected onslaught.
Ormond was keenly aware o f  the potential o f  printed material to upset his 
position stating to Arran in regard to the allegation that he w as a Catholic, ‘ now  
though it m ay be as truly sworn that I w as circum cised at Christchurch [ ...]  yet i f  it 
get into a narrative thousands w ill sw allow  it as truth; and against this there is no 
fen ce ’ .30 He attempted to check the actions o f  the libellers and rumour-mongers by 
encouraging his supporters to take action against them and w as also not averse to 
manipulating the press him self. His supporters patronised many o f  London’ s 
pamphleteers so that Arran was able to inform him  ‘ i f  you ever have a mind at any
30 Ormond to earl o f  Arran, 1 Jan. 1689, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 543-4; Hereafter Arran and his older 
brother, Thomas Butler, earl o f  Ossory will be referred to in footnotes as Arran and Ossory.
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time to have a letter put out in print relating to yourself I can get it put into one o f  
those books ’ .31 The art o f  political spin-doctoring has a long history.
Ormond attempted to suffocate insinuations made by Orrery and others that he 
was a crypto-papist by outdoing them in his zeal for the Protestant interest. He 
attempted to show  that their complaints and fears w ere m isplaced and ultim ately they 
were actually endangering the Protestant interest by preventing him  from  getting to 
the bottom o f  the plots, whilst simultaneously he prudently took steps to have his 
actions in regard to the plots endorsed by the Irish Privy C ouncil and figures w ith 
Irish interests like Edward, earl o f  C on w ay .32 He w as keenly aware and sensitive that 
his Catholic kin were in effect his A chilles heel. W itness the turm oil occasioned when 
treasonous information appeared against his half-brother C olonel John Fitzpatrick. 
The Catholic Fitzpatrick w as now  categorised w ith the pejorative ‘Papist’ label in so 
much that he w as now  a threat to the established order. Orm ond had the information 
quickly brought before the Irish Privy Council and despatched to London, lest it be 
claim ed he was failing to properly prosecute the plot. It must be pointed out, however, 
that he w as easily able to take this stance as he had sent Fitzpatrick out o f  the 
kingdom  several months earlier.
The Scottish link with Ulster was very difficult for Orm ond to manage, because 
he had no clients there and very little influence over Scottish events. He attempted to 
overcom e these problem s in various ways, for instance, by recruiting agents and 
informers amongst Scottish Presbyterians both in Ulster and Scotland thereby gaining 
a direct conduit to important information regarding future developm ents. In the light 
o f  his financial and political difficulties in maintaining his authority in Ulster, this
31 Arran to Ormond, 7 Feb. 1681, Ormonde MSS, pp 573-4.
32 The Privy Council is also referred to as ‘Council’ and ‘Board’ throughout this thesis.
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strategy was extrem ely practical because it allow ed him to interfere as he saw  fit to 
influence events and head-off threats.
The most important body o f  primary source material for this thesis is O rm ond’s 
ow n papers. These are divided into tw o collections, the Orm ond manuscripts in the 
National Library o f  Ireland and the Carte papers in the Bodleian Library, Oxford. 
Both these collecuons com bined comprise what is one o f  the largest sources for 
seventeenth-century Ireland, but it has one key problem, w hich is its bias. The duke o f  
Ormond w as without doubt clearly aware o f  the dangers inherent in everything he 
wrote as can be ascertained from the follow ing letter to his son Arran on 7 M arch 
1677, wherein he advises him
I have yours o f  the 26 th o f  the last, to many parts whereof you will find 
answers in former letters o f  mine if  you will keep them by you and will 
look over them. I confess all the part allowed you in the Irish affairs needs 
not the keeping copies o f  your letters, yet it will be o f  use to you to 
practice it, even when you think the subject trivial; for without it you may 
be said to have written what you did not and not to have written what you 
did, and if your letters be pretended to be lost there may be many 
affirmations against your single negative.33
A t various times in his political career most notably during his bitter public dispute 
with Arthur Annesley, earl o f  Anglesey, in 1681 concerning contentious issues during 
the British civil wars o f  the 1640s, Ormond took time to tidy up his letters. The 
problem with this source is that it is basically the papers and correspondence that 
Ormond wanted to keep. In effect what Ormond left us, was Orm ond’ s v iew  o f  
Ormond. It is thus important to balance out the biases o f  Orm ond’ s papers by actively 
cross-exam ining them using other relevant primary sources, firstly and most notably 
the State Papers o f  all three kingdoms. Secondly, the papers o f  politicians and 
eminent figures, especially those who were not in regular correspondence with 
Ormond or outside his networks o f  supporters and allies such as R oger B oyle, earl o f  
Orrery, Anthony A shley Cooper, earl o f  Shaftesbury, Arthur Capel, earl o f  Essex, Sir
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John Reresby, Henry Sidney, Gilbert Burnet, George Savile, earl o f  H alifax, and 
others. In light o f  the explosion o f  printed material post 1679, the third important 
body o f  sources for this thesis is the contemporary published material and pamphlet 
literature including libellous articles and pamphlets concerning Ormond, testimonies 
o f  witnesses to the various plots and other contemporary w orks in w hich Orm ond’ s 
proceedings at that time or the 1640s were questioned such as Edmund B orlase’ s 
H istory o f  the execrable Irish R ebe llion 34
The vast majority o f  the source material for this thesis is to be found in the 
National Library o f  Ireland, Dublin, w hich contains Orm ond’ s ow n papers previously 
stored in K ilkenny Castle and the Carte papers, held in the Bodleian Library, Oxford. 
This repository also contains a large quantity o f  printed books and pamphlets from  the 
late Restoration .35 It has been suggested by Harold M . W eber that the E xclusion 
Crisis and the Popish Plot cannot be understood without reference to the printed word 
and the culture o f  print, w hich by this stage was inextricably linked to politics and 
history. The expansion o f  the political nation w as therefore accom panied by the 
inauguration o f  public opinion as a decisive arbitrator. M ost o f  the material produced 
and reprinted in Ireland w as in effect government propaganda though Orm ond’ s 
authority was also undermined by numerous seditious w orks such as Ire lan d ’s sa d  
lamentation  and the w res tlin g ’s o f  the K irk  o f  Scotland fo r  the kingdom o f  Christ,
•j/
surreptitiously acquired from England, Scotland and Holland. These pamphlets 
therefore remain a valuable but not unbiased source.
33 Onnond to Arran, 7 Mar. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 128-9.
34 Edmund Borlase, I„e history o f  execrable Irish rebellion trac ’dfrom  many preceding acts, to the 
g ra n d  eruption the 23. o f  October, 1641. thence pursued to the Act o f  Settlement, MDCLXII (London, 
1679).
35 Harold M. Webb, Paper bullets: print and kingship under Charles II (Kentucky, 1996), pp 4-5.
36 Toby Barnard, The kingdom o f Ireland, 1641-1760 (New York, 2004), p. 68; Anon, Ireland's sad 
lamentation: some remarkable passages, which have happened since the discovery o f the horrid popish 
plot. In a letter from a person o f honour to his friend in London, upon the dissolution o f the late 
parliament (London, 1681); Sir Janies Stewart, Naptali, or, the wrestlings o f the Church o f Scotland for
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In conclusion, this thesis endeavours to enhance and deepen our know ledge o f  
the role and position o f  the Irish government within the com posite Stuart m onarchy 
during the period 1677-82 by exam ining how  a series o f  Catholic and Presbyterian 
plots exposed the tensions inherent in this relationship.
This thesis consists o f  five  chapters. The first is entitled Ormond and the 
origins of the Popish Plot, 1678-9. It exam ines Orm ond’ s position during the 
opening months o f  the Popish Plot from Titus O ates’ s revelations in Septem ber 1678 
to Decem ber 1678 when the general b e lie f in the plot subsided after Oates and other 
informers were discredited. The importance o f  this intense period o f  anti-Catholicism  
and hysteria is that it accentuated Orm ond’ s precarious position and highlighted his 
vulnerability in regard to Catholicism . It shattered his new ly restored detente w ith the 
new  Protestant interest, in particular their leading spokesman, and his old adversary, 
Orrery, who genuinely believed that Ormond w as negligent in his duties during a 
period o f  crisis when both the established order and the established religion w ere 
under threat. Therefore Ormond w as forced to defend and renew his position against 
his enemies in Ireland and England. He attempted to do this by demonstrating to 
Protestants in Ireland and eminent figures in a London that his security measures had 
properly safeguarded the Protestant interest w hilst on the other hand convincing them 
that Orrery’ s zeal w as m isplaced and in fact, detrimental to the Protestant interest.
The second chapter The realignment of the Stuart polity, 1679 w ill 
demonstrate the inherent weaknesses in Orm ond’ s position as lord lieutenant o f  
Ireland because o f  political events in London and Scotland in 1679. The most 
significant o f  these w ere the fall o f  Charles II’ s ch ie f minister, Thomas Osbourne, earl
the kingdom o f  Christ contained in a true and short deduction thereof, from the beginning o f the 
reformation o f  religion, until the year 1667: together with the last speeches and testimonies o f  some 
who have died fo r the truth since the year 1660. Whereunto are also subjoined a relation o f  the
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o f  Danby, as w ell as the partial resolution o f  political and religious strife in Scotland 
after the battle o f  B othw ell Brig, 22 June 1679, and finally the sharpening o f  the 
Exclusion crisis when James, duke o f  Y ork, returned to London in Septem ber 1679. 
A gain  Orm ond’ s alleged partiality to Catholicism  w as a m ajor issue. M oreover the 
crown on w hich he depended for support was in a very awkward position after the fall 
o f  its most powerful minister. Charles attempted to alleviate his position by bringing 
leading members o f  the opposition into government. A lm ost to a man these w ere 
Orm ond’ s bitterest enemies. W hilst detailing the various m echanisms and strategies 
adopted by Ormond and his allies in an attempt to secure his position, these w ere only 
partly effective and the re-establishment o f  his position in autumn 1679 actually 
resulted from the contrivance o f  political events over w hich he had no control.
The third chapter Oliver Plunkett and the Irish plot, 1679-80 exam ines 
Orm ond’ s position during a series o f  crises ending in M ay 1680, w ith the failure o f  
his enemies at court to sufficiently persuade the English Board that Orm ond had 
suppressed evidence in relation to a Catholic conspiracy hatched b y  O liver Plunkett, 
archbishop o f  Arm agh. These crises w ere a direct result o f  the breakdown in the 
relationship between the crown and the opposition. Therefore the W higs were 
com pelled to use ^ con stitution al means to reassert their position. A  key component 
o f  their desperate strategy w as to foster intense anti-Catholic hysteria by fabricating 
an Irish Catholic plot to introduce the French into Ireland and England.
The fourth chapter The Irish plot and parliamentary politics, 1680-81 
reveals how  Orm ond’ s position vis-à-vis the Irish and English political nations was 
distorted when the prosecution o f  the Irish plot, previously hatched b y  his enem ies in 
England, w as taken out o f  his hands and transferred to London, where parliament at
sufferings and death o f  Mr. Hew. McKail and some instances o f  the sufferings o f  Gallowy and 
Nithisdale (1693).
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that time w as convening. These proceedings w ere a terrible b low  for him , as it added 
credence to previous accusations that he could not be trusted to prosecute Catholics. 
Even more m enacingly, English political attention at this time w as fixated upon the 
dangers associated w ith Catholicism  and the exclusion o f  his key ally, James, duke o f  
Y ork  from the throne.
The fifth  and final chapter is titled, Royalist resurgence and reaction, 
1681-2. The dissolution o f  the final E xclusion parliament in M arch 1681 resulted in 
an improvement in Orm ond’ s fortunes in relation to the Popish Plot. In the light o f  
this Ormond avoided all contentious issues. He made no attempt to ascertain O liver 
Plunkett’s innocence and failed to reply to libellous allegations made by Arthur 
Annesley, earl o f  Anglesey, lest they resuscitate the dying plot or bring him  once 
more into the political spotlight. In the long term, this w as prudent, for Plunkett’ s 
death brought the Popish Plot to a close because Charles II had made it clear in the 
case o f  another Irishman, Edward Fitzharris, that there w ould be no more pardons for 
treason or concealing treason. U ltim ately denied access to parliament, w hich  w as their 
main instrument o f  w ielding pow er and bringing about the political change they 
desired, and w eeded out o f  their municipal strongholds by royal prerogative and the 
strict enforcem ent o f  law s against Protestant non-conformists, the W higs disintegrated 
as a political force. A m idst this atmosphere, Ormond finally reasserted his control 
over those who had circum vented his position and powers as lord lieutenant in concert 
w ith his enemies in London.
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CHAPTER ONE
ORMOND AND THE ORIGIN OF THE POPISH PLOT,
1678-79
18
In 1677, James Butler, first duke o f  Ormond arrived in Ireland to take up the 
duties o f  the viceroyalty for the third and final time in his career. He cam e w ith a 
resolution to summon a parliament at the earliest possible moment. It had been eleven 
years since the dissolution o f  the only Irish parliament called in the reign o f  Charles 
II, assembled during Orm ond’ s previous tenure o f  office. In securing a meeting o f  the 
Irish legislature, Ormond had clear m otives, o f  w hich the m ost important w as the 
acquisition o f  increased revenue. This w ould allow  him to im prove the lamentable 
military infrastructure o f  the Irish kingdom . 1 The Restoration government established 
in the kingdom  o f  Ireland had been built on unstable foundations. Its various 
settlements both ‘religious and land’ had failed to com e to grips w ith the political, 
religious and social transformations that occurred in Ireland throughout the 
seventeenth century. There w as resentment towards it from m any quarters, 
particularly the Presbyterian Ulster Scots, some G aelic Irish and Republican remnants 
from the previous Crom w ellian regim e .2 On occasions this m anifested itse lf in 
resistance and attempts to subvert the Restoration regime, such as ‘B lo o d ’ s P lot’ o f  
1663, the growth in banditry and the ramblings o f  discontented Scottish Presbyterian 
ministers. In this period, according to Sir W illiam  Petty, 100,000 out o f  the 
contemporary population o f  1 , 1 0 0 , 0 0 0  belonged to the established church and were 
intimately linked to the political order. A s  such the Irish government throughout the
# a
Restoration depended on the maintenance o f  a large standing army.
This army came at a cost and the military lists throughout the Restoration 
accounted for the greater part o f  the establishment, in 1666 for instance it amounted
1 J. E., Aydelotte,’ The duke o f  Ormond and the English government o f  Ireland, 1677-85’ (unpublished 
Ph.D dissertation, University o f  Iowa, 1975), p. 30.
2 S. J. Connolly, Religion, law and power: the making o f Protestant Ireland, 1660-1760 (Oxford,
1992), pp 24-33.
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to £160,000 out o f  a total expenditure o f  nearly £190,000.4 The Irish governm ent 
struggled to meet such payments and on several occasions, the years 1662 and 1666 
being among them, substantial aid was required from London .5 This state o f  affairs 
worsened in the 1670s as the Irish revenues were subjected to serious abuses. The 
major cause o f  this shortfall w as the defalcations o f  Richard Jones, Lord Ranelagh, 
and his undertakers o f  the farm o f  the Irish revenue and their failure to m eet Irish 
establishment paym ents.6 It w as not long before complaints emanated from  all 
quarters o f  Irish life especially the army, as Ranelagh attempted to m eet arrears ow ed 
to the army b y  not paying them for long periods and then forcing its soldiers to accept 
lump sums far smaller than what they w ere ow ed .7 The lord lieutenant at this period, 
Arthur Capel, earl o f  Essex, w as unable to bring Ranelagh to account because o f  his 
pow erful allies at court, most notably the English lord treasurer, Thom as Osbourne, 
earl o f  D anby .8 Essex was acutely aware o f  the political realties o f  Restoration 
Ireland and once stated that ‘ an unpaid army w as like tinder. ’ 9 On 18 June 1676 he 
warned Henry Coventry, senior Secretary o f  State in the English P rivy C ouncil, that 
unless Ranelagh’ s actions were more closely  scrutinised, ‘til some tim e in the 
beginning o f  September next I do not see that I shall have the command o f  five
3 Sir William Petty, The political anatomy o f  Ireland, with the establishment fo r  that kingdom when the 
late duke o f  Ormonde was lord lieutenant (London, 1691), pp 7-9; this figure was a w ild overestimate, 
but it does reveal the embattled state o f  mind o f  Irish Protestants.
4J.G. Simms, ‘The Restoration 1660-85’ in T.W. Moody, F.X. Martin and F.J. Byrne (ed.), A new 
history o f  Ireland, Hi, early modern Ireland 1534-1691 (Oxford, 1976), iii, p. 440.
5 Ibid., pp 397-401.
6 C. I. McGrath, ‘Richard Jones, earl o f  Ranelagh (1641-1712),’ in H. C. G. Matthew and Brian 
Harrison (ed.), Oxford dictionary o f  national biography (60 vols, Oxford, 2004), xxx, pp 606-8; 
Ranelagh and his eight partners, or undertakers were responsible for the management o f  all Irish 
expenditure from June 1670 to December 1675.
7 Ronald Hutton, ‘The triple-crowned Islands’, in Lionel K. J. Glassey (ed.), The reigns o f  Charles II 
and James VII and II (London, 1997), p. 81.
8David Dickson, New foundations; Ireland 1660-1800 (2nd edn, Dublin, 2000), p. 16; Ronald Hutton, 
Charles the Second, king o f  England, Scotland and Ireland (Oxford, 1989), p. 339.
9 Richard Bagwell, Ireland under the Stuarts and during the interregnum (3 vols, London, 1909-16), 
iii, p. 120.
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government to that o f  the lords justices in 1641, who w ould have been able to nip the
1641 rebellion in the bud with just £ 1 0 , 0 0 0  but the exchequer w as empty, they had no
credit ‘ and the insurrections in several parts made everyone w ho had m oney look to
h im self and none could be found to lend to the public ’ . 11 Orm ond deemed the
resolution o f  this state o f  affairs as paramount to the security and maintenance o f  the
Protestant interest in Ireland. A  proper military infrastructure w ould effectively  deter
• 12and suppress all internal insurrection and external threats to the established order.
Ormond also wished to introduce legislation that w ould elicit the Irish 
parliament’ s support for such m oney b ills . 13 In these additional measurers, he also 
saw solutions to problems that had plagued the Irish kingdom  throughout the 
seventeenth centuiy, most notably those involving land, religion, finance and 
constitutional issues . 14 In relation to the first problem, the land settlement o f  the 
country, as defined by the A cts o f  Settlement (1663) and Explanation (1665), w as 
deeply contentious. It w as felt by many to be incomplete as there w as m uch property 
without clear title and liable to be seized by land projectors or discoverers o f  old titles 
under one pretext or another. To paraphrase Essex, the lands o f  Ireland had been a 
mere scramble, as they were the least done by w ay o f  orderly distribution, which 
consequently made many men uneasy in their estates and possessions w ith  the result 
that many w ere afraid to lay out money on improvements w hile potential settlers
hundred pounds of the public moneys’.10 He likened the condition o f the Irish
10 Earl o f  Essex to Mr Secretary Coventry, 18 Jun. 1676, in C. E. Pike (ed.), S elec tion s  fr o m  the  
co rr esp o n d en c e  o f  the e a r l  o f  Essex, 1675 -7  (London, 1913), pp 56-8.
11 Ibid., pp 56-8; Edmund Borlace, The h istory  o f  the e x e c ra b le  Ir ish  r e b e ll io n  t r a c ’d  fr o m  m any  
p r e c e d in g  acts, to the g ra n d  eruption  the 23. o f  O ctober, 1641. th en ce p u r s u e d  to  th e  A ct o f  Settlem ent, 
MDCLX11 (London, 1680), p. 27; H utton , ‘The triple-crowned Islands’, p. 83.
12 Aydelotte,’ The duke o f  Ormond and the English government o f  Ireland, 1677-85’, p. 17; p. 30
13 Ibid., p 31.
14 J.C. Beckett, T he m akin g  o f  m odern  Irelan d , 1603-1923  (London, 1966), p 127.
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from England we^c frightened aw ay . 15 In 1678, Ormond prepared a bill to end this 
state o f  affairs. He anticipated that it w ould result in a clear undisputed title to every 
acre o f  land, thus ending years o f  schem ing and instability. This w ould greatly 
encourage the improvement o f  land and the immigration o f  Protestants from  England 
which w ould have the effect o f  stimulating an increase in trade and w ith it, the 
revenue o f  the Irish government. It w as further envisioned that religious and political 
tensions resulting from before the Restoration would be eased by the introduction o f  a 
B ill o f  O blivion by which m alicious prosecution w ould be prevented for offences o f  
very old dates . 16
The issue o f  finance w as connected to greater constitutional issues. Throughout 
the Restoration, the English governm ent and parliament saw  it in their interests to 
legislate and interfere to a greater level in Irish affairs. The Irish governm ent hotly 
contested the imposition o f  laws such as the N avigation A cts and the 1667 Cattle 
A c t . 17 Their grievances were further aggravated throughout the 1670s as R anelagh’ s 
undertaking was accompanied by the increased interference o f  the English crown and 
treasury in Irish revenues . 18 Ormond and others in the Irish kingdom , like M ichael 
Boyle, archbishop o f  Arm agh and lord chancellor o f  Ireland, observed in these 
developm ents the prerogatives o f  the Irish government being subtly transferred to
15 Earl ot'Essex to William Harbord, 28 March. 1674, in Osmund Airy (ed.), E ssex  p a p ers , 1672-9  
(London, 1890), pp 56-8; Connolly, R elig ion , law  a n d  P ow er; T he m akin g  o f  P rotestan t Irelan d , 1660- 
1760, pp 12-7; Contained in Bagwell, Ir e la n d  under th e  Stuarts a n d  during th e  interregnum  (3 vols, 
London, 1909-16), iii, p. 126.
15 Ibid, p. 126.
,7 L.M. Cullen, ‘Economic trends, 1660-91 ’in Moody, Martin and Byrne (ed .) ,/l new  h istory  o f  
Ireland, iii, pp 397-401; S. J. Connolly (ed), T he O x ford  com pan ion  to  Ir ish  h istory  (2 ,ul edn, 2004), p. 
403: Raymond G illesr>:e, ‘Political ideas and their social contexts in seventeenth-century Ireland’, in 
Jane H. Ohlmeyer (ed.). K in gdom  o r  co lon y ; p o l it ic a l  thou ght in sev en teen th  century Ir e la n d  
(Cambridge, 2000), p. 111.
18 Sean Egan, ‘Finance and the government o f  Ireland, 1660-85’ (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, 
University o f  Dublin. 1983), introduction.
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London . 19 Ormond thus sought to bring control o f  the revenues o f  the Irish kingdom  
back to its government. Upon his return he started negotiating for a royal declaration,
• 90
that all revenue voted by the Dublin parliament w ould be spent in Ireland. In return 
for these measures, Charles II could expect tw o revenue bills from the Irish 
parliament. The first comprised subsidies o f  thirty thousand pounds for four years, 
w hilst the second w ould increase his ‘ constant revenue’ by thirty-seven thousand 
pounds annually .21 They were included within a package o f  eighteen bills Ormond 
sent to the English Privy Council in late July 1678.22 The fate o f  Orm ond’ s 
parliamentary ambitions now  lay at Westminster.
Orm ond w as extrem ely optim istic, envisaging the return o f  the approved bills 
by mid-September, the assem bling o f  the Irish parliament at the start o f  N ovem ber 
and the passage o f  as many bills as possible, especially the Revenue bills before 
Christmas 1678.23 He had good reason to be optim istic, as he lacked neither 
representation nor support in London. A m ong his forem ost representatives was his 
eldest son, Thomas Butler, earl o f  Ossory, an influential figure at court w ith 
connections within the m ilitary where he held various commands and in English high 
political circles because he had been a member o f  the House o f  Lords since the 
1660s 24 H is influence also extended to the continent where he maintained friendly
19 For information on Michael Boyle, lord chancellor o f  Ireland and Church o f  Ireland archbishop o f  
Armagh, see Toby Barnard, ‘Michael Boyle (1609-1702)’ in Matthew and Harrison (ed.), Oxford 
D.N.B., vii, pp 86-7.
20Aydelotte, ‘The duke o f  Ormond and the English government in Ireland, 1677-85’, p. 32.
21 Ibid., pp 60-1.
22 Ibid., pp 63-79; for a complete analysis o f  all eighteen bills see these pages in Aydelotte’s thesis.
23 Ormond to earl o f  Danby, 5 Aug. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, p. 175; Aydelotte, ‘The duke o f  Ormond 
and the English government in Ireland, 1677-85’, pp 79-80.
24 J. D. Davies, ‘Thomas Butler, sixth earl o f  Ossory (1634-1680)’ in Matthew and Harrison (ed.), 
OxfordD.N.B., ix, pp 226-9; Ossory was MP for Bristol from 1661 to 1666, in 1660, he became a 
member o f  the Irish Privy Council and was called to the Irish House o f  Lords two years later. In 1666, 
he became a gentleman o f the bedchamber to the king, an English Privy Councillor and was called to 
the English House o f  Lords in September o f  that year. In September 1672, Ossory was made a knight 
o f  the Garter and in 1 u 16, he was appointed lord chamberlain to queen.
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correspondence with W illiam  o f  Orange, the champion o f  European Protestantism .25 
Finally as a gentleman o f  the bedchamber to Charles II, he made it a certainty that a
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Butler w ould always be at the k in g ’ s ear. Ormond w as also assured o f  the support o f  
Henry Coventry, ..ho as the senior Secretary o f  State and a member o f  the English 
Privy Council, dealt with all official business relating to the Irish kingdom  in London. 
The clerk o f  the Privy Council w as his close friend and confident Sir Robert
97
Southw ell, an important and influential figure in the English House o f  Com m ons. 
There he w as joined by several others, nam ely Sir C yril W yche, w ho had previously 
acted as one o f  E ssex ’s private secretaries in London, and Francis Aungier, earl o f  
Longford, a prominent figure at the English court who had recently married the 
w idow  o f  Orm ond’ s son, John Butler, earl o f  G ow ran .28 Finally, Ormond did not lack 
support from  other political figures o f  Stuart England such as the heir to the English 
throne James, duke o f  Y ork , and Henry Bennett, earl o f  Arlington and Lord 
Cham berlain o f  England.
The bills how ever w ere subjected to fierce attacks from  the outset. There w as a 
general disappointment over the revenue bills; Charles II had envisaged that his 
‘ constant revenue’ would arrive at £60,000 rather than £37,000. He also showed a
25 J. C. Beckett, T he c a v a lie r  du ke: a  l i fe  o f  J a m e s  B utler, 1st du ke o f  O rm on d  (Belfast, 1990), p. 96; 
Toby Barnard, ‘The dukes o f  Ormonde’ in Toby Barnard and Jane Fenlon (ed.), T he du kes  o f  
O rm onde, 1 6 10 -1745  (London, 2000), p. 15; Bodleian Library, Oxford, Carte Manuscript (hereafter 
referred to in footnotes as Bodl. Carte M S) 40, f  (This refers to the page number in manuscripts) 543; 
Bodl., Carte MS 70, f. 423; Arthur Hassall, ‘The foreign policy o f  Louis XIV (1661-97)’ in A . W. 
Ward, G. W. Prothero and Stanley Leathers (ed.), T he C am brid g e  m odern  history, v, the a g e  o f  L ou is  
X IV  (Cambridge, 1905), p. 45; Ossory had just recently returned from the Spanish Netherlands where 
according to letters from many including the king o f  Spain and the Marquis o f  Grana he had done 
wonders at the action o f  Mons under William o f Orange against a French army led by Francois Henri 
de Montmorency-Bouteville, duke de Luxembourge.
26 Hutton, C h ar le s  the S econd , k in g  o f  E ngland, S co tlan d  a n d  Ir e lan d , p. 238.
27 Toby Barnard, ‘Sir Robert Southwell (1635-1702)’, in Matthew and Harrison (ed.), O xfordD .N .B ., 
li, pp 718-22. Southwell was a staunch supporter o f  Ormond in Munster during the 1640s. In 1664 he 
bought the post o f  Clerk to the English Privy o ff Ormond’s secretary Sir George Lane. Between 1672 
and 1679 he sat in the English House o f  Commons as MP for Penryn in Cornwall.
28 Sir Cyril Wyche to Ormond, 26 Oct. 1678, O rm on de MSS, iv, pp 221-2; Toby Barnard, ‘Francis 
Aungier, first earl o f  Longford (c. 1632-1700)’ in Matthew and Harrison (ed.), O xford  D.N.B., ii, pp
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natural lack o f  interest in a schem e to produce m oney that he w as not supposed to 
touch .29 Ranelagh was heavily involved in such m anoeuvres because an Irish
O A
parliament w ould certainly attempt to bring him to book for his defalcations. James 
Shaen and the present farmers o f  the Irish revenues were likew ise involved in similar 
intrigues, as they feared an Irish parliament w ould increase excise taxes and so reduce 
trade to the detriment o f  their incom es .31 Longford inform ed Orm ond o f  this:
I am told from a very good hand that one o f  the Council who is always 
busy in all affairs o f  Ireland (and therefore your grace can safely guess at 
him) says that in the bill for granting the addition to the revenue his 
majesty will lose more than he will get by It, by having his prerogative 
clipped and debarred o f  those advantages he now has to make in his 
revenue [ .. .]  I have not heard any particulars mentioned, and I have some 
reason to believe Sir James Shaen is the formentor o f  this malicious 
notion.32
The bill for the confirm ation o f  estates attracted the greatest swarm o f  critics. It 
w as denounced as too favourable to Catholics by several contem porary Irish figures 
w ith powerful connections in London. The most significant o f  these w as R oger B oyle, 
earl o f  Orrery, who stood to lose eight thousand acres under the terms o f  the proposed 
land b ill .33 His status and possessions in the south o f  Ireland enabled him to exercise 
pow er and influence in W hitehall, where he was represented among others by his 
brother Richard B oyle, earl o f  Burlington, and on occasions by his nephew 
Ranelagh .34 Ormond later accused Orrery o f  showing little interest in utilising his
954-5. Aungier was MP for Surrey from 1661 to 1679 and between 1670 and 1675; he was the vice­
treasurer o f  Ireland.
29 Earl o f  Longford to Ormond, 24 Aug 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 187-9.
30 Dickson, New foundations; Ireland 1660-1800, pp 16-7.
31 C. I. McGrath, ‘Sir James Shaen, first baronet (d. 1695)’ in Matthew and Harrison (ed.), Oxford 
D.N.B., xlix, pp 925-6; Shaen was a former Cromwellian who as Sheriff o f  Longford and Westmeath 
played a key role in the transplantation o f  Catholics to Connaught. In 1661 he was elected MP for 
Clonmel and later served in various government positions such as secretary to the lords justices in 
1661. In 1675, the second farm o fth e  Irish revenue was granted to Shaen and ten other partners till 
1682.
32 Earl o f  Longford to Ormond, 5 Oct 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, p. 209.
33 Ormond to earl o f  Burlington, 21 Dec. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 286-8; Toby Barnard, ‘Roger 
Boyle, first earl o f  Orrery (1621-1679)’ in Mathew and Harrison (ed.), Oxford D.N.B., vii, pp 109-113.
34 Toby Barnard, ‘Richard Boyle, first earl o f  Burlington and second earl o f  Cork (1612-1698)’ in 
Matthew and Harrison (ed.), Oxford D.N.B.. vii, pp 92-3; Ranelagh was a son o f  Orrery’s sister 
Katherine; see Sarah Hutton, ‘Katherine Jones [née Boyle], Viscountess Ranelagh (1615-1691)’ in
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connections to circles o f  pow er in London in order to try and ‘ mend the bill to his ow n 
mind and profit’ ; instead he sent and had numerous letters dispersed among courtiers 
and parliament men who were not members o f  the English Privy C ou n cil.35 This 
inevitably ruptured the fragile friendship, w hich had been resumed between the tw o 
upon Orm ond’ s arrival in Ireland in 1677. The reason for this w as the content o f  
Orrery’ s letters, w hich insinuated that ‘the great partiality o f  the bill in favour o f  the 
Irish’ w ould bring about the destruction o f  the Restoration land settlement that was 
fundamentally tied to the English and Protestant interest in Ireland. Several eminent 
politicians in England w ith Irish connections also came out in opposition. For 
instance, Arthur Annesley, earl o f  Anglesey, Orm ond’ s former colleague in 
government during the 1660s and the English lord privy seal at that time. A n glesey 
w as joined by Edward V iscount Conw ay, a brother in law  o f  the English lord 
chancellor, Heneage Finch, who had been charged w ith the exam ination o f  the land 
settlement b ill .37 Finch and other members o f  the Privy Council w ere not immune to 
such pressure as Southw ell’ s letter on 3 September intimates, that ‘ w h ereof m y lord 
chancellor [...]  seemed to approve o f  it indifferent w ell [...]  he took occasion to tell
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me he had been thinking again .. .and did find several matters to be objected against’ .
The arguments, conducted by post between D ublin and London, wasted 
valuable time until the English parliament w as due to meet on 21 October 1678. This 
w as problem atic for Ormond because Charles II w as reluctant to a llow  two 
parliaments to sit simultaneously for the specific reason that they w ould encourage
Mathew and Harrison (ed.), OxfordD.N.B., xxx, pp 574-6. Katherine Jones was also associated with 
the Hartlib circle.
35 Ormond to earl o f  Burlington, 21 Dec. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 286-8.
36 Ibid., pp 286-8.
37 Aydelotte, ‘The duke o f  Ormond and the English government in Ireland, 1677-85’, p. 83.
’8 Sir Robert Southwell to Ormond, 3 Sep. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 449-51.
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each others malcontents .39 B y  the end o f  September Orm ond’ s parliamentary 
ambitions had been dented but not destroyed. He tried to tackle the opposition by 
jettisoning his control over the drafting o f  any land bill and prom ising the Irish 
Com m ons a free vote; they could reject it or send it back to England accom panied 
with their alterations, w hilst Ormond got his M ajesty’ s supplies passed .40 Secondly, 
he tried to persuade many at W hitehall that both parliaments could sit 
simultaneously, stating to Danby on 27 September,
I do not presume to judge the inconveniency o f  a parliament sitting in 
England and here at the same time, yet I should think that in the five or 
six w ew S which must pass before a parliament can meet here, the 
parliament there will have done much o f  the business or will be in a quiet 
way o f doing it, or there will be a recess; in either case the parliament 
here may sit or be separated without, ! hope, any worse consequences 
than will follow  the having o f  none."
Orm ond’ s plans how ever were to com e to nothing, when on 28 Septem ber 
1678, Titus Oates and Israel Tongue appeared before the English P rivy Council. 
Oates supplied a fantastic tale o f  a Catholic plot, contrived and hatched by the 
Jesuits, Benedictines, and several prominent English Catholic politicians w ith the 
support o f  the French king Louis X IV  and Pope Innocent XI. The purpose o f  this plot 
was to re-establish the Roman Catholic religion by the sword, and towards w hich the 
plotters were resolved to w ipe out the house o f  Stuart, ‘ root and branch’ along with 
the champion o f  European Protestantism, W illiam , prince o f  Orange. The plotters 
had various agents and instruments with w hich to effect these changes, four unknow n 
Irish ruffians who had travelled to W indsor to assassinate Charles II, designated 
poisoners at court such as Edward Colem an, a former secretary to James, duke o f  
Y ork, and Sir George W akeman, Queen Catherine’ s physician, and finally over 2000
39 Hutton, Charles the Second, king o f  England, Scotland, and Ireland, p. 358.
40 Aydelotte, ‘The duke o f  Ormond and the English government o f  Ireland, 1677-85’, p. 94;
4lOrmond to earl o f  Danby, 27 Sep. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 204-6
Aydelotte, ‘The duke o f  Ormond and the English government o f  Ireland, 1677-85’, pp 94-5; Ormond 
to Earl o f  Danby, 27 Sep. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 204-6.
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trained men in the vicinity o f  London waiting to massacre its Protestants.42 From 
London, a confused Coventry wrote to Ormond after having listened to O ates’ s 
discoveries for four days in Council,
If he be a liar, he is the greatest and the adroitest I ever saw, and yet it is a 
stupendous thing to think what vast concerns are like to depend upon the 
evidence o f  one young man who hath twice changed his religion-if he 
now be a Protestant.43
The existence o f  a Catholic plot becam e apparent during the follow ing w eeks after 
the mysterious death o f  Sir Edmund Berry Godfrey, the magistrate to w hom  Oates 
and Tongue had swore to the truth o f  their information. W hat further fanned the 
flames o f  anti-Catholicism  was the discovery o f  letters written to Louis X I V ’ s 
confessor, Pére la Chaise, by Edward Colem an. The poison o f  these letters w as the 
numerous references they contained to the possibility o f  a Catholic restoration in 
England .44
A nti-Catholicism  cam e to play an increasingly important part in English 
politics throughout the 1670s, because its ‘restless spirit’ w as seen to have corrupted 
the monarchy again as it had in the 1630s.45 The court o f  Charles II w as seen to be 
under the domination o f  Catholic and crypto-Catholic courtiers such as the heir 
presumptive to the crown James, duke o f  Y ork, as w ell as the earl o f  Arlington and 
Lord Thomas Clifford. Charles II h im self did not escape the suspicion o f  the political 
nation in the light o f  his Catholic and pro-French leanings w hich were clear for all to
42 A brief account o f  the conspiracy to place the Duke o f  York on the throne, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 
181-4; John Kenyon, The Popish Plot (London, 1972), pp 97-100; Alan Marshall, The strange death o f  
Edmund Godfrey: plots and politics in Restoration London (Stroud, 1999), p. 45; pp 82-4; Titus Oates, 
The discovery o f  the popish plot, being the several examinations o f  Titus Oates [ . . . ]  before the high 
court ofparliament, the lord chief justice, Sir Edmund-Bury Godfrey, and several other o f  his 
majesty's justices o f  the peace  (London, 1679).
43 Henry Coventry to Ormond, 1 Oct. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, p. 207; Bodl., Carte Ms 81, f. 362-3.
44 A. S. Turberville, Commonwealth and Restoration (London, 1928), pp 133-7; John Miller, James II 
(Yale, 2000), pp 87-9; Marshall, The strange death o f  Edmund Godfrey: plots and politics in 
Restoration London, pp 114-5; J. R. Jones, Country and court, England 1658-1714 (London, 1978), pp 
201 - 2 .
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see in the Treaty o f  D over 1668-70 46 These fears were exacerbated by the illicit 
works o f  Andrew  M arvell and other subversive writers. In 1677, M arvell alleged that 
there w as a design in progress ‘ to change the law ful governm ent o f  England into an 
absolute tyranny, .nd to convert the established Protestant religion into downright 
popery ’ .47 These words were reinforced by occurrences in France, where its Catholic 
king, Louis X IV , had grown into an absolutist monarch, and as trickles o f  Huguenot 
refugees arrived in Ireland and England, it becam e apparent h ow  such rulers regarded 
Protestantism. The corruption o f  the Stuart polity by Catholicism  w as therefore 
equated w ith the destruction o f  laws and liberties, parliaments and Protestantism.
The design o f  O ates’ s plot or ‘ The Popish P lot’ as it becam e know n also 
extended to Ireland. Ormond w as to be murdered through the contrivance o f  the 
titular archbishop o f  Dublin, Peter Talbot, and four Jesuits and the Protestants 
massacred like in 1641, w ith the kingdom  being taken charge o f  by a papal nuncio 
assisted by Louis X IV  49 A t this juncture, it cannot be overem phasised enough how  
ever-present in the contemporary English psyche w as the fear o f  events emanating 
out o f  the Irish kingdom , as the follow ing extract testifies:
If we take a view o f  popery in its true scarlet dye, and know what horrible 
murders, prodigious cruelties, barbarous villainies, and inhumane 
practices the Jesuits and friars are the authors and encouragers, and 
papists in general the actors of, w e need not look any further back than 
the present age: In the rebellion o f  Ireland wherein there were in all above 
three hundred thousand innocent Protestants destroyed, and this in a base 
treache’-'ms manner, without any provocation; no age, sex, or quality 
being privileged from massacres and lingering deaths [ .. .]  A ll o f  which
45Barry Coward, T he Stuart age, E n g lan d  1603 -1714  (3rd edition, London, 2003), pp 315-7; John 
Kenyon, T he P o p ish  P lo t  (London, 1972), pp 9-18; John Milton, N ew s fr o m  hell, R om e, a n d  th e Inns  
o f  C ourt... (London, 1642).
46 Ronald Hutton, ‘The making o f  the secret treaty o f  Dover 1668-70’, Hist. Jn , xxix (1986), pp 297- 
318; Richard L. Greaves, S ecrets  o f  the kin gdom : B ritish  r a d ic a ls  fr o m  th e p o p is h  p lo t  to  the  
revolu tion  (Stanford, 1992), prologue.
47 Tim Harris, P olitic s  u n der th e  la ter  Stuarts; p arty  con flic t in a  d iv id ed  society , 1660-1715  (Harlow,
1993), pp 54-5; Andrew Marvell, An accou n t o f  th e  g row th  o fp o p e iy  a n d  a rb itra ry  govern m en t in 
E n g lan d  (London, 1677), p. 3; Jones, C ountry a n d  court, E n g lan d  1 6 5 8 -1714 , pp 199-201.
IK Coward, T he Stuart ag e , 1603-1714 , p. 316
49 Bod!., Carte Ms 81, ff. 362-3; Bagwell. Ir e la n d  un der the Stuarts a n d  during the Interregnum , iii, p. 
127.
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being acted within these 40 Years, I hope is not yet, nor ever will be 
forgot.50
The 1641 rebellion w as significant in precipitating the English C iv il W ar and all its 
accom panying destruction. Tied to this w as the traditional fear that England’ s 
continental Catholic enemies w ould attempt to utilise Ireland as the backdoor 
through w hich to introduce Catholicism  in England. The plot resurrected such fears 
and occasioned popular panic and hysteria through Britain w ith one new s writer from 
Leeds alleging ‘ that Spaniards are landed in Ireland and 5,000 o f  them got over to 
W ales ’ .51
The news o f  this Catholic conspiracy quickly reached Ireland. B y  3 October 
1678, it w as w id ely  know n o f  throughout D ublin city, as newsletters from  England 
had been publicly read in its post house. Ormond had entrusted M ichael B oyle  with 
the care o f  the city upon his departure to K ilkenny the previous August. B o yle  was 
immediately concerned by these reports believing them to be but a continuance o f  the 
same design, w hich had been discovered some years previously by Friar French 
against the titular archbishop o f  Tuam, John Burke. He thus took it upon h im self to 
issue orders to Sir Stanley Fielding, an officer o f  the Irish army, ‘to have a care o f  his
53guards, and to direct a com m ission officer to be still upon some duty’ .
Ormond received his first intimation o f  the plot on 3 October ju st after he 
returned from a progress made into Munster to v ie w  its fortified places specifically  
the new  fort under construction for the defence o f  Kinsale harbour.54 H e originally
50 Anonymous, A b r i e f  n arrativ e  o f  the s e v e ra l p o p is h  tr ea son s  a n d  cru elties  ag a in st th e  P rotestan ts  in 
E ngland, F ran ce , a n d  I r e la n d  g iv ing  a  fu l l  a ccou n t o f  th e  p o p is h  p lot, a n d  a  fu l l  d iscov ery  o f  the  
m anner o f  the m u rder o f  S ir E dm und-bury G od frey  (London, 1678), pp 4-5.
51 Henry Layton to Williamson, 9 Dec. 1678, Cal. S. P. dom , 1678, pp 562-4; Antonia Fraser, K in g  
C h arles  I I  {London, 1979), pp. 372.
52 Michael Boyle to Ormond, 3 Oct. 1678, O rm onde MSS, iv, pp 207-9
53 Michael Boyle to Ormond, 6 Oct. 1678, O rm onde MSS, iv, p. 210; Michael Boyle to Ormond, 9 Oct. 
1678 O rm onde MSS, iv, pp 215-6; John Burke was the Catholic archbishop o f  Tuam from 1667-1713. 
Benignus Millet and C. J. Woods, ‘Roman Catholic Bishops from 1534’ in Moody, Martin and Byrne 
(ed.), N ew  H istory  o f  Ir e lan d , ix, p. 379.
54 Earl o f  Ossory’s memorandum on the state o f  Ireland, 5 Apr. 1679, O rm on de MSS, v, pp 15-20.
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did not know  what to make o f  O ates’ s revelations. He replied to Sir Robert 
Southw ell’ s first letter regarding the plot:
if  Oates his tale be true, the Jesuits have found a short and sure way to put 
me out o f  the government, but I hope I shall rather go alone than in the 
company they designed me [Charles II]; though it be the best in the 
world.
This attitude changed over the follow ing days as more letters arrived from  the 
English Privy Council, and by 7 October, Ormond w as convinced o f  the p lot’ s 
existence, writing to M ichael Boyle: ‘ I am confident there is an ill-design one w ay or 
other in the contrivance . ’ 56 He had little doubt that Peter Talbot w ould be found to be 
behind it and pointed out to Southwell, ‘ that this is not the first time he has been said 
to have encouraged the acting o f  it ’ .57 He im m ediately put into effect the orders o f  
the English Privy Council ordering Captain Brow n to take a squadron o f  horse 
guards to apprehend Talbot and convey him to Dublin castle. A t the same time he 
made speedy preparations for a return to Dublin where he intended to put into 
execution, with the advice o f  the Irish P rivy Council, the other parts o f  the English 
C ouncil’ s order, m 'ating to the removal o f  Catholic clergy and the disarmament o f  its 
laity .58
During his journey to Dublin there w ere several instances, w hich indicate that 
Ormond genuinely believed in the plot. On 11 October 1678, he received a letter 
dated the previous day from M ajor H em y Brennt. In it Brennt reported that he had 
failed to fulfil his orders to apprehend Peter Talbot on account o f  his extreme 
sickness and instead entrusted him to the charge o f  his brother, C olonel Richard
Talbot. Ormond h im self had written several days earlier to M ichael B oyle  on the
subject o f  T albot’ s supposed infirmity stating:
55 Ormond to Sir Robert Southwell, 5 Oct. 1678, Ormonde MSS, ii, p. 277.
56 Ormond to Michael Boyle, 7 Oct. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, p. 209.
57 Ormond to Sir Robert Southwell, 10 Oct. 1678, Ormonde MSS, ii, p. 277.
31
I have been told ever since he [Peter Talbot] landed that he is [so] infirm 
that he could not suffer no ordinary way o f  being carried a few miles. But 
I should think he may be as [easily brought from] town to Dublin as he 
was from Dublin thither. However it is with him, he and his friends must 
excuse me if  in such an occasion I am not over careful o f  his ease.59
He w as true to his word, for by the time Ormond entered Dublin city on 11 October, 
Peter Talbot w as confined within the w alls o f  Dublin castle as a close prisoner. There 
were no papers o f  significance found upon him or in his chamber at Lutterellstown 
House. Ormond eliminated this as a basis for Talbot’ s innocence stating to 
Southwell:
I did not doubt but he would have intelligence o f  the informations given 
against him as soon as I, at least time enough to dispose o f  any he had no 
mind shuuld be found with him, or in his chamber or trunks.60
During the follow ing days Ormond displayed a sincere zeal to get to the bottom o f
any alleged plot. Peter Talbot w as examined on three separate occasions, how ever to
no avail, as was his servant Andrew  Bermingham and various Catholic gentlemen
from Dublin who maintained correspondence with Talbot such as N icolas
N etterville .61
Despite his precautions, the aftermath o f  O ates’ s revelations w as already 
beginning to adversely affect Orm ond’ s position in London. The hysteria and 
apparent threat arising from the plot distracted the attention o f  the English Council 
com pletely from  his parliamentary bills. Coventry wrote to Orm ond on 8 October, 
‘ we have m uch noise and w e o f  the Council much business about a plot; w ould but 
two witnesses swear but h alf that w hich one doth there w ould be enough to hang a 
great many m en . ’ 62 Ormond and his agents in London took drastic measures to try 
and resuscitate his sinking enterprise. On 29 October, Sir Robert Southw ell and Sir
58 Ormond to Michael Boyle, 8 Oct. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, p. 212; Ormond to Earl o f  Orrery, 17 
Dec. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 278-81; Bodl., Carte Ms 146, f f  136-7.
59 Bodl., Carte MS 38. f. 740; Ormond to Michael Boyle, 6 Oct. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, p. 212.
60 Ormond to Sir Robert Southwell, 13 Oct. 1678, Ormonde MSS, ii, p 278.
61 Bodl., Carte MS 38, f. 722; Ibid., f. 730; Ibid., f. 703; Ibid., f f  726-8; Ibid., f f  736-7.
62 Henry Coventry to Ormond, 8 Oct. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 212-3.
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Edward Dering made it clear to Lord Chancellor Finch in C ouncil, ‘h ow  the earl o f  
Orrery w as em ploying his skill and arguments against the Confirm ation [bill] . ’ 63 Sir 
Cyril W yche w as em ployed to make a form al representation to the king, w hereby he 
would present and explain various letters from Ormond regarding objections held 
against his bills, especially his ‘observations upon a letter [Orrery’ s] o f  m any sheets 
o f  paper sent, as I [Ormond] am informed, into England pretending to show  the 
unreasonableness o f  the bill for the settlement o f  estates here and the partiality o f  it 
to the Irish . ’ 64 W ith the storm clouds o f  anti-Catholicism  gathering over the Stuart 
polity, Orm ond’ s desire for an Irish parliament w as now  m atched by the need to 
distance h im self from the proposed land bill and the accusation o f  favouring popery.
H ow ever the atmosphere in England w as so intense that the country w as 
gripped by a w ave o f  anti-Catholic hysteria and panic not seen since 1640-2.65 
Charles II w as apprehensive about facing a suspicious and scared English parliament 
and soon pulled the plug on the possibility that an Irish parliament w ould convene. 
On 15 N ovem ber Ossory form ally notified his father that neither Charles II nor the 
duke o f  Y o rk  w as prepared to summon a parliament in Ireland w hile one w as sitting 
in England .66 On 30 N ovem ber, Ormond reluctantly concurred with his son citing the 
Popish Plot rather than the initial opposition from Orrery and C on w ay for disrupting 
his parliamentary am bitions.67 Ormond reiterated this opinion to O ssory on 24 
Decem ber 1678, stating
when I undertook a parliament here would furnish the king with money,
and would not be troublesome, I little dreamt o f  such a tempest as is now
raised, and is like without the breath o f  god calm it, to shake all those
68
kingdoms into confusion.
63 Sir Robert Southwell to Ormond, 29 Oct. 1678, O rm on de MSS, iv, pp 464-6.
64 Ormond to Sir Cyril Wyche, 29 Oct. 1678, O rm onde MSS, iv, p. 226.
65 Coward, T he Stuart age, E n g lan d  1603-1714 , p. 321.
66 Aydelotte, ‘The duke o f  Ormond and the English government o f  Ireland, 1677-85’, p. 99.
67 Ibid., p. 99; Ormond to Ossory, 30 Nov. 1678, O rm on de MSS, iv, p. 254.
68 Ormond to Ossory, 24 Dec. 1678, O rm onde MSS, iv, pp 288-9; Aydelotte, ‘The duke o f  Ormond 
and the English government o f  Ireland, 1677-85’, pp 98-100.
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The plot also threatened to alienate popular support for Orm ond’ s regim e both 
in Ireland and England. This was something that he and his agents understood from 
an early stage. On 6  October, M ichael B oyle, w hilst inform ing Orm ond o f  the 
precautionary measures he had undertaken to defend D ublin city from  the plot, 
suggested to him
whether your grace will not think fit upon this occasion to com e sooner to 
Dublin than your grace intended, for though I do not apprehend the least 
o f danger, yet I know not what misrepresentation might be made o f  your 
absence by some that do not love you. 9
In London, both Coventry and Longford believed that such a critical conjuncture
required the presence o f  his second son Richard Butler, earl o f  Arran, at court, ‘him
70
being very w ell with the king and duke, and in good esteem w ith all men here.’ 
Longford also hoped that Ormond had received directions in regard to O ates’ s plot 
from England before the Irish plotters had escaped, ‘ for from  your vigour in this 
particular measure w ill be taken o f  your inclinations, and you w ill be reflected upon
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accordingly’ .
The discovery o f  the Popish Plot in England highlighted tw o o f  Orm ond’ s main 
weaknesses, his position vis-à-vis Catholicism  and the court and parliament in 
London. Despite his many protestations o f  loyalty to the established church, he could 
never fu lly  escape the accusations o f  being pro-papist or being a crypto-papist, and 
his recent attempts to forge a new  land settlement did little for his case in the light o f  
its perceived partiality to Catholics. A  Catholic contemporary wrote from  Ireland that 
previous September, ‘his grace o f  Dublin, Peter Talbot [...]  tells me that Ormond is
69 Michael Boyle to Ormond, 6 Oct. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 210-1.
70 Earl o f  Longford to Ormond, 8 Oct. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 214-5; Harman Murtagh, ‘Richard 
Butler, first earl o f  Arran (1639-1686)’ in Matthew and Harrison (ed.), Oxford D.N.B., ix, pp 127-8; in 
1662, Butler was created Baron Butler o f  Cloughgrenan, Viscount Tullogh, and earl o f  Arran. The 
following year he was made an Irish Privy Councillor and in 1673 on account o f  his bravery at the 
battle o f  Texel, he was created Baron Butler o f  Weston in the English peerage.
71 Ibid., pp 214-5.
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as much out with the Protestants as ever he w as with the C atholics . ’ 72 The duke o f  
Y ork  being implicated in treasonous affairs by Edward C olem an’ s letters likew ise 
did little to help his cause as he had endorsed Orm ond’ s reinstatement as viceroy; 
Southw ell reported from the House o f  Com m ons days after it had convened:
Upon the stirring o f  the matter o f  this conspiracy in the House many o f  
the country gentlemen were much scandalised to see none o f  the other 
side speak a word, but all the matter o f  this agitation left to them, though
it concerned the king’s security. One o f  them, a principal man, pressing to
have the cognisance o f  the affair brought before them, enlarged into the 
rumour o f  other resolutions intended, and said these could not be the 
doings o f  a little secretary [Edward Coleman], but persons o f  other note 
that must be inquired after.73
Orm ond’ s enemies in Ireland and England were quick to utilise such conditions 
to attack both his person and position. In Ireland, Orrery w as forem ost among those
who took up this mantle; the projected Land B ill had resurrected many o f  their
previous differences, but the plot soon brought their traditional enm ity to the fore. It 
provided Orrery with the perfect opportunity as Clarendon’ s fall had in 1667, to use
his two weaknesses against him - his links to Catholicism  and his precarious position 
w ith the court and parliament in London. Coventry soon reported to Ormond on 8 
October, ‘ I hear likew ise Lord Orrery’ s papers are com e over ’ . 74 In London, 
Longford noted the intrigues o f  Ranelagh and others, stating, they
[ ...]  are very busy and industrious to represent your grace as very partial 
to the papists, and though 1 am confident their malicious insinuations will 
never gain credit with those that know you, ^et your enemies will make 
use o f  all tools and means to do you mischief.
M any eminent politicians in London were receptive to such intrigues. Anthony
A shley  Cooper, earl o f  Shaftesbury, had never liked Ormond and G eorge V illiers,
duke o f  Buckingham , had actually conspired to have Ormond murdered in 1670.76
72 Bodl., Carte MS 38, f. 751.
73 Sir Robert Southwell to Ormond, 22 Oct. 1678, O rm on de MSS, iv, pp 400-1.
74 Henry Coventry to Ormond, 8 Oct. 1678, O rm on de MSS, iv, pp 212-3.
75 Earl o f  Longford to Ormond, 8 Oct. 1678, O rm on de MSS, iv, pp 214-5.
76 Bagwell, Ir e la n d  under the Stuart's a n d  during the Interregnum  iii, p. 122; Hutton, C h ar le s  the  
Secon d , k in g  o f  E ngland, S co tlan d  a n d  Irelan d , p 370; Beckett, The c a v a lie r  du ke: a  life  o f  Ja m e s
3 5
Essex and others were partial to such intrigues, especially w hen the rem oval o f  
Ormond might occasion his reinstatement to his former office. M any other courtiers 
w ere made suspicious and receptive to such complaints and accusations by the 
contemporary atmosphere o f  fear, distrust and uncertainty in England. Afterall, the 
previous existence o f  such upheavals in England in the 1630s and ’ 40s had 
precipitated a rebellion in Ireland w ith disastrous implications for the English nation.
It w as soon alleged in the House o f  Lords b y  W illiam  W entworth, son o f
77
Thom as W entwortn, earl o f  Strafford, during a m otion relating to the proceedings 
o f  the Irish government against Catholics, ‘that the papists w ere strangely insolent in 
several places o f  the kingdom , nam ely W aterford and D ublin, where [...]  
proclamations w ere pulled down from  the posts after they had been a second time set
7 0  i
up’ . He further lamented the grow ing strength o f  Catholicism  in Ireland and put it 
to the H ouse o f  Lords that i f  some care w as not taken, ‘ all other cares w ere in vain . ’ 79 
Arthur Annesley, earl o f  Anglesey, attempted to rebuke Strafford, acquainting the 
House that effectual orders had been issued and that the said lord Strafford had been 
present at them. According to Southw ell however, this ‘w as so m uch doubted [...]  
that the Lords appointed to have that order brought to them on Friday m orning ’ .80 It 
w as also spread around London that Ormond w as sympathetic to Peter Talbot. 
Ossory informed his father, ‘ it is whispered that you seized not his papers w hich
Butler, I s1 du ke o f  O rm ond, pp 104-5; Tim Harris, ‘Anthony Ashley Cooper, first earl o f  Shaftesbury 
(1621-1683)’ in Matthew and Harrison (ed.), O x ford  D.N.B., xiii, pp 199-217. According to Harris, o f  
the principal reasons behind Shaftesbury’s support for a bill in 1667, preventing the importation into 
England o f  Irish cattle, one was due to personal antipathy to Ormond that an Irish peer had superseded 
English ones.
77 C. V. Wedgwood, T hom as W entworth : f i r s t  e a r l  o f  S trafford , 1593-1641  (London, 1961), p. 56; 
William Wentworth was born on the eight o f  June 1626.
7S Ossory to Ormond, 23 Oct. 1678, O rm on de MSS, iv, pp 219-20; Sir Robert Southwell to Ormond,
26 October. 1678, O rm onde MSS, iv, pp 461-4;
79 Sir Robert Southwell to Ormond, 26 Oct. 1678, O rm on de MSS, iv, pp 461-4.
80 Ibid., pp 219-20; Ibid., pp461-4.
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have been the course here o f  all that have been imprisoned by accusation.’ A t court 
itself, many o f Ormond’ s traditional allies were wavering, and a worried Anglesey 
sought discourse with Ossory over alleged defects within the Irish kingdom such as
89
ammunition being kept in insecure places and substandard public officials.
Ormond wrote frantic letters during the first half o f October 1678 defending his 
character in regard to the established religion and order. In one such letter, he stated 
to Southwell ‘what may be said in refutation o f  the suggestions o f my being a 
favourer o f  papists, is a little touched in a letter I have sent by this post to my lord o f 
Longford’ .83 In another drawn up for a greater audience than Southwell, Ormond 
clarified his position in regard to his many Catholic relatives stating
that if I find any of them who are nearest to me acting or conspiring 
rebellion against the government and religion established amongst us, I 
will endeavour to bring them to punishment sooner than the remotest 
stranger to my blood.84
He refuted out o f hand potentially disastrous revelations made by Peter Talbot during 
his examinations that he had allowed him to return to Ireland after mediation and
QC
interposition on his behalf by Ormond’ s brother in law, Colonel John Fitzpatrick. 
Ormond informed Southwell that the Remonstrant cleric Peter Walsh, who at that 
time was present in England, could say something about Peter Talbot’s earlier threats 
against his life and how few  Catholic bishops there were in Ireland, when he left 
government in 1669, in comparison to when he returned. These manoeuvres are 
indicators that Ormond perceived he was under threat. The plot distorted his position
81 Ibid., pp 219-20.
82 Ibid., pp 219-20; Anglesey was referring to Peter Ward, the lord mayor of Dublin at this time.
83 Ormond to Sir Robert Southwell, 15 Oct. 1678, Ormonde MSS, ii, p. 278.
84 Ormond to Sir Robert Southwell, 30 Nov. 1678, Ormonde MSS, ii, p. 280.
85 Ormond to Colonel John Fitzpatrick, 17 Oct. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, p. 218.
86 Ormond to Sir Robert Southwell, 15 Oct. 1678, Ormonde MSS, ii, p. 278; S. J, Connolly (ed.), The 
Oxford companion to Irish History (2nd edition, Oxford, 2004), p. 506; Catholic nobles drew up the 
loyal Remonstrance in 1661 after the Restoration, acknowledging Charles II to be their king in all 
matters temporal as they were anxious to secure their position in the forthcoming land settlement. 
Throughout the Restoration the greatest exponent of this formula that would limit the pope’s power 
was Peter Walsh.
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in regard to a series o f fixed points and as such forced him to engage in a drastic 
series o f measures to defend his position. The main purpose o f  these was to redress 
the balance between the Irish government and various figures within the Irish 
kingdom and the court and parliament in England.
Ormond’s first attempt to redress the balance was by tackling the constant 
stream o f  information emanating from Orrery towards him in Dublin and behind his 
back to London. The content o f these letters, but more importantly, Orrery’ s carriage 
at this time precipitated a ‘pen war’ with Ormond, for as the latter stated to 
Southwell ‘the matter o f his letters to me and to my lord chancellor o f  Ireland 
[Michael Boyle] (which he knows are read to me) are transmitted into England and 
probably get thither as soon as our answers to him’ .87 The root o f  this dispute was 
two different views over what measures were most important to maintain and secure 
the Protestant interest.88 In the days following his arrival in Dublin, Ormond acted 
upon the orders o f  the English Council dated 1 October, to set forth the departure o f  
Catholic clergy and require its laity to relinquish their arms.89 On 14 October, all 
officers and soldiers o f the army in Ireland were ordered to repair to their quarters 
within fourteen days. Two days later, all Catholic archbishops, bishops, vicars, 
abbots, regular priests and Jesuits were ordered to depart the kingdom by 20 
November and finally, on 2 November, all those belonging to the Catholic religion 
were ordered to hand in all arms within twenty days to particular persons sent from 
the kings stores. The militia were later ordered to put themselves into a posture o f
87 Ormond to Sir Robert Southwell, 30 Nov. 1678, Ormonde MSS, ii, p. 280; Ormond to Sir Robert 
Southwell, 7 Dec. 1678, Ormonde MSS, ii, pp 281-2.
88 Toby Barnard, ‘Roger Boyle, first earl of Orrery (1621-1679)’, in Matthew and Harrison (ed.), 
Oxford D.N.B., vii, pp 109-113; Richard L. Greaves, ‘Arthur Capel, first earl of Essex (bap. 1632, d. 
1683)’, in Matthew and Harrison (ed.), Oxford D.N.B., ix, pp 976-982. Orrery firmly believed that the 
best way to protect the long and vulnerable coast of Munster was by setting up militia’s composed
solely of local Protestants. This viewpoint was not shared by Ormond or his predecessor Essex who 
feared that Presbyterians, former Crontwellians and others of dubious loyalties would undoubtedly join 
such militias.
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defence in case o f widespread disobedience o f the said proclamations.90 Ormond 
would later summarise the plan o f action adopted, stating, ‘ in short, we have 
endeavoured to remove incendiaries, to disarm those justly suspected and to warn 
and arm the English and Protestants.’91
Ormond undertook this policy for many reasons. Despite all the warnings and 
reports from London, no rebellion had materialised and the Irish countryside still 
remained relatively peaceful. The apprehension o f  Peter Talbot and his associates 
and correspondents had failed to shed further light on the existence o f  an Irish plot. 
Rather it appeared from Talbot’ s papers that the charges against him may have 
originated with one John Sergeant, with whom he had been at loggerheads over 
points o f divinity.92 It is also certain that Ormond held interviews with prominent 
Irish Catholics during this critical period to ascertain whether there was a Catholic 
plot in existence. Richard Talbot moved from his residence at Lutterellstown into the 
city and significantly, when directions arrived for his apprehension on 12 November, 
he was in the gallery o f  Dublin castle.93 There are several instances which make it 
apparent that Ormond was already sceptical o f Oates’s revelations, most notably the 
case o f  his cousin, Edmund Butler and his son, Richard Butler.94 On 23 October,
89 Ormond to Earl of Orrery, 17 Dec. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 278-81.
90 Ormonde MSS, v, pp 24-9.
91 Thomas Carte, An history o f the life o f James duke o f Ormond from his birth to his death in 1688 (3 
vols, London, 1736), ii, p. 484; Ormond to Sir Robert Southwell, 19 Nov. 1678, Ormonde MSS, ii, p. 
279.
92 Bodl., Carte Ms 146, ff 137-8; Malcolm V. Hay, The Jesuits and the popish plot (London, 1933), pp 
183-90; Talbot had kept Sergeant’s letters in his possession in the hope of occasioning trouble for him 
or diverting attention away from himself, but this evidence disappeared in London where Sergeant a 
Catholic priest and confessed enemy of the Jesuits had connections with Oates and other promoters of 
the Popish Plot. According to Hay most of Oates’s revelations especially what he alleged about the 
proposed assassination of Ormond originated with Sergeant.
Ormond to Viscount Conway, 12 Nov. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, p. 234; Philip W. Sergeant, Little 
Jennings and fighting Dick Talbot, The story o f  the duke and duchess ofTyrconnel (2 vols, Dublin, 
1912), i, pp 268-70.'
91 William Carrigan, Tite history and antiquities o f  the diocese o f  Ossory (4 vols, Dublin, 1905) ii, pp 
93-4; Richard Butler, 3rd Viscount Mountgarrel married a daughter of Hugh O’Neill. Their son, 
Edmund (1599-1679), 4th Viscount Mountgarret married a daughter of the earl of Castlehaven. His 
son, Richard (c. 1634-1706), 5'1' Viscount Mountgarret.
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Oates had accused them along with Richard Talbot and Mr Peppard o f  Drogheda at 
the bar o f  the Commons with complicity in the plot.95 Henry Coventry had already 
forewarned Ormond o f  this as early as mid October, but he failed to take any action 
against any o f the accused until he received directions from England on 12 
November. Ormond was encouraged in this stance by his knowledge o f  both the 
father and son, ‘the father is 84 years old and his eldest son the weakest young man 
both in body and mind that I [Ormond] know living without a guardian’ . Thus on the 
same day that he put the orders o f the English Council relating to both into 
execution, Ormond privately wrote to his confidant Captain George Mathews, ‘ I am 
confident i f  Mr Oates had been better informed he would rather named my cousin 
Ned.’96
Orrery did not fail to make clear his disappointment over Ormond’s actions in 
response to the plot. In his letters, he claimed to be writing on behalf o f the poor 
Protestants who lived isolated and insecure throughout the counties o f Cork, Kerry 
and Clare.97 He made it known to Ormond that though a Catholic conspiracy 
threatened the very existence o f  the Protestant interest, yet no orders were 
forthcoming for the effectual setting up o f the county militias throughout Munster, 
except those proclamations pertaining to the removal o f  Catholic clergy and the 
disarmament o f its laity. Orrery’ s inherent distrust o f  Catholicism convinced him that 
this course o f action was not only poorly conceived and impractical, but also 
reckless. He wrote to Ormond,
95 Sir Cyril Wyche to Ormond, 23 Oct. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 221-2.
96 Henry Coventry to Ormond, 8 Oct. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 2 12-3; Ormond to Viscount 
Conway, 12 Nov. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, p. 234; Ormond to Captain Mathew, 12 Nov. 1678, 
Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 232-3; Bodl., Carte Ms 146, f. 267; Bodl., Carte Ms 72, f. 429; Sir Robert 
Southwell to Ormond, 3 Dec. 1678. Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 485-7; Ormond probably shared the same 
view as Charles II, who on various occasions in Council made it known that he had no manner of 
belief in the popish plot instead he feared Protestant fanatics and Fifth Monarchy men more, and 
believed them to be the instigators of the plot in the hope of reinstituting a Commonwealth as under 
Cromwell.
40
[...] it is an unusual thing first to irritate a numerous and dangerous 
clergy, who are blindly obeyed by all their flocks, and a numerous laity 
also, and then to prescribe the means to justify it by force if they prove 
disobedient [...] nor could I think the civil officers would have been very 
active therein until they saw the militia up to have protected them in 
doing their duties.98
He advised Ormond to undertake a further course o f measures to properly secure the 
Protestant interest such as purging the garrison towns o f Catholics and having the 
most dangerous Catholics, especially those who had lost their estates, secured.99
The contents o f these letters were discomforting for Ormond because o f  the 
dangerous insinuations within them. He stated to Sir Cyril W yche that these lay with 
their ‘ double edged threats’ . First, by demonstrating extraordinary vigilance and 
forecast, Orrery won both ways. He would never want applause i f  no m ischief 
occurred for his providence and circumspection and i f  violence did occur, its 
prevention would he attributed to his counsel, while i f  it succeeded, it was because o f  
the neglect o f  the Irish government. Second, his letters disparaged the Irish 
government and rendered it suspect to Protestants by associating negligence, 
weakness and other faults to its charge for not acting vigilantly for the Protestant 
interest. In essence, the implied meaning in Orrery’ s letters was that England was in 
a state o f crisis similar to the 1640s, which precipitated a rebellion in Ireland; 
furthermore Ormond was doing little to counter this threat and protect the Protestant 
interest and the reason for this was obvious -  he was a crypto-papist.
Orrery was fully aware o f Ormond’s weak points and immediately focused on 
contentious issues such as the widespread disobedience to the government’ s recent 
proclamations. On 19 November, he stated to Ormond in a letter almost certainly 
sent to London,
97 Sir Robert Southwell to Ormond, 19 Nov. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 474-8.
98 Bodl., Carte Ms 118, ff 162-5; Earl of Orrery to Ormond, 10 Dec. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 270- 
4.
41
the mayor and some of the chief Aldermen of Youghal, Cork, and
Kinsale, say only one of the regular romish clergy (named Grace) has
given in his name to be shipped in those three ports, though this is the end 
of the time.100
Orrery also made use o f the plot to aggravate and enlarge the existing fears o f
Protestants throughout Ireland and England to the detriment o f  Ormond. In London,
Sir Robert Southwell understood perfectly Ormond’ s contemporary predicament 
stating,
tis a hard game you have to play when more care is required to obviate 
the imaginary dangers that malice does create than those real ones which 
are more apparent, and which a little unanimity and honesty would easily 
suppress.101
The case o f Dongan’ s regiment makes such proceedings apparent. During the 1670s, 
Charles II had submitted to growing anti-Catholic and anti-French feeling by 
recalling all his regiments fighting under the banner o f Louis XIV. However, 
contrary to this policy, in early 1678, he issued instructions to Colonel Thomas 
Dongan to recruit an infantry regiment o f twenty-one companies in Ireland with the 
intention o f sending them to aid Louis X IV  in France.103 The paranoia surrounding 
the Popish Plot made the presence o f  this regiment a huge embarrassment to 
Ormond. It was accentuated even more by the arrival in Ireland o f  Catholic soldiers 
dismissed from the service o f James, duke o f Monmouth, but compensated by
99 Bodl., Carte Ms 38, ff 657-8; in 1672 at the time of the Third Anglo-Dutch war Orrery had 
attempted to prevent the readmission of Catholic merchants and traders into towns.
100 Bodl., Carte Ms 118, ff 154-5.
101 Sir Robert Southwell to Ormond, 16 Nov. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 472-4.
102 Aydelotte, ‘The duke of Ormond and the English government of Ireland, 1677-85’, pp 279-80; J. D. 
Davies, ‘International elations, war and the armed services’ in Lionel K. J. Glassey (ed.), The reigns 
o f Charles II and James VII and //(London, 1997), p. 219; H. Pichat, ‘Les armées de Louis XIV en 
1674’, Revue d'histoire, 37, 109 (January 1910), p. 3; John A. Lynn, Giant o f the Grand Siecle: the 
French army, 1610-1715 (Cambridge, 1997), p. 367; according to Lynn, inl674, there were close to 
six thousand Irish, English and Scots in the French army.
103 Aydelotte, ‘The duke of Ormond and the English government of Ireland, 1677-85’, pp 280-2; 
Stephen Webb, Lord Churchill's coup: the Anglo-American empire and the Glorious Revolution 
reconsidered (New York, 1995), pp 46-7; Piers Wauchope, ‘Thomas Dongan, second earl of Limerick 
(1634-1715)’ in Matthew and Harrison (ed.), OxfordD.N.B., xvi, pp 523-4; Dongan who was married 
to Mary Talbot, a sister of Richard, later became lieutenant governor of the city and garrison of 
Tangiers in the place of Sir Palmes Fairbourne. In 1683, he was appointed governor-general of New 
York.
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Charles II with commissions in Dongan’s regiment.104 The movements o f  these 
soldiers led to ugly incidents at Chester in England and Cork and Kinsale in County 
Cork, where the said officers were disarmed and interned.105 They occasioned 
hysterical letters from Orrery who suspected something sinister especially as it 
seemed to him, ‘there are more officers that pretend to be o f  that regiment than will 
officer it, at least i f  it be as other regiments usually are.’ 106 In London, he had letters 
dispersed alleging that in ten or twelve o f the companies in Dongan’ s regiment, their 
was not a single Protestant bar Sir Richard Parsons and Lord Blaney but over eighty 
Catholic officers ‘ready to head any rebellions, invasions or massacres that have been 
or are designed in this or that kingdom’ .107
In England, these incidents precipitated the demise o f  Sir Joseph Williamson, 
Secretary o f State, as these soldiers had been commissioned without taking the 
required oaths.108 It furthermore strained Charles II’s already tenuous relationship 
with his parliament, but more importantly, it highlighted to many in England at a 
particularly sensit: /e time how very little the lord lieutenant o f Ireland feared and 
was prepared for a Roman Catholic insurrection. It added further weight behind 
Orreiy’ s intrigues that Ormond was actually a crypto-Catholic, especially since 
Dongan’ s regiment was now headed by his nephew, Justin MacCarthy who had 
previously served in France under Louis X IV ’s banner.109 Orrery tried to use these 
incidents to corner Ormond or force him into a mistake. He wrote to Ormond on 12
104 Certificate by the duke of Monmouth to Donough MacCarthy, 7 Nov. 1678, Cal. S. P. dom, 1678, 
p. certificate by the duke of Monmouth, 9 Nov. 1678, p. 508.
105 Bodl., Carte Ms 72, f. 412; Bodl., Carte Ms 38, ff 699-701; Ibid., f.617; Bodl., Carte Ms 243, f.
334.
Infl Earl of Orrery to Ormond, 12 Nov. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, p. 231.
107 Earl of Anglesey to Ormond, 23 Nov. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 242-3; Aydelotte, ‘The duke of 
Ormond and the English government of Ireland, 1677-85’, pp 280-2.
103 Aydelotte, ‘The duke of Ormonde and the English government of Ireland, 1677-85’, p. 281; Hutton, 
Charles the Second, king o f  England, Scotland and Ireland, p. 281 ; Kenyon, The Popish Plot, p. 117.
109 1 Oct. 1678, Cal. S. P. dom, 1678, pp 444-5; Justin MacCarthy replaced Thomas Dongan as the 
commander of Dongan’s regiment.
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November, desiring orders in regard to these officers as he was assured from London 
that none but merchants were to go from England without passes. He tried to tease 
out Ormond’s prior knowledge by desiring a list o f such officers as really belonged 
to Dongan’ s regiment, so as to discover those who were not to be sheltered under 
that pretence. Orrery concluded his advice with an indirect condemnation o f 
Ormond’ s actions in regard to the plot, ‘especially till your excellency sees how the 
Romish clergy obey and the disarming goes on.’ 110
Orrery’s letters painted a picture o f  total anarchy, with murderous armed 
Catholics fomenting rebellion and a French invasion fleet almost daily expected. The 
Protestants o f Ireland were scared out o f their wits and according to Orrery ‘every 
country gentleman and Protestant out o f a garrison goes to bed in fears’ . The advent 
o f this terror was not far away as a priest had privately advised his brother Francis 
Boyle, Viscount Shannon, to send his best goods into the nearest garrison town.111 
Despite these imminent threats, the militia in Munster had not yet been effectively 
raised. He him self had intended to follow his wife to England, ‘but [...] was forced 
from those designs by the universal applications which the poor Protestants made to 
me’ .112 He made it known to Ormond that
though in the beginning of September the horrid plot was detected, yet till
the 11th of November not so much as a letter came for the setting up the
militia; and when it came, some of those to whom it was directed did not
113find it answer their hopes or fears.
The officers appointed by Ormond to institute the militia in Munster had petitioned 
Orrery for his help as they had never lived there and were at a loss to appoint a 
rendezvous for the militia and order them accordingly. In light o f all these 
developments, Ormond was clearly seen as failing to protect the Protestant interest.
110 Earl of Orrery to Ormond, 12 Nov. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, p. 231.
111 Earl of Orrery to Ormond, 29 Nov. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 246-51.
112 Ibid., pp 246-51.
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There may have been a reason for this. On 29 November 1678 Orrery wrote to 
Ormond to substantiate information recently dispersed around Munster claiming that 
the lord lieutenant had met with ‘one Mr Fitzgerald’ o f Connacht who had assured 
him ‘that the plot would take effect, there were so many great persons involved in it, 
and that the Irish, by the help o f the French, would be masters o f Ireland by March 
next’ .114
Ormond’s ‘pen war’ with Orrery was attracting quite an audience in London, 
thus from an early stage he knew the importance o f not been caught out by Boyle and 
proven negligent in his duties. In regard to Dongan’ s regiment, Ormond showed 
acute political awareness by taking pre-emptive action before any incidents occurred. 
He informed Coventry on the 10 November 1678 that he had ‘been in expectation a 
good while to receive some directions concerning a regiment o f  Irish here called 
Colonel Dongan’ s’ .115 He stated that there had at first been little exception taken to 
them as they were quietly raised and kept, but since the noise o f  the plot, ‘I have 
heard o f some disorders committed by them’ . Ormond was confident that i f  there 
were any ‘ they are such as at another time would not have been taken notice o f . 116 
He suggested to Coventry that instead o f disbanding them and allowing them to turn 
tory, ‘ they might be permitted and assisted to make conditions in some other 
service’ .117 In London, Ossory was immediately set to work at court and on 26 
November before Council, he showed Charles II Ormond’s previous letters relating 
to MacCarthy’ s regiment, reminding him o f  what both he and Coventry had
113 Ibid., pp 246-51.
' 14 Earl of Orrery to Lieutenant-Colonel Meade, 28. Nov. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 245-6; Bodl., 
Carte Ms 38, f. 709; John Fitzgerald had been originally arrested in county Sligo after saying mass and 
was soon suspected of being one of twelve Jesuits sent into Ireland by the pope and French king to 
seduce the people into rebellion.
115 Ormond to Henry Coventry, 10 Nov. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 228-9.
116 Ibid., pp 288-9.
117 Ibid., pp 228-9; in seventeenth and eighteenth century Ireland, a tory was the term given to bandits 
or outlaws.
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previously said on that subject to his father. Ossory was successful and two things 
arose out o f this tactic. First, Charles announced in Council that i f  any ill accident 
occurred before they were disbanded, ‘the blame will neither light on you [Ormond] 
or me [Ossory]’ .1'8 Secondly, Coventry informed him that ‘this day at Council his 
majesty declared he would have Colonel MacCarthy’ s regiment in Ireland 
disbanded’ .119 Ormond was cautious enough not to be found wanting in the 
meantime and endorsed Orrery’s initial orders concerning Catholic officers arriving 
in Ireland, that those who cannot produce commissions be immediately interned.
The intense political pressure that Ormond was under cannot be better 
demonstrated than by his efforts to clear him self o f  any personal involvement in the 
plot and to the get to bottom o f  it. He categorically denied meeting and receiving any 
information regarding the plot from a Mr Fitzgerald o f Connacht. He informed 
Orrery that he had one by that name, who had been apprehended in Sligo for having 
said Mass, conducted to Dublin after he claimed he could make great discoveries o f 
those sent into Ireland by Louis X IV and the pope to seduce the people to their 
service. However upon examination, he was found to be a notorious scoundrel and 
vagabond friar, ‘who has been preaching among the Presbyterians in the north, as 
one o f their way, but discarded by them for his three virtues o f  lying, drinking and 
whoring.’ 121 In regard to the advertisements and advice given by the priest to 
Viscount Shannon, Ormond acknowledged in a letter to Orrery that ‘ i f  well followed 
and traced to the fountain, to be the likeliest way I have yet seen offered to discover
» 199
that damnable plot in all its circumstances o f contrivement and conspirators.’ A s 
such he ordered Orrery to have the priest in question and others concerned to be
1,8 Ossory to Ormond, 26 Nov. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 243-4.
119 Henry Coventry to Ormond, 26 Nov. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, p. 245.
120 Ormond to Earl of Orrery, 16 Nov. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 236-7.
121 Ormond to Earl of Orrery, 7 Dec. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 265-9; Bodl., Carte Ms 70, ff 523-4.
4 6
speedily sent to Dublin for examination. The Protestants that received the warnings 
were to be likewise sent to Dublin or, i f  this was not feasible, Orrery could send their 
examinations to Dublin.
Ormond denied Orrery’s subtle accusation o f time wasting, stating he received 
first notice o f the plot on 7 October 1678. He queried whether Orrery had received 
any earlier notice o f the plot, for ‘ i f  your lordship had known it sooner I presume you 
would have thought fit to be imparted to me.’ 124 Ormond reassured Orrery that he 
could show him how the time o f the Irish board was spent, both by public acts and 
the journals o f  the Council books and indirectly made it clear to him that his opinions 
were shared by none o f the Privy Council by sarcastically wishing that his health had 
permitted his presence with them:
Because it would have saved us both the pains in writing, and either you 
would have been better satisfied with our proceedings (which are as 
hitherto very unanimous) than your letters intimate, or they would have 
been chr.nged to your liking.125
In regard to the militia, which had developed into the most contentious issue between 
the two, Ormond averred ‘that it was proceeded in as fast as the Council thought it 
convenient’ .126 He pointed out that before any actions in regard to the plot were 
taken, it had been the Irish government’ s immediate duty to act upon the king’s 
pleasure, signified by the order o f the English Council dated 1 October, ‘to set forth 
the proclamation for the departure o f popish titular and regular clergy and in 
pursuance o f  his general directions to require the popish laity to bring in their 
arms’ .127 The milma that had been raised, he had inspected in several counties, and to 
him they appeared ‘well modelled, armed, and commanded’ . This made him question
122 Ibid., pp 265-9.
123 Ibid., pp 265-9.
124 Ibid., pp 265-9.
125 Ibid., pp 265-9.
126 Ibid., pp 265-9; Ormond to Orrery, 17 Dec. 1679, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 278-81.
127 Ormond to Earl of Orrery, 7 Dec. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 265-9.
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greater than in any other part o f the kingdom, ‘ from whence I [Ormond] do not hear
■ 128but that Protestants that live out o f  garrisons lie down quietly and rise safely’ .
Ormond showed great political ingenuity in dealing with Orrery’ s initial 
complaints but the reality o f  his position at the end o f  November 1678 was that 
Orrery’ s complaints were still affecting him. The reason behind this was quite 
simple, the initial measures undertaken by the Irish government had very little impact 
at ground level, and even the Catholic clergy o f  Dublin remained relatively 
unmolested. This situation allowed Orrery a reservoir o f constant abuses alluding 
negligence towards the plot by the Irish government. Orrery was weekly providing 
evidence o f large numbers o f Catholics illegally mustered in the Irish army and 
Catholic clergy present in the country.129 The supposed unanimity o f  the Irish Privy 
Council with Ormond’ s actions and opinions was far from true with Captain Robert 
Fitzgerald expressing serious concern for the Protestants o f  Queen’ s County (Laois). 
Concerned gentry there had assured him that they were under great trouble, because 
the Captain o f their county militia was reputed to be a papist who regularly had Mass
• • I TO •
said in his house and had his children christened by Catholic priests. There is no 
doubt that even Ormond was aware o f such problems, and on one occasion even 
conceded to Orrery that many county militias might not be well ordered ‘unless 
where perhaps there might be the governor o f a county, o f  whom few  were resident
• 131in their counties, and, I doubt, fewer took pams.’
These weaknesses in dealing with the Catholic threat within the Irish kingdom 
were immensely damaging to Ormond’ s position in England at a time when anti-
128 Ibid., pp 265-9.
129 Earl of Orrery to Ormond, 19 Nov. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 238-9.
130 Bodl., Carte Ms 247, f. 328; Earl of Orrery to Sir John Mallet, 3 Dec. 1678, H. M. C. Reports, 5, pp 
318-9.
how the fears of the Protestants of Munster represented by Orrery could be any
4 8
Catholicism was in the ascendant and it was further exacerbated by the publication 
and dispersal o f many o f Orrery's letters there. Southwell reported on 23 November, 
‘the squabble there between the Irishman and the sentinel about pulling down the
1 99
proclamation is made matter o f  news from thence’ . Anglesey felt compelled to 
inform Ormond o f  information he had received from Ireland reporting widespread 
dangers to the Protestant interest, despite Ossory’ s recent attempts to conciliate him. 
He was extremely critical o f  the methods undertaken to disarm the Catholic Irish:
It is written from Ireland that the late proclamation published there for the 
papists m bring in their arms gives them twenty one days to do it [...] 
which is looked upon as an advantage held forth to the sectaries, and a 
warning to the Irish to hide and conceal their arms; whereas in 1663 the 
poor English were searched by surprises and their arms taken away and 
not restored to this day.133
He finished by encouraging Ormond to safeguard the Protestant interest indirectly 
expressing his belief that the Irish government were negligent in their duties,
I wish the militia of English and Protestants were as well settled as I saw
it, when once I attended his majesty’s service in that kingdom; that
Dublin and other garrisons and the store house may be so secured that the 
Protestants may not be a sacrifice to the Irish treachery, and implacable
134
thirst for their blood and estates.
To add to Ormond’s woes, a cipher o f his Catholic brother in law, Colonel John 
Fitzpatrick was discovered amongst Edward Coleman’s papers, which according to
1 9 S
Southwell, ‘gives frequent occasion to discourse o f him’ .
The only way Ormond could refute such rumours at court was outdoing Orrery 
in his zeal for securing the Protestant interest. On 20 November, the Irish Privy
Council issued a proclamation rewarding anyone who discovered any officer or
soldier o f the army to be a Catholic or hear Mass. The sheriffs o f several counties 
received letters from the Irish Privy Council on 2 December, to be communicated to
131 Ormond to Orrery, / Dec. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 265-8.
132 Sir Robert Southwell to Ormond, 23 Nov. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 478-9.
133 Bodl., Carte Ms 70, f. 519.
134 Ibid., f. 519.
|j5 Sir Robert Southwell to Ormond, 23 Nov. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 248-9.
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the justices o f the peace taking notice o f their neglect in apprehending Catholic 
clergy who did not transport themselves according to the proclamation o f  16 October 
1678. A  second proclamation for disarming Catholics was issued under virtually the 
same conditions as the first. It contained several paragraphs which condemned both 
the officers o f the law and military for ‘their great neglect in not making strict search 
for, and seizing upon all such arms as immediately after the 22nd o f  November last
i i nr
past might be found in the possession o f  [...] persons o f  the popish religion’ . They 
were commanded to proceed about their duties with care, diligence and
i n n
circumspection, otherwise, ‘ they will answer the contrary at their utmost peril.’ 
Ormond’s anxiety can be thus seen at this time in his chastisement o f officials found 
negligent in practices which he him self had turned a blind eye to before the plot. This 
can be observed in a letter from Lieutenant Richard Locke to Major Henry Brennt in 
which Locke explained his position in regard to a Mass held in Athy the previous 
week. Locke finished by hoping Ormond ‘will not longer be dissatisfied with me or
1 TO
anybody hereabouts’ .
Ormond also tackled Orrery and his tactic o f showing vigilance for the 
Protestant interest. Orrery had advocated a series o f measures designed for Connacht 
and western Ireland where he averred ‘ the Irish in those wild parts are too w ell armed 
and officered.’ 139 He proposed that Catholics be turned out o f  the towns and their 
leaders secured.140 Ormond knew if  he neglected these measures it would be to the 
detriment o f his position in London i f  anything happened, whilst on the other hand 
such extreme measures might very well drive many Catholics into rebellion. The 
implications o f  the latter would signify the presence o f a plot in Ireland, which would
136 Proclamations and public notices chiefly in connection with Ireland, Ormonde MSS, ii, pp 340-51.
137 Ibid., pp 340-51.
138 Lieutenant Richard Locke to Major Henry Brennt, 30 Nov. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, p. 256
139 Bodl., Carte Ms l ib,  ff 154-5; Earl of Orrery, 19 Nov. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 238-9.
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almost certainly occasion an already suspicious court to pressurise Charles II to 
remove him. A t a meeting o f  the Irish Privy Council on 15 November 1678 Ormond 
made his m ove.141 He acquainted the board that all directions coming out o f England 
had been put into execution, furthermore, the papists had been disarmed, the militia 
settled and the garrisons secured, thus he desired the advice o f  the board what further 
was to be done. A t this juncture, Ormond had Orrery’ s proposed measures 
introduced whereupon he demonstrated the dangers inherent within them to the 
Protestant interest and then proceeded to lead the board in moderating them.142 He 
later informed Southwell that it was felt dangerous to remove all papists from towns 
as it would be detrimental to markets and leave garrisons dangerously in want o f  
food, it was also deemed impracticable to arrest all dangerous subjects because it 
could not be foreseen to how many this rule would extend to.143 Ormond pointed out 
that the latter course o f action would drive many Catholic lords upon desperate 
courses which, although it would inevitably end in their ruin, it ‘may be magnified in 
France and invite an invasion’ .144 Ormond finally tackled these two issues by 
implementing several practicable measures refusing Catholics’ entrance into his 
majesty’ s forts without special orders and limiting the numbers o f  Catholics 
inhabiting towns to those resident for a period greater than twelve months.145
Ormond’s recent experience with his parliamentary bills had made him well 
aware o f the fragility o f his position and ambitions once figures in England with Irish 
connections expressed opposition and dissatisfaction towards him. He thus attempted 
to offset Orrery and his intrigues by securing the support o f powerful English figures
140 Ibid., pp 238-9.
141 The date of this meeting is uncertain, and all that can be said for certain is that it occurred between 
the 15 and 19 of November; Bodl., Carte Ms 38, ff 657-8; Bodl., Carte Ms 70, f. 513.
142 Ormond to Sir Robert Southwell 19 Nov. 1678 Ormonde MSS, ii, p. 279
143 Ibid., p. 279.
144 Ormond to Sir Cyril Wyche, 20 Nov. 1678, Leyborne Popham MSS, pp 242-3.
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with Irish connections like Viscount Conway. The relationship between the two had 
been tense in proceeding years. Conway had been one o f  the critics o f  his land bills 
that autumn, and was also aggrieved at missing out on the viceroyalty whilst Ormond 
had reportedly stated in 1677 upon hearing that Conway was marked down as 
Essex’ s replacement in Ireland that ‘he would never visit Ireland while Conway 
governed it’ .146 The plot necessitated a change in Ormond’ s attitude. In November, 
he placated Conway by issuing orders installing several sheriffs endorsed by Conway 
and relocating several companies o f the Irish army to Ulster to hunt tories. Ormond 
also took care to keep him well informed o f  his actions regarding the plot, stating in 
one letter ‘we [Ormond and the Irish Privy Council] do all we can to put the 
Protestants into negligent security’ , telling Conway what bills had been issued for 
raising the militia and that the kings instructions regarding Colonel Richard Talbot, 
and Richard B u tle ', Viscount Mountgarrett, had been enforced.147 In a letter o f  16 
November, an obviously satisfied Conway commended Ormond on his measures 
regarding the plot,
I perceive they make great a bustle in England about this plot and that the 
trouble of it reaches to your grace; for my own part I know not what to 
make of it, but by your grace’s letter I should judge they were mistaken in
i 148 some particulars.
This was a huge endorsement from a potential opposition figure with important 
connections in London.
Ormond was also quick to vindicate his actions to Anglesey, his old associate 
in government during the 1660s, especially in regard to allegations o f  partiality 
towards Catholics in the matter o f  disarming in 1678 compared to that o f  the 
Protestants in 1663. Ormond informed him that in 1663 there had been a plot
145 Ormonde MSS, v, pp 24-9.
146 Bagwell, Ireland under the Stuarts and Interregnum, iii, p. 122.
147 Ormond to Viscount Conway, 12 Nov, Ormonde MSS, iv, p. 234.
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contrived by one Thomas Blood and others, who called themselves Protestants, ‘only 
because they say they are not papists’ .149 He quickly ascertained after examining 
several persons that it was too far advanced and ‘that i f  I should follow  the thread o f 
the discovery as far as it might lead me, possibly I might bring on that insurrection 
which they designed and I had rather should be prevented than punished.’ 150 He 
pointed out to Anglesey that this conclusion would have been disastrous for the 
newly restored monarchy as the Irish countryside and towns were full o f 
Cromwellian planters and disbanded soldiers, therefore he quickly decided to order 
the disarming o f  both Catholics and Protestants.151 Ormond distanced him self from 
reports that arms were not relinquished to their owners in 1663 by commenting ‘i f  
their arms were not afterwards restored to them, pursuant to my directions,
152embezzlement is no new or extraordinary thing in the execution o f such orders.’ 
Instead he reminded Anglesey o f the satisfaction soon held at that time amongst 
Protestants towards his majesty’s government because,
They [Irish Protestants] were by his [Charles II] command and my 
[Ormond’s] ready obedience, better armed than they were before, in a 
great part out of his majesty’s stores; and as your lordship is pleased to 
remember, they were well modelled into troops and companies, and so 
appeared in the field, amongst whom, I think there was not one papist153
Ormond was perfectly aware that Orrery’ s rumours had played a large role in 
diminishing the standing o f his government amongst Protestants, for instance stating 
to Southwell, that
I can assure you that the real or pretended fears of some considerable 
men, have put the common sort of English and Protestants almost out of 
their wits, especially in Munster, from whence the terror is diffused
through the whole kingdom, to the greatest disheartening of the English
154and encouragement of the disaffected Irish.
148 Viscount Conway to Ormond, 16 Nov. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 235-4.
149 Bodl., Carte Ms 70, ff 521-2.
150 Ibid., pp 521-2.
bl Ormond to Earl of Anglesey, 29 Nov. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 251-3.
152 Ibid., pp 251-3.
153 Ibid., pp 521-3.
154 Ormond to Sir Robert Southwell, 6 Nov. 1678, Ormonde MSS, ii, pp 278-9.
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The knock on effects o f these hysterias were immensely damaging to his position in 
London and his anxiety in regard to the movement o f uncontrolled information 
between both kingdoms and within Ireland materialises in several examples which 
demonstrate that he issued orders to censor and control its flow:
Our last letters were of the 4th of this month and yet by interlopers from 
Chester and Liverpool, we are told from Chester that my Lord Treasurer 
[Danby] is fled and that the prentices of London are up in arms. The 
reporter of this I have caused to be secured to answer his spreading of 
false news if it prove so.155
Ormond may have also manipulated information to demonstrate his Protestant
credentials by portraying himself as the intended victim o f a Catholic conspiracy. In
December 1678, officials in Dublin announced the discovery o f  a conspiracy to
assassinate Ormond, after finding several letters scattered about the streets o f Dublin.
Within days the Irish Privy Council issued a proclamation promising two hundred
pounds to any person who would come in and make a full discovery o f  what was
revealed within the said letters.156 A t the same time, Ormond wrote over to London,
it seems now to be the papists turn to endeavour to despatch me, the other 
non-conformists have had theirs, and may have again, when they shall be 
inspired from the same place for different reasons to attempt the same 
thing.1"
The planting o f letters throughout streets was not new to seventeenth century Ireland, 
previously it had been used to disparage certain individuals or draw attention to 
potential threats or contentious issues, however what occasions suspicion in this case
155 Ormond to Sir Robert Southwell, 21 Jan. 1679, Ormonde MSS, ii, p. 283.
156 Greaves, Secrets o f  *he kingdom: British radicals from the popish plot to the revolution, pp 7-8; A 
young English man, Michael Jephson (although some sources give his name as John or Joseph) was 
arrested. He was the son of Alexander Jephson who had been executed in 1663 for his role in Blood’s 
abortive plot. In Jephson’s confession, four Catholic clergy were implicated as the instigators of the 
plot, of whom two were later apprehended.
157 Bod I., Carte Ms 38, ff 676-7.
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is that it was generally not in Ormond’s cautious and calculating manner to be taken 
in by such ploys.
The plot, it is important to remember, did not weaken Ormond’s position in 
Ireland; it just created an atmosphere where a wide range o f  defects within the Irish 
kingdom and in Ormond’s position vis-à-vis Catholicism was highlighted. This 
information distorted his position in relation to the English court and parliament and 
whilst it is important to realise that the decision to remove him lay ultimately with 
Charles II, Ormond could ill afford to fall completely out o f  favour with those around 
him. He needed to restore this balance before his opponents could repeat 1667-9 and 
overwhelm the king with demands for his removal. In Ireland, by the end o f 
December, Ormond was doing all he could to protect the home front, enforcing a 
further range o f measures and appearing eager to get to the bottom o f the plot. It was 
equally important for him to also protect his position in London and towards this 
purpose, he was represented by several agents and political allies who worked 
towards a common aim, postulating the safety o f the Protestant interest within 
Ireland, what measures were being taken to secure it and combating any reports to 
the contrary. It is important to examine their actions, as they provide a further insight 
into position o f viceroy during this period.
158 Anon, The horrid conspiracy o f such impertinent traitors as intended a new rebellion in the 
kingdom o f Ireland (London, 1663); R. T., A true and perfect account o f the discovery o f  a barbarous 
and bloody plot lately carried on by the Jesuits in Ireland\ for the destroying o f  the duke o f  Ormond, 
his majesties lord lieutenant there. Sent over in a letter from Dublin, to a friend in London; and 
confirmed by several persons o f quality in that nation (London, 1679). The accused Jephson was 
obviously a person with a grudge against Ormond, as his confession later revealed, thus he would not 
have needed much encouragement to assassinate Ormond, if he was not already planning it for some 
time. Whether Ormond was aware of Jephson’s proceedings and decided to utilise them to his 
advantage, we can only speculate. There is however a simple explanation that Jephson, who may or 
may not have converted to the Catholic faith, was prevented from marrying a young Catholic heiress 
thereby improving his social standing. Now driven by revenge and a desire to obtain financial reward, 
he concocted a plot with a magistrate of Dublin city in which he accused several Jesuits of converting 
him to the Catholic faith and then persuading him to revenge his father’s execution and assure them of 
the truth of his convei ion by murdering Ormond. In return for which he would obtain a Catholic 
bride.
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Sir Robert Southwell’ s importance during the plot lay as Ormond’ s agent in 
London. He was sent transactions o f all affairs from Ormond, being especially 
entrusted to utilise his letters justifying his position vis-à-vis Catholicism, for 
instance, he made sure that news o f  Michael Jephson’ s plot was made public in 
England by inserting it in the ‘ gazette’ .159 In the House o f Commons, Southwell was 
Ormond’ s most vocal and important supporter, reprimanding Sir Thomas Lee on 2 
November 1678 for claiming that Ireland was still insecure despite Titus Oates 
revelations, which were reported to have been ‘not unseasonable’ .160 He prudently 
maintained correspondence with Orrery despite the latter’ s intrigues against Ormond 
and justified it by stating, ‘ I [Southwell] received some other observations, neither so 
unseasonable or material, and therefore suit my answers accordingly, for i f  I should 
quarrel down right I might not hear no more.’ 161 Southwell was thus able to supply 
Ormond with a constant stream o f information regarding Orrery’s intrigues and other 
potentially contentious issues. He encouraged Ormond to combat Orrery in 
essentially two ways, firstly, by sending over transactions o f  all affairs o f 
importance, for ‘giving frequent accounts o f  doing something on that side, will 
furnish your friends wherewithal to answer impertinent informations hither, which 
are to have the effect o f complaints.’ 162 Secondly, that those from whom the 
complaints emana+ed like Orrery, should not lack commissions or orders to exercise 
their supposed zeal because ‘then it would soon appear how much less active they 
were in reformation than in complaint.’ 163 It also appears that Southwell came up 
with the idea o f instituting a club for Ormond’ s followers as this letter from Ormond
159 Sir Robert Southwell to Ormond, 24 Dec. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 490-1.
160 Sir Robert Southwell to Ormond, 2 Nov. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 466-7; Stuart Handley, ‘Sir 
Thomas Lee, first baronet (bap. 1635, d. 1691) in Matthew and Harrison (ed.), OxfordD.N.B., xxxiii, 
pp 124-5; Lee (MP for Aylesbury) was a firm believer in the authenticity of the plot and later voted for 
the exclusion o f the duke of York from the throne in 1680.
161 Sir Robert Southwell to Ormond, 19 Nov. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 474-8.
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testifies, ‘ I offer to your club Sir Cyril Wyche, an honest gentleman and a good 
protestanf ,164 The purpose o f this club was to put in place an appropriate plan o f 
action to protect Ormond’s position at court.
Ossory was Ormond’ s formal representative at court, Council and the Lords. 
He used his influence at the start o f the plot to dispel initial threats and intrigues 
against Ormond. He did not hesitate to defend Ormond’s position in London 
launching an attack on Strafford’ s earlier remarks in the Lords by retorting ‘that what 
linkboys did (such as I supposed those actors were i f  any) was not worth minding.’ 165 
Ormond and his allies at court seemed not altogether satisfied with Ossory’s brash 
cavalier tactics given the contemporary state o f affairs. Ormond pressured him to
give more time and commitment to his cause, stating ‘I am o f [the] opinion you
should resign the charge you have in Holland’ . He also informed him:
When ju have a mind to be informed of the affairs of this place you 
must take the pains to be it sufficiently, and not venture your interposition 
in them without full information; if you do you will be under great 
disadvantage, and some will be glad to find you so.166 
In being so informed, Coventry, Southwell and Wyche would best serve him.
Ormond stressed the importance o f maintaining the utmost loyalty to the monarchy,
as he knew more than most where the ultimate decision to replace him rested. In late
November 1678, when the opposition in parliament were tiying to force Charles II to
divorce Queen Catherine after Oates alleged before them that she had engaged her
physician, Sir George Wakeman, to kill her husband, Ormond reminded Ossory:
I am sm e I need not now put you in mind of the great obligation you and
your family have to the queen, and how well it will become you to show
it at this time by diligent attendance and by all the services your greater 
duty to the king and country will permit.167
162 Sir Robert Southwell to Ormond, 16 Nov. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 472-4.
163 Ibid., pp 472-4.
164 Ormond to Sir Robert Southwell, 11 Nov. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, p. 279.
165 Ossory to Ormond, 23 Oct. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 219-20.
166 Ormond to Ossory, 26 Oct. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 222-3.
167 Ormond to Ossory, 4 Dec. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, p. 261.
5 7
Ossory carried out Ormond’ s commands and soon became a real asset at court 
during this period. On the morning o f  16 November 1678 he spoke to Charles II 
concerning rumours in London that ‘the French ambassador has given out that his 
master would see the Irish have the benefit o f  the peace the Catholics made with 
[Ormond]’ .168 In light o f this rumour, Ossory reminded him o f  a report from France 
o f ships being fitted out, o f ten thousand men moving to the coast and that Bernardin 
Gigault, marquis de Bellefonds, who had promoted a scheme for a diversion to be 
made on Ireland during the second Anglo-Dutch war was now back in favour at Saint 
Germain.169 Ossory begged Charles II to find out the truth behind these movements 
and afterwards i f  he saw cause, to provide for the security o f  Ireland. In regard to 
Dongan’ s regiment, he continued to pressurise Charles II. On 28 November after 
James Scott, duke o f Monmouth, had informed the Lords, that the kings orders for 
removing Catholics from the English army had been performed, Ossory publicly 
took occasion to enquire whether such orders might also be signified to MacCarthy’ s 
regiment. When the day’s business was finished, he spoke privately with the duke o f 
York, lord chancellor Finch and the duke o f Monmouth concerning Ormond’s fears 
and requested a guarantee that his father would not be inconvenienced by the absence 
o f  orders regarding Dongan’ s regiment.170 He undermined Orrery’ s intrigues in front 
o f the whole Privy Council by informing Charles II, how busy he ‘was in alarming 
all persons in Ireland and here with his informations o f the dangerous posture o f 
affairs by the desperate condition the Protestants and English took themselves to be
168 Ossory to Ormond, 16 Nov. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, p. 235.
169 Ossory to Ormond, 16 Nov. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, p. 235; François Bluche, LotusXIV  (Oxford,
1990), pp 126-7; Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, The Ancien Régime: a history o f  France, 1610-1774 
(English translation, Oxford, 1996), p. 170; the French court was still at Saint Germain as Versailles
was still being built and only finally completed in 1691.
170 Ossoiy to Ormond, 28 Nov. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, p. 246.
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in by the [...] evil designs o f the Irish.’ 171 This tactic was a success as Charles II 
replied with the following endorsement o f Ormond that ‘he knew him [Orrery] to be
» 1 7 9
a rogue, and that he would ever continue so.’
The other members o f Southwell’ s club played prominent roles in 
rehabilitating Ormond both with court and parliament at this time. The earl o f 
Longford hosted the majority o f  its meetings at his St James’s Square residence and 
on several occasions disseminated information throughout the Commons regarding 
Ormond’s proceedings.173 Sir Cyril Wyche played a far more prominent role, 
possibly because o f  his detailed knowledge and experience o f  Irish affairs dating 
from the time o f Essex’ s viceroyalty. This was why Ormond sent him to explain the 
proposed parliamentary bills to Charles II on 26 October and why Ormond later 
urged Ossory to seek his counsel.174 In the Commons he watched carefully as the true 
extent o f plot was revealed and informed Ormond on 26 October, that Oates had 
formally acquainted the House o f what part each man was to bear both in an Irish 
and English context. These he immediately relayed back to Ormond with the 
observation ‘ I thought it necessary your grace should have some account o f what 
strange scene is acting here.’ 175 He was foremost among those tackling Orrery’ s 
insinuations at ground level and was soon able to report to Ormond ‘though I find my 
lord Orrery’s agents have been busy in making insinuations, yet your grace’s 
proceedings cany those reasons with them that I meet with no man that is not fully 
satisfied.’ 176 Finally, Wyche was an innovative tactician encouraging Ormond for 
example on the benefits o f composing a narrative regarding his proceedings in
171 Ossory to Ormond, 26 Nov. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 243-4.
172 Ibid., pp 243-4.
173 Sir Cyril Wyche to Ormond, 26 Oct. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, p 221-2.
174 Ibid., pp 221-2; Ormond to Ossory, 26 Oct. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 223-4.
175 Sir Cyril Wyche to Ormond, 26 Oct. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, p. 222.
176 Sir Cyril Wyche to Ormond, 26 Nov. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, p. 244.
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response to the Catholic plot. Charles II could then view  the contemporary state o f 
the Irish kingdom allowing him to see in W yche’ s words,
[...] the utmost that can be done at present (till a parliament shall have 
provided further) for the safety of the nation; and when upon such a naked 
representation His majesty’s opinions and commands upon the whole 
shall be desired, I cannot see how your grace can suffer by any private 
whispers or insinuations.177
B y mid-December 1678, Ormond was also winning the battle against Orrery 
and his agents in London. Ossory informed his father, that ‘my lord o f Anglesey 
seemed much satisfied with a letter he told me he had received from you.’ 178 A  letter 
from Coventry dated 10 December reveals, however, that this improvement derived 
only partly from O m o n d ’ s protective measures but more so, from the highly charged 
atmosphere in London at this time. Ormond’s opponents had more important fish to 
fry, namely James, duke o f York, Thomas Osbourne, earl o f Danby, and Queen 
Catherine o f  Braganza. Coventry stated that
he [Orrery] writeth many circular letters to parliament men and lords of
the Council...but they make not as yet much noise, whether in respect of
your grace or disrespect to him, or what is worse, to expect a better
179opportunity, I cannot determine.
This is substantiated by a letter from Wyche at the end o f November wherein he
informed Ormond that he was unable to gain admittance to Charles II, for
[...] matters now begin to come to a crisis. Oates has gone as high in his 
accusation as he can possibly, for he has positively and upon oath before
the king and Council charged the queen herself with having consented to 
the death of the King.180
Titus Oates and another informer, Captain W illiam Bedloe, had concocted this 
accusation in the hope o f  reward because it would bring about a royal divorce, which 
was desperately sought by the opposition in parliament, allowing Charles II to
177 Sir Cyril Wyche to Ormond, 10 Dec. 1678, Ormonde MSS. iv, p. 270.
178 Ossory to Ormond, 10 Dec. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, p. 274.
' Henry Coventry to Ormond, 10 Dec. 1678, Ormonde MSS. iv, pp 268-9.
110 Sir Cyril Wyche to Ormond, 10 Dec. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, p. 270; Kenyon, The Popish Plot, pp 
126-7.
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remarry and produce an heir, thus preventing the crown from passing to his Catholic 
brother.181
This relaxation o f pressure against him in London appears to have moved 
Ormond into taking direct action against Orrery. He stated to Southwell,
[...] I have thought it high time for me to come to plain dealing with him,
that his professing to be my friend (perhaps to others as well as me) may
182not give credit to what he acts as an enemy.
The spark, which ignited it, was the issue o f the militia. In early December, Ormond 
had attempted to answer Orrery’s complaints in regard to the supposed negligence o f 
the Commissioners o f Array in Munster in constituting its militia by appointing 
governors in every county to command its militia. He also took on board Southwell’ s 
advice by according Orrery an opportunity to exercise his zeal. A s Major General o f 
the army, it would be his responsibility to decide cases o f  presidency between 
captains o f the militia and furthermore, upon emergencies, he was legally allowed to 
take command o f the militia as well as the army in Munster.183 Orrery continued to
express doubts however both in regard to the terms o f his new commission and the
posture o f the militia in Munster, so much so that Ormond was forced to send new
• 184
Commissions o f  Array and instructions into Munster.
On 17 December 1678, Ormond finally confronted Orrery after the latter once 
again expressed his disappointment over the delay in constituting the militia at the
beginning o f the plot. Ormond retorted,
All I can say of the setting up of the militia (to avoid bringing our 
discourse upon it into volumes) is that it was proceeded in as fast as the 
Council thought it convenient, that we held it our duty, immediately upon 
the kings pleasure signified by the order of Council of the 1st of October, 
to set forth the proclamation for the departure of the popish titular and
regular clergy, and in pursuance of his general directions to require the
popish laity to bring in their arms—whether this method or that your
181 K. H. D. Haley, The first earl o f  Shaftesbury (Oxford, 1968), pp 483-5; Kenyon, The Popish Plot, 
pp 125-30; Fraser, King Charles II, p. 363.
182 Ormond to Sir Robert Southwell, 18 Dec. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 282-3.
183 Bodl., Carte MS 118, ff 678-9.
184 Bodl., Carte MS 118, f. 166.
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lordship supposes would have been more safe and effectual would have 
been best, I have not leisure this way to debate185
Ormond conceded that every privy councillor had a right to advise and offer his 
opinions, however he pointed out to Orrery that his proceedings were not within 
these rights and as such were detrimental to both him and the rest o f the Council, for
[...] If any councillor, after acts of Council are past and emitted, shall say 
they should have come out sooner, or in other manner or method, when 
the time is irrecoverably elapsed and the acts impossible to be recalled, if 
he should be in the right, yet is he not overbold with his fellows, and is he 
very friendly to them and to what end can such remonstrances serve?
How can they be otherwise interpreted than to lay negligence, or 
weakness, or some worse fault upon the government, the foundations of 
accusations in proper time and hands?186
After chronicling Orrery’ s behaviour, Ormond finally confronted him stating,
[...] 1 must plainly declare that I do not understand how your lordships 
proceedings in this conjuncture is suitable to or in discharge of your 
renewed professions of friendships and favours to me, or yet a just return 
to the respect and freedom with which I began to treat you and correspond 
with you since my last coming to this government, in pursuance of my 
promise to your brother, my lord of Burlington.187
Ormond added further pressure by expressing his grievances to many o f 
Orrery’ s allies in London such as his brother, Richard Boyle, earl o f  Burlington. 
Such actions along with his plain dealing with Orrery were successful, for on 20 
December, Orrery wrote to Ormond wherein he solemnly swore that nothing had 
been further from his intentions than to traduce the Irish government. He added, ‘but 
since therein I have erred in your grace’s judgement, I am sorry. I am more plainly 
instructed in the way you like best, and your excellency shall have my obedience to 
it.’ 188 In London, Southwell reported a marked change in the letters and reports 
coming from Munster,
I have just now [...] read that of the 20l1' from Munster and that in a style 
quite metamorphosed, for it says [...] that the Protestants have of late 
been very hearty, the militia in all places being now mustering and setting
185 Ormond to Earl of Orrery, 17 Dec. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 278-81.
186 Ibid., pp 278-81.
187 Ibid., pp 278-81.
188 Bodl., Carte MS 118, ff 168-70.
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up, and several very welcome proclamations having been lately issued to 
animate them and mortify the papists.189
Ormond’s intensive efforts to combat Orrery’ s zeal for the Protestant interest and 
perceptions o f such both in Ireland and England was only part o f  the reason for his 
improved position with regard to Orrery, London and Catholicism. That Ormond 
him self was perfectly aware o f  this can be discerned from his comments to Henry 
Bennet, earl o f Arlington, regarding his Pen War with Orrery, ‘our skirmish seems to 
be come to a period, and compared with the great things now on foot, is but a storm 
in a cream bowl.’ 190 The danger to Ormond’ s position had been defeated, but his 
insecurity in regard to changing politics in London had been clearly demonstrated. 
The development o f  a similar state o f affairs would once again allow his opponents 
opportunities to remove him from the office o f  viceroy.
189 Sir Robert Southwell to Ormond, 31 Dec. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 494-6.
I9U Ormond to earl of Arlington, 28 Dec. 1678, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 291-2.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE REALIGNMENT OF THE STUART POLITY, 1679.
64
The purpose o f  this chapter is to demonstrate the inherent weaknesses in the 
position o f James Butler, duke o f  Ormond and lord lieutenant o f  Ireland, because o f 
political events in London and Scotland in 1679, as the full political fallout o f  the events 
o f  1678 discussed in the previous chapter became clear. These were in chronological 
order: the fall o f  Charles II’ s chief minister, Thomas Osbourne, earl o f Danby, the partial 
resolution o f political and religious strife in Scotland after the Battle o f  Bothwell Brig, 22 
June 1679, and finally the sharpening o f the exclusion crisis after the return o f  James, 
duke o f York, to London on 2 September 1679. During these periods, Ormond’ s standing 
in regard to a series o f fixed points such as the court and parliament in London and 
Protestants in Ireland, was distorted, and his unique position in regard to Catholicism was 
further highlighted. Furthermore, the king upon whom he depended for support was put 
in a very awkward position whereby Charles II was forced to countenance many o f  his 
bitter enemies. A s such, Ormond was compelled to undertake a series o f  drastic 
measures, that under normal circumstances he would not, to safeguard his interests and 
offices. He altered his stance towards Catholics in Ireland, manipulated the press in 
various ways, confiscated letters o f perceived opponents and finally attempted 
reconciliation with former enemies. A t the same time whilst emphasising the various 
mechanisms and strategies that Ormond and his allies in London adopted to secure his 
position, it must be highlighted that they were only partially effective. The re­
establishment o f  his position in all cases examined below actually resulted from the 
contrivance o f  political events over which he had no say and was powerless to effect. In 
the first Exclusion Parliament the breakdown in the relationship between the Lords and 
the Commons and the contentious nature o f  the exclusion bill divided many o f his 
opponents. Deep divisions within the English Privy Council and the escalation o f  tension 
between Episcopalians and Presbyterians in Scotland further strengthened his position.
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Moreover in late autumn, Ormond’ s removal from office was only prevented, by a 
fortuitous, i f  unexpected royal invitation to James, duke o f  York, to return to supervise 
Scotland. Betokening a shift in royal policy this upturn in the fortunes o f  Ormond’s key 
ally was accompanied by the removal o f Shaftesbury from office and the prorogation o f 
the English parliament till the following January.
In late December 1679 the English crown’s run o f  good fortune ended as a series o f 
blunders came back to haunt it. The most important o f  these were letters produced in 
parliament by Ralph Montagu, the former English ambassador to France. These letters 
proved Danby’ s duplicity, as he had been in negotiations with France that previous year 
whilst simultaneously asking parliament for funds to fight Louis XIV. The effect o f  such 
revelations was utter pandemonium, the Lords were furious whilst an enraged Commons 
tried to impeach Danby, though his allies and the bishops in the Lords defeated it.1 The 
resultant deadlock between both houses put Charles II in a very awkward situation; there 
was little chance that the Commons would now pass a supply bill, which he desperately 
required, to disband part o f the army. Instead he was faced with the possibility o f more 
embarrassing secrets being revealed. The king therefore took the decision on 27 
December 1678 to prorogue parliament till 4 February, which was subsequently extended 
to 25 February. This decision shocked many even within his court, as it was a clear 
indication that he was protecting Danby. Furthermore, it was seen as a tactic for the 
continuance o f a standing army and preventing any further investigation into the plot 
especially since two new witnesses, Stephen Dugdale and Miles Prance came forward at 
the end o f  December and corroborated the evidence o f Oates and Bedloe. These actions 
sowed the seeds o f deep distrust hitherto not held towards the monarchy since the third
1 K. H. D. Haley, The first earl o f Shaftesbury (London, 1968), pp 487-91; G. M. Trevelyan, England under 
the Stuarts (paperback edn, London, 2002); J. R. Jones, Country and court, England 1658-1714 (London, 
1978), p p  203-4.
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Anglo-Dutch war. London was full o f wild rumours that the country had been sold to the 
French, which were fuelled by the lord mayor’ s actions in chaining the streets and 
doubling the guards.3 It was reported by correspondents from France, that ‘the king o f 
England had left his parliament and betaken him self to an island, and that the French king 
was coming over with thirty thousand men to succour him.’4 Henry Coventry sent 
Ormond a copy o f  a letter he received from an officer sent to view  the French naval 
preparations at Brest, with the following ominous warning ‘ it is said the Baltic is 
intended, but our exchange will hardly find merchants will ensure England or Ireland.’5 
In Ireland, Ormond’ s brief respite created by the political manoeuvrings at the end 
o f 1678 was over. Fears o f  absolutism and anti-Catholicism returned to the fore o f  
English politics. On 14 January, an informer swore before the English Privy Council that 
he had lately heard Jesuit correspondence read aloud which intimated that Ireland was to 
be invaded along with England.6 Henry Coventry’ s sources convinced him that Ireland 
was Louis X IV ’s sole target, ‘Mr Brisban’s letter [...] and our Amsterdam letters confirm 
[...] that the design is Ireland’ .7 This climate o f uncertainty gave fresh alarm to Orrery 
and he wrote several letters to Ormond and other members o f the Irish Privy Council 
complaining that in the light o f a French invasion which was daily expected, the 
preparations to meet it were still insufficient. He likewise reiterated his former 
suggestions regarding the removal o f  Catholics from towns and the apprehension o f their 
nobles and clergy, stating to Michael Boyle, that
2 John Kenyon, The Popish Plot (London, 1972), p. 151. Miles Prance accused two lay Catholics Robert 
Green and Lawrence Hill and a Protestant named Henry Berry of murdering Sir Edmund Berry Godfrey.
3 John Kenyon, Stuart England (London, 1978), p. 229; Referred to in Ronald Hutton, Charles the Second, 
king o f  England, Scotland and Ireland (Oxford, 1989), p. 365; Haley, The first earl o f  Shaftesbury, pp 495- 
6.
,l Joseph Williams to Henry Coventry, 1 Jan. 1679, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 297-8.
5 Henry Coventry to Ormond, 7 Jan. 1679, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 296-7.
6 Henry Coventry to Ormond, 14 Jan. 1679, Ormonde MSS, iv, p. 303; Bodl., Carte MS 228, f. 147; There 
were also reports from Portugal at this time that there was of a squadron of Spanish ships carrying troops 
intended for Ireland.
7 Henry Coventry to Ormond, 11 Feb. 1679, Ormonde MSS, iv, 322.
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tis hardly to be [...] believed that they [the French] will engage in such a 
design but on assurance of a great party in this place either to join with 
them at their landing or to surprise some good places at remote distances
g
for them against they come, or a little before their invasion.
He pointed out to Boyle that it was apparent both to him and to the poor Protestants o f 
Munster that this could be easily effected. There were multitudes o f  Catholics within the 
walls o f  every seaport in that province, apart from Cork, and the surrounding countryside 
was full o f  Catholic clergy and gentry who were eager to regain possession o f  lands they 
had previously forfeited.9 With his recent pen war with Orrery in mind, Ormond took 
great care to have Michael Boyle answer his fears, whilst at the same time sending copies 
o f B oyle’s recent correspondence with Orrery to London, stating to Southwell, ‘because 
that good lord seldom covers his candle under a bushel and may have prepared that 
discourse for other eyes and uses than my lord chancellor’ s and mine’ .10
These uncertain times brought many more opponents and critics out o f the 
woodwork. In Cork, Lieutenant John Chinnery, a justice o f the peace for the said county, 
openly declared that Ormond had done ill in suppressing a late design by the Dublin 
apprentices for putting down Mass houses there.11 Captain Francis Annesley, half brother 
to Arthur Annesley, earl o f  Anglesey, was found to be dispersing libels against Ormond 
under the title o f  ‘ intelligence from a Privy Councillor o f  Ireland’ . Captain W illiam 
Ivory o f  Ross was reputed to be scattering twenty-four anonymous articles about the 
country, which he received from a secretary in Dublin Castle. These articles accused 
Ormond o f direct involvement in the plot alleging, for instance, that Ossory’ s return to 
Ireland that previous winter had nothing to do with the military matters but rather to see 
how ready the Catholics were to cut the throats o f the Protestants. It was further alleged
8 Earl of Orrery to Lord Chancellor Boyle, 28 Feb. 1679, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 337-8
9 Ibid., pp 337-8.
10 Bodl., Carte MS 118, ff. 186-7; Ormond to Sir Robert Southwell, 8 Mar. 1679, Ormonde MSS, ii, pp 
284-5.
1‘Richard Aldworth to Ormond, 3 Mar. 1679, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 340-1.
12 Bodl., Carte MS 146, f. 158.
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that despite several proclamations to the contrary, Catholic lords, such as Dongan, 
Clanricarde, Purcell, Dempsey and Dillon, regularly attended Ormond and Arran in 
Dublin Castle, where they played cards till three in the morning. It is evident from the 
wording o f  many o f these articles that they were drawn up specifically for English 
audiences,
the papists here told us before Christmas that your parliament was to be 
prorogued or dissolved before the 31SI of December [...] We hear the 
commissions taken at Chester were to raise the Irish to cut the throats of 
the parliament, yours and ours. God deliver us both.14
Many similar libels were found to be emanating from the Netherlands, and Coventry
discovered that they were ‘ addressed to the same men that are disposers o f those that
come from Ireland’ , o f whom one was found to be a certain Bonnell who was a ‘constant 
and dangerous correspondent’ with the ill-affected in Ireland.15
In England the elections that followed the dissolution o f  parliament were a 
complete disaster for the crown, as most o f  Danby’ s followers from the Cavalier 
parliament were not re-elected.16 Ormond’s position was likewise eroded as many o f his 
supporters were removed. On 4 March 1679 Henry Thynne informed him, ‘my Lord 
Longford has just now returned from Surrey where he has lost his election, though he has 
spent, I believe, at least £1500 or £2000’ .17 Ormond’ s position was further diminished as 
Charles II took a ^eries o f precautionary measures to improve his position vis-à-vis the 
opposition in parliament by bringing figures more amenable to them into government. 
Ossory wrote to his father, ‘I am told Mr Secretary Coventry is to be removed, and that
13 Anonymous accusations against Ormond, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 361-4; Bodl., Carte MS 118, ff 188-9.
14 Ibid., pp 361-4.
15 Henry Coventry, 21 Jan. 1679, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 306-7; Ormond to Henry Coventry, 22 Jun. 1679,
Ormonde MSS, v, p. 142; D. W. Hayton, ‘James Bonnell (1653-1699)’ in Matthew and Harrison (ed.), 
Oxford D.N.D., vi, pp 551-2. This is almost certainly James Bonnell, a non-conformist who spent part of his 
youth in Ireland. In 1673, he graduated with a BA from St Catherine’s College, Cambridge and crucially he 
had spent the whole of 1678 in the United Provinces as a tutor to Ralph Freeman, the son of a Hertfordshire 
politician.
Antonia Fraser, King Charles II (London, 1979), p. 366; Hutton, Charles the Second, king o f  England, 
Scotland and Ireland, pp 367-8; Barry Coward, The Stuart age, England 1603-1714 (3rd edition, London, 
2003), pp 320-1; Jones Country and court, England 1658-1714, pp 206-7.
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Sir Lionel Jenkins was to have succeeded him; but now that Sir W illiam  Temple is fixed
upon.’ 18 Temple refused to replace Coventry who kept his job, but the latter by his own
words was already in the political wilderness by this stage, ‘ concerning his [Ryder’s] 
negotiations here he w ill best acquaint you himself, for I have not o f late been invited to 
any o f  those meetings.’ 19 Ormond’s anxiety heightened as Charles II contemplated 
removing him from the post o f lord steward, and using it to gratify James Cecil, earl o f  
Salisbury.20 Ormond was determined not to lose such an important position in the king’ s 
household without adequate compensation, especially since, as he intimated to Ossory, he 
expected to be attacked by the disaffected party in parliament. He elaborated more on its 
importance during that juncture to Coventry, stating
The staff, as slender as it is, is no small support to me in the state of
affairs here, and would certainly be a great one taken from me,
contending as I do against those that would be glad to see any sign of the
21diminution of my credit with my master.
This anticipated move did not develop and on 18 February 1679, Ossory informed him, ‘ I
22find the king very kind, and hear no more o f the matter.’
Charles II tried to relieve another source o f  tension between the crown and the 
political nation by appearing to be convinced o f  the reality o f  the Popish Plot. He signed 
the death warrants for two o f  the three Jesuits convicted upon the information o f  Oates, 
Bedloe and Stephen Dugdale, and, on 28 February 1679, he issued instructions ordering
17 Henry Thynne to Ormond, 4 Mar. 1679, Ormonde MSS, iv, p. 341.
18 Ossory to Ormond, 15 Feb. 1679, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 324-5
19 Henry Coventry to Ormond, 28 Feb. 1679, Ormonde MSS, iv, p. 355; G. E. Aylmer, ‘The first duke of 
Ormond as patron and administrator’ in Toby Barnard and Jane Fenlon (ed.), The dukes o f  Ormond, 1610- 
1745 (London, 2000), p. 126; William Ryder was another individual who was entrusted with the second 
farm of the Irish revenue however he fell out with Sir James Shaen over the running of it and with 
Ormond’s support attempted to gain control over the syndicate.
20 Kenyon, The Popish Plot, p. 154; through this initiative Charles II intended to re-establish his position in 
relation to the English political nation by trying the Catholic lords and others accused of complicity in the 
plot in the absence of parliament before a select group of peers nominated by a lord steward who was not 
linked to either Danby or the duke of York.
21 Ormond to Ossory, 14 Feb 1679, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 323-4; John Miller, James 11 (Yale, 2000), p. 91.
22 Ossory to Ormond, 18 Feb. 1679, Ormonde MSS, iv, p. 327.
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the duke o f  York to go abroad. He also showed concern for the security o f  his 
Protestant subjects in his western kingdom. On 25 February Ossory learned that he 
twenty companies o f foot were being sent to Ireland.24 This body o f  men, or Dumbarton’ s 
regiment as contemporaries called it, was a nuisance as far as Ormond was concerned. 
First, it raised the annual establishment budget by nearly £20,000, an increase the Irish 
revenues could ill afford which ultimately forced Ormond to suspend payments on 
pensions for several months.25 Secondly, with the fever o f  the plot reaching its peak, 
Charles II was sending over a regiment tainted with popery, as it had previously fought
• 96
under the banner o f Louis X IV and its commander was reputed to be a Catholic. This 
was something Ormond perfectly understood stating to Ossory
it is not unknown what my Lord Dumbarton’s religion is, and that tho’ all
his men and officers should be Protestants, yet their having been much
under his command will render them suspected, and consequently very 
27unwelcome at this time.
They would thus occasion the suspicions and instant hostility o f  Irish Protestants and 
because o f  this, be almost impossible to billet.
Ormond was worried by the manoeuvres both by the crown and opposition across 
the water. In London’s coffee houses there had been widespread criticism o f 
Dumbarton’s regiment who were said to be pro-French and crypto-papists, furthermore, it 
was alleged that Ormond had sought such an addition. Ormond conceded to Ossory that it 
was impossible to escape such criticism, as
Those who take the boldness to asperse my lord chancellor and me 
[Ormond] as papists without colour will lay hold on such an instance as 
this, and be able to make worse use of it than of anything that has yet 
happened; for it will not easily be believed [...] that such an election and
23 Hutton, Charles the Second, king o f England, Scotland and Ireland, pp 366-8; Bodl., Carte MS 81, f. 
609; Kenyon, The Popish Plot, p. 164; Charles II ordered the execution of two of the three Jesuits 
convicted on Oates’s information on 24 January, William Ireland and John Grove.
24 Ossory to Ormond, 25 Feb, 1679, Ormonde MSS. iv, p. 333.
25 Aydelotte, ‘The duke of Ormond and the English government of Ireland, 1677-85’, p. 196.
26 M. R. Glozier, ‘George Douglas, earl of Dumbarton (c. 1636-1692)’ in Matthew and Harrison (ed.), 
Oxford DM. B., xvi, pp 550-1; Douglas took military service under Louis XIV in 1656 and by 1677 he had 
risen to the rank of lieutenant general in the French army.
27 Ormond to Ossory, 8 Mar. 1679, Ormonde MSS, iv, p. 354.
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reinforcement would be made with consulting me and without my 
inclination.28
The rapidly changing atmosphere in London alarmed Ormond’s supporters who informed
9Q
him o f ‘many libels spread abroad and put into the hands [...] o f  parliament men’ . 
Ossory found many discontented from Ireland keeping great company with leading 
opposition figures like Anthony Ashley Cooper, earl o f  Shaftesbury, especially Roderick
TO
Mansell, whom Ormond had cashiered out o f  the Irish army the previous year. 
Southwell discovered that a club o f Adventurers and their associates met in London 
where many things were brewed and fomented for the lords that desired to speak on the 
subject o f Ireland, in particular ‘at the prodigious grants he [Ormond] has had from the 
king and the public in Ireland’ .31 Finally, with the convening o f  parliament approaching, 
many eminent figures within the House o f  Lords such as Charles Powlett, marquis o f 
Winchester, were deeply suspicious o f Ormond as the duke o f  York had sponsored his 
appointment. They also noted that Colonel John Fitzpatrick had held several private 
meetings with Edward Coleman when he was negotiating Ormond’ s return and that 
Ormond him self had discoursed privately with Arundel o f  Wardour at Bedford’ s house in 
1677.32 In light o f  these developments and his contemporary situation, his supporters in 
London advised him to draw up a list o f ready answers to combat potential accusations 
that might be lodged against him in parliament.
Ormond disagreed with their suggestions stating to Ossory
38 Ibid., p. 354.
29 Ormond to Ossory, 20 Mar. 1679, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 364-5.
30 Roderick Mansell to earl of Arran, 29 Dec. 1677, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 94-5; p. 99; p. 107; p. 117; 
Mansell became associated with a discredited Presbyterian minister, William Douglas. He further 
ostracised himself by making libellous accusations against the Lord Marshall of the Irish army, Arthur 
Forbes, earl of Granard, that he favoured non-conformists in the southwest of Scotland who were opposed 
to the Restoration Religious settlement there.
11 Memorandum on public affairs by Sir Robert Southwell, 19 Apr. 1679, Ormonde MSS, iv, preface, pp 
xviii-xxxiv.
’2 Ibid., pp xxii-xxiii; Ossory to Ormond, 25 Mar, 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 1-2; Arundel of Wardour was 
one of several English Roman Catholic peers accused by Oates of planning the plot.
32 Ibid., pp xxii-xxiii.
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most of them I have seen are so false, and the rest so foolish, that no man 
that knows me; my way of life, and this country, but is able to refute them 
[...] so that I do not think it is fit to anticipate my defence by answers any 
further than I have done in letters to some friends which they can 
announce when and where they think fit.34
Mis private views on his contemporary circumstances can be discerned from a letter to his
near relation and confidante, George Mathews, that
if such intelligence from hence as this [...] I send you a copy shall gain
credit in the House of Commons, I have no reason to expect that my stay
35here will be long; and therefore I am to prepare for a remove.
This attitude certainly explains his actions in the weeks prior to parliament; Ossory was 
commissioned to ask Charles’s advice concerning the libels and also whether he would
TA
command his place-men in the Commons to get Ormond fair play at least. Southwell 
was pressed to make use o f his connections to discover the origin and destination o f  the 
libels, whilst in Ireland, Ormond sought to do likewise by having Captain Annesley’ s
papers seized.37 Ormond also attempted to do everything within his power to prevent
further accusations and sent Mathews the following hint enclosed within a full copy o f 
the accusations against him, ‘upon the view  o f  this letter most o f  the papist lords and 
gentlemen forbear coming to the castle, half that discretion at first would have been more 
useful.’38 Finally, he commissioned an unnamed non-conformist to write a long letter 
intended for publication countering the various accusations against his government. It 
was titled a letter from a dissenter to his friend against the calumnies [ in relation to the
39government o f Ireland] thrown upon the duke o f Ormond.
In England political tension grew, Danby had quarrelled with the Commons over 
the issue o f the speaker-ship and soon all hopes o f co-operation with a relatively
j4 Onnond to Ossory, 20 Mar. 1679, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 364-5.
j5 Ormond to George Mathew, 11 Mar. 1679. Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 354-5,
36 Ormond to Ossory, 20 Mar. 1679, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 364-5.
37 Bodl., Carte MS 146, f. 158; Ormond to Sir Robert Southwell, 1 Mar. 1679, Ormonde MSS, ii, p. 284.
38 Ormond to George Mathew, 11 Mar. 1679, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 354-5.
39 Bodl., Carte MS 115, ff 190-5.
7 3
inexperienced parliament were lost.40 Charles II compounded matters by allowing the 
despised Danby, who lay under impeachment for high treason to retire with a marquisate 
and a pension 41 Shaftesbury took notice in the Lords ‘that he heard a person under so 
black a character as high treason was to be promoted’ .42 George Savile, earl o f  Halifax 
followed him by presuming it so improbable, ‘nay so monstrous, that he gave no credit to 
it.’43 Danby resigned in the face o f this pressure and surrendered to parliament in April to 
prevent being attainted. His fall had enormous ramifications; not least it disturbed a set o f 
political relations that had been relatively consistent since 1674 44 Three politicians soon 
filled this vacuum, James, duke o f Monmouth, Robert Spencer, earl o f  Sunderland, and 
Sir William Temple. This triumvirate as they became known sought to stabilise politics 
by conciliating many o f the crown’s leading opponents, a move that could not but further 
undermine Ormond’ s position in London.45 A s in 1667, it was expected that the fall o f 
the supreme minister in England would be followed by that o f  his counterpart in Ireland; 
many that had been among the leading critics o f Ormond’ s government during the latter
half o f 1678, such as Shaftesbury, Halifax and Thomas Bennet, now held sway in
parliament.46 The important question that remained was whether this coalition could 
make use o f complaints against his government to create conditions at court and 
parliament that would persuade or even compel Charles II to believe that a change in the 
Irish viceroyalty was in the royal interest.
This question was posed several days after Danby’ s resignation. Shaftesbury was 
determined to divert parliament’ s attention from the politically ruined Danby to the more
40 Hutton, Charles the Second, king o f  England, Scotland and Ireland, pp 368-9; Jones, Country and court, 
England 1658-1714, p. 207.
41 Haley, The first earl o f Shaftesbury, pp 503-7.
42 Colonel Edward Cooke to Onnond, 18 Mar. 1679, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 359-60.
43 Ibid., pp 359-60.
44 Hutton, Charles the second, king o f England, Scotland and Ireland, pp 368-9.
45 Ibid., pp 370-1.
46 Ibid., pp 370-1; Haley, The first earl o f Shaftesbury, pp 506-7.
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important issue o f  succession.47 He attempted to do this by bringing the Popish Plot and 
alleged Catholic conspiracies back to the fore in the Lords and where better to derive 
such complaints, but Ireland. On 22 March, at a committee o f  examinations about the 
plot, drawn up after both houses ‘expressed great concern and zeal against papists and 
popery’ , Halifax pressed Lord Strafford to speak o f  the dangerous condition o f  Ireland. 
Afterwards Shaftesbury ‘ shook his head and said he did not like the management o f 
affairs there.’49 On 25 March, Shaftesbury openly attacked Ormond in the Lords during a 
motion into ‘the state o f  the nation’ . He remarked in a speech based on one o f  the lesser- 
studied books o f  the bible that
We [England] have a little sister, and she hath no breasts; what shall we 
do for our sister in the day, she shall be spoken for? If  she be a wall, we
will build on her a palace of silver; if she be a door, we will enclose her 
with bonds of cedar’.
Shaftesbury then proceeded to identify the ‘ little sisters without breasts’ as the Huguenots
in France, who were ‘the only wall and defence to England’ , and the kingdoms o f
Scotland and Ireland as the ‘two doors, either to let in good or m ischief upon us’ .50 After 
a brief pause, he then proceeded to attack the government o f John Maitland, duke o f 
Lauderdale in Scotland. As for Ireland, he sarcastically pointed out that Douglas’s 
regiment, which had formerly fought for the French had been sent there to secure its 
Protestants.51 The seaports and inland towns were full o f Catholics who had lately been 
restored to their aims and all this, when there was a wicked plot in existence to destroy 
the Protestant religion and subvert the monarchy. Shaftesbury put it to the Lords ‘that this
47 Haley, The first earl o f  Shaftesbury, p. 510.
48 Ossory to Ormond, 22 Mar. 1679, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 366-7; Colonel Edward Cooke to Ormond, 22 
Mar. 1679, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 368- 71.
49 Ibid., pp 366-7;Ibid„ pp 368- 71.
50 Bodl., Carte MS 72, ff 470-1; Thomas Carte, An history o f  the life o f  James duke o f  Ormonde from his 
birth to his death in 1688 (3 vols, London, 1736), ii, appendix p. 90; Haley, The first earI o f  Shaftesbury, pp 
509-11; This author gives a detailed account of this speech in both a Scottish and Irish context. The book of 
the bible used by Shaftesbury was the Song o f  Songs, viii, pp 8-9; Shaftesbury’s speech in the House of 
Lords on 25 March 1679 was later printed in 1688 under the following title; Anon, The English states­
mans the Protestant oracle being the earl o f  Shaftesbury's famous speech... (London, 1688)
51 He almost certainly meant Dumbarton’s regiment.
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kingdom cannot long continue in the English hands, i f  some better care be not taken o f
• • •
it.’ He therefore encouraged them to take Ireland into their consideration when they
were making laws for England as ‘there can be no safety here [England] i f  these doors be
not shut up and made sure.’
Ossory sprung to his father’ s defence attacking the accusation that Dumbarton’s 
regiment was riddled with Catholics, replying ‘that the duke o f Monmouth being general 
could answer, as [...] he undertook that all officers and soldiers were Protestants and had 
taken oaths’ .54 He then proceeded to respond to Shaftesbury’ s speech announcing to the 
House
1 am very sorry, and do much wonder to find that noble lord so apt to 
reflect upon my father, when he is so pleased to mention the affairs of
Ireland. It is well known that he was the chief person that sustained the
king’s and the Protestant interest, when the Irish rebellion first broke 
out.55
Ossory highlighted the fact that both Charles I and English parliament were so satisfied 
with his father’ s services that parliament had voted him a rich jew el after the battle o f 
Kilrush, and that during the Interregnum Charles II had depended upon him to rescue the 
young duke o f Gloucester from being converted to Catholicism in Paris.56 After 
highlighting several more examples o f Ormond’ s zeal for the Protestant interest, Ossory 
shifted his line o f  response by indirectly condemning Shaftesbury’ s history vis-à-vis that 
same interest, ‘having spoke o f what he [Ormond] has done, I presume with the same
52 Anon, The English states-mans the Protestant oracle being the earl o f Shaftesbury's famous 
speech... (London, 1688).
53 Ibid.
54 Ossory to Ormond, 25 Mar. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 1-2.
55 Carte, An history o f the life o f James duke o f  Ormonde from his birth to his death in 1688, ii, appendix p. 
90.
56 J. C. Beckett, The cavalier duke: a life o f  James Butler, f  duke o f Ormond (Belfast, 1990), p. 26; The 
battle of Kilrush took place on 15 April 1642; Anon., The last joyful news from Ireland. Wherein is related, 
a most famous and victorious battle between the Protestants and the rebels, at Kilrush in the county o f  
Kildare: At which place the English with 3000foot and horse, valiantly set upon the enemies, being 12000 
in number, kilted near upon 600 o f them, look abundance o f arms and ammunition from them, and brought 
3 heads o f  their chief commanders to Dublin... (London, 1642).
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truth to tell your lordships, what he has not done.’ He never advised the breaking up o f 
the Triple League, a Protestant alliance comprising England, Holland and Sweden. In 
1672, he refused to support the Declaration o f Toleration and the falling out with the 
Dutch and the alliance with France against them. Finally, Ormond was not the author o f 
‘Delenda est Carthago that Holland, a Protestant country, should contrary to the true 
interest o f England be totally destroyed’ .58 Ossory finished by begging the lords present 
to judge his father and all men, ‘ according to their actions and council.’59
Ossory’s outburst put Shaftesbury on the defensive and he protested that his 
reflection was not intended to implicate Ormond, but Colonel John Fitzpatrick, who was 
the ‘ single person which could not be understood to be the duke’ .60 Despite this, Ossory 
failed to edify the House o f  Lords who moved ‘that inquiry be made what care is taken 
for the safety and preservation o f  his majesty’ s kingdom o f  Ireland at this time o f
danger’ .61 He was ordered to give the House an account on 31 March o f  what Ormond
•  • 62 * had done since the discovery o f  the plot for the security o f the Protestant interest. This
order disturbed Ormond’ s agents in London. W yche informed him that ‘the best account
his lordship [Ossory] will be able to give will be but an imperfect one, and therefore not
such as w ill be fully for your grace’ s service’ .63 Longford was o f the opinion that this was
a matter to be well considered before Ossory delivered it to the House ‘because the state
o f Ireland is desired by some not so much to receive satisfaction from your grace’s
57 Carte, An history o f the life o f James duke o f Ormonde from his birth to his death in 1688, ii, appendix p. 
90.
55 Ibid., p. 90.
y> Carte, An history o f  the life o f  James duke o f  Ormonde from his birth to his death in 1688, ii, appendix p. 
90; The declaration of Toleration 1672 was another facet of the pro French and pro Catholic policy adopted 
by Charles II after the treaty of Dover, May 1670. It removed all the penal laws against Catholics and 
Protestant dissenters; J. D. Davies, ‘Thomas Butler, sixth earl of Ossory (1634-1680),’ in Matthew and 
Harrison (ed.), Oxford D.N.B., ix, pp 226-9; Ossory and Shaftesbury had a history of mutual antagonism. 
For instance, in 1667 during a heated debate on the issue of Irish beef being imported into London, Ossory 
was forced to withdraw from the House of Lords after labelling Shaftesbury a Cromwellian collaborator.
60 Captain John St Ledger to Henry Gascoigne, 1 Apr. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, p.23.
61 Bodl., Carte 72, ff 486-7.
62 Bodl., Carte 72, f. 487; pages 477-88 are also very informative as they supply notes of the proceedings of 
the House of Lords upon the state of Ireland during late March and early April.
77
proceedings there as to find an occasion o f  carping at them to prejudice your grace.’64 
Ormond concurred with Longford’ s opinion stating to Mathews that i f  Ossory’ s decision 
was voluntary, he was too forward. I f  it was required o f  him, he might well have desired 
time to inform him o f the House’ s pleasure, ‘that I [Ormond] being most concerned 
might have some knowledge o f what was expected from me, and have time to prepare 
and transmit it to them’ .65 He intimated these views to Ossory with the following 
observation, ‘ I presume you have not bound yourself and much less me to what you can 
then produce’ .66
Despite Ormond’ s misgivings, Ossory and other supporters took a series o f  drastic 
and necessary measures before 31 March to safeguard his interest. Ossory sought out and 
told the marquis o f Winchester that he hoped Ormond’ s prior services might secure him 
from any suspicions and that reflections would not be made or aspersions laid upon him 
without some grounds.67 He accosted Charles II in parliament, after the heated session o f 
the 25 March, and produced before him, in front o f several lords, a letter from Ormond 
that specified the recruits he desired were to be English Protestants.68 Longford and 
Coventry reiterated the importance o f  Ormond’s son, the earl o f Arran, in such times; he 
was an eyewitness to all transactions, and ‘can answer any objections that shall be made 
better than any upon the place here’ .69 Arran was also a member o f  the Lords and 
entitled to attend its committee o f Irish affairs when he pleased. Most importantly he had 
good credit with Charles II, and as such ‘has the ready method o f  finding opportunities to 
speak to his majesty, and preventing the impressions that may be made by
63 Sir Cyril Wyche to Ormond, 29 Mar. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 5.
64 Earl of Longford to Ormond, 29 Mar. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 3-5.
65 Ormond to Captain George Mathews, 5 Apr. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 30.
66 Ormond to Ossory, 31 Mar. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 13-5.
67 Paraphrased from the following letter, Ossory to Ormond, 25 Mar. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 1-2.
68 Ibid., pp 1-2.
69 Earl of Longford to Ormond, 29 Mar. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 3-5
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misrepresentations o f things.’ It is also evident that Ormond’s supporters club sprung 
into action again; Southwell and Ossory requested the earl o f  Longford, Sir Cyril Wyche, 
Henry Coventry and Colonel Edward Vernon, newly arrived from Ireland, to meet them 
at Ossory’s lodgings on 30 March and to carry with them all the proclamations and letters 
they had received from Ireland since the discovery o f  the plot. W yche deemed that these 
actions would serve only as a delaying mechanism, and thus desired Ormond to send over 
a more complete narrative, ‘which will at once satisfy their lordships and clearly answer 
all those scandalous libels or false reports or malicious interpretations which have filled 
the town’ .71
Ormond had prudently undertaken such a design when he heard o f  the resolution 
taken in the House o f Lords on 25 March. B y 5 April 1679, a full narrative o f his 
proceedings since the discovery o f  the plot had been drawn up, endorsed by the Irish 
Council and transmitted to England.72 This document is a clear acknowledgement that 
Ormond understood how events in England had altered his position in relation to the 
king, court, parliament, and English and Irish Protestants. Ormond recognized that unless 
he undertook a series o f drastic measures, which under normal circumstances he would 
not, he would be at the very least, greatly inconvenienced. It contained no acts or details 
o f actions against Catholicism from the end o f December 1678 to February 1679, while 
the month o f March 1679 is littered with a constant stream o f acts and proclamations. On 
31 March 1679, the day that Ormond received a copy o f  Shaftesbury’ s speech in the 
Lords, the lord mayor and sheriffs o f  Dublin were finally ordered to suppress Mass 
houses throughout the city and its suburbs. The removal o f Catholic inhabitants from 
Galway, Limerick, Waterford, Kilkenny, Clonmel and Drogheda was likewise ordered, 
except for those necessary for the said towns and garrisons. This was a massive
70 Ibid., pp 3-5.
71 Ibid., pp 3-5; Sir Cyril Wyche to Ormond, 29 Mar. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 5.
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turnaround in policy, as Ormond had written several letters over the previous six months 
in which he stated the reasons that forbade the persecution o f  Catholics in Dublin and 
other cities and towns in Ireland as in England.73 Ormond’s anxiety at this time can also 
be perceived from the tough stance, which he adopted in regard to two persistent 
problems within the Irish kingdom: the large number o f  Catholic clergy present in the 
country, and the discontented Catholic lords, turned bandit, who were termed tories by 
contemporaries. Ormond issued a proclamation promising £5 sterling for every friar, and 
£10 sterling for every Jesuit, bishop and archbishop apprehended; whilst the parish 
priests and nearest relations o f every tory were to be committed to prison till the said 
rebels were captured or killed.74 These measures shocked many Catholics in Ireland. 
Patrick Brady, a Catholic living in Dublin, wrote to a correspondent in London ‘this is 
more than ever was done in Crom well’ s tim e.’
Ormond undertook further steps in the days after this narrative was transmitted to 
London to counter what he perceived as contentious issues. On 11 April, he ordered the
lord mayor and sheriffs o f Dublin to make returns o f  the names o f  the proprietors o f
houses in that city in which unusual meetings o f persons o f the ‘Romish religion’ had 
been held.76 He sent Ossory a full account o f  disorders that had taken place at and after 
the suppression o f a Mass house in Dublin city wherein one o f  the lord mayor’ s officers 
who struck a pries', was viciously assaulted, remarking
this account I give you of that affair because it may be otherwise
represented by letters hence [...] these things, as light as they are, may
make noise there as everything does, and therefore I send accounts of 
them.77
72 Memorandum of the Irish Privy Council, 5 Apr. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 24-9.
73 Ibid., pp 24-9; Bodl., Carte MS 146, ff 161-3; Ormond to Sir Cyril Wyche, 20 Nov. 1678, HMC., 
Leyborne Popham MSS, pp 242-3.
74 Ibid., pp 24-9.
75 Bodl., Carte 70, f. 544.
76 Bodl., Carte MS 70, f. 541.
77 Ormond to Ossory, 12 Apr. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 40-1.
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On 18 April, letters were sent from the lord lieutenant and Council to the Commissioners 
o f Array throughout Ireland. The commissioners were authorised to appoint a muster 
master, who was to draw up a muster role containing the names o f  each militiaman and 
the quality o f his arms. Furthermore, they had to certify whether the troops were trained 
since they had been arrayed, how often, when they were last so exercised and also what 
places were appointed for the general rendezvous o f the companies and for lodging their 
arms, drums and colours.78 Ormond had showed no concern for these details before 
Christmas when he was able to aver to Orrery, without being in a position to know, that 
the militia throughout the country was properly constituted and ordered.
On 31 March, the anticipated assault on Ormond’ s position did not materialise as 
Ossory had taken care to mobilise his friends in the Lords, and his narrative sufficiently 
allayed the fears and suspicions o f  others.79 Ormond would later write to him, ‘the paper 
you gave in to the Lords House could not be composed to more advantage, nor anything 
added to it but what has been lately done, o f which Mr Coventry has an account from 
me’ .80 The danger was not completely removed, however, as Shaftesbury prudently 
decided to reserve his opinions and resolutions regarding Ireland to the subcommittee o f 
the Lords. It met after the House adjourned following Ossory’ s speech. Here he was 
guaranteed the support and cooperation o f the majority o f its members, notably, Essex, 
Strafford and John Robartes. Ossory was powerless to act as the House o f  Lords 
concurred with the resolutions o f  this committee and proceeded to legislate for the Irish 
kingdom, without desiring the advice o f  its government. The lord chief justice o f the 
Court o f Common Pleas, along with the attorney general, were ordered to prepare a bill 
whereby all the inhabitants o f Dublin and other ports and forts in Ireland would be
78 Lord Lieutenant and Council to the Commissioners of Array of the several counties of Ireland, 18 Apr. 
1679, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 52-3.
79 Earl of Ossory’s memorandum on the state of Ireland, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 15-20; Ossory’s title in the 
House of Lords was Lord Butler of Moor Park.
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required to take the oaths o f Allegiance and Supremacy, thereby distinguishing Catholics 
from Protestants. In the same bill, it was inserted that members o f  both houses o f 
parliament, practising lawyers, clerks o f the court and sheriffs, would have to take the 
oaths. The House finally moved that Colonel John Fitzpatrick was to be prohibited from 
coming within twenty miles o f  Ormond’s court in Dublin, to which Ossory dared not 
protest, later informing his father, ‘the motion concerning Colonel Fitzpatrick was very
Q 1
quick and impossible to prevent’ .
Over the course o f  the following days, Shaftesbury tried to hurt Ormond in other 
ways, by encouraging members o f parliament to reflect upon contemporary grievances in 
Ireland against Michael Boyle in the Commons. It was alleged that Boyle was 
endeavouring to engross the great offices o f church and state in his own family. This 
referred to the advancement o f his son in law, Sir William Davys to the position o f  Irish 
lord chief justice on the death o f  Sir John Powey. Coventry informed Ormond that i f  this 
occurred, it ‘would make that flame that already smokes and [...] it will be o f great 
prejudice both to my Lord Primate and your grace [Ormond].’ Southwell perceived that 
Shaftesbury’ s principal objective was ‘to make as many places void as to gratify those 
that concur to gratify him’ .83 The prospect o f office in Ireland was held up to Essex to 
make him quit pretensions in England and for a while at least, the former viceroy 
swallowed Shaftesbury’s bait. Ossory informed his mother on 19 April, ‘ i f  very strange 
informations and circumstances be true I have reason to believe my lord o f  Essex is one 
o f the bitterest enemies my father has.’ 84 Essex was soon discovered to be utilising his
80 Ormond to Ossory, 7 Apr. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 34
81 Bodl., Carte MS 72, ff. 477-88; Ossory to Duchess of Ormond, 19 Apr. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 53-4; 
Ossory to Ormond, 1 Apr. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 21.
82 Henry Coventry to Ormond, 8 Apr. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 35-6.
83 Memorandum on public affairs by Sir Robert Southwell, 19 Apr. 1679, Ormonde MSS, iv, preface xx-
xxi,
84 Ossory to Duchess of Ormond, 19 Apr. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 53-4.
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o r
old connections in Ireland to attain proof that an Irish Catholic plot existed. On 12 April 
1679 he brought an issue to the attention o f the Lords committee on Ireland that was 
undoubtedly envisaged to paint Ormond as pro-Catholic. Essex stated that during his 
viceroyalty, he carefully endeavoured to have Donough MacCarthy, Lord Clancarty, 
educated in the Protestant religion, upon which Shaftesbury pressed for an ‘account o f 
what minors were so bred up since that law passed’ .86 Essex was also instrumental in 
procuring a copy o f  a controversial quit rents that had been granted to Fitzpatrick, which 
Shaftesbury brought into the Lords on 15 April, ‘ casting many reflections upon it and
87upon the person [Fitzpatrick], all which were seconded very vigorously by [...] Essex.’ 
Ormond’ s representatives were also active at court and parliament during this 
period. Wyche acquainted many with his attempts to transplant French Huguenots to 
Ireland, whilst Ossory sent him lists o f those who made favourable mention o f him 
during the debates regarding the state o f Ireland in the Lords. Ossory also pressed 
Ormond to quickly bring to his attention the issue o f  large numbers o f  Catholics residing 
within the towns and cities o f Ireland, and requested information regarding creatures 
from there associated with Shaftesbury’s party, especially ‘one Mansel, that was 
cashiered’ , stating ‘ I think it were not amiss i f  you sent me the reasons for the 
proceedings against him’ .88 He made use o f  Ormond’ s narrative not only around 
Whitehall and Westminster but also had it inserted in several journals and gazettes, 
stating, ‘I am careful [...] to let the world see your care for preventing any m ischief from 
the Irish.’89 Southwell was also involved in the manipulation o f the press patronising a 
printer who was an associate or former associate o f those dispersing articles regarding
85 A letter to the right honourable A. earl o f Essex, from Dublin. Declaring the strange obstinacy ofpapists, 
(as here, so) in Ireland; who being [...] convicted and condemned for criminal causes, yet at their
death...absolutely deny the fact (London, 1679).
86 Ossory to Ormond, 12 Apr. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 40.
87 Ossory to Ormond, 15 Apr. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 45-6.
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Ormond in London. This person whom Southwell called ‘my Dutch friend’ was entrusted 
with propagating the letter written on Ormond’ s behalf by the dissenter and Ossory’ s 
narrative, to which he added a preface.90 Ossory’ s adoption o f  more dishonest 
instruments indicates his apprehension over his father’ s position. On 18 April, he came to 
plain dealing with Shaftesbury, wherein he presented before him an embarrassing 
reference in favour o f Fitzpatrick, when he had been one o f  the Treasury ministers. He 
gave Shaftesbury a copy at his desire, but assured him that he would make use o f it unless 
he ended his prosecution o f  that gentleman, to which Shaftesbury acquiesced.91 
Southwell however, was immensely sceptical o f such an assurance and passed on the 
following hint to Ormond,
I could wish that Fitzpatrick would be persuaded to go and travel with
what speed he can. For if it be left to your grace to clap up suspected
92persons and your grace leave him out there will be a cry raised upon it.
Ormond took Southwell’s suggestions on board informing him on 23 April, 
‘Colonel Fitzpatrick is gone beyond [the] sea and according to the time I was told he took 
shipping, I suppose he may be landed somewhere.’93 He told Ossory the same day in no
uncertain terms that he was willing to play the same games as Essex and Shaftesbury,
it is not hard to guess by whom the inquiry concerning the grant supposed
to be fc the benefit of Fitzpatrick is set on; and since things of that nature
are come into play, possibly I may be able to inform of some much less
94justifiable than that in question.
At the same time, Ormond urged Ossory to continue close relations with Shaftesbury 
stating, ‘ i f  he keeps his word and finds it not to be his interest not to be satisfied, I am
88 Sir Cyril Wyche to Ormond, 1 Apr. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 21-2; Ossory to Ormond, 5 Apr. 1679, 
Ormonde MSS, v, pp 29-30.
89 Ossory lo Ormond, 12 Apr. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 40.
90 Sir Robert Southwell to Ormond, 15 Apr. 1679, Ormonde MSS, iv, p. 303.
91 Ossory to Duchess of Ormond, 19 Apr. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 53-4.
92 Memorandum on public affairs by Sir Robert Southwell, 19 Apr. 1679, Ormonde MSS, iv, preface p. 
xxiv.
93 Ormond to Sir Robert Southwell, 23 Apr. 1679, Ormonde MSS, ii, pp 286-7.
94 Ormond to Ossory, 23 Apr. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 60-1.
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confident he may receive satisfaction’ .95 He adopted a new stance on the subject o f 
Catholics within towns and garrisons by shifting the blame to others. He reminded 
Ossory, that
I doubt it is not known or remembered there [London] that in the time of 
my lord Berkeley’s government there issued a proclamation to let all 
papists at one blow into corporations, and if Mr Bridgeman be examined, 
he is able to tell at whose solicitation the letter commanded such a 
proclamation was procured.96
Ormond took several pragmatic steps also, including trying to amend his relationship
with Orrery, especially since the latter was intending to attend parliament in London in
May. Such an initiative was prudent, as Orrery’ s deportment in London in 1668 had
helped bring about Ormond’ s removal as viceroy, when he severely criticised his
mismanagement for aggravating the deficit in the Irish budget. It was relatively
successful for on 25 April, Orrery wrote to him,
I have in this written my heart without disguise to your excellency, who
will on due examination find me a plain but honest man. When I am in
London I shall make it my proposal to rectify any mistakes which may
9 7have been run into on any of my letters to any of my friends there.
This state o f affairs was dramatically transformed on 22 April 1679, by enormous 
changes in the composition and functions o f  the English Privy Council.98 Charles II had 
been persuaded that such change accompanied by bringing leading opposition figures 
into government was necessary. They would do his bidding as the appointment o f the earl 
o f Essex as a Treasury Commissioner had demonstrated. He also envisaged that such 
transformations would be proof enough to the opposition in parliament that he had honest
95 Ormond to Ossory, 26 Apr. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 66.
96 Ormond to Ossory, 23 Apr. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 60-1
97 Earl of Orrery to Ormond, 25 Apr. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 61-4; Ronald Hutton, ‘The triple-crowned 
islands’ in Lionel K. J. Glassey (ed.), The Reigns o f  Charles II and James VII & II (London, 1997), pp 81-
2 .
98 It now contained thirty members instead of forty-six, furthermore the much maligned against foreign 
affairs committee and the practice of informal consultations were done away with; See E. R. Turner ‘The 
Privy Council of 1679’ in English Historical Review, xxx (1915), pp 251 -66; Fraser, King Charles 11, pp 
376-7; J. P. Courtenay (ed.), Memoirs o f Sir William Temple (2 vols, London, 1836), ii, pp 34-44.
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advisors who were not ‘popishly affected’ , thus they would be more com pliant." These 
changes once again moved the goal posts between Dublin and London that had been set 
after the fall o f Danby, by dramatically altering Ormond’ s status in relation to his 
opponents in London. Southwell observed these alterations with apprehension and wrote, 
‘ so little is Ormond secured by the king that all these are the men whose favour is courted 
by him at any rate.’ 100
This new Council was packed with Ormond’ s opponents, especially the key posts. 
Shaftesbury became Lord President, Essex, C hief Treasury Commissioner, while Halifax, 
Robartes and Winchester gained commissions.101 These appointments were doubly 
disastrous, as Ossory was denied a place at Council and could but complain to Charles II, 
‘that, i f  anything hard did ever befall me, I [Ossoiy] had reason to believe it would 
proceed from the ill-will o f others, having had many and sufficient proofs o f  your
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graciousness towards my family and m yself in particular.’ The new committees 
constituted by this Council were likewise deprived o f  Ormond’s supporters; the all- 
important committee for Ireland was made up almost exclusively o f his opponents or 
those o f dubious loyalty such as Anglesey, Essex, Salisbury, Halifax, Robartes and 
Edward Seymour.103 There were other alterations proposed which would undoubtedly 
affect Ormond. W yche acquainted him on 22 April, ‘that it is said that the lieutenancy o f 
Ireland shall likewise be in commission.’ 104 This proposal originated with Essex who 
deemed it as a quick indirect method o f removing Ormond.105 These changes
99 Trevelyan, England under the Stuarts, p. 389.
l00Memorandum on public affairs by Sir Robert Southwell, 19 Apr. 1679, Ormond MSS, iv, preface; 
George Clark, The later Stuarts, 1660-1714 (Oxford, 1956), p. 98; Haley, The first earl o f  Shaftesbury, pp 
512-4.
101 HMC., Portland MSS, iii, p. 362.
102 Ossory to Ormond, 22 Apr. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 54-5.
103 Sir Robert Southwell to Ormond, 22 Apr. 1679, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 504-5.
104 Sir Cyril Wyche to Ormond, 22 Apr. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 58-9.
105 Earl of Longford to Ormond, 29 Mar. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 3-5; Richard L. Greaves, ‘Arthur 
Capel, first earl of Essex (bap. 1632, d. 1683)’, in Matthew and Harrison (ed.), Oxford D.N.B., ix, pp 976-
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dramatically distorted Ormond’s position with London, Ossory instantly recognised this 
informing Ormond that ‘great whispers are against you, as Sir Robert Southwell informed 
you. I hope in God the worst they can do will be to remove you from your present 
station.’ 106
Ormond him self immediately saw parallels to 1668, when many o f  his fiercest 
opponents had been brought into government after the fall o f Clarendon. He wrote to 
Coventry, ‘ I do not remember any session o f parliament held when I was out o f  England 
but that I was hotly alarmed by my friends o f  preparations and contrivances to accuse 
m e’ .107 He believed that the chief grounds for the intrigues against him were not because 
o f his perceived favouritism towards Catholicism but were malicious, ‘because I would 
not bear calumny and envy to the places I hold’ .108 He planned a drastic course o f  action 
to protect his position and desired Coventry to request Charles II to send permission for 
him to attend him at court, where he intended to re-establish his position by undergoing 
the strictest inquiry and trial o f his actions.109 A t the same time, Ormond understood 
perfectly the advantages inherent in taking this decision at that time. On 26 April, the 
English Commons had finally resolved to sit the next day to consider ways o f  protecting 
the Protestant religion against Catholics, both in the reign o f Charles II and his successor. 
The day Shaftesbury had longed for had finally arrived, an opportunity to exclude the 
duke o f  York from the succession. However, the arrival o f Ormond in London intent on 
refuting accusations against him would spoil this by diverting the attention o f  the Lords 
and Commons from the exclusion bill, which he so desperately sought. In a letter o f 30 
April to Ossory dealing with the request he recently made o f  Coventry, Ormond cleverly
82; Essex also urged a committee of the Lords to enact a bill preventing the lord lieutenant of Ireland from 
acquiring any estate by royal grant or from selling any offices.
106 Ossory to Ormond, 22 Apr. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 54-5.
107 Ormond to Henry Coventry, 30 Apr. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 72.
108 Ibid., p. 72.
109 Ibid., p. 72.
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added ‘perhaps i f  my lord o f  Shaftesbury or any other that may wish this government in 
other hands saw how I am disposed in the matter it might do no hurt.’ 110
Ormond’ s decision split his supporters right down the middle; Coventry and 
Southwell opposed Arlington in exposing the folly o f  such an action. He would be 
charged with deserting his post at a time o f great uncertainty, which would create further 
backing for those planning to impeach him; whereas distance, as Southwell stated, ‘may 
afford several advantages by length o f time, etc.’ 1 1 They instead stressed the importance 
o f undertaking some necessary actions, such as swallowing his pride in regard to 
Shaftesbury. During the heated debates in the Lords at the end o f March 1679, Ossory 
had made several libellous accusations regarding Shaftesbury’s conduct in the early 
1670s. Considering Shaftesbury’ s newly acquired dominance within Council this now 
came back to haunt both father and son.112 Southwell felt that the occasion required that 
Ormond must write to Shaftesbury disowning his son’s mistake and furthermore that 
Ossory must present it himself.113 This initiative mirrored the duke o f Y o rk ’ s own 
strategy to arrive at a modus vivendi with Shaftesbury. Since he was now on good terms 
with the king, he might also afford to let bygones be bygones. The importance o f 
ingratiating him self with the new power brokers at Whitehall such as Sir W illiam Temple 
was also emphasised
It may not be a miss if you congratulate Sir William Temple who is a sort 
of tutor to the great secretary Sunderland and may influence that cabal to 
divert mischief, especially if you desire him to call on [Sir Robert 
Southwell] to be informed how matters stand, that so [Ormond] be not be 
run down, at least [Sir William Temple] may properly be put on this 
work. 114
110 Ormond to Ossory, 30 Apr. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 73,
111 Sir Robert Southwell to Ormond, 29 Apr. 1679, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 506-8.
113 Richard Bagwell, .7 eland under the Stuarts and during the Interregnum (3 vols, London, 1909), iii, pp 
130-1; according to Bagwell, Ossory falsely accused Shaftesbury of advising the stop of the Exchequer in 
1673, when the latter was part of the group of ministers called the “CABAL" that dominated Stuart politics
at this time
113 Captain John St Leger to Henry Gascoigne, 1 Apr. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 22; Sir Robert Southwell 
to Ormond, 22 Apr. 1679, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp. 504-5; Beckett, The cavalier duke: a life o f  James Butler, 
Is' duke o f Ormond, p. 118.
114 Ibid., pp 504-5.
The gravity o f  Ormond’ s position compelled his supporters in London to undertake 
more drastic measures. On 26 April 1679 Coventry, Longford and Ossory waited on 
Charles II concerning reports that impeachments were prepared against several lords for 
27 April, the day appointed by the Commons for considering ways to protect the 
Protestant religion against Catholics.115 Ossory went further and openly accused Richard 
Jones, Viscount Ranelagh, o f gathering articles to be used against Ormond in the 
Commons. Charles was horrified and took great pains to reassure Ossory declaring, ‘that 
i f  it could be proved, or that i f  he could have grounds to believe that [...] that lord 
[Ranelagh] held such practices he should not continue an hour in his place.’ 116 Ossory 
was also endeavouring to implicate Shaftesbury in underhand practices and pressed John 
St Leger, an Irish Privy Councillor, with connections to many o f Ormond’s opponents, to 
procure him a copy o f libellous queries in the hands o f  one o f  Shaftesbury’ s creatures, 
Thornhill.117 Finally, Southwell and his ‘Dutch Friend’ pragmatically adopted tactics, 
which Ormond associated with his enemies, such as manufacturing propaganda on his 
behalf, ‘your grace will here see in print what some friend thought necessary to be so, and 
Arlington as well as Ossory liked the draft [...] in the figure o f  an Adventurer reconciled 
to truth.’ 118
In any event Ormond was saved by a series o f circumstances outside his control. 
The entrance into Council o f many o f  his opponents actually diminished their status as 
they were suspected o f selling out to the court, for as Southwell highlighted to Ormond
That whoever is of the highest estimation among the people, or in either 
house of parliament, if he go or be called to a secret consultation, and
115 Sir Robert Southwell to Ormond, 26 Apr. 1679, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 505-6; Ossory to Ormond, 26 
Apr. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 70.
"Mbid., p. 70.
117 Ossory to Ormond, 13 May. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 94-5.
118 Sir Robert Southwell to Ormond, 29 Apr. 1679, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 506-8.
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especially if he touch at preferment, he is immediately looked upon as a 
man infected and lopped off from the body where he had credit before.119
Shaftesbury became stuck in the middle between the Commons and Charles II. He agreed
with the policies o f the former such as punishing Danby for his treasonous actions and
depriving the duke o f York o f the throne, but Charles II expected that his appointment
would make the Commons more compliant and that once in power Shaftesbury would
carry out his will. Ossory informed Ormond on 6 M ay ‘I do not perceive that my lord o f
Shaftesbury grows in credit since his being a Councillor, or that since his dignity he gains
much with his own or that which ill men call the court party. ’ The tensions contained
within the new Privy Council were soon exasperated by attempts in the Commons to pass
an exclusion bill. Shaftesbury, Monmouth, and other exclusionists were forced out into
the open, whilst moderates like Temple, Halifax, Sunderland and Essex favoured
121 •legislation that would limit the prerogatives o f any future Catholic sovereign. This 
unpleasant state o f  affairs soured relations between the court and Commons but, most 
importantly for Ormond, it divided and diverted the attention o f many on the new 
Council, who may hitherto have clamoured his removal. It is also significant that 
Ormond, whose demise was hitherto anticipated from the changes in Council, was 
actually a beneficiary from them.122 Essex was distracted from the affairs o f  Ireland and 
became resolved *o attain the post o f Lord Treasurer. He was also instrumental in 
launching a campaign to force his old enemy Ranelagh and his partners to return to 
Ireland to give a full and final account o f  his undertaking. This was a devastating setback
119 Memorandum on public affairs by Sir Robert Southwell, 19 Apr. 1679, Ormonde MSS, iv, preface, p. 
xvii; Jones, Country and court, England 1658-1714, p. 207.
120 Ossory to Ormond, 6 May. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 87.
121 Hutton, Charles the Second, king o f  England, Scotland and Ireland, pp 373-4; Haley, The first earl o f 
Shaftesbury, p. 517.
122 Ibid., p. 372.
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to Ranelagh who had been endeavouring to raise the animosities o f  the Commons to
1
prevent such an occurrence.
Ormond was saved by several other factors such as the breakdown in the 
relationship between both houses o f parliament, as they disagreed whether the trial o f 
Danby or that o f  the five Catholic lords accused by Oates should take precedence.124 In 
the Commons, the rumours o f  intended proceedings against Ormond proved ill founded 
as members instead lighted upon allies o f  the duke o f  York more close at hand such as 
Samuel Pepys, secretary to the Admiralty, and John Maitland, duke o f  Lauderdale, and
Secretary o f State for Scotland. Pepys was accused o f being a closet Catholic and passing
information to France, whilst Lauderdale’s bitter rival W illiam Douglas, duke o f 
Hamilton, had managed, unlike Orrery, to take residence in London during the meeting o f 
parliament, where he allied himself with Lauderdale’ s English enemies in attempting to 
oust him.125 Southwell informed Ormond o f this
there was great expectation this day of an assault in parliament upon the 
duke of Lauderdale, which may, in this conjuncture, end much to his 
prejudice, and ‘tis not likely to be long deferred, and many talk as if
things in Scotland were grown insupportable and at the point of coming to
blows.126
123 Ibid., pp 372-3; Sir Robert Howard to Ormond, 15 May. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 104; Ormond to Sir 
Robert Howard, 24 May. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 113; Primate Boyle to Lady Ranelagh, 4 Apr. 1679, 
Ormonde MSS, v, pp 42-5; C. I. McGrath, ‘Richard Jones, earl of Ranelagh (1641-1712),’ in Matthew and 
Harrison (ed.), Oxford D.N.B., xxx, pp 606-8; Ranelagh was in a precarious position after the fall of his key 
ally Danby. As such he employed many strategies in an attempt to secure his position with the king and 
prevent his enemies from bringing him to book for his corrupt practices during the 1670s. There were 
rumours that he sought to make his eldest daughter a mistress to the king. Ranelagh and his wife Elizabeth 
Jones, née Willoughby, also dispersed many accusations against Ormond and Michael Boyle in an attempt 
to alleviate his own position and stifle their inquiries into his undertaking. Ranelagh based a large 
proportion of his accusations on correspondence with Orrery and other relatives in Ireland such as Captain 
Robert Fitzgerald; Ormond to Ossory, 22 Mar. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 365-6.
12,1 Haley, The first earl o f  Shaftesbury, pp 522-6.
125 Stephen Coote, Samuel Pepy's: a life (New York, 2000), pp 285-90; Hutton, Charles the Second, king o f 
England, Scotland and Ireland, pp 374-5; William Douglas, duke of Hamilton was an exponent of 
toleration to Presbyterians; William Douglas, duke of Hamilton, Some further matter o f  fact relating to the 
administration o f affairs in Scotland, under the duke o f  Lauderdale. Humbly offered to his majesties 
consideration, in obedience to his royal commands. That the duke o f  Lauderdale was concerned in the 
design o f  bringing in popery and arbitrary government... (London, 1679).
126 Sir Robert Southwell to Ormond, 3 May. 1679, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 508-9.
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Tension in Scotland between Presbyterians and the Episcopalians escalated further that 
May after Covenanters murdered the archbishop o f St Andrews, James Sharp. Southwell 
was soon o f  the opinion, ‘that neither Ireland nor any man in it can at present be thought
197
o f in this crowd o f things depending and o f near concern.’ A s such, Coventry took the 
prudent decision not to present Charles II with Ormond’s desire to attend him at court, 
stating to him
How far his majesty will struggle, or run with this tempest, I know not.
But you being in the House of Lords at the time must needs upon daily
occasion oblige you either to weaken your interest there or increase the
animosities in the House o f Commons, where as yet I do not perceive 
128them increase.
Southwell agreed with Coventry’ s actions and advised Ormond to write the exact same 
letter again, though this time without a date ‘to be presented in such a conjuncture as may 
require it’ .129
On 27 May 1679 Charles II avoided the controversial issue o f  exclusion by 
proroguing parliament till 14 August. He informed both houses that it was the only
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expedient left as the animosities between them had frustrated his designs. An important 
question to be addressed at this juncture is the degree to which an exclusion bill or an act 
limiting the prerogatives o f  the duke o f York would have affected Ormond. It would have 
placed him in an invidious position between the wishes o f  parliament and those o f his 
traditional ally. Ormond understood that any such bill would be accompanied by an oath 
that all considerable officers and Privy Councillors would be required to take, to make 
such an act o f parliament effectual. This troubled him deeply, and reflecting upon it in a 
letter to Ossory, he stated
127 Sir Robert Southwell to Ormond, 10 May. 1679, Ormonde MSS, iv, p. 509; Fraser, King Charles II, p. 
378.
128 Henry Coventry to Ormond, 17 May. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 105-6.
129 Sir Robert Southwell to Ormond, 10 May. 1679, Ormonde MSS, iv, p. 509.
130 Henry Coventry to Ormond, 27 May. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 117; Haley, The first earl o f  
Shaftesbury, pp 525-6.
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How I shall be able to digest such an oath I cannot judge till 1 see it; only 
I tell you I am somewhat tender in the point of oaths. The matter must be 
true in my opinion, just in what they bind to, and compatible with other 
lawful oaths formerly taken by me, or else I shall refuse them, cost me 
what they will.131
The prorogation o f parliament saved Ormond from this dilemma and Ossory wrote back 
to him that day ‘by what you hear has passed this day, you w ill see there will be time
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enough to consider the contents o f  your letter.’ During the previous three months, 
Ormond’ s position had been shown up by the rapidly changing body politic after the fall 
o f Danby; the marriage o f convenience, however between Charles II and many o f his 
opponents had collapsed because o f the confluence o f  several forces: the issue o f 
exclusion, the need to punish Danby, and Scottish affairs. The resolution o f the last o f 
these factors was to end the stalemate between Charles and the opposition, and bring 
many opposed to Ormond into a position where they could once again force Charles II to 
remove him.
In June 1679 matters came to a head in Scotland; the Presbyterians in the western 
lowlands had risen and crown forces were compelled to abandon the country west o f
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Stirling including the city o f Glasgow. The implications o f  these events were 
immediately felt in Dublin, as there was a large non-conformist population in the north 
east o f Ulster which had strong links with Scotland. Ormond had been aware for some 
time through his agents and informers in Belfast o f growing restlessness amongst 
Presbyterians and that it had been occasioned by increasing numbers o f  Scottish refugees 
and malcontents arriving in Ulster. The murder o f Archbishop Sharp had been openly 
celebrated in Londonderry, whilst elsewhere seditious books such as The wrestling’s o f  
the Kirk o f Scotland for the kingdom o f Christ were widely available and preachers 
proclaimed openly ‘that when sin is not punished by the magistrate, it is then the peoples
131 Ormond to Ossory, 21 May. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 109.
132 Ossory to Ormond, 27 May. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 116-7.
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duty to supply that defect’ .134 Ormond had also good reason to believe that many officers 
o f the army and militia in Ulster kept correspondence with disaffected both there and in 
Scotland.135 He therefore took it upon himself, before any orders arrived from London, to 
exert his authority in Ulster lest discontent there and in Scotland precipitate a ‘ fanatic 
rebellion’ .136 In early June, he ordered eleven troops o f  horse to rendezvous at
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Charlemont under the command o f Arthur Forbes, earl o f Granard. Extra troops were 
also despatched to landing points from Scotland such as Donaghadee where arrivals were 
interned and examined for information. While in Dublin, Ormond ordered the opening o f  
all the letters o f those suspected o f keeping correspondence with the disaffected in either 
England or Scotland.138
On 10 June, the English Privy Council ordered that Ormond be directed to give 
immediate orders for marching towards the north o f  Ireland o f as many troops that could 
be safely spared. When they arrived there they were to a wait the further directions o f  the 
Scottish Privy Council.139 Ossory warned:
I need not remind you how much it concerns you in regard of the king, 
the kingdom you govern, and yourself well to consider of the safety of the 
north, and what number you can spare without hazarding the loss of the 
country entrusted to your care.140
Ormond did not need to be told to act diligently and on 17 June orders were despatched 
for 2,300 foot and horse to assemble around Dublin where there would be better shipping 
available to transport them, if  need be, to Scotland or Ulster.141 This, like so many o f
133 Henry Coventry to Onnond, 10 Jun. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 127; G. B. McNeill and Hector L. 
Macqueen (ed.), Atlas o f  Scottish history to 1707 (Edinburgh, 1996), pp 145-7.
134 Bodl., Carte MS 45, f. 482; Ibid, f. 486; Bodl., Carte 146, f. 172; Bodl., Carte MS 240, f. 377; It was 
also reported in several intelligences sent from Ulster in April that the great conventicler John Welsh was 
hiding out in Ulster; Phil Kilroy, Protestant dissent and controversy in Ireland, 1660-1714 (Cork, 1994), p. 
236.
135 Bodl., Carte MS 221, f. 394.
136 Bodl., Carte MS 45, f. 500.
137 Ormond to Henry Coventry, 11 Jun. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 128.
138 Bodl., Carte MS 45, f. 500; Ormond to Henry Coventry, 22 Jun. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 142.
139 Order in Council for Despatch of troops to North of Ireland, 13 Jun. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 128-9.
Ossory to Ormond, 10 Jun. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 127-8.
141 Aydelotte, ‘The duke of Ormond and the English government of Ireland, 1677-85’, pp 270-3.
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Ormond’s decisions, shocked Orrery and many Protestants in Ireland, that a substantial 
part o f the army could be sent out o f  the country when there were disturbances in Ulster 
and a purported Catholic conspiracy still in existence.142 He wrote to Ormond
tis but too probable if the rebellion there be prosperous it may have too 
much influence on the Scots of Ulster, who may be also the more incited 
to assist their associates if they see the forces which should awe them sent 
into Scotland. And who knows if the discontented Scots in Ulster should 
rise, but the discontented Irish may do the like, and both do it with the 
less apprehension by the absence of a large part of this little army.143
Fortunately for Ormond, such a scenario did not develop, as the non-conformist rebels 
were defeated at the battle o f  Bothwell Brig on 22 June by English and Scottish troops 
under the command o f James, duke o f Monmouth.144 During the following weeks, 
Ormond took care to prevent disorder spreading to Ireland by placing large numbers o f 
troops along the north east coast o f  Ulster to prevent fugitives from Scotland sheltering 
with their brethren there, and a proclamation was issued commanding all subjects o f 
Charles II to aid them in apprehending Scottish rebels.145
The events in Scotland held other implications for Ormond as they brought about a 
dramatic volte-face in court politics in London. After the prorogation, Ormond’s position 
was relatively secure as those in favour around Charles were moderate ministers like 
Arthur Capel, earl o f Essex, George Savile, marquis o f Halifax, and Robert Spencer, earl 
o f Sunderland, w llo were prepared to work with him and to do his bidding.146 The 
resolution o f  affairs in Scotland put Shaftesbury back into the political driving seat; 
Monmouth, his political alley in Council during the previous year had gained a lightning 
victory in Scotland. The prestige o f this cabal was subsequently increased by
142 Ibid., p. 271; Richard L. Greaves, Gods other children: Protestant nonconformists and the emergence o f  
denominational churches in Ireland, 1660-1700 (Stanford, 1997), pp 116-7.
143 Earl of Orrery to Ormond, 24 Jun. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 143-4.
144 Rosalind Mitchison, A history o f Scotland (3,d edition, London, 2002), p. 264.
145 Bodl., Carte MS 59, f. 587; Proclamation by the lord lieutenant and council, Whereas there hath been a 
notorious and unnatural rebellion lately raised in Scotland... (Dublin, 30 June, 1679)
146 Despite the relative security of his position, behind the scenes in London both Essex and Halifax were 
endeavouring to supplant Ormond, it appears that Ormond anticipated such an alteration as Ossory was
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Monmouth’s lenient treatment o f  defeated rebels.147 On hearing o f  this victory, the 
ministers around Charles pressed him to dissolve parliament rather than allow it to fall 
under the control o f  the Shaftesbury group. Charles acted on this advice and called a new 
parliament for October 1679. However he did so without consent o f  the majority o f 
Council, infuriating many parliamentarians. Henry Thynne intimated to Ormond
We are likewise very busy in all parts in order to new elections of 
members of parliament, and by what can be guessed at, most o f the same 
faces will appear there again, which, if they do, I believe they will not be 
in much better humour for having spent a great deal of money for the 
same place they had most of them paid dear for before.148
In London Ossory noticed that the prestige o f his enemies had correspondingly 
increased. He found Shaftsbury’ s emissaries busily scheming against Ormond for not 
being careful enough for the Protestant interest: ‘they complain o f the excessive rates o f 
powder, and do liftle value truth in what they affirm.’ 149 In 1679 the ‘Licensing A ct’ had 
expired. A s such there was nothing to restrain the press or more importantly the 
opposition from utilising it to disparage various individuals.150 Ormond’s character or 
more precisely his religion was once again brought into question. Longford informed him 
‘the enclosed print I have sent your grace that you may see with what industry your 
enemies endeavoured to reflect upon you in the account o f Colonel Talbot’ s liberty’ .151 It 
was also represented in print that during the late rebellion in Scotland Ormond was 
dissatisfied with Protestants and viewed them as more dangerous to his government than 
Catholics. Longford informed him that this derived from the following lines in a letter
privately looking for a suitable residence for him in England. Ossory to Ormond, 22 Jul. 1679 and same to 
same, 19 July 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 160; 158
147 Hutton, Charles the Second, king o f England, Scotland and Ireland, pp 376-7; Fraser, King Charles II,
p. 379; Sir Robert Hamilton, For the right noble and potent Prince James, duke o f Bucclengh [sic] and
Monmouth, general o f his majesties forces now in Scotland the humble supplication o f the non-conformists 
in the west, and other parts o f the kingdom, now in arms in their own name, and in the name o f all the rest 
o f  those who adhere unto us in this Church and kingdom o f Scotland (Glasgow, 1679).
148 Henry Thynne to Ormond, 18 Jul. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 157.
149 Ossory to Ormond, 17 Aug. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 182-3.
150 The Licensing Act had hitherto been the mechanism whereby the government controlled the publication 
of seditious books and pamphlets.
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written to Coventry on 1 July ‘that the fanatics there who began to prick up their ears 
upon the Scotch rebellion do now pull in their horns since the defeat o f  the rebels’ . He 
believed the design o f Ormond’ s enemies was clear ‘to give the approaching parliament a 
very ill impression o f you [Ormond], and consequently to prepare them for whatever 
attack is intended against you.’ Coventry felt that those who dispersed this rumour 
intended to disaffect those under his government in Ireland for ‘they could make any 
great advantage o f it here (London) but by the clamour from hence.’ 154 This interpretation 
is certainly plausible as occurrences in England were closely observed and discussed in 
Ireland; Dublin’s first coffee house had opened in 1665. In September 1679, when 
Ormond was unable to find the addresses o f  the previous parliament relating to Ireland he 
asked Michael Boyle to ‘desire Dr Topham or any other to make search among the 
booksellers and coffee-houses, where such things possibly may be kept.’ 155
Shaftesbury and his associates did not have to look hard to find accomplices in their 
intrigues against Onnond, an atmosphere o f  anti-Catholicism and a hostile court had a 
magnet-like effect o f bringing those disaffected with Ormond out o f  the woodwork. In
London, Longford found Sir Henry Ingoldsby, a member o f  the Irish Privy Council,
foremost amongst these.156 In plain English Ingoldsby told him
That your grace [Ormond] puts greater confidence in the papists than the 
Protestants, that when the plot was first discovered in Ireland your grace
[Onnond] took so little notice of it, that though the papists thronged then
151 Earl of Longford to Ormond, 5 Aug. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 167-9; Same to same, 2 Sep. 1679, 
Ormonde MSS, v, pp 196-7.
152 Ibid., pp 167-9.
153 Ibid., pp 167-9.
IM Henry Coventry to Ormond, 9 Sep. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 202-3.
155 Ormond to Michael Boyle, 18 Sep. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 210; Aytoun Ellis, The penny 
universities: a history o f  the coffee houses (London, 1956) p. 200.
156 Longford to Ormond, 5 Aug. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 167-9; Timothy Venning, ‘Sir Henry Ingoldsby 
(bap. 1623, d. 1701)’, in Matthew and Harrison (ed.), Oxford D.N.B., xxix, pp 276-7; Ingoldsby was a 
brother of the regicide, Sir Richard Ingoldsby and a distant relation of Oliver Cromwell. He led a 
parliamentarian regiment in Ireland during the late 1640s and fought at the sieges of Drogheda and 
Limerick. At the Restoration he was permitted to retain the lands that he had acquired during the 
Interregnum and was made an Irish Privy Councillor. In the summer of 1679, Ingoldsby was full of 
acrimony against Onnond for having disobliged him in preferring Drury Wrey to the command of a militia 
troop in Limerick instead of his brother George.
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to Dublin and into the castle in greater numbers than they had done
formerly, yet your grace [Ormond] did not think fit to double the guards
157though pressed to it by himself [Ingoldsby] and others.
Ingoldsby’s behaviour was extremely worrying to Longford and he stated to Ormond 
‘when he talks with this freedom to me I leave your grace to judge what his behaviour is
1 SR
toward you amongst others.’ Ingoldsby was soon found to have great acquaintance 
amongst the party ‘now getting into the saddle’ .159 Shaftesbury wasted no time in 
utilising this newlv acquired asset and throughout September the renegade councillor 
accompanied him to many meetings o f the English Privy Council. The Whigs also 
exposed him in many o f London’ s coffee houses where he gladly traduced Ormond and 
his government.160
In Ireland, Orrery, who fell out with Ormond again that summer, was now 
presented with the perfect climate to damage Ormond and he wasted no time in 
demonstrating his zeal for the Protestant religion. He wisely made use o f  Ormond’ s main 
weakness, the court in London, to cast doubts over his religion and his proceedings in 
regard to the plot. On 20 September, Coventry informed Ormond that he was employing 
many o f his old tricks:
My lord of Essex telleth me (his night that he hath by this post received a 
letter from my lord Orrery mentioning the report of a master of a ship 
coming from France that a ship was ready to sail for Cork from thence 
that brought 6000 horse arms, and that he [Orrery] had given orders for 
the seizing of them if they came. If the intelligence be true, I wish he had 
acquainted your grace first with it that notice might have come from
In London, Ossory had further cause for concern as alarming news filtered through from 
Munster. He immediately wrote to his father, ‘I received a letter from Sir Robert 
Southwell giving an account o f my lord o f  Orrery having a discovery made him o f a plot
157 Ibid., pp 167-9.
158 Ibid., pp 167-9.
159 Ibid., pp 167-8.
160 Arran to Ormond, 13 Nov. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 486; Account of John Fitzgerald of his first 
coming into England, 8 feb. 1682, Cal. S. P. dom., 1682, pp 65-6.
161 Henry Coventry to Ormond, 20 Sep. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 210-1.
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that had been carrying on these two or three years.’ A  County Limerick gentleman, 
David Fitzgerald, exposed the plot in question; he accused Lord Theobald Brittas, Colonel 
Pierce Lacy and others o f plotting to seize the citadel o f  Limerick and bring in the French. 
Ossory had immediate suspicions about Orrery’s intentions as the latter wrote his letter on 
16 September whilst intimation from Ormond only arrived on 27 September. Coventry 
and Ossory were unable to respond and it did not but appear that Ormond was concealing 
evidence. Orrery’s schemes had evidently hurt Ormond as Ossory made a point o f 
representing them to Charles who called him  a ‘rogue’ and was ‘m uch incensed.’
In the face o f  this pressure, Ormond’s representatives in London were fighting a 
dogged rearguard action. Sir Richard Stephens forced Ingoldsby to acknowledge before 
Shaftesbury and the English Privy Council that Ormond had actually proposed at the 
beginning o f  the plot that the Irish should be immediately disarmed, as many Protestants 
were at the time o f  B lood’s Plot ‘but that matter was overruled by another person, with 
whose opinion the Council there concurred.’164 Ossory meanwhile dismissed as feints 
reports that Shaftesbury had spoken kindly o f  Ormond to Stephens after this meeting. He 
warned him  ‘whatever my lord o f Shaftesbury may say to Sir Richard Stephens I am o f 
opinion that according to the course he steers he will endeavour to remove from posts o f 
power all persons o f your principles.’165 Ossory advised him quickly to bring to his 
consideration the events o f  the previous year especially the addresses o f the House o f 
Lords relating to Ireland, that satisfactory reasons may be given why they were not 
complied with. It was also prudent to have someone present who was witness to his
162 Ossory to Ormond, 10 Oct. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 220.
163 Ibid., p. 220; David Fitzgerald, A narrative o f the Irish popish plot, fo r  the betraying that kingdom into 
the hands o f the French, massacring all the English Protestants there, and the litter subversion o f the 
government and Protestant-religion; As the same was successively carried on from the year 1662 (London, 
1680), pp 7-12.
164 Earl of Longford to Ormond, 5 Aug. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 167-9; Sir Richard Stephens was a page 
of the backstairs to the queen at this time though he later received a warrant for a grant of the office of 
Sergeant at Law.
165 Ossory to Ormond, 6 Sep. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 198-9.
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proceedings during this period ‘I doubt not but you will think it proper to send over my 
brother [Arran] towards the time o f the parliaments sitting’.166 Ossory’s warning and 
advice was soon justified. On 23 September he wrote ‘I am inform ed that an 
impeachment is to be delivered against you [Ormond] at the meeting o f the parliament; 
and I am promised the particulars and notice o f  these proceedings from  a man o f 
quality.’167
Ormond was too politically astute not to notice the changing tide o f  politics in 
London and the subsequent manoeuvres o f his enemies there and in Ireland. He was 
determined not to be found wanting and informed M ichael Boyle that he was ready to 
journey to Dublin within twenty-four hours notice.168 His main weakness during such 
times was his supposed Catholic proclivities and while in Kilkenny he undertook various 
strategies to shore up his position. Ormond took on board Ossory’s recent advice and 
replied to him  ‘you advise well that the addresses o f  the parliam ent concerning Ireland 
should be considered. We are here upon them, and shall give the best account we can o f 
them ’.169 It is obvious that the approaching parliament occasioned a transformation in 
how Ormond now perceived Catholicism
The most difficult to come well out of for you and myself it is that 
relating to the guardianship of the children of papists, wherein we are 
both bo-nd in £10,000 to see young Aylmer educated as a Protestant, 
which has been neglected and the boy is in France, but I will do the best I
170can to have him suddenly brought over and then take order with him.
Ormond was frustrated by the behaviour o f  his representatives in London being o f 
the opinion that they already had the requisite material from him to counter Ingoldsby’s 
accusations, which were no more than libels set down by Edward Brabazon, earl o f
166 Ossory to Ormond, 9 Aug. 1679, Ormonde MSS. v, pp 175-6.
167 Ossory to Ormond, 23 Sep. Ormonde MSS, v, pp 212-3.
168 Ormond to Primate Boyle, 17 Sep. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 210.
16l) Ormond to Ossory, 26 Aug. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 190-1.
170 Ibid., pp l90- l .
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M eath.171 Ingoldsby’s importance lay not so much in the content o f  his accusations, but 
the sheer fact that Ormond was being denounced as a crypto-papist by a m em ber o f  his 
own Privy Council before parliament was due to meet. It is evident from  Henry 
Coventry’s letter o f 9 October 1679 that Ormond undertook action to snuff out this threat 
‘the letter you [Ormond] wrote me that related to Sir Henry Ingoldsby I gave my lord o f 
Ossory to show his majesty [ ...]  and yesterday he [Ossory] sent me word that his majesty
i n 'y
consented to w hat your grace proposed in that po int’. This, as Ossory’s correspondence 
reveals, was Ingoldsby’s removal from the Irish Board.173
In Ireland, Ormond proceeded with haste and diligence into all matters that 
involved the plot. As demonstrated elsewhere in this thesis, he was keenly aware and 
sensitive o f the implications o f any o f his kin being involved in rebellion. He soon had to 
act on these words, when treasonous inform ation appeared against his half brother 
Colonel John Fitzpatrick. The Catholic Fitzpatrick now became a ‘papist’ in so much as 
he was now a threat to the established order; the information was quickly brought before 
the Irish Privy Council and despatched to London, lest it be claimed by his enemies that 
he was failing to properly prosecute the plot. Ormond was able to take such a stance as he 
had sent Fitzpatrick out o f the country a few  months earlier.174 The English Privy Council 
subsequently ordered that Fitzpatrick be indicted for treason upon the said evidence 
against him  and outlawed if  he failed to appear before the indictment. Such advice no 
doubt put Ormond in a very awkward position, between protecting the Protestant interest 
and ostracising many o f  his supporters w ithin Ireland. Ormond queried Secretary o f  State 
Sunderland on the legitimacy o f such proceedings as the like were not done w ith fugitives 
in England. A t the same time, he ordered the Irish chief justice to carry out its
171 Winifred Gardner, The life o f James first duke o f Ormonde 1610-88 (2 vols, London, 1912), ii, pp 371-3.
172 Henry Coventry to Ormond, 9 Oct. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 219; Ormond to Arran, 12 Aug. 1679, 
Ormonde MSS, v, p. 178.
173 Ossory to Ormond, 5 Oct. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 218.
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instructions in case exception was taken, but attached the following words ‘according to 
the course o f  law and justice’.175
On 23 August 1679 the Irish Privy Council assembled at Kilkenny to debate the 
readmission or exclusion o f the Catholics o f  Galway city. Ormond chose this meeting to 
acquaint the Irish Board with Coventry’s letter o f  9 August. In it both he and Charles 
repudiated that they had ever received inform ation from Ormond during the late rebellion 
in Scotland that intimated his dissatisfaction with Protestants in Ireland. The Irish Board 
was not in a position to affirm or deny that he had written such, but in his defence, as he 
stated to Coventry
What they have thought fit to say makes it very improbably I should have 
so little wit as to charge all the Protestants of this kingdom who only were 
armed and drawn together to suppress the Scotch rebellion (if need should 
be) with favour of it.176
The above proceedings demonstrate Orm ond’s anxiety over such accusations in light of 
the upcoming parliament, and he sent a copy to Coventry suggesting ‘if  his majesty shall 
think it may serve to any good use to have it made public, you may easily find the way o f 
doing it.’177 In regard to Ireland he felt ‘Protestants should not believe they are falsely 
and maliciously represented by m e’.178 He therefore distributed copies o f  the letter to 
members o f  the Council, which he believed was ‘no ill-way o f  publishing the contents of 
it.’179
Ormond was clearly troubled by Orrery’s role in souring his reputation with many 
in London. Regarding David Fitzgerald’s recent discovery he protested to Ossory that 
before his examination was completed ‘my lord o f Orrery got notice o f it, writ it over,
174 Sir Robert Southwell to Ormond, 19 Apr. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, preface, pp xvii-xxiv,
175 Henry Coventry to Ormond, 20 Sep. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 212; Ormond to earl of Sunderland, 27 
Sep. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 215; Bodl., Carte MS 146, f. 218.
176 Lord lieutenant and Council to Henry Coventry, 23 Aug. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 188-9; Ormond to 
Henry Coventry, 24 Aug. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 190.
177 Ibid., p. 190.
178 Ibid., p. 190.
,79 Ibid., p. 190.
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and so it is gotten into print, with such reflections and remarks as I doubt not he 
designed.’180 Orm ond’s counterstrategy against the charlatan o f M unster can easily be 
reconstructed from his letters.181 The first entailed demonstrating that Orrery’s zeal was 
misplaced. At the time o f  the impending French invasion, Ormond was at his house at 
Carrick on Suir, twenty miles from Waterford. He commented several weeks later to 
Southwell that although at the time it seemed implausible to him to com prehend that the 
French would land such a quantity o f firearms in such a location ‘where our troops and
companies, both o f the army and m ilitia lie thickest, and where the country is well
• • 189 • . . .
inhabited by English’, he had prudently maintained Orrery’s initial orders. His initial 
misgivings were soon proved correct, when the ship from whence Orrery derived his
• 183alarm arrived and was found to be laden with nothing more dangerous than salt. 
Secondly, Ormond endeavoured to show that Orrery was actually endangering the 
Protestant interest by preventing him  from getting to the bottom o f the plot in Ireland. He 
reinforced his own proceedings by having an account o f  Fitzgerald’s plot dispersed 
amongst his supporters in London. Ossory also received some additional remarks on the 
negative impact o f Orrery’s disclosures
If their be any reality in the discovery (as very well there may be) the 
publishing of it in print will in a great measure frustrate the success of any 
further inquiry, instruct such as may be guilty what defence to make, and 
perhaps warn them to fly away from justice.184
Despite these hindrances, Ormond wanted Ossory to make it known ‘I have sent to take
and secure them [those guilty] by an express before the print can come into their
hands.’185
l80Ormond to Ossory, 18 Oct. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 223-4.
181 The nickname that Ossory had given to the earl of Orrery.
182 Ormond to Southwell, 8 Oct. 1679, Ormonde MSS, ii, pp 291-3.
183 Ibid., pp 291-3; Beckett, The cavalier duke: a life o f James Butler, T ' duke o f Ormond, p. 116.
184 Ormond to Ossory, 18 Oct. 1679, Ormond MSS, v, pp 223-4.
185 Ibid., pp 223-4; Ormond to Southwell, 8 Oct. 1679, Ormonde MSS, ii, pp 291-3.
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Notwithstanding his best efforts, the precarious nature o f  his position in regard to 
events in London was clearly emphasised during a three-week period at the end o f 
September. A t the beginning o f  that month, James, duke o f York arrived back in England 
on the invitation o f Sunderland, Essex, Halifax and Louis Duras, earl o f Feversham as 
they feared that M onmouth who controlled the army would seize the throne after Charles 
II fell ill.186 The hostile reception that James expected did not materialise and sensing a 
turn around in his fortunes, he launched several initiatives o f  his own. M onm outh was 
stripped o f his military commands and would likewise have to go into exile along with
1 87James before parliament assembled in October. As Ronald Hutton contends these 
actions should not be seen as evidence o f  the duke o f  Y ork’s growing prestige and 
dominance. In fact the brash way in which he dwelt with those who had sided w ith his 
opponent’s sharpened tensions and efforts at reconciliation.188 It became evident to such 
people that they would receive no favour if  he secured the throne, thus self-interest 
compelled many to now support the exclusionists. Shaftesbury’s preparations to attack 
York in the upcoming parliament now proceeded with renewed vigour that September, 
w hilst the latter was sent back to Brussels where he remained isolated and powerless to 
shape his faith.189
In London, the anxiety o f  O rm ond’s supporters grew correspondingly, and the 
details o f  a meeting between Ossory and Southwell on 20 September 1679 testify to their 
awareness that previous methods o f protecting his position there were now  redundant. 
Ossory was disturbed that he would not be able to defend Ormond from such previously 
discredited accusations as Edward Brabazon’s claims o f  the illegal quartering o f  troops
186 Miller, King James II (Yale, 2000), p. 99; Miller, Charles //(London, 1991), pp 315-6; Fraser, King 
Charles II, p. 383.
187 Ibid., pp 381-3; John Miller, Charles II, pp 316-7; Trevelyan, England under the Stuarts, p. 381.
188 Haley, The first earl o f Shaftesbury, pp 546-7; Hutton, Charles the Second, king o f  England, Scotland 
and Ireland, p. 381.
189 Ibid., pp 381-2.
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shortly after the Restoration. He suggested that Ormond request a pardon from Charles II,
for this or any other transgressions. Southwell disagreed, however, as it would justify  all
the accusations that had hitherto been cast upon him  and only em bolden his enemies to
attack him in parliament. At the same time Southwell conceded that even this accusation
if  introduced into the Commons in their present mood would certainly occasion his
removal from the viceroyalty. Ormond’s main advisor in London was thus resigned to
hoping that maybe he might not be attacked in parliament, as ‘there will not be room  to
hearken to it in so busy an age o f  fresh and higher things elsewhere.’190 O rm ond’s
response to these events and advices clearly emphasise his acknowledgement o f  his own
powerlessness to influence events in which he was concerned, and as such he adopted the
tactic o f  remaining inconspicuous, in anticipation that the dark storm clouds would blow
over or converge on others. On 29 September 1679, he wrote to Southwell:
If it were not too late to put on the armour prepared against the next 
conflict (as I think it is), yet I am convinced that it would be of no defence 
against the great guns that are expected, at least to me, who know no 
reason why I should fear anything beyond the changing of my station, and 
1 have the vanity to think it may concern others more than immediately it 
does me, that I should hold it for a time.1'”
As quickly as events in London threatened to run his career aground, the winds o f 
fortune dramatically changed in O rm ond’s favour. On 7 October 1679, the duke o f  York
i Q'y
received a royal invitation to return from  Brussels and supervise Scotland. Shaftesbury 
was aggrieved at this decision as his ally M onmouth would have to remain in exile. He 
exploited his position as Lord President o f  the English Board and immediately summoned 
it to discuss this rumour. Charles refused to countenance his protest and for his 
impertinence sacked him. He followed this up a week later on 17 October by proroguing
190 Ossory to Ormond, 20 Sep. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 211; Sir Robert Southwell to Ormond, 20 Sep. 
1679, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 535-7.
191 Ormond to Sir Robert Southwell, 27 Sep. 1679, Ormonde MSS, iv, p. 291.
192 Miller, James II, pp 100-1; Hugh Ouston, ‘From Thames to Tweed departed; the court of James, duke of 
York in Scotland, 1679-82’ in Eveline Cruickshanks and David Starkey (ed.), The Stuart courts (Stroud, 
2000), pp 266-7.
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parliament till 25 January 1680. O rm ond’s allies in London w elcom ed these alterations; 
Longford was o f  the opinion that ‘by which means our friends w ill be freed from  some 
trouble which was intended against them  by malicious people.’193 He confidently stated 
that Ormond had out rid hitherto all the storms his enemies had endeavoured to raise 
against him and more importantly he would continue too as ‘his majesty being 
immovable in his resolution o f  continuing him  there in the governm ent.’194
193 Earl of Longford to Captain George Mathew, 18 Oct. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 225-6.
194 Ibid., pp 225-6.
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This chaptei examines O rm ond’s position during a series o f  destabilising crises 
ending in May 1680 with the failure o f  his opponents in London to sufficiently 
persuade the English Privy Council that he had suppressed evidence regarding a 
Catholic conspiracy hatched by Oliver Plunkett, archbishop o f  Armagh. The first o f  
these crises was the complete disintegration o f the coalition o f moderate ministers 
w ith whom Charles II cooperated after the reconstitution o f the English Privy Council 
in April 1679. This was followed by the political resurgence o f  Shaftesbury and other 
advocates o f the exclusion o f James, duke o f York from the throne and the removal 
his allies, including Ormond, from office. The second was a direct result o f  the 
heightening o f the exclusion issue. Shaftesbury and his supporters were unable to 
coerce Charles II into meeting parliament wherein they could enact legislation against 
the duke o f  York. Instead he dissolved parliament in January 1680 and demonstrated 
his support for York by inviting him to return from Scotland. The W higs were 
therefore compelled to utilise other means in order to reassert their position in relation 
to the crown. The m ost important o f these was fostering an atmosphere o f  intense 
anti-Catholic hysteria by manufacturing a bogus Irish Catholic plot to introduce the 
French into Ireland and England.
Shaftesbury’s removal from the English Privy Council and the prorogation o f 
parliament on 17 October 1679 was a decision Charles II was soon to regret. 
Shaftesbury’s appointment as Lord President in April had greatly dim inished his 
political standing amongst the opposition especially in the Commons leaving him 
frustrated and powerless to effect the constitutional change he desired. Shaftesbury 
had therefore been labouring for his own removal since mid-August for as Southwell 
observed, ‘he app ars to undervalue his station, and would affect to be discharged
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harshly as the way to enhance him self elsewhere.’1 Such a scenario was ultimately 
produced by the bungling attempts o f a group o f Catholics associated w ith James, 
duke o f York, to frame Shaftesbury with involvement in a secret Presbyterian plot 
against the monarchy. Their informer Thomas Dangerfield, alias W illoughby a 
notorious villain and forger, deceived them by fabricating evidence and after the first 
proper investigation was forced to change his story.2 He turned on his Catholic 
patrons and accused them  o f involvement in the plot that was revealed by Titus Oates. 
The former added that two o f the Catholic lords imprisoned in the Tower o f London 
had offered him  £2,000 to kill the king and £500 to kill Shaftesbury.3 Charles was 
horrified when this news broke a week before parliam ent was due to assemble. In one 
stroke it destroyed the possibility o f the calm political climate he had sought by 
sending both the duke o f York and M onmouth out o f the country. It left him  with no 
alternative but to prorogue parliament or else allow control o f  both Houses to pass to 
Shaftesbury and other advocates o f  the plot.
This decision outraged a large segment o f  the English political nation and re­
established the legitimacy o f the Popish Plot which had been waning after several 
high profile trials had highlighted the flaws in O ates’s evidence. Sir Robert H oward 
commented to Ormond, ‘the business has given new ferment to that which seemed 
more quiet than formerly, and has now confirm ed belief and wakened apprehensions, 
rendering most men o f modest principles eager for a parliam ent.’4 Shaftesbury’s 
biographer, Kenneth Haley is o f the opinion that it made him  a ‘public m artyr’ as it
'Sir Robert Southwell to Ormond, 20 Aug. 1679, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 534-5.
2 Ronald Hutton, Charles the Second, king o f  England, Scotland and Ireland (Oxford, 1989), p. 383,
1 Hutton, Charles the Second, king o f England, Scotland and Ireland p 383; Richard L. Greaves,
Secrets o f the kingdom: British radicals from the popish plot to the revolution (Stanford, 1992), pp 10- 
2; K. H. D. Haley, The first earl o f Shaftesbury (London, 1968), pp 554-6; John Kenyon, The Popish 
plot (London, 1972), pp 2 16-7; G. M. Trevelyan, England under the Stuarts (paperback edition,
London, 2002), pp 383-4; Antonia Fraser, King Charles 11 (London, 1979), p. 385; Roderick Mansell, 
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confirmed what he had been claiming since the exoneration o f the queen’s physician, 
Sir George W akeman o f plotting to poison the king, that Charles II was deliberately 
failing to prosecute the plot. As such Shaftesbury was now propelled to the head o f  a 
loose coalition o f  groups opposed both to court corruption and the succession o f  the 
duke o f  York to the English crown.5 Charles II aggravated his position further by 
refusing to consult the advice o f  his own Council before he prorogued parliament. 
This made nonsense o f his promise in April before them, ‘that he would have all his 
affairs here debated freely’ and as such, he alienated the moderates w ithin it who had 
cooperated with his designs throughout the summer.6 Essex and Halifax were deeply 
aggrieved at being publicly rebuffed by a king who was clearly numb to the wishes o f 
both parliament and Council. The former expressed his dissatisfaction by resigning 
his commission in the treasury whilst the latter, along with Sir W illiam  Temple
n
absented him self from court.
The Meal Tub plot, as Dangerfield’s plot soon became known, and its 
associated consequences both political and religious affected Ormond and the Irish 
kingdom in several ways. It dashed any initial aspirations he may have had o f 
securing a meeting o f  the Irish legislature upon hearing o f the prorogation in England. 
Southwell informed him, ‘our prosecutions here have as it were quite laid asleep the 
thoughts o f the I f  sh bills’.8 At the same time, it paradoxically copper fastened the 
desire o f  many in London to enact the exact same penal legislation in Ireland as in 
England, something the English House o f Lords had unsuccessfully attempted 
between the 31 M arch and 15 April 1679. In Ireland the bulk o f  the legislation against
4 Sir Robert Howard to Ormond, 12 Nov. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 237-8.
5 Haley, The first earl o f  Shaftesbury, pp 548-9; Hutton, Charles the Second, king o f  England, Scotland 
and Ireland, p. 383-4; Sir Robert Southwell to Ormond, 18 Oct. 1679, Ormonde MSS, pp 545-9.
6 W. C. Costin and Steven. J. Watson (ed), The law and the working o f the constitution: Documents 
1660-1783 (London, 1952) i, pp 329-30.
7 Haley, The first earl o f Shaftesbury, pp 549, 556.
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Roman Catholics such as the Act o f Supremacy which required all clergy and secular 
officials to swear an oath accepting the supremacy o f  the English crown against all 
foreign jurisdictions dated from Queen Elizabeth’s reign. However in practice they 
were not sufficient from deterring many Catholics from holding public office and 
sitting in both the Irish Lords and Commons.9 On 1 December 1679, Charles II 
conceded to the wishes o f opposition politicians and indeed many o f  his remaining 
advisors. He ordered Ormond to prepare bills for a future parliam ent in Ireland ‘for 
the preventing papists from sitting in either house thereof and from holding any public 
office’.10 This order was received civilly but privately it displeased Ormond. 
Although it was customary for most legislation passed in England to be likewise 
enacted in Ireland, he and others such as M ichael Boyle firmly believed that all 
legislation affecting the kingdom of Ireland should receive its first hearing in the Irish 
Council.11 Reports from London also spoke o f ‘a new stratagem ’, which aimed to 
render his service in the government ineffectual.12 If  Ormond refused to transm it such 
bills he would be attacked for failing to properly secure the Protestant interest 
whereas if  he sanctioned severe legislation against Catholics as in England, it might
13very well drive them into rebellion, devastating the kingdom and its revenues. 
Finally, although in favour o f the exclusion o f Catholics from the lower house,
8 Sir Robert Southwell to Ormond, 18 Nov. 1679, Ormonde MSS, pp 558-60.
9 J. E. Aydelotte, ‘The duke of Ormond and the English government of Ireland, 1677-85’ (unpublished 
Ph.D dissertation, University of Iowa, 1975), pp 111-2; S. J. Connolly (ed), Oxford companion to Irish 
history (Oxford, 2002), p. 558.
10 Bodl., Carte MS 39, f. 81.
11 Col. Edward Cooke to Ormond, 15 Apr. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 48-50.
12 This is alluded to by Aydelotte, ‘The duke of Ormond and the English government of Ireland, 1677- 
85’, p. 111.
13 Ormond to Ossory, 27 Apr. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 312-3; Aydelotte, ‘The duke of Ormond and 
the English government of Ireland, 1677-85’, p. 111. Aydelotte contends (hat this order may have 
reflected a plan by Shaftesbury and his associates to embarrass and ultimately remove Ormond and in 
the process obtain new confiscations of land there for Protestants.
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Ormond opposed their removal from the Lords, as it would violate the inherent rights 
o f  nobles that they were immune from the requirements o f  oaths.14
The most obvious significance o f  the Meal Tub plot was the resurgence in anti 
Catholicism and the distrust o f those associated w ith James, duke o f  York that 
accompanied it. In England at this time there was a genuine fear that another Irish 
rebellion on the scale o f 1641 could very easily reoccur. That same year, Sir John 
Tem ple’s anti-Irish tract o f 1646, The Irish Rebellion, had been republished tw ice.15 
In London’s coffee houses, Ormond’s Catholic proclivities once again appear to have 
been a popular topic o f conversation, so much so that he was included w ithin a pack 
o f cards and paper o f verses made by a prisoner, James Carroll, about the p lo t.16 M any 
complaints, which he had hitherto countered, were readily countenanced so m uch so 
that Ossory advised him to order another seizure o f  arms as ‘great exceptions have 
been taken at you giving the Irish time to bring in their arms, and not making a private
17
and strict search as you did when the conspiracy o f  Blood was on foot.’ It was 
alleged that Richard Talbot, who had been released on bail by Ormond on account o f 
an illness, was now in Paris and displaying great health while in Ireland Ormond was 
hindering the investigation of the plots that had been discovered by David Fitzgerald, 
Hubert Burke and John MacNamara. These informers had accused Lord Theobald 
Brittas, Colonel Pierce Lacy, the earl o f Tyrone, Richard Power, and other gentry in
14 Aydelotte, ‘The duke of Ormond and the English government of Ireland, 1677-85’, pp 111-2.
15 Sir John Temple, The Irish rebellion: or, an history o f  the beginnings and first progress o f the 
general rebellion raised within the kingdom o f Ireland upon the three and twentieth day at October, in 
the year 1641. Together with the barbarous cruelties and bloody massacres which ensued 
thereupon (London, 1646); Samuel Gellibrand who had printed the original in 1646 was responsible for 
reprinting it again in 1679. A second reprint was produced that same year for one Edward Gellibrand. 
Sir Robert Southwell to Ormond, 5 Jul. 1679, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 529-30.
16 Sir Robert Southwell to Ormond, 3 Jan. 1679, Ormonde MSS, pp 569-70; Kevin Herlihy, ‘The Irish 
Baptists, 1650-1780’ (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, University of Dublin, 1992), p. 94; James Carroll, 
A narrative o f  the popish plot in Ireland... Discovered by me James Carroll, in the year 1672. With an 
account o f  my sufferings for discovering the same (Dublin, 1681).
17 Ossory to Ormond, 29 Nov. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 243-4.
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M unster o f  planning to introduce the French to massacre their Protestant neighbours. 
Ossory advised him,
I doubt not that all diligence is used to search into the truth of that matter,
as it is necessary that it should be manifest to the world the care that is
taken, since my lord of Shaftesbury and many others indicate the 
19contrary.
In late 1679, such accusations w hether they contained any truth or not were 
extremely dangerous as the Licensing Act, the means by which the Crown had 
controlled the publication and dispersal o f political information in England since 1662 
had lapsed.20 Ormond would now have to suffer the implications o f rum ours and 
insinuations not only at court and around W estminster in London but throughout the 
three kingdoms o f  the Stuart monarchy. M any in Ireland were not oblivious to such 
alterations. Southwell informed Ormond on 6 December, ‘I have the honour o f  your 
grace’s o f  the first instant, and observe how  the plot begins to ferment, or at least the 
informations to increase on that side.’21 In Waterford, a dispute between several 
companies o f  Dum barton’s regiment garrisoned there and its citizens that had been 
immediately pounced upon by the unlicensed press in London was found to have been 
largely contrived and calculated for it by disaffected individuals instructed out o f 
England.22 To add to Ormond’s woes, a narrative o f the heated events o f  the 1640s
1 o
18 David Dickson, New foundations: Ireland 1660-1800 (new edition, Dublin, 2000), p. 20; Anon, A 
fu ll and true relation o f  a new hellish plot in Ireland, carried on hy the papists in Munster... (London, 
1679); Julian C. Walton, ‘Richard Power, first earl of Tyrone (1629/30-1690)’, in Matthew and 
Harrison (ed.), Oxford D.N.B., xlv, pp 141-2; During the Irish rebellion of 1641, Power’s father became 
a lunatic. Legally this meant his land could not be touched during the Cromwellian plantation. During 
the 1650s, he added to his inherited estates by marrying into the New Protestant interest by marrying 
Dorothy Annesley, the eldest daughter of the earl of Anglesey.
19Ossory to Ormond, 30 Dec. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 260-1; Henry Coventry to Ormond, 2 Nov. 
1679, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 233. Ossory’s was referring to the information against Richard Power, earl 
of Tyrone in this advice.
20 John Miller, ‘Public opinion in Charles IPs England’, in History, Ixxx, no. 260, (Oct, 1995), pp 362- 
3; Harold M. Weber, Paper bullets: print and kingship under Charles II (Kentucky, 1996), p. 134.
21 Southwell to Ormond, 6 Dec. 1679. Ormond MSS, v, pp 564-6.
22 Ormond to Southwell, 8 Nov. 1679, Ormonde MSS, ii, p. 293-5; The two plots in question were first, 
the information of David Fitzgerald against Lord Brittas and others and second, the information of 
Hubert Burke and John MacNamara against Richard Power, earl of Tyrone. An indictment brought 
against Tyrone for conspiring to raise men to aid a French invasion had already been ignored by the 
Grand Jury of Waterford on 14 August 1679. Coventry to Ormond, 2 Dec. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, p.
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was due to be published by a Chester physician, Edmund Borlase who had lampooned 
him in several pamphlets already that year.
In England, the investigation o f  the Meal Tub plot was entrusted to the English 
Privy Council. M any o f its members were clearly disaffected in light o f  Charles IPs 
actions and began courting Shaftesbury. Essex was reported to have consulted 
Shaftesbury on whether the former should vacate his position on the Privy Council 
and was observed to have become active in investigating the plots.24 Southwell 
suspected that Essex’s ultimate aim was to compel Charles II to lure him  away from 
the opposition, because a year previous to this he held a post in the Treasury, and by 
1679 he was anxious to seize control o f the key position o f viceroy which he had once 
held.25 He was certainly prominent amongst those criticising O rm ond’s proceedings 
regarding the plot and questioned his zeal for the Protestant interest in  Ireland. A t the 
Council table when it was noted how the Catholics had set W illoughby on to 
incriminate Shaftesbury and Roderick Mansell, Essex observed that he had also heard 
o f  a parallel plot in Ireland for pulling down the Mass houses o f  Dublin by the 
apprentices. It had failed and upon inquiry it was found that O rm ond’s brother in law,
248; John Napper to the Farmers of the Customs, 19 Nov. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 240; Captain 
Julius Lockhart to Ormond, 22 Nov. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 240-1; Ormond to Mayor of Waterford, 
25 Nov. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 242-3; Ormond to Ossory, 10 Dec. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 252; 
Bodl., Carte MS 70, f. 449.
23 Edmund Borlase, The history o f the execrable Irish rebellion trae'dfrom many preceding acts, to the 
grand eruption the 23. o f  October, 1641. thence pursued to the Act o f  Settlement, MDCLXII (London, 
1681); Nicolas Canny, Making Ireland British, 1380-1650 (Oxford, 2001), p. 463; Sir Robert 
Southwell to Ormond, 5 Jul. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 529-30; Borlase was a son of Sir John Borlase 
who was joint Lord Justice of Ireland when the 1641 rebellion erupted. Sir Robert Southwell to 
Ormond, 5 Jul. 1680, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 528-9; J, C. Beckett, The cavalier duke: a life o f James 
Butler, T' duke o f  Ormond (Belfast 1990), p. 23; Aidan Clark, ‘Edmund Borlase (c. 1620-1682)’ in 
Matthew and Harrison (ed.), Oxford dictionary o f  national biography, vi, pp 660-1.
21 Haley, The first earl o f  Shaftesbury, p. 556.
25 Anon. // letter to the right honourable Earl o f  Essex, from Dublin, declaring the strange obstinacy o f  
papists, (as here, so) in Ireland; who being... convicted and condemned for criminal causes, yet at 
their death... absolutely deny the fact (London, 1679); In this letter, it can be observed that Essex had 
been writing to correspondents in Ireland since the beginning of the plot in order to acquire evidence to 
increase his position among the opposition.
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Colonel John Fitzpatrick was behind it.26 On 8 November 1679 Southwell informed 
Ormond that this person’s name ‘is upon frequent occasions made use o f  as the poison 
against [Orm ond].’27 Shaftesbury, still angry with both Ormond and Ossory on 
account o f the latter’s reaction to his speech in the Lords on 25 M arch 1679, intended 
to make it appear that Fitzpatrick had corresponded with Colonel Thomas Blood who 
had also been implicated in Dangerfield’s plot. W hat added menace to such 
information were reports from London that Charles II, desperate to improve his 
position vis-à-vis the English political nation, was having second thoughts about 
Shaftesbury’s removal from the Council and was holding secret discussions with him 
through Sunderland wherein according to Southwell, Shaftesbury had been offered 
‘the Treasurers staff and to make all the other great officers such as he should like’. 
However Shaftesbury had apparently sent back word that ‘he had already declared his 
conditions; and without them  he would never enter, nor was there any good to be 
done.’28
This was not the only alarming information received by Ormond during this 
period for on 28 October 1679 enclosed within a letter from Henry Coventry was 
report o f a rumour circulating around Brussels,
That in or about May or June last Colonel Fitzherbert [Fitzpatrick] 
delivered to the pope’s Internuncio at Brussels a letter and a paper signed 
by four Roman Catholic bishops, two of whom were Plunkett, archbishop 
o f Armagh and [Patrick] Tyrell, bishop of Clogher, recommending 
Fitzherbert [Fitzpatrick] to be the only person fit to be entrusted general
of an army for establishing the Roman Catholic religion in Ireland, under
29French sovereignty.
To the neutral observer such a report was certainly plausible as Fitzpatrick was 
closely associated with most o f the Irish Roman Catholic hierarchy throughout the
26 Sir Robert Southwell to Ormond, 28 Oct. 1679, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 552-3.
27 Sir Robert Southwell to Ormond, 8 Nov. 1679, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 557-8.
28 Ibid., pp 557-8; Same to same, 18 Nov. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 558-60; Haley, The first earl o f  
Shaftesbury, pp 550-1.
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1670s especially Plunkett.30 During the viceroyalty o f  Sir John Berkeley, Fitzpatrick 
obtained passports for both Plunkett and Thady Keogh, archbishop o f  Tuam that they 
might travel around Ireland unmolested. In 1679 during the height o f  the Popish Plot, 
Plunkett lamented his absence from Ireland in a letter to Urbano Cerri, Secretary o f 
Propaganda in Rome stating ‘Colonel Fitzpatrick [...]  was a greater benefactor to me 
than the whole diocese o f Armagh and all my friends and relatives in  this country’. 
The Brussels rumour was almost certainly framed however to harm  Plunkett more 
than his patron. His hostility to tories and determination to im plem ent Tridentine 
reforms in the Irish church combined w ith his old English background had led him  to 
fall out with a large segment o f  the native Irish clergy in Ulster, in particular the 
Franciscans, against whom he gave a decision in favour o f the Dominicans in 1671
• "39
regarding questing or begging rights.
In light o f  recent events, Ormond immediately perceived that such information 
was quite possibly an indirect attack aimed at his removal and he quickly reacted to 
stifle this threat and protect his position. He wrote to a m em ber o f the Irish Privy 
Council and a senior law officer in north Leinster and south Ulster, Sir Hans 
Hamilton, stating that it would be in the best interests o f  the king if  Oliver Plunkett 
and Patrick Tyrell were apprehended. He failed to m ention the nature o f  the crime 
they were charged with only that it ‘is o f more than ordinary im portance’. On 30
29 Paper presented to the king by the duke of York, 20 Oct. 1679, H. M. C., Appendix to the fifth report, 
p. 318.
10 John Hanly, ‘Oliver Plunkett [St Oliver Plinkett] (1625-1681)’, in Matthew and Harrison (ed.), 
Oxford D.N.B., xliv, pp 526-532. A member of a prominent Old English family Plunkett was ordained 
a priest in Rome in the 1650s. In 1669, he was appointed archbishop of Armagh upon the death 
archbishop Edmund O’Reilly.
31 John Brady, ‘The arrest of Oliver Plunkett’ In /. E. R„ 5,h ser, Ixxxi (Jan-Jun 1954), p. 85; John 
Hanly (ed), The letters o f  saint Oliver Plunkett 1625-81, archbishop o f  Armagh and primate o f  all 
Ireland (Dublin, 1979), pp 529-31.
32 Patrick J. Corish, The Catholic community in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Dublin,
1981), pp 67-8; Tomas O Fiaich, ‘The fall and return of John Mac Moyer’, in Seanchas Ardmhaca, iii, 
(1958-59), pp 58-60; Brendan Jennings, ‘An appeal of the Ulster Franciscans against blessed Oliver 
Plunkett’ in Seanchas Ardmhaca, ii (1956-57), pp 114-5.
” Ormond to Sir Flans Hamilton, 28 Oct. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 231.
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October 1679 Ormond replied to Coventry wherein he protected him self by 
deliberately making no mention o f Fitzpatrick, who after all, was the main figure 
implicated in the rumour. Instead he focused on the clerical conspirators and the 
impossibility o f  authenticating the evidence against them affirming that there were 
no more than seven or eight Catholic prelates present in Ireland and that if  such a 
plot were in existence it would be near impossible to verify even if  he managed to 
apprehend any o f them upon which he added ‘nor can I image from what other hand, 
or by what other means to go about the discovery o f a thing the knowledge and 
concealing w hereof is so crim inal.’
During the following weeks, O rm ond’s anxiety regarding the Brussels rum our is 
most apparent in his attempts to distance him self from the charge o f  partiality in 
Fitzpatrick’s affairs. In late November 1679, he finally brought the earlier charge o f 
treason against him before the Irish Board in his absence, which he had hitherto 
procrastinated over. However his accuser Darby Costigan retracted his inform ation in 
front o f them stating there was no truth in his initial accusation, ‘that it was a mere 
contrivance betwixt him and others; who had suborned and set him  on in that manner 
to accuse the said Colonel [Fitzpatrick]’.35 In rather suspicious circumstances, 
Ormond was thwarted from getting to the bottom o f this sham plot as Costigan 
escaped, supposedly through the negligence o f his gaoler, before he could be 
prosecuted for perjury. Other precautions were also taken; Ormond mockingly 
dismissed out o f hand the idea that Fitzpatrick would be in league w ith Colonel 
Thomas Blood who had, after all, plotted ten years previously with the duke o f 
Buckingham to bring about his murder adding ‘I should so soon have expected it
34Ormond to Henry Coventry, 30 Oct. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 231-2.
35 Lord Lieutenant and Council to Henry Coventry, 9 Dec. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 249-50.
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or
betwixt him  and the M ufti for the establishment o f  Alcoran [the K oran].’ The 
ludicrous nature o f  such reports was no small comfort to Ormond as he appears to 
have been painfully aware that once such information was in Shaftesbury’s hands, it 
mattered little whether it contained a grain o f truth or not in light o f  his increased 
prestige and the fawning attempts o f the crown to win him  over again. He 
despondently concluded upon this subject,
Since Shaftesbury is able to make that appear, I do not wonder that he 
should be courted by Charles II, and all the world; for he seems to have 
everybody’s destiny in his hands, at least by his proposal he seems to 
think so 37
Ormond was perfectly aware o f the monarchy’s instability but more importantly 
that concerning his own position in London at this time. D uring these months he 
hurriedly prepared and transmitted several explanations to England regarding actual 
or perceived accusations against him. On 10 November 1679 he had Arthur Turner, 
Deputy Constable o f Dublin Castle certify Colonel Richard Talbot’s state o f  health 
prior to his release on bail and retained for future use inform ation apparently extracted 
from Talbot in return for his freedom, most importantly a memorandum on the illegal
o O ,
conveyance o f  arms and am munition in Ireland. Ormond was evidently perturbed 
that comparisons would be made in London upon the treatment o f  Catholics there and 
in Dublin, for by the end o f  November a list o f Catholic convents, chapels and parish 
priests were drawn up.39 He attempted to counter the incursions o f the unlicensed 
gazettes by supplying his supporters in London with a full account o f  the late
36Ormond to Southwell, 16 Nov. 1679, Appendix to Thomas Carte,. An history o f  the life o f  James 
Duke o f Ormonde from his birth to his death in 1688 (3 vols, London, 1736 ed.), vol ii, p. 93; Ormond 
intended to say the Koran when he said Alcoran; Alan Marshall, Intelligence and espionage in the 
reign o f Charles II, 1660-85 (Cambridge, 1994), pp 190-2; It appears that Buckingham enlisted Blood 
to kidnap Ormond and hang him at Tyburn though other sources reveal that Blood carried out this deed 
of his own initiative in order to ransom Ormond for ten or twenty thousand pounds.
37 Ibid., p. 93.
38 Bodl., Carte MS 243, f. 343; Bodl., Carte MS 221, f. 367; Kilkenny Borough Council Archive: The 
White Book of Kilkenny Corporation 1656-88, fol. 119; on 6 May 1680 Arthur Turner replaced 
Richard Ryves as Recorder of Kilkenny.
35 Bodl., Carte MS 308, f. 695.
disorders in W aterford w hilst he dealt with the root o f  the problem  by exerting his 
authority over the city’s mayor and corporation. He reprim anded them  for the 
inferences drawn upon his government because o f their negligence in reporting the 
supposed violence committed upon them post haste to Dublin.40 At the same time, 
Ormond tried to conciliate them promising that ‘whatsoever they have to com plain o f  
shall be readily and impartially heard and justice as im partially done to them or any o f 
them that shall appear to have been w ronged.’41 Finally he was once again obliged to 
legitimise and explain his proceedings concerning the disarming o f  Catholics and 
arming o f Protestants at the outset o f  the plot. In what Sir Robert Southwell called, a 
‘closely argued paper’, Ormond cleverly defended his decision to allow Catholics 
twenty days to surrender their arms by hiding behind the law. He stated there was no 
stipulation in force in Ireland prohibiting them from having arms or authorising their 
removal from any subject. In fact, what Ormond propounded was the m ost practical 
alternative available to him and was a clear example o f his foresight and vigilance for 
the Protestant interest. He estimated that in Ireland there were fifteen papists for every 
Protestant, which meant that if  there had been a Catholic p lo t afoot, he could have 
given them  no greater advantage than to disperse the army throughout the country 
searching for arms, ‘to be destroyed [ ...]  w ith clubs, stones, swords and skeins’.42 To 
those that complained o f the exorbitant prices o f the arms and powder im ported into 
Ireland, Ormond affirmed ‘it does not much belong to me to answer for the price set 
upon arms and ammunition, having no share in the m erchandise’ and if  Protestants
40 Bodl., Carte MS 146, f. 230; Omiond to mayor of Waterford, 25 Nov. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 
242-3.
41 Ormond to mayor of Waterford, 25 Nov. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 242-3.
42 Omiond to Sir Robert Southwell, 8 Nov. 1679, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 294-6; Southwell was pleased 
with this paper except for Ormond’s estimation that there were fifteen Catholics to eveiy Protestant in 
Ireland. He informed him that Sir William Petty had estimated the Irish population at eleven hundred 
thousand, which work J out at three Catholics to every Protestant; Sir Robert Southwell to Ormond, 18 
Nov. 1679, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 558-60.
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complain o f the rates, ‘it was an argument that either they did not want them; or that 
they were not really in those apprehensions that were represented.’43
Ormond also took care to protect him self from any future charges o f  failing to 
discover Catholic conspiracies. On 10 December, he issued a proclamation 
commanding all persons with knowledge o f any plots to make them  known before the 
last day o f Februaiy 1680, after which time no pardon was to be expected for such 
treasons or misprision o f treason.44 He deliberately appointed a vehem ent anti 
Catholic, Henry Jones, bishop o f Meath as head o f a committee set up to examine and 
prosecute the earl o f Tyrone, Lord Brittas and others implicated in the plots recently 
discovered but wisely held the Brussels rumour implicating Plunkett and his relative 
Fitzpatrick from him. Southwell acknowledged the prudence o f  this appointment 
stating;
tis well to employ the bishop of Meath in the works of that nature, 
because his authority weighs with many, and will not only satisfy 
expectation that there could no more be made of the matter, but that it 
also could not sooner be finished.45
By the end o f December, Jones and his committee had been unable to bring any o f  the
information to such a conclusion that would allow him to report anything o f
substance to London. Furthermore what was revealed did not in any way materially
concur with the discoveries revealed in England; in fact the evidence was so flimsy
that many o f the accused were released on b a i l46 This created uproar in the English
Council where the articles against Tyrone and Brittas were held to import clear proofs
43 Ibid., pp 294-6.
44 Proclamation by the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland, 10 Dec. 1679.
45 Sir Robert Southwell to Ormond, 18 Nov. 1679, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 558-60; Aidan Clarke, ‘Henry 
Jones (1605-1682)’ in Matthew and Harrison (ed.), Oxford D.N.B., xxx, pp 511-13. Jones was a brother 
of Michael Jones who defeated Ormond at the battle of Rathmines in 1649 and a nephew of archbishop 
James Ussher. Upon Cromwell’s arrival in Ireland, Jones was appointed scoutmaster-general of the 
army and during the 1650s his service to the Commonwealth and Protectorate were rewarded with 
several forfeited estate in County Meath. In 1661, he became Church of Ireland bishop of Meath and a 
member of the Irish Privy Council.
46 Lord Granard to Lord Conway, 26 Nov 1679, Cal. S. P. dom., 1678-9, p. 290.
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of treason. On 7 February 1680, a clearly embarrassed and angry Coventry advised 
Ormond to immediately reorder their arrest,
That there being an information of so great a treason as aiding a French 
invasion that the Council of Ireland that was so scrupulous in the case of 
the Talbot’s and others as not to bail them, though never so rich, without 
acquainting the board here, it is a thing divers here seem surprised at to 
see that all the men accused o f the plot are allowed their liberties upon 
bail.47
Ormond was sufficiently protected from the ramifications o f their release for as 
Southwell correctly pointed out, ‘it falls out very well that the bishop o f  M eath
48
presides in the exam ination o f  the plot, since the work proves so dilatory.’
In London, Ormond set in action several stratagems through his allies in order 
to protect his position there. Their actions can be categorised along the following 
lines. First, their determination to avoid any potential embarrassment. Second, 
utilising the press to improve his position and finally, maintaining the utm ost loyalty 
to the monarchy despite the consequences. In London, Southwell visited and 
reassured one o f  Orm ond’s key Catholic allies, the Remonstrant cleric Peter W alsh 
who was aggrieved at his refusal to maintain correspondence with him. Southwell 
informed him that Ormond was anxious to avoid potential em barrassm ent either by 
writing or receiving letters from him and encouraged him in that ‘busy tim e’ to search 
over his papers and extinguish ‘every shadow o f inconvenience’.49 Southwell and 
Walsh also arrived at the opinion that Ormond should counter the history o f the Irish 
rebellion put forward by Edmund Borlase by encouraging a certain Mr. Hill, a former 
minister to the English at Flushing in the Netherlands, a man acquainted with books 
and the press to resume improving a pam phlet entitled The affairs o f  Ireland from  
1641-60. Hill had brought it to Southwell’s attention in 1677 as it was a great
47 Henry Coventry to Ormond, 7 Feb. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 272.
48 Sir Robert Southwell to Ormond, 3 Jan. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 569-73.
49 Sir Robert Southwell to Ormond, 10 Jan. 1680, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 571-3.
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vindication o f Ormond’s actions during the 1640s but for some unknown reason, 
Ormond terminated this project in 1678.50
Throughout November and December 1679, Coventry and others took care to 
give the English public full and proper accounts o f  Irish affairs, for instance having 
the circumstances surrounding the W aterford disorders and the directions issued 
thereafter by Ormond inserted in several journals. On 27 November, the duke o f 
Monmouth, the Protestant alternative to the duke o f  York, returned from the 
Netherlands without the king’s permission at the instigation o f  Shaftesbury who was 
determined to pressurise Charles into meeting parliament.51 In London, M onm outh’s 
residence was soon full o f obsequious courtiers and politicians anxious to ingratiate 
themselves with the faction generally perceived to be in the ascendant. Ossory was 
perfectly aware where the ultimate decision to remove his father lay and steadfastly 
refused to undertake such a course o f action. He reassured Ormond, ‘I w ill prefer 
decency to my master to all other considerations, and I think it is not consistent with
• 52that to complement any that stands in his present circum stances.’
By January 1680, it can be ascertained that Ormond perceived his position in
regard to Catholicism and the plot as relatively secure for he was now primarily
concerned with the possibility o f securing a meeting o f the Irish legislature and
enacting within it his solution to what was regarded by many contemporaries as an
incomplete and divisive Restoration land settlement. On 9 January, his am bition
*
50 Sir Robert Southwell to Ormond, 9 Oct. 1677, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 377-9. Ormond possibly feared 
that such a work on his behalf would draw upon him rejoinders from figures that had different 
interpretations of the events ° f  the 1640s and 1650s and his actions during this period. This course of 
action was very much true to his character for on many occasions throughout his political career,
Ormond shied from conflict by in effect letting sleeping dogs lie.
51 Haley, The first earl o f  Shaftesbury, pp 557-9; Hutton, Charles the Second, king o f  England,
Scotland and Ireland, pp 385-6; Miller, Charles II, p. 328. Both Haley and Miller suggest Shaftesbury 
possibly instigated Monmouth’s return. Whilst Hutton does not engage with this question, instead he 
highlights the fact that Charles II had promised Monmouth that he could return to England once 
parliament was over.
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received a boost when the king in the Council laid aside the bills transm itted from 
Ireland in the summer o f 1678 and ordered a new transm ission o f bills. Ormond was 
advised that all the old bills could be retransmitted without alterations except the land
CO
bill, which was to be laid aside.' This bill was extremely contentious and had been 
highlighted previously by his opponents as an instance o f his Catholic sympathies. 
For instance, in the aftermath o f the ‘Meal Tub p lo t’ Ossory wrote to him, ‘I am 
informed that my lord o f  Essex does very maliciously inveigh against the bill o f 
confirmation and that o f settlement, as partial to the Irish and consequently prejudicial 
to the Protestant interest.’54 Not surprisingly during periods when anti-Catholicism 
was in the ascendant in London, Ormond had distanced him self from this bill by 
down playing its value and encouraging the English Council to reject it as it would in 
no way retard the determination of the Dublin parliament to vote the king’s subsidies. 
Ormond now back tracked on this policy by asking for clarification o f the last part o f 
Charles II’s order hypocritically warning that if  some sort o f  confirmation bill was not 
prepared the Irish parliament might very well refuse supplies till they had something 
before them to set them at ease.55 Coventry was astonished by Orm ond’s stance and 
reminded him on 6 M arch that the majority o f  the English Council were still o f an 
opinion against that bill wherefore he urged him to accept a compromise solution that 
he him self had previously advocated, ‘if  you shall find upon the meeting o f  the 
parliament that there is a desire to have such a bill and upon what terms, your grace 
and the Council would transmit it hither.’56 Ormond refused to contemplate such 
initiatives and on 9 March, his stubbornness was rewarded, when Charles II ordered
52 Ossory to Ormond, 2 Dec. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 246; Ossory to Ormond, 6 Dec. 1679,
Ormonde MSS, v, pp 248-9.
53Aydelotte, ‘The duke of Ormond and the English govermnent of Ireland, 1677-85’, pp 115-7.
54 Ossory to Ormond, 17 Jan. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 263-4; Ossory to Ormond, 13 Dec. 1679, 
Ormonde MSS, v, p. 253.
55 Aydelotte, ‘The duke of Ormond and the English government of Ireland, 1677-85, p. 115,
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the Irish Privy Council to include within its new  transmission ‘a short bill for settling 
and confirming estates’.
This stance is testament to the effectiveness o f the initiatives adopted by 
Ormond and his allies during the preceding months. The most successful o f  these was 
his handling o f  the Brussels rumour involving Fitzpatrick. On 6 Decem ber 1679 
Oliver Plunkett was arrested in Dublin but neither he nor the inform ation against him 
was handed over to Jones. Instead Ormond placed him  in solitary confinement in 
Dublin Castle as he was relatively secure in the knowledge that no further inform ation 
had appeared to corroborate that contained in Coventry’s letter o f  21 October. 
Ormond was still apprehensive o f  further revelations appearing and therefore on 7 
December, he queried Coventry whether he should interrogate the prisoner, to which 
Coventry replied that no further information against Plunkett or any others had come 
to light. This would have delighted Ormond, for although he was personally confident 
o f the old cleric’s innocence, embarrassing information regarding Fitzpatrick or other 
Catholic relatives would almost certainly appear if  Plunkett was transferred before 
Jones and his com mittee.58 Coventry only added the following instructions ‘that 
unless his [Plunkett] papers discover some further grounds I doubt little will be got 
from him .’59 It was therefore left to O rm ond’s discretion to ply Plunkett w ith further 
questions otherwise the sheer fact that he was in the kingdom contrary to a 
proclamation o f  16 October 1678 justified his imprisonment. Ormond was also greatly 
encouraged by the fact that the Irish and English plots were in no ways linked and that 
the prospect o f  further discoveries by unscrupulous individuals was greatly
56 Henry Coventry to Ormond, 6 Mar. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 287.
57 Francis Gwyn to Ormond, 9 Mar. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 287-8; Aydelotte, ‘The duke of 
Ormond and the English government of Ireland, 1677-85’, p. 118.
58 Henry Thynne to Ormond, 16 Dec. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 253-4; Brady, ‘The arrest of Oliver 
Plunkett’, pp 90-2.
124
diminished as the proclamation granting pardons for speedy and full discoveries o f 
Catholic conspiracies had expired at the end o f February. Thus w ith the credibility o f 
the Irish plot waning, Ormond anticipated that there would be little opposition to his 
proposed land confirmation bill especially since the death o f  Orrery rem oved his life 
long antagonist from the scene.60
In England, Charles II had found his feet after the crisis following the 
prorogation o f  parliament and the M eal Tub plot revelations. He discontinued talks 
with Shaftesbury when the latter refused to enter government unless Charles 
repudiated his brother and wife.61 The overt recalcitrance o f  Shaftesbury, M onmouth 
and other lords only emboldened him  to exert his authority and he took revenge on his 
‘favourite son’ by stripping him o f all his offices and pensions and barring him  from 
court. The W higs attempts to pressurise concessions out o f Charles through the use o f 
mass petitions had failed and in fact drove him  to prorogue parliament for a further
• ft ')
eleven months and evoke laws against the promotion o f petitions. By the N ew  Year 
(1680) Charles had rehabilitated him self w ith a large segment o f  the political nation 
derogatorily term ed Tories by opponents o f the duke o f York. Both royal brothers 
based this alliance on the assertion that the crown and the Church o f England were the
f \ \
sole bulwarks preserving the English political, religious and social order. This minor 
turnabout in the crow n’s fortunes and indications from England that the plot scare had
59 Henry Coventry to Ormond, 23 Dec. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 258-9; ‘An account of the present 
state of Ireland presented by Lord Butler of Moor Park to the House of Lords’, 31 Mar. 1679, Ormonde 
MSS, v, p. 16.
f’° Henry Coventry to Ormond, 28 Oct. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 231.
61 Southwell to Ormond, 18 Nov. 1679, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 558-60; Hutton, Charles the Second, king 
o f England, Scotland, and Ireland, p. 385.
i>2 Haley, The first earl o f Shaftesbury, p. 561.
bl John Cannon (ed.), Oxford companion to British history (Oxford, 1997), pp 633, 673; The key to the 
party divide during the exclusion crisis as Tim Harris (Politics under the later Stuarts, 1660-1714 
(Harlow, 1993)) correctly points out was over the issue of the church, the Whigs being the party 
sympathetic to Dissent and the Tories the party of intolerant Anglicanism. The tenns used to describe 
both parties best emphasises this as the term Tory derived from the Irish for bandit and Whig from 
‘Whiggamore’ the name by which Scottish covenanters had been derogatorily known.
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more or less run its course removed the climate which had made O rm ond’s 
confirmation bill potentially a double edged sword. This appears to be the case, for on 
31 M arch 1680 Ormond informed Ossory that he had no other news other than ‘we 
are here labouring at the bills now sent for in much haste out o f  England in order to 
the calling o f a parliament here’.64
The tranquil state o f Irish affairs did not last long because the political situation 
in England altered again. The failure o f the petition campaign exposed the cracks in 
Shaftesbury’s loose coalition o f supporters, who were termed W higs by the court.65 
These were further aggravated when Charles II quashed rumours that he would 
reconcile h im self with M omnouth by inviting the duke o f York to return from 
Scotland. Shaftesbury viewed this as a challenge thrown down by the crown and 
responded by encouraging the English Council to resign en mass. To his dismay 
however, only four councillors answered his call. Others, like Essex, who up to now 
had been restrained from resigning, were growing accustomed to trim m ing.66 
Shaftesbury’s support base was further undermined as Charles attempted to ingratiate 
him self with moderate Whigs by strictly enforcing statutes against Catholics and 
despatching envoys, including Sir Robert Southwell, to the Protestant courts o f
• 7 •
Europe in order to construct a Protestant alliance against Louis XIV. In light of 
these setbacks, Shaftesbury and his allies became more and more desperate to 
improve their position in regard to the crown. They circulated rumours o f a ‘Black 
Box’ which supposedly held a marriage certificate proving the Protestant 
M onm outh’s legitimacy thus making him  the next in line for the throne.68 Plans were 
also made to utilise Charles II’s western kingdom to reinvigorate the plot thereby
64 Ormond to Ossory, 31 Mar. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 294-5.
65 Tim Harris, Politics under the later Stuarts, 1660-1714 (Harlow, 1993), pp 83-6.
66 Haley, The first earl o f Shaftesbury, p. 565.
67 Ibid., pp 566-7; Sir Robert Southwell to Ormond, 17 Feb. 1680, Ormonde MSS, iv, p. 580.
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creating conditions that would improve their prestige and influence. In Ireland, 
Ormond was unaware and unprepared for the menace brewing across the water.
Shaftesbury intended to make anti-Catholicism the driving force behind Stuart 
politics by resuscitating fears o f another rebellion in Ireland on the scale o f  1641. 
From a position o f  strength, the W higs could then force Charles to reconvene 
parliament and solve once and for all the controversial issue o f  succession. As an ally 
o f the duke o f  York, Ormond was a secondary target especially if  it could be 
demonstrated that he was negligent in protecting the Protestant interest. Shaftesbury 
had sought since 1679 to extend the plot to Ireland but to no avail, but now  his efforts 
were aided by several factors.69 First, within the ranks o f the W higs there were many 
disaffected from the Irish kingdom such as Roderick M ansell, Sir Flenry Ingoldsby 
and, it was rumoured, Sir W alter Plunkett, another member o f  the Irish Privy Council. 
Second, the linkages and knowledge possessed by the former Irish viceroy, Essex, 
who by this stage was frustrated with English politics and desirous to regain his old 
post. Third, those with vested interests in preventing parliament from meeting in 
Ireland, the farmers o f the Irish revenues, Ranelagh and many Protestants who feared 
that Ormond would overturn the Restoration land settlement. Finally, the atmosphere 
and example set by the M unster informers encouraged the desperate, disreputable and 
self-serving to collaborate in manufacturing plots.70 Shaftesbury was not thoroughly 
excited by m ost o f  those who flocked to his banner; a motley crew o f escaped 
criminals, perjurers and individuals with grudges against Ormond or others in his 
government. The necessity o f his position however forced him  to make to most o f 
such individuals.
68Haley, The first earl o f  Shaftesbury, pp 574-5; Trevelyan, England under the Stuarts, p. 394.
69 John Brady, ‘Oliver Plunkett and the popish plot’ in IE . R., 5th series, Ixxxix (Jan-June, 1958), pp 9- 
13.
70 Brady, ‘Oliver Plunkett and the popish plot’, pp 7-8.
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The first such figure was John Fitzgerald who had been exposed by Ormond in 
December 1678 as an impostor and a vagabond friar. He managed to escape from 
Ireland before he could be tried for perjury and held to account for the sum o f £8 
owed to Jeremiah Jones and others from Sligo who transported him  to Dublin after he
71
claimed he could make great discoveries o f  Catholic treasons. He appeared in 
London in July 1679 because in two letters from John Verney to Sir Robert Verney, it 
is noted that one Fitzgerald had arrived to discover more o f the plot, but was 
discarded after three days by his sponsors on suspicion o f assum ing a false identity
79
and trying to implicate them in a ‘counter plo t’ or Presbyterian plot. In 1682, 
Fitzgerald gave a different version to David Fitzgerald, but distinguishing truth from 
fiction in the account o f such a notorious rogue is impossible especially because by 
this stage it was worth his while to co-operate with the crown.73 In any event, he 
claimed that he came to London after reading a copy o f a letter from Shaftesbury in 
the possession o f  a Scottish m an in France promising ‘no encouragement would be 
w anting’ for those who would confirm the plot. Shaftesbury was not impressed with 
his information however, and specified to him, ‘I thought you would have hinted 
something o f the duke o f Ormond [...]  and the duke o f York and duke o f  Lauderdale 
[...] the three greatest enemies o f  these three nations as to destroying laws and 
government and all Protestant interests’.74 In late 1679, he was most likely 
reintroduced to Shaftesbury by Essex, who had been acquainted with Fitzgerald
71 Bodl., Carte MS 38, f. 748.
72 John Verney to Sir Robert Verney, 14 Jul. 1679, H. M. C., Appendix to the 7,h report (London, 
1879), pp 473-4.
73 After the dissolution of the third exclusion parliament held in Oxford in March 1681, the Crown had 
exerted its authority o . er the Whigs by reconstituting Crown and borough charters thereby filling 
government at all levels with Torys. Charles II also manipulated the law in order to bring the press to 
heel in the case o f ‘the Protestant Joiner’, Stephen College and exact revenge on Whig leaders, such as 
Lord William Russell and Algernon Sidney.
74 Brady, ‘Oliver Plunkett and the popish plot’, p. 11; Account by John Fitzgerald of his first coming to 
England, Cal. S. P. dow, 1682, pp 65-6; Haley, The first earl o f Shaftesbury, pp 570-1.
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during his viceroyalty.75 Fitzgerald alleged that after several interrogations by Ezrael 
Tonge and Titus Oates, a plot was fabricated for him and letters were produced in 
Latin, French and English, which would be conveyed ahead o f  him  to Ireland where
7 f\
he would discover them in the wall o f Galbally Abbey in County Limerick.
On 19 February 1680, Essex used his influence with Sunderland persuading 
him to issue instructions for Fitzgerald to proceed to M unster and letters for the
• • 77governor o f Limerick, Francis Boyle, Viscount Shannon to aid him  in his enterprise. 
Ranelagh’s wife wrote several letters on Fitzgerald’s behalf and promised him  that he 
should want for nothing if  he was successful. Ormond received no prior notice o f 
Fitzgerald’s mission as he could quickly ascertain his true character to many in 
London. The latter did not get veiy far however and was arrested in Bristol on 
suspicion o f  some papers found in his chamber. After being brought before the 
English Privy Council, it was eventually decided on 29 M arch that he should continue 
on his mission.78 Ezrael Tonge’s son, Sampson, would later claim that immediately 
after Fitzgerald’s release, Essex had urged his father ‘to the utm ost o f his power to 
defend what has been cunningly contrived’.79 This is almost certainly the case for 
whilst Fitzgerald was in Ireland, a printed pamphlet appeared wherein a former
servant o f Sir W illiam Waller, a London justice o f the peace was accused o f
• xn
counterfeiting and planting treasonous papers in Fitzgerald’s room.
7> This reference was obtained from John Brady, ‘Oliver Plunkett and the popish plot’, p. 11. On 4 
February 1672, Essex, the then viceroy of Ireland brought out a proclamation whereby John Fitzgerald 
and his servant were protected from the molestation of Catholics when he preached against them.
76 Account by John Fitzgerald of his going to Ireland, Cal S. P. dom., 1682., pp 46-7; 65-6.
77 Lord Shannon to Lord Sunderland, 10 April 1680, Cal. S. P. dom., 1679-80, p. 435; Instructions for 
A. B. (Egan alias Fitzgerald) 19 Feb. 1680, Cal. S. P. dom., 1679-80, p 394.
78New'.sletter to Christopher Bowman at Newcastle on Tyne., 25 Mar. 1680, Cal S. P. dom., 1679-80, 
p. 423-5; Newsletter to Christopher Bowman at Newcastle upon Tyne, 30 Mar. 1680, Cal S. P. dom.,
1679-80, pp 426-7.
79 Sampson Tonge to the King, Aug. 1680, Cal. S. P. dom., 1679-80, pp 628-9; It is also interesting to 
note that after Tonge’s death in December 1680, Essex asked the House of Lords committee on the plot 
for permission to view Tonge’s papers.
80 Anon., A short narrative o f Mr. Fitzgerald, who lately was summoned up from Bristol by one o f  his 
Majesties messengers to the honourable Privy Council fo r  suspicion o f high treason... (London, 1680).
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The delay in bringing Fitzgerald’s plot to fruition suited the conspirators in the 
long run for in the intervening weeks another discoverer came forward. W illiam 
Hetherington from Ganderstown, County Louth was a fugitive from the law in 
Ireland.81 M asquerading as an Irish justice o f the peace in London, he claimed that in 
October 1679, it had been disclosed to him by a certain Father Edmund M urphy in 
Dundalk that Oliver Plunkett was plotting with several officers o f  the Irish judiciary 
and military establishment to destroy the Protestant interest by bringing in the 
French.82 Ormond did not escape censure as M urphy had reputably urged 
Hetherington to discover Plunkett’s treasons in London on his behalf but not to trust 
or acquaint Ormond with them for ‘Plunkett has so many friends about the castle and 
town if  you do anything there you will have your estate and family destroyed.’83 It is 
conceivable that Shaftesbury or some o f his more unscrupulous allies encouraged 
Fitzgerald to intertwine this information with his own, thereby allowing them to 
synchronize both o f them, thus maximising their impact. This hypothesis is certainly 
plausible for during the three weeks that Fitzgerald was held up in Bristol due to 
contrary winds, something went wrong. Among the suspicious material found on him, 
Sir Robert Reading informed Ormond, ‘one was dated from Primate Plunkett to the
84Franciscans here and contained m uch.’
In any case, on 24 M arch 1680, Shaftesbury appeared before the English
Of
Council w ith a statement drawn up the previous day by Hetherington. He desired a 
private committee for imparting all he knew and that the clerks o f the Council
8lBrady, ‘Oliver Plunkett and the popish plot’, pp 341-2.
82 Ibid., 345-7; Brady republished Hetherington’s disclosure before Shaftesbury in full: Shaftesbury 
Papers, P. R. O., London. 30/24-50, pt. ii, no. 29; A true and brief account o f  the proceedings between 
Mr. David Fitzgerald and William Hetherington before his Majesty in Council, on Friday 11 February 
1681 (London, 1681), pp 11-2.
83 Ibid., 345-7.
84 Bodl., Carte MS 39, f. 66.
85 Brady, ‘Oliver Plunkett and the popish plot’, p. 343.
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immediately withdraw.86 This committee consisted o f  several politicians hostile to 
Ormond such as Essex, John Robartes, earl o f Radnor, and others upon whom he was 
on good terms such as Henry Coventry, Laurence Hyde and Heneage Finch, lord 
chancellor o f England.87 They refused to investigate H etherington’s plot w ithout the 
king’s knowledge and immediately despatched letters to Newm arket where he had 
been since 10 M arch requesting his return. However a majority conceded to 
Shaftesbury’s demand that the author o f his information should not be nam ed and that 
rigid precautions be adopted to preserve secrecy including an embargo on all the post 
to Ireland until his witnesses could be retrieved from Ireland. A t the end o f  M arch, a 
furious Charles II returned to London to convene the Council. It turned out to be a 
very heated session and many hostile words passed between Coventry and Hyde on 
one side and Shaftesbury, Essex and Radnor on the other. Coventry urged Charles to 
immediately inform Ormond o f  the information lately revealed and to hand its 
investigation over to the Irish judiciary.89 He was not convinced by Shaftesbury’s 
witnesses. The Sergeant-at-Law John Osborne had given a bad character o f 
Hetherington whilst his informer, Murphy, had a ‘scurvy load upon him, being [...] 
upon record o f suborning witnesses’.90 The scheme had been embraced or even 
concocted by Shaftesbury to sow discord between the king and the political nation 
and tarnish the reputation o f  the duke o f Ormond. Faced with this situation, Charles 
II, ever the pragmatist, attempted to satisfy both parties.91 He ordered Coventry to
86 Ibid., pp 343-4; Francis Gwyn to Ormond, 3 Apr. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 296-7.
87 Henry Coventry to Ormond, 2 Apr. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 295.
88 Brady, ‘Oliver Plunkett and the popish plot’, pp 343-5; James MacPherson, Original papers 
containing the secret history o f  Great Britain from the Restoration to the accession o f the House o f  
Hanover. To which are prefixed extracts from the life o f  James II as written by himself (2 vols, Dublin, 
1875) i, p. 105.
89 Bodi., Carte MS 243, f. 236; Bodl., Carte MS 243, f. 456; Haley, The first earl o f Shaftesbury, pp 
571-2; Gilbert Burnet to George Savile, 3 Apr. 1680, Camden Miscellany, xl, pp 18-9.
90 Henry Coventry to Ormond, 2 Apr. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 295; Gilbert Burnet to George Savile, 
10 Apr. 1680, Camden Miscellany, xl, pp 20-2; Brady, ‘Oliver Plunkett and the popish plot’, p. 347.
91 Haley, The ftrst earl o f  Shaftesbury, p. 572.
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inform Ormond o f all the circumstances o f Hetherington’s plot whilst at the same 
time he conceded to the Council’s desire to prosecute the plot in London for fear o f  
being accused by the Whigs o f endangering Irish Protestants.
In London itself, the exact details o f what had been disclosed before the Council 
were unknown though it was common knowledge since 27 M arch 1680 that a 
desperate Catholic design had been discovered in Ireland. The secrecy surrounding it 
along the doubling o f the guard at W hitehall and news that messengers had been sent 
to fetch the king led to widespread apprehension. It quickly elevated Ireland in the
QO
words o f Gilbert Burnet into one o f the ‘grand subjects o f our discourse here’. In a 
letter to Halifax, he highlighted its effect on the coffee houses noting they ‘were in a 
most languishing condition before, this matter has brought them  in heart again, and 
you never saw a more sensible alteration in the country after a great rain than this 
makes in some people’s looks.’94 With the development o f  such a climate it was soon 
rumoured that Ormond had plotted with the Catholics to betray Ireland and England, 
and that Shaftesbury’s discoverer had requested that he was not to be acquainted with 
his information till several witnesses were brought out o f Ireland. Other circumstances 
conspired to produce such opinions. In late March, Sir W illiam W aller uncovered a 
plot by a group o f apprentices to burn effigies o f members o f the Rump and Cromwell 
and to tear down conventicles and brothels. The W higs and many councillors 
suspected that the hidden hand o f republicans or papists were behind such plans 
especially as one o f the examinations revealed that the guards would aid them  in their
92 Haley, The first earl o f  Shaftesbury, p. 572; Henry Coventry to Ormond, 2 Apr. 1680, Ormonde 
MSS, v, p. 295.
93Newsletter to Christopher Bowman at Newcastle on Tyne, 25 Mar 1680, Cal. S. P. dom., 1679-80, pp 
423-4; Gilbert Burnet to George Savile, 27 Mar. 1680, Camden Miscellany, xl, pp 15-17; — to Sir 
Edward Harley, 13 Apr. 1680, H. M. C., Portland MSS, iii, p. 365.
94 Ibid., pp 15-7; Bodl., Carte MS 243, f. 454.
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design and Ossory had egged them on.95 Ossory suspected foul play and commenting 
on recent developments in London to Arran stated, ‘the work now  in hand is to injure 
the duke o f Ormond and in this work lords Essex and Shaftesbury proceed w ith an 
ingenuity equal to that o f Sir W illiam Waller, Oates and Bedloe [com bined].’96
On 10 April 1680 a yacht from Holyhead arrived in Dublin. On board was Sir 
W illiam Petty, who informed Ormond that the post had been detained at Holyhead by 
order o f the English Board. This confirmed information received from Chester on 4 
April mentioning that a stop had been put on all packets to Ireland on account o f  the 
discovery o f a horrid Catholic conspiracy and in relation to which, both him self and 
Ossory had been ‘bespattered’. By the end o f  that same day he had a fuller 
appreciation o f these events when news filtered through from M unster o f the arrival 
o f one Fitzgerald accompanied by two messengers o f  the English Council to discover 
treasonable practices. Piecing these reports together, Ormond hypothesised ‘I m ust 
suspect it is designed that the proceeding is intended to be concealed from me and
» 07
from thence that something is informed against m e.’
These events caused Ormond a good deal o f  anxiety and his confusion and 
uncertainty regarding his own position is visible in two letters written that same day to 
Ossory and Coventry. Ormond sidestepped the embargo by sending them  to England 
with Sir Thomas Newcomen, a member o f the Irish Privy Council. His letter to 
Ossory was clearly intended to be put before Charles II. In it Ormond clearly voiced 
his opinion regarding the events in London. He acknowledged that the king had to 
countenance all that came forward with information otherwise ‘it will be said great
95 Francis Gwyn to Ormond, 3 Apr. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 296-7; Miller, Charles II, pp 330-1.
96 BodL Carle MS 240, f. 460.
97 Ormond to Ossory, 10 Apr. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 298-9; the most valuable and comprehensive 
study of this plot and the initial reaction of the Irish government to it is still John Brady’s article;
Brady, ‘Oliver Plunkett and the popish plot’, pp 12-3.
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matters would have been found out if  he had given way to it’. However inquiry into 
treasonable practices in Ireland without the knowledge o f  its chief governor was out 
o f the question and he warned ‘if  he [Ormond] be not to be trusted with that certainly 
he ought not to be with the kingdom .’99 Ormond understood that the root o f  all his 
troubles derived from the machinations o f disaffected Irish in London. He had heard 
o f  the ‘great noise’ made by one Fitzgerald who had received countenance from a 
‘great m an’ there. He was also aware o f the inherent weakness in his position with 
anti-Catholicism now in the ascendant in London, ‘I still presume we shall be heard to 
anything that shall be objected against our proceeding’.100 He took sufficient care 
therefore to look to him self and informed Ossory o f  the recent departures o f Hubert 
Burke and John M cNamara to England. He was certain that the purpose o f their 
journey was to complain against ‘the government, the judges, the jury or against them 
all’ for not finding a bill o f treason against Tyrone.101 Ormond cleverly added that 
both had an ulterior motive for their journey, as with the trial over, they no longer had 
protection against suits and prosecutions for their own crimes, M acNamara being 
accused o f  horse stealing whilst Burke was liable for many crimes that he could not 
remember offhand.
In his letter to Coventry, Ormond put forward his position in regard to Oliver 
Plunkett who appeared to be the cause o f  the recent suspicion held o f him  in London. 
He was aware that among the treasonous letters found on Fitzgerald at Bristol was 
supposed correspondence between Plunkett and the Franciscans.102 Combining this 
with the return o f  the duke o f York to England, the original source o f  the Brussels 
rumour, Ormond came to the conclusion that the embarrassing inform ation involving
98 Ibid., pp 298-9.
99 Ibid., pp 298-9.
100 Ibid., pp 298-9.
101 Ibid., pp 298-9.
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Fitzpatrick had come to light.103 The previous February, another story o f  an Irish plot 
involving Plunkett was revealed before him by Father Edmund Murphy in an attempt 
to extricate him self from being returned to prison for corresponding w ith Tories. 
Murphy declared that a certain William Hetherington had been enlisted to carry the 
like information to the king in London and that his examination should cease till a 
return from England, o f which he expected every post, arrived.104 Ormond may have 
also suspected that if  Hetherington’s inform ation were countenanced then the earlier 
accusation would almost certainly come to light.105 He attempted therefore to 
legitimise his proceedings in regard to Plunkett and reminded Coventry upon what 
account and information Plunkett had been apprehended and that he had rem ained so
for no other reason known to him or any but himself, but that he had stayed in Ireland
in contempt o f  a proclamation. Ormond made it clear that his decision to forbear 
Plunkett’s examination was prudent for his crime was
of such a nature that he will certainly deny his having any part in it, then
we shall want anything wherewith to convince him or draw any
acknowledgement from him that may lead towards a discovery of the
♦ 106 truth.
By the end o f  that same day Ormond was in a better position to comprehend 
recent events in London, as W illiam Hetherington landed in Dublin accompanied by 
two messengers, Bradley and Atterbury who carried with them  several letters and 
instructions from the English Board. Ormond received a copy o f  H etherington’s 
disclosure and Coventry’s letter o f 2 April detailing its discovery and enlargement 
before the Council along with his own suspicion o f both witnesses and the plot they 
proposed to discover.107 He was instructed to investigate the charges lodged against
102 Brady, ‘Oliver Plunkett and the popish plot’, p. 12; Bodl., Carte MS 39, f. 127.
103 Brady, ‘Oliver Plunkett and the popish plot’, pp 299-300.
104 Brady, ‘Oliver Plunkett and the popish plot’, pp 351-2.
105 Ib id ., 13-4.
106 Ormond to Henry Coventry, 10 Apr. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 299-300.
107 Bodl., Carte MS 146, ff 255-6.
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Sir Hans Hamilton, Captain W illiam Bolton and Lieutenant Henry Baker by 
Hetherington on M urphy’s behalf and to immediately forward to London two letters 
previously put in his hands. One written by a Catholic priest in Portugal and another 
found in the pocket o f Patrick Fleming, a tory killed in 1677, written by Oliver 
Plunkett under his alias Thomas Cox and brought to his attention by Sergeant John 
Osborne o f the Court o f Common Pleas.108 The following day pursuant to the 
Council’s orders, Ormond handed Murphy over to the messengers and provided them 
with a party o f  soldiers to assist them. W hen we examine the above order more 
closely, Orm ond’s caution in regard to such delicate proceedings becomes evident for 
according to John Brady all the soldiers supplied were non-Irish speaking. Therefore 
the messengers would be unable to com plain upon their return to London that 
Ormond’s men had interfered with the witnesses in a language unknown to them .109 
W ithin two days, Ormond had fulfilled the bulk o f the other requirements. In a letter 
o f 12 April to Coventry, he enclosed the Portugal letter upon which he humbly 
begged the k ing’s pardon for hitherto neglecting it for he had believed that its date 
and manner made it more ‘foolish than dangerous’.110 Ormond confessed that he was 
unable to locate Plunkett’s letter but the subject o f it was advice to Fleming to 
transport h im self beyond the seas which he had connived at in order to secure the 
country.111
108 Ibid., ff 255-6; P. G. Murray, ‘A previously unnoticed letter of Oliver Plunkett’s’ Seanchas 
Ardmhaca, viii (1975-7), pp 23-25; L. Murray, ‘The lament for Patrick Fleming’ in Journal o f the 
County Louth Archaeology Society, viii (1933), pp 75-92.
109 Brady, ‘Oliver Plunkett and the popish plot’, pp 14-5.
110 Bodl., Carte MS 146, ff 255-6.
111 Ibid., ff 255-6.
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Ormond was relieved at the sight o f Hetherington as it m eant the Brussels
119
rumour had not come to light. He had no confidence whatsoever in his witness or 
Fitzgerald who had landed in M unster, and assured Ossory that
the discoveries now on foot in the north and in the west of this kingdom
can come to nothing by reason of the extravagant villainy and folly of the
discoverers, who are such creatures that no schoolboy would trust them
113with a design for the robbing of an orchard.
Essex’s ‘tool’ Fitzgerald was no more than a ‘silly drunken vagabond that cares not 
for hanging a month hence if  in the meantime he may solace h im self w ith brandy and 
tobacco.’114 Edmund Murphy was equally ‘debauched’ whilst Hetherington was a 
fugitive from execution.115 Ormond’s predictions were almost im mediately confirmed 
as news filtered through to Dublin that Fitzgerald’s errand to M unster had failed. 
Ormond sarcastically commented to Ossory that the discoverers had the misfortune 
that Orrery was not still alive, for ‘he would have done his part here as well as the 
other cripple [Shaftesbury] in England.’116 The fraudulent nature o f  the northern 
discoverers would soon be likewise exposed. Though he believed H etherington’s 
business in the north could be resolved within a week, Ormond suspected that the 
pair, under orders from their patrons, would deliberately procrastinate. After all it was 
important to keep the atmosphere in London tense in case a parliam ent in Ireland met. 
Ormond, therefore, suggested to Coventry that the time frame o f  their venture be 
curtailed and promised to have a narrative o f  the lives and actions o f  M urphy and 
Hetherington completed by the time o f their return to Dublin thereby destroying their 
political credit in London.117 There is a hint o f despondency in this letter as in many 
o f O rm ond’s at this period. For instance, he acknowledged that if  Hetherington and
112 Brady, ‘Oliver Plunkett and the popish plot’, pp 13-6.
113 Ormond to Ossory, 12 Apr. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 302-3.
114 Ibid., pp 302-3.
115 Ibid., pp 302-3.
116 Ormond to Ossory, 14 Apr. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 303; Haley, The first earl o f Shaftesbury, p. 
572.
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Murphy were too incompetent to prevent him from holding parliament, it would be 
easy to substitute another plot to thwart his ambitions for ‘if  jailbirds liable to hanging
or starving will serve the turn, my lord o f Sunderland shall have who he pleases in the
• 118 Irish agency. ’
On 14 April 1680, Ormond wrote to Coventry and represented the reasons that 
prevented him  resigning. The first and m ost important was ‘methinks the crown and 
monarchy and my bountiful master are too apparently threatened for a m an that 
pretends to honour and gratitude to make a voluntary resignation’.119 W ith the 
embargo on the packet boats lifted, Ormond was able to construct a picture o f  the 
events in London at the end o f March. He felt deeply embarrassed, hurt and betrayed 
by the carriage o f many o f the king’s ministers towards him  saying ‘I think I have 
ground to com plain o f the suspicion expressed o f  me in the directions sent about
1 'yn.
Fitzgerald’s discovery in M unster’. They were deeply damaging to his honour, 
giving licence not only to popular discourses ‘but some umbrage to m en o f higher 
quality’.121 Many traders in England had also stopped their traffic and sent letters to
1 99
clarity whether their correspondents were still alive. On 19 April 1680, Ormond 
made it clear that a person o f  his quality could not be treated in such a manner. He 
warned that i f  such conduct persisted in London, ‘I shall certainly be less able to serve
i
the king, which to do is the greatest delight I have in the place I hold .’ Ormond 
evidently believed that this would occur anyway for he begged Coventry to look for a
117 Bodl., Carte MS 146, ff 258-60
,lsOrmond to Ossory, 14 Apr. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 303; Bodl., Carte MS 146, ff 257-8; Ormond 
was referring to Sunderland’s role in Fitzgerald’s expedition.
119 Ormond to Henry Coventry, 14 Apr. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 304-5.
I"’t’ Ormond to Ossory, 19 Apr. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 308
121 Ibid., p. 308.
122 Ibid., p. 308.
123 Ibid., p. 308.
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convenient house for him because without the viceroyalty, Ireland would no longer be 
a fit place for his residence.124
Despite these words, Ormond had no intention o f resigning or being removed 
without a fight against such opponents. He wrote to Coventry on 14 April 1680 saying 
‘I have little stomach left yet that rises at the thought o f giving some men their will 
ju st when they would have it o f m e.’ He was determined to counter Essex’s 
manoeuvres at the Council by exonerating him self and the Irish army o f  any 
knowledge or involvement in the plot. It was obvious to him  that Essex was the 
‘great man in England’ funding Fitzgerald and that he had requested the Portugal 
letter and the letter found on Flem ing’s body in an attempt to insinuate that Ormond 
had suppressed evidence.126 Ormond summoned the relevant officers to Dublin where 
they were examined before Sir John Davys, Secretary o f State for Ireland and Henry 
Jones in order to safeguard him self from accusations o f tampering w ith them .127
During the examination o f Sir Hans Hamilton, Ormond came across inform ation 
that delighted him as can discerned from his letter to Ossory on 27 April 1680. It read 
‘it will appear by Sir Hans H am ilton’s examination that he sent m y lord o f Essex 
some examinations that seemed to be o f  more consequence than any I have seen 
produced’.128 This was on 27 December 1676 during Essex’s viceroyalty, a 
Franciscan friar, John Mac Moyer or M oyer having being declared apostate and 
prohibited from exercising the sacraments o f the Catholic Church by Plunkett, swore 
information before Hamilton that the Primate was conspiring to bring in the French. 
Ormond could now accuse Essex o f suppressing evidence by concluding that Edm und
124 Ormond to Henry Coventry, 14 Apr. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 304-5.
125 Ibid, pp 304-5.
126 Brady, ‘Oliver Plunkett and the popish plot’, p. 19.
127 Bodl, Carte MS 145, ff 260-1; pp 262-4; though Sir Hans Hamilton was delayed for several days as 
he had to bury his wife.
128 Ormond to Ossory, 27 Apr. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 312-3.
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M urphy’s knowledge o f the plot was derived from Moyer. He suggested to Ossory ‘if  
it was his lordship that moved I should be called to for the Portugal letter, and that 
found in Fleming the tory’s pocket, he may as well be called for those more material 
papers’. Ormond was still conveniently unable to find P lunkett’s letter found on 
Flem ing’s body, but he skilfully defended him self by reflecting on Essex’s recent 
involvement with the now notorious rogue, John Fitzgerald:
I confess it will be hard to call a chief governor to account for any of
those thousands of papers he must receive in three or four years time’, but
it is easy for any man to pay or for any knave to swear to the contents of a
129letter that cannot be produced.
The return o f Hetherington and Murphy along with their witnesses, Father 
James Callaghan, Father Daniel Finan and John Moyer to Dublin added to O rm ond’s 
confidence.130 They were held up in Dublin for over a week by contrary winds during 
which time, they were all ‘examined very strictly’ especially M oyer about his 
discovery in 1677.131 Evidently, Ormond was not impressed stating to Ossory on 23
• 1 T9
April, ‘they are the best any market in this kingdom will yet afford.’ Ormond 
believed their patrons in London would have their work cut out for them because 
‘there m ust go in my opinion much skill to make anything material out o f their
ITT
narratives and as much indulgence to make them credible w itnesses.’ O rm ond’s 
disposition is best revealed in a letter to Coventry on 24 April, ‘somethings have 
lately [...] occurred that give me cause for caution when I have to do anything that 
related to the plot and such a set o f discoveries’. Before the witnesses took boat for 
England, he took care to further insulate him self by handing David Fitzgerald over to
129 Ibid., pp 312-3; The examination of John Moyer, 27 Dec. 1676, Cal. S. P, dom, 1676-7, pp 473-4;
Brady, ‘Oliver Plunkett and the popish plot’, p. 19; O Fiaich, ‘The fall and return of John Mac Moyer’,
pp 60-2; Bodl., Carte MS 146, ff 262-4.
l30Brady, ‘Oliver Plunkett and the popish plot’, pp 16-7.
131 Gilbert Burnet to George Savile, 2 May. 1680, Camden Miscellany, xl, pp 25-6.
132 Ormond to Ossory, 23 Apr. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 309-10.
133 Ormond to Ossory, 27 Apr. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 312-3.
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the messengers as his discovery was yet to be brought before the Irish judiciary.134 He 
had Davys and Jones prepare a narrative containing all that they thought material to 
be set down o f what happened between them and Murphy in February 1680 thereby 
demonstrating that the bad character given o f him  by Hamilton, Bolton and Baker was 
in O rm ond’s words ‘without the least inducement on my [O rm ond’s] part to provoke 
reflection upon M urphy’.135
It is in light o f this improvement in his position regarding the Popish Plot that 
O rm ond’s actions after the witnesses’ departure can be best understood. He was 
determined to chastise those in London who conspired against him  but also to 
reaffirm his status. On 27 April 1680, he confidently stated to Ossoiy that the Irish 
kingdom ‘has not been so quiet as it is at this instant these forty years.’136 He sought 
to highlight Essex’s clandestine role in setting John Fitzgerald’s expedition afoot and 
desired his son ‘if  his majesty find no objection against it, I should humbly beseech 
him that I may have copies o f  the letters and instructions that were sent which may be 
had out o f the secretaries office, and the Council books.’137 He was also endeavouring 
to obtain letters to implicate the earl’s brother, Sir Henry Capel, as the principle 
promoter o f the reports that Ireland was on the verge o f rebellion. Ormond also 
brushed aside the advice o f Ossory and Arlington that he ingratiate him self with the 
earl o f  Radnor by congratulating him  on his appointment as Lord President as he had 
with Shaftesbury a year previously. He stated ‘it has been the fortune o f  all I have 
courted to become useless as soon as my friends, so that for lucks sake I forbear till I 
see you.’138 Radnor had done him as much injustice in the Privy Council as his
134 Gilbert Burnet to George Savile, 15 May. 1680, Camden Miscellany, xl, pp 27-30.
135 Bodl., Carte MS 146, f. 265.
136 Ormond to Ossory, 27 Apr. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 312-3.
137 Ibid., pp 312-3.
138 Ormond to Ossory, 23 Apr. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 309-10.
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predecessor and like him was ‘a man that may perhaps love to receive but cares not to
• 11Q
return com plim ents.’
In London, O rm ond’s position was resolutely defended throughout the whole 
crisis by his agents. Coventry continued to attend the Council ‘like a lock’ guarding 
the crown and its servants despite his retirement in February.140 Ossory had correctly 
recognised that the king was forced to countenance the Irish plot upon its first 
discovery for fear o f being accused by the Whigs o f endangering the Irish Protestants. 
Therefore he reasserted his father’s position with him by highlighting their com mon 
ground in regard to the W higs and the importance o f  the upcoming Irish parliament. 
He also attempted to come to grips with the libellers and rum our mongers disparaging 
his fathers name, ‘I do consult with my friends and men o f the law, and if  I can get 
any punished that way I will not be wanting in so just a vindication.’141
O rm ond’s cause was also aided by Charles II’s attitude and actions at this 
period. The involvement o f many o f his ministers in petition drives and attempts to 
legitimise M onmouth through the discovery o f  a ‘Black B ox’ tested his patience but 
the proceedings in the Council during his absence incensed him  greatly.142 He was 
soon presented with a perfect opportunity to go on the offensive, as reports from 
Ireland were not as serious as initially represented. On 10 April 1680 Sir W illiam 
Waller was put out o f the Commission o f  the Peace for apparently dictating the 
deposition o f an apprentice he arrested.143 On 16 April, several royalist peers 
including Ossory were brought into the English Privy Council, where he was now 
ideally positioned to combat the machinations o f Essex. On 17 April, he wrote to his 
father ‘M r secretary being ill, I did from him communicate your letters with the
139 Ibid., pp 309-10.
140 Bodl., Carte MS 243, f. 454; Ormond to Henry Thynne, 25 Apr. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 310.
141 Ormond to Ossory, 6 Apr. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 297-8.
142 Haley, The first earl o f  Shaftesbury, pp 573-4.
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Portugal information to the Council which caused some sport, his majesty being 
present.’144 In the face o f  a royalist reaction, the embarrassing failure o f Fitzgerald’s 
m ission and increasing doubts over Hetherington’s credibility, cracks within the Whig 
ranks appeared. On 17 April, Gilbert Burnet noted that Shaftesbury com plained 
mightily o f the earl o f Essex, ‘who was at first very much possessed with a belief o f  it 
[the business o f Ireland], and did o f a sudden fall from it.’145
On 7 May the messengers and Irish witnesses arrived in London. They were 
examined the following day before an extraordinary meeting o f the English Council at 
which the king was not present. Charles II knew exactly what to expect from 
Shaftesbury’s witnesses because o f  copies o f  O rm ond’s letters which had been given 
to him and news o f  Fitzgerald’s comical plot. Fie thus despatched Ossory and Jenkins 
to this meeting with instructions that if  the Board were unable to com prehend their 
information, they were to be kept separate from each other and any other company 
until their depositions were in writing signed and sealed before the clerk o f  the 
Council.146 At the same meeting the examinations o f Hamilton, Bolton and Baker 
along with additional letters from Ormond to Coventry were read. These produced the 
desired effect that Ormond was hoping for and this led to Essex being rebuked in 
front o f the Privy Council. No evidence o f what Ossory said during this m eeting has 
survived, but one can discover an understanding o f  his observations o f  Essex’s 
behaviour from his letter to Ormond that night which stressed:
I cannot but wonder that my Lord of Essex, who is now so diligent in 
discovering Irish plots, and who knew from Sir Hans Hamilton something 
of this business, as appears by one of the papers you sent, should not have
113 Gilbert Burnet to George Savile, 3 Apr. 1680, Camden Miscellany, xl, pp 18-9.
1,14 Ossory to Ormond, 17 Apr. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 305.
145 Gilbert Burnet to George Savile, 17 Apr. 1680, Camden Miscellany, xl, pp 22-4.
146 Francis Gwyn to Ormond, 8 May. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 314-5; O Fiaich, The fall and return 
of John Mac Moyer’, pp 66-7; Brady, ‘Oliver Plunkett and the popish plot’, pp 21-3.
143
taken notice of it when he was in the Government, or advertised you at his 
leaving it.147
The former viceroy was ordered to hand over any papers o f importance.
On 12 May 1680, the information o f the four priests and David Fitzgerald was 
read before the king and Council. None o f  the witnesses made charges against either 
the duke o f  York or Ormond and only Moyer accused Plunkett o f plotting to bring in 
the French.148 The Council was not sufficiently moved to take matters into their own 
hands, instead Ormond was ordered to speedily bring Plunkett to trial and issue 
indictments against Lord Brittas and Colonel Pierce Lacy and to take particular care 
that no Catholics \vere on any o f the juries. The Irish plot was therefore a minor 
success. O rm ond’s reputation was salvaged because the investigation and all the 
papers handed up to the Privy Council by Essex were entrusted to h im .149 During the 
following weeks, he protected him self further by sending others im plicated in 
Hetherington’s plot to London namely Plunkett’s servant, Father James M cKenna and 
Friar Cullo M cDonnell after they arrived in Ireland from Prague. Ormond was 
equally concerned with tackling his opponents and their villainous suitors and he put 
the following shot across Essex’s bows in a letter to Ossory:
The titular primate accused by them is not no more above them in gifts of 
nature then he ought by his place to be and I doubt hardly so much, his 
life 1 confess is much more churchman like. This character I believe my 
lord of Essex will concur with me in, his lordship having had much more 
conversation with him than I.150
147 Ossory to Ormond, 8 May. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 315; See footnote 131 for Essex’s 
explanation of the letters concerning the Irish plot that he had in his possession.
148 O Fiaich, ‘The fall and return of John Mac Moyer’, pp 66-7; Haley, The first earl o f Shaftesbury, pp 
574-5.
149 Gilbert Burnet to George Savile, 15 May. 1680, Camden Miscellany, xl, pp 27-30; Brady, ‘Oliver 
Plunkett and the popish plot’, pp 22-3. At 12 May when Essex handed up the letters containing the 
circumstances of Moyer’s earlier discovery, he claimed that at the time he could nether make head nor 
tail of such information ‘not knowing the bottom of the business’, but that they did so exactly agree 
with the information newly given in that he was fully convinced ‘o f the truth of the whole affair’.
150 Ormond to Ossory, 16 May. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 319; The earl of Essex to Sir Henry Capel, 
13 Oct. 1673, Osmund Airy (ed.), Essex papers 1672-9 (London, 1890) i, pp 126-7; In 1673, when 
Charles was forced to repeal the Act of Toleration and enact the Test Act and other severe legislation 
against Catholics, Essex had written to his brother and other allies in England to secure Plunkett who 
he termed as ‘one of the best men of his persuasion I have met’ from any severity which should be 
singly or personally inflicted on him.
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He was also no longer content to wait until Sir Henry Ingoldsby returned to Ireland 
before removing him  from the Irish Council for fear o f upsetting Shaftesbury. He 
informed Ossory on 25 May:
I have recommended the removal of Sir Henry Ingoldsby from the
Council which would be a useful demonstration of his majesty’s
dissatisfaction with him by reason of his factious carriage in England, and
traducing of the Government here, and 1 think there need no reason be 
f  . .  151 given for it.
By the latter end o f  May, Ormond’s focus was once again on the possibility of 
parliament meeting in Ireland. He wrote to Ossory, ‘I hope the bills may be ready to
152be sent over by the end o f this m onth’.
In conclusion, the Irish plot demonstrated that sensationalist revelations 
produced at the right moment could fan the flames o f the Popish Plot and anti- 
Catholicism. Charles IPs weakness vis-à-vis these forces had been confirmed once 
again as in February 1679 when he had sent James, duke o f York to Scotland before 
parliament sat. Ormond’s position was little better, Charles II, sympathised w ith him, 
but he only overtly supported him once the initial smoke o f  the revelations cleared. 
The actions o f the English Council in late M arch clearly illustrated that many 
politicians distrusted Ormond or even suspected him  o f having ‘papist’ sympathies. 
Added to this, due to retirement and promotion, he was devoid o f his m ost trusted
1 ST
servants and supporters in England, Henry Coventry and Sir Robert Southwell. 
Sunderland who had ascended to the vitally im portant position o f senior Secretary o f
151 Ormond to Ossory, 25 May. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 327; Ormond did not move against 
Ingoldsby during previous months in case it had occasioned an attack from his sponsor, Shaftesbury.
152 Ormond to Ossory, 16 May. 1680. Ormonde MSS, v, pp 319-20.
153 Toby Barnard, ‘Sir Robert Southwell (1635-1702),’ in Matthew and Harrison (ed.), Oxford 
D.N.B.M, pp 721-22; Sir Robert Southwell to Ormond, 29 Nov. 1679, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 561-3; Sir 
Robert Southwell to Ormond, 6 Dec. 1679, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 564-6. In December 1679, Southwell 
sold his post of Clerk to the Privy Council, to Sir Francis Gwyn for £2500. This was an extremely 
prudent decision as Southwell had already been accused of suppressing evidence in regard to the plot. 
Southwell went to great pains to reassure Ormond that his replacement would serve him with as much 
devotion as he had himself despite the fact that Gwyn was a relation of Edward Conway and a known 
acquaintance of Ranelagh.
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State, handling all the official correspondence between both kingdoms had shown he 
was indifferent to the fates o f established figures like Ormond and Lauderdale. 
Therefore, although his position was relatively secure, it is evident that Ormond knew 
the potential o f the plot to ruin him and the importance o f taking the necessary steps 
to safeguard his position. He advised Ossory to remain at court ‘till you and I are 
agreed o f  the tim e.’154 M eanwhile in Ireland, he w ould proceed w ith all m anner o f 
diligence into the information o f Hetherington’s witnesses, ‘and be as careful as I 
[Ormond] can that no advantage shall be given on that account against m e’.155
154 Ormond to Ossory, 23 May. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 325.
153 Ibid., p. 325.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE IRISH PLOT AND PARLIAMENTARY POLITICS,
1680- 81 .
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In June 1680, Ormond strove to bring his parliamentary ambitions to fruition by 
sending a new package o f  bills to London. Arthur Forbes, earl o f  Granard was also 
despatched to communicate the bills importance before the English Privy Council on 
behalf o f  their namesakes in Ireland. Granard reiterated the fears and anxieties o f  Irish 
Protestants that in the case o f  a French invasion, m ost o f  the Catholic Irish, 
particularly those who had lost or forfeited estates, would make com mon cause with 
them. However, despite this ever-present threat, the Irish army was in a desperate 
condition, its stores and ammunition depleted and apart from  Kinsale, its forts ruined 
or in disrepair. To remedy these defects, £100,000 was required immediately and this 
could only be supplied by parliam ent.1 O rm ond’s efforts were to come to no avail, for 
that very summer the crown’s temporary ascendancy over the W higs was reversed 
when it received several severe blows. On 26 June, Charles II was publicly 
embarrassed when his brother narrowly escaped being indicted as a recusant and his 
own mistress, Louise de Keroualle, duchess o f Portsmouth as a com mon whore by the 
grand jury o f  M iddlesex.2 In July, Charles lost what small influence he had in 
selecting juries in this county, when its citizens voted two radical W higs, Slingsy 
Bethel and Henry Cornish as sheriffs.3 The crown policy advocated by Sunderland 
that sought to divide the Whigs before parliament in October now lay in ruins, as no
1 Sir Francis Gwyn to Jrmond, 14 Aug. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 379-81; Same to same, 26 Aug. 
1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 393-4; Sir Francis Gwyn was Southwell’s replacement as clerk to the 
English Privy Council. J. E. Aydelotte, ‘The duke of Ormond and the English govermnent of Ireland, 
1677-85’ (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, University of Iowa, 1975); Hutton, Charles the Second, king 
o f England, Scotland and Ireland (Oxford, 1989), p. 393,
2 James MacPherson, Original papers containing the secret history o f Great Britain from the 
Restoration to the accession o f the House o f Hanover... (2 vols, Dublin, 1775), i, p. 106; John Miller, 
Charles II  (London, 1991), pp 332-3; Antonia Fraser, King Charles II  (London, 1979), p. 390.
3 Mr. Mulys to Henry Gascoigne, 28 Jul. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 355-6; Hutton, Charles the 
Second, king o f  England, Scotland and Ireland, p. 392; K. H. D. Haley, The first earl o f  Shaftesbury 
(London, 1968), pp 580-2; Gilbert Burnet, History o f  my own time, (6 vols, Oxford, 1823), ii, pp 241- 
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country in Europe apart from Spain was prepared to ally against Louis XIV with a 
king who was clearly alienated from a large proportion o f his subjects.4
These developments frightened many at court and Council especially those 
closest to Charles, like Sunderland and Portsmouth, who were well aware o f  his 
pragmatism. They perceived that he would eventually succumb to W hig pressure and 
exclude his brother in return for parliamentary subsidies. As such, to safeguard their 
own interests, thev began labouring to improve their standing with the faction in the 
ascendant before the approaching parliament. This duo along w ith many others at 
court believed that Ormond and every other ally o f the duke o f  York had to be 
sacrificed in order to allow Charles to restore his partnership with the full political 
nation.5 In early August Longford informed Ormond that Sunderland and Portsmouth 
had joined Shaftesbury in supporting Essex’s ambitions o f regaining the viceroyalty 
and vigorously opposed a meeting o f  the Irish legislature lest it recom mend Ormond 
so vociferously to Charles that he could not be rem oved from office.6 Longford 
believed their strategy was to countenance so many objections to the Irish bills that 
the Irish parliament would be delayed till the meeting o f  the English parliament was 
scheduled; thus forcing the Irish parliament to be postponed by default because o f  the
n
contemporary maxim that two simultaneous sessions in both kingdoms was unsafe. 
Shaftesbury was not so subtle and he sought to frighten councillors from becoming 
associated with Orm ond’s design by invoking comparisons with Strafford’s attempts 
to make the Charles I independent o f  parliament. In London’s coffee houses, it was 
common discourse that he had ranted,
4 Haley, The first o f  earl o f Shaftesbury, p. 581.
5 Ibid., pp 586-90; John Miller, James II (Yale, 2000), pp 102-3; Hutton, Charles the Second, king o f 
England, Scotland and Ireland, pp 393-4; J. R. Jones, Country and court, England 1658-1714 (London, 
1978), p. 212.
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What! does Ireland, the snake, which we have harboured in our bosom 
and warmed it then when it could scarce live, think to give law to 
England? To give money to make the king independent of his people, to 
raise an army if they be so powerful.8
Ormond was seen as an exact replica o f  Strafford, the Irish Privy Council was packed 
with his supporters and those who depended solely upon the king and the duke o f 
York for their estates and livelihoods, therefore the Irish bills were to be rejected out 
o f hand. Shaftesbury concluded by reminding his listeners that Strafford had lost his 
head, ‘and he did not question but to see those who thought to bring England under 
the same tyranny my lord o f Strafford did to have the same fate.’9
The farmers o f  the Irish revenue, in particular Sir James Shaen, how ever 
conducted the most effective opposition. On 16 August he claimed before the 
committee appointed to examine the Irish bills, ‘that the poverty o f the kingdom  was 
such and the species o f money so scarce that there was hardly enough in the kingdom  
to answer to present farm ’.10 Leo line Jenkins and Arlington argued on O rm ond’s 
behalf that the modus operandi o f  Shaen was solely the disparagement o f  the Irish 
viceroy and his Council, ‘who were m en o f interest and fortune, and without doubt as 
it was their interest to preserve the kingdom, would propose nothing to the 
disadvantage o f it or the king’s service.’11 This was overruled by the majority o f the 
committee, including Laurence Hyde, son o f Orm ond’s closest ally throughout the 
1650s and 60s, Henry Hyde, earl o f Clarendon. The countenance given to these
6 Bodl., Carte MS 243, f. 498; Ronald Hutton, Charles the Second, king o f England, Scotland and 
Ireland, p. 393; Thomas Carte, An history o f the life o f  James duke o f  Ormonde from his birth to his 
death in 1688 (3 vols, London, 1736 ed.), ii, pp 508-9.
7 Aydelotte, ‘The duke of Ormond and the English government of Ireland, 1677-85’, pp 144-5.
8 Netterville to earl of Longford, Jul. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 350-1; Winifred Gardner, The life o f  
James first duke o f Ormonde, 1610-88 (2 vols, London, 1912), ii, pp 313-5; Hutton, Charles the 
Second, king o f  England, Scotland and Ireland, p. 393.
9 Ibid., pp 350-1; Haley, The first earl o f  Shaftesbury, pp 584-7.
10 Carte, An history o f the life o f James duke o f  Ormonde from his birth to his death in 1688, pp 508-9; 
Aydelotte, ‘The duke of Ormond and the English government of Ireland, 1677-85’, p. 143.
11 Earl of Longford to Ormond, 17 Aug. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 381-4; Earl of Longford to 
Ormond, 21 Aug. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 388-91; Same to same, 4 Sep. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 
409-13.
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objections fritted away time as they had to be transmitted to Ireland to be answered. 
Having ju s t returned from Ireland where the commissioners o f  his accounts calculated 
his defalcations over £100,000, Ranelagh showed as little inclination as Shaen for an 
Irish parliament. Instead, he sought sanctuary by ingratiating him self with the ‘m en in 
pow er’ at Council before whom  his appeal would be brought.12 By early September, 
Ormond had conceded defeat once more in his parliamentary ambitions. On 1 
September, he despondently wrote to Coventry ‘I have had a full account o f the 
proceedings about the Irish bills and parliament, and m ust conclude that those who
1 'I
would not have one called here till that in England hath sat have gotten the victory.’ 
His attention was now focusing on more im minent matters, the approaching 
parliament in England that October, which in light o f the recent opposition to his 
parliamentary bills, he was not relishing. In the same letter to Coventry, he attempted 
to reassure him self that there was nothing personnel in their behaviour, ‘I am sure 
those that were for it are my friends, and I hope still all the other[s] are not my 
enem ies.’14 Evidently he did not succeed for he concluded by desiring Coventry to 
allow Longford view another house that he had mentioned in a previous letter adding 
‘for till after October it is not certain I shall have no use o f  it.’15
Ossory’s death after a short sudden illness on 30 June 1680 had left Ormond 
dangerously exposed in London especially with the dramatic turnaround in the
12 Hutton, Charles the Second, king o f England, Scotland and Ireland, p. 393; Newsletter to Sir Francis 
Radcliffe at Dilston, 21 Sep. 1680, Cal. S. P., dom, 1680-1, p. 34; Despite Ranelagh’s efforts, it was 
rumoured from London that articles were to be exhibited against him in parliament.
13 Ormond to Henry Coventry, 1 Sep. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 404-5; Ormond to earl of Longford, 6 
Sep. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 416-7; Ibid., p. 393; Although Ormond was deprived of any 
opportunity of supplementing the Irish revenues, the demands placed upon it continued to increase, for 
instance Sunderland was granted a pension of £3000 out of the Irish establishment; letter of earl of 
Sunderland, 18 Sep. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 425.
14 Ibid., pp 404-5.
15 Ibid., pp 404-5.
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fortunes o f the W higs.16 Orm ond’s own friends were aghast to find many very busy
1 7
against him, but those playing the game on his behalf, ‘understand it no t’. Longford 
recommended that Arran be immediately sent over, ‘for he has good interest with my 
Lord [William] Russell, who will be the leading man in the House o f Commons and 
his lordship can him self represent the true state o f  affairs there in the House o f 
Lords.’18 There was further substance given to such advice, w hen on 17 September, a 
large party o f Irish priests and other discoverers arrived in London to prove before 
parliament the existence o f an Irish plot. They complained that they had been forced 
to leave ‘being in fear o f  their lives’ having received all the discouragement 
imaginable from Ormond and Michael Boyle, so much so that they were forced to 
steal aboard ship at night w ithout money or encouragement except from Captain 
Robert Fitzgerald and Henry Jones, bishop o f Meath. In London, they were met by 
Oates who conducted them to Shaftesbury’s lodgings.19 Shaftesbury was unable to 
discourse with them as he was ill w ith gout but menacingly they resolved to lie close 
till parliament met. Longford understood the significance o f their arrival and warned 
Ormond on 18 September, ‘your grace must expect that in a few days all the coffee 
houses in London will ring with their discourses and that the fanatical party will make 
use o f  everything to reflect upon you.’20 In light o f these developments even Jenkins,
16 Physicians account of Lord Ossory’s illness, and post mortem examination, 31 Jul. 1680, Ormonde 
MSS, v, pp 362-3; E. S de Beer (ed.), The diary o f  John Evelyn, (6 vols, Oxford, 1955), iv, pp 209-11; 
William Bray (ed.), Memoirs o f John Evelyn (London, 1818), pp 362-3; according to Evelyn, Ossory’s 
only regret before he died was taking part in Sir Robert Holme’s expeditionary force which attacked 
the Dutch Smyrna fleet on 12 March 1672 before the outbreak of the second Anglo-Dutch war.
17 Chief Justice Keating to Arran, 30 Aug. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 401-2; Richard Mulys to Capt. 
George Mathew, 14 Aug. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 378-9.
18 Earl of Longford to Ormond, 4 Sep. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 409-13.
19 Secretary Jenkins to Sidney Godolphin, 17 Sep. 1680, Cat. S. P. dom., 1680-81, pp 23-4; Secretary 
Jenkins to Sidney Godolphin, 18 Sep. 1680, Cal. S. P. dom., 1680-81, p. 25; Hutton, Charles the 
Second, king o f  England, Scotland and Ireland, p. 393.
20 Earl of Longford, 18 Sep. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 427-32.
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who was better informed than most in his capacity as Secretary o f  State was worried
9 1
and he wrote to Ormond, ‘I beseech God to preserve your grace from all m alice.’
To make matters worse, that summer, Ormond had been thwarted from getting 
to the bottom o f the information against Plunkett. On 22 May 1680 the latter’s 
accusers arrived in Ireland. The following day, Ormond notified Jenkins that the 
papers accompanying them would be put into the hands o f  the Irish Attorney General. 
However he was perturbed by the absence o f directions detailing how they were to be 
treated till Plunkett’s trial.22 Were they to be set at liberty to prosecute Plunkett and 
his associates or should ‘more than ordinary care’ be taken to prevent them  from 
slipping away or being interfered with to suppress or mollify their evidence on 
Plunkett’s behalf? After all Edmund Murphy lay under a capital charge o f 
corresponding with tories and the others were not o f ‘tender consciences’ or in 
O rm ond’s words, they would ‘hearken to an advantageous proposition from any 
hand’.23 In London, despite their recent embarrassments, the W higs were determined 
that the Irish plot should not flounder. With this in mind Shaftesbury wrote to Henry 
Jones, Crom well’s former Scoutmaster General and the most zealous tory and 
conspiracy hunter in Ireland, recommending Murphy to his care. Jones responded 
positively to this request and on 1 June, he wrote to one o f  Shaftesbury’s Irish agents 
in London, Colonel Roderick Mansell wherein he stressed the importance o f M urphy 
obtaining a free pardon as he was in danger o f  being prosecuted by his enemies for 
earlier crimes.24
21 Leoline Jenkins to Ormond, 25 Sep. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 433.
22 Secretary Jenkins to Ormond, 14 May 1680, Cel. S. P. dom., 1679-80, pp 478-9; Ormond to 
Secretary Jenkins, 16 May 1680, Col. S. P. dom., 1679-80, p. 482; Ormond to Secretary Jenkins, 23 
May. 1680, Cal. S. P. dom., 1679-80, p. 491; Onnond to Secretary Jenkins, 16 Jun. 1680, Cal. S. P. 
dom., 1679-80, p. 518; Ormond to Secretary Jenkins, 23 May. 1680, Cal. S. P. dom., 1679-80, p. 491.
23 Ibid., p. 491.
24 John Brady, ‘Oliver Plunkett and the popish plot’ in I. E. R.,. 5th series, xc (July-Dee 1958), pp 23- 
25; Bodl.,Carte MS 39, f. 140; Ibid., f. 142; Haley, The first earl o f Shaftesbury, p. 578; Tomas O’ 
Fiaich, ‘The fall and return of John Mac Moyer’ in Seanchas Ardmhaca, iii (1958-59), pp 67-71.
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Jones explained that two officers o f the Irish army, Baker and Smith had 
proffered these charges against Murphy after he had discovered their illicit dealings 
with tories in and around Dundalk.25 This letter fell into Orm ond’s hands as the letters 
o f Jones and others suspected o f correspondence w ith his enemies in London had 
been censored for some time. He had now clear proof o f Jones’s underhand dealings 
for as he stated to Ossory on 20 July, ‘the bishop is not only a spiteful but a false 
informer, where he says that M urphy was prosecuted after he had accused Smith and 
Baker, the contrary is the truth to the bishops know ledge.’ This was O rm ond’s 
opportunity to prevent any outside influence whatsoever in Plunkett’s trial, but he 
shied away from confronting Jones, choosing instead to monitor his correspondence 
further. Ormond advised Ossory that notice should not be made o f  it in London 
especially when the kings displeasure could only am ount to Jones’s removal from  a 
station that was honourable but unprofitable and would consequently only put him  in
97
a greater humour ‘to do m isch ief.
On 24 July 1680, the trial o f Oliver Plunkett collapsed in Dundalk through the 
absence o f the main prosecution witnesses, Murphy and Moyer, the former having 
fled into England, the latter refused to attend court w ithout him. Such an outcome had 
been predicted four days earlier by Jones in a letter to Mansell, ‘I doubt that few  o f 
the witnesses or evidence for the king will appear there (Dundalk), partly not being 
themselves (they think) secured and chiefly doubting the issue o f  the trial in that 
place.’28 This has led one eminent historian to suggest that Jones advised M urphy to
25 Bodl., Carte MS 39, f. 142; Laurence P. Murray, ‘Life and times of Edmund Murphy, parish priest of 
Killeavy and chanter of Armagh’, in L. A. J„ vii, no. 3 (1933), p. 339.
26 Bodl., Carte MS 39, f. 164; Bodl., Carte MS 243, f. 475; In another letter dated 29 June 1680, Jones 
responded to Mansell’s query as to the numbers of Catholics lawyers and attorneys in the courts o f law, 
by stating that in the courts of exchequer there were fifteen Catholic attorneys and twice that number of 
lawyers; Murray, ‘Life and times of Edmund Murphy, parish priest of Killeavy and chanter of 
Armagh’, p. 339.
27 Ibid., f. 164.
28 Bodl., Carte MS 39, f. 101; Bodl., Carte MS 39, f. 170.
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abscond before the trial.29 He had no illusions as to his character having examined 
him that previous February before Sir John Davys and Ormond. Furthermore, he 
knew that in Dundalk the characters o f Plunkett and his accusers was only too well 
known, so much so that Plunkett had acquiesced to M oyer’s petition that the jury 
there be solely composed o f Protestant’s because even they looked upon M oyer’s 
story as ‘fabulous’ and knew him as a confederate o f tories for which he had been
Of» m t
prosecuted at the criminal sessions in Armagh in 1678. Jones knew  that i f  a high 
profile figure like Plunkett was exonerated, it would be the death-knell o f 
Shaftesbury’s ambitions o f  establishing the existence o f  a Catholic conspiracy in 
Ireland and he warned M ansell on 8 July 1680, ‘if  Plunkett be tried in Dundalk all 
business will come to an end.’31 In London, Murphy was quickly reunited with 
W illiam Hetherington and from there he wrote to Moyer on 7 August, w ith the news 
that the W higs intended to have all the discoverers o f the Irish plot present during the 
sitting o f parliament that October. He desired Moyer to journey to London and to 
bring Hugh Duffy and others who might ‘confess the truth concerning O liver’ along 
with him. Howeve” this letter fell into the wrong hands and eventually found its way 
to Ormond.32 Therefore the witnesses who arrived in London on 15 September were 
all Munster-men like John MacNamara, Hubert Burke, Thomas Sampson and Euctace 
Comyn.33
The arrival o f the Irish witnesses in London that autumn added another 
dimension to a political climate that was already volatile. Burlington believed the 
upcoming parliament would ‘be the fullest house that had been these many years’,
29 Brady, ‘Oliver Plunkett and the popish plot, pp 26-7.
30 O’Fiaich, ‘The fall - id return of John Mac Moyer’, pp 72-4.
31 Brady, ‘Oliver Plunkett and the popish plot, pp 26-7; Bodl., Carte MS 39, f. 154.
32 Bodl., Carte 39, f. 186; Ibid., f. 187.
33 Thomas Sampson, A narrative o f the late popish plot in Ireland, for the subjugating thereof to the 
French king together with the proceedings against, and the trial o f the earl o f Tyrone and others who
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whilst Shaftesbury professed him self amazed that it 'should be called to sit at this 
time, there being not [ ...]  the least probability o f their doing good to the king.’34 The 
most important lever possessed by the W higs in their efforts to exclude York from  the 
throne was the Popish Plot and anti-Catholicism and on 28 September 1680, 
Shaftesbury made a point o f  recommending Burke and his companions to the English 
Council, when they sought his charity .35 On the same day, Oates appeared in front o f 
the Council with frightening news that a great number o f ‘Irish papists’ had lately 
come to London, whilst newsletters were cleverly dispersed around England warning 
that they were noticeable ‘by their gaiety and brisk deport’.
In the m idst o f this atmosphere, Charles II was indecisive and his refusal to 
chastise Sunderland, Portsmouth and Godolphin who were openly m eeting his 
brother’s enemies only added to the jealousies and uncertainty at court. He choose 
instead to remain in Newmarket until the convening o f parliament despite desperate 
appeals by Jenkins and others for him  to return and exert his authority over wayward 
ministers at W hitehall.37 At the beginning o f  October, the English Council succumbed 
to Whig pressure and accepted a petition delivered by W illiam Hetherington 
requesting that Plunkett be brought from Ireland to stand trial in London. Even more 
worryingly, during the opening days o f  parliament, the Lords bowed likewise to W hig
were accusedfor carrying on the same: containing the several examinations o f Hubert Burke, Edward 
Ivie, Gent., late Steward o f  the earl Tyrone (London, 1680).
34 Earl of Burlington to Ormond, 12 Oct. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 445-6; Secretary Jenkins to 
Sidney Godolphin, 30 Sep. 1680, Cal. S. P. dom., 1680-81, pp 44-45.
35 Earl of Longford to Ormond, 28 Sep. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 438; Leoline Jenkins to Ormond, 28 
Sep. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 436-7.
>(> Ibid., pp 436-7; Newsletter to Roger Garstell, Newcastle, 25 Sep. 1680, Cal. S. P. dom., 1680-81, p. 
39; Proclamation ordering all papists and reputed papists to depart from within 10 miles of London and 
Westminster, and not to return for six months, 4 Oct. 1680, Cal. S. P. dom., 1680-81, p. 50; Earl of 
Burlington to Ormond, 12 Oct. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 445-6. Burlington believed that these great 
numbers of Irish were multiplied by the fears of some and the designs o f others; Haley, The first earl o f  
Shaftesbury, pp 588-9; Leoline Jenkins to Ormond, 28 Sep. 1680, Ormonde MSS, pp 436-7.
37 Hutton, Charles the Second, king o f England, Scotland and Ireland, pp 393-4; Miller, Charles II, pp 
332-3; Earl of Sunderland to Ormond, 6 Oct. 1680, Cal. S. P. dom., 1680-81, p. 54; Earl of Longford to 
Arran, 16 Oct. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 454.
38 Haley, The first earl o f  Shaftesbury, p. 594.
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demands by issuing orders empowering three Irishmen, Thomas Hetherington, 
W illiam Fitzgerald and Owen Murphy to bring over whatever witnesses they thought 
necessary to lay open the plot in Ireland.39 They were assisted in their errand by a 
proclamation on 30 October offering a ‘free and gracious pardon to all and every 
person and persons who within two months after the said proclamation should come 
in and give further information and evidence concerning the said popish p lo t.’40 These 
developments were disastrous as far as Ormond was concerned. To his 
embarrassment, it had been made blatantly clear that his peers in London had deemed 
him unfit to conduct investigations previously entrusted into his care. Furthermore, he 
was now faced with the prospect o f  fresh allegations being directed at him , his 
government or his many Catholic relatives by unscrupulous individuals anxious to 
obtain reward or pardon.
In London, Ormond’s supporters believed he would be faced with im peachm ent 
when parliament met. Longford ascertained that
Ormond is to be accused in parliament of keeping back his knowledge of 
the plot, and then of faintly prosecuting those accused by the discoverers 
[...] to blacken his reputation, so depriving him of any chance of serving 
the crown in any capacity.41
39 Secretary Jenkins to Sidney Godolphin, 6 Oct 1680, Col. S. P. dom., 1680-81, p. 53; The Earl of 
Sunderland to Ormonu, 6 Oct. 1680, Cal. S. P. dom., 1680-81, p. 54; O Fiaich, ‘The fall and return of 
John Mac Moyer’, pp 76-7.
40 Proclamation by the lord lieutenant and council offering free and gracious pardon to all and 
every persons who within two months after the date [15 November] o f the said proclamation should 
come in and give further information concerning the said popish plot (Dublin, 1680); [W. C], The 
historians guide, or, Britain's remembrancer. Being a summary o f  all the actions, exploits, sieges, 
battles, designs, attempts, preferment's, honours, changes, &c. and whatever else is worthy notice, that 
hath happened in his majesties kingdoms, from Anno Dom. 1600 to this time. Showing the year, month, 
and day o f  the month, in which each action was done. With an alphabetical table for the more easy 
finding any thing out (London, 1690), pp 127-8,
41 Earl of Longford to Ormond, 5 Oct. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 439-40; Earl of Longford to 
Ormond, 9 Oct. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 443; Hutton, Charles the Second, king o f  England, Scotland 
and Ireland, pp 393-4; Secretary Jenkins to Sidney Godolphin, 30 Sep. 1680, Cat. S. P. dom., 1680-81, 
pp 44-5; Longford’s information most likely emanated from a contemporary report that during the 
upcoming parliament, Shaen, Ingoldsby, Mansell, Thornhill (an associate of the earl of Anglesey) and 
Coppinger (an individual who was aggrieved at the aggrandisement of clerical offices by Michael 
Boyle and his family), would accuse Ormond of concealing the plot.
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It was averred by others that more serious charges would be introduced specifically 
that he held correspondence with the French and was personally involved in the plot.42 
Apart from the recent arrival o f the Irish witnesses in London, a dramatic 
development gave substance to this rumour. On 5 October 1680 it was written from 
London that O rm ond’s brother in law, Colonel John Fitzpatrick had returned from 
London where he had been converted to the Church o f England by Dr Thom as Ken, 
the princess o f Orange’s chaplain and that he had ‘been very civilly received by 
Sunderland’.43 This was not all, for Arran had received an anonymous newsletter, 
which stated that Fitzpatrick’s intention was ‘to turn one o f  the king’s evidence, and 
make great discoveries o f  the p lo t’ and that he had had several ‘private consults’ with 
Shaftesbury.44 W ith a storm o f some make, shape or form approaching, Longford 
urged Ormond ‘to look to h im se lf and o f the importance o f  employing delaying 
tactics such as complying temporarily w ith whatever requirements m ight arise. He 
also stressed the prudence o f writing obliging letters to figures who could be 
amenable him in the future.45
In Ireland, the repercussions o f  recent occurrences in London and the 
imminence o f the approaching parliament there were apparent. On 31 October, 
Ormond noted to Burlington, ‘overtures o f  discovery o f the plot in this kingdom have 
o f late m ultiplied upon us’.46 He prudently withheld his negative opinion o f such
42 Ibid., pp 439-40; Earl of Longford to Arran, 16 Oct. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 454; Ormond to earl 
of Conway, 1 Nov. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 471-2.
43 John Brady, ‘The arrest of Oliver Plunkett’ in I. E. R., 5th ser, Ixxxi (Jan-Jun, 1954), pp 88-9; R. W. 
Blencoe (ed.), Diary o f the times o f Charles the second by Henry Sidney, afterwards earl o f Romney: 
including his correspondence with the countess o f  Sunderland and other distinguishable persons at the 
English court; to M'hich are added letters illustrative o f the times o f James II and William III, 2 Vols 
(London, 1843), i, p. 98; Doctor Thomas Ken to Archbishop Sancroft, 13 Sep. 1680 in Charles McNeill 
(ed.), The Tanner letters (Dublin, 1943), p. 433; Earl of Longford to Ormond, 5 Oct. 1680, Ormonde 
MSS, v, pp 439-40.
44 Bodl., Carte MS 39, ff 202-3.
45 Earl of Longford to Ormond, 9 Oct. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 443.
46 Ormond to earl of Burlington, 31 Oct. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 470-1.
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discoverers and their plots. Instead he took care to reassure Burlington, Sir W illiam 
Temple and others that he would not slight the information o f  any inform er however 
incompetent. After all he knew better than m ost the w icked control the Catholic 
clergy exerted over their flocks and how ready they were in the past and would be in 
the future to seduce them to enact their designs.47 At the end o f September, Ormond 
hastily departed from Kilkenny to Dublin in order to prosecute the recent discoveries 
but not before signing orders for the apprehension o f  the earl o f  Tyrone who had been 
vilified by MacNamara, Burke and others in London.48 At the Council chamber in 
Dublin O rm ond’s anxiety is evident. He had two witnesses w hose stories appeared to 
match David Fitzgerald’s escorted from Limerick and narratives o f  their examinations 
though incomplete, sent to Sunderland lest their disclosures be reported in London to 
his disadvantage.49 At this juncture, it m ust also be noted that Ormond him self was 
not immune to adopting strategies employed by the Whigs. For instance his journey 
from Kilkenny to Dublin closely resembled M onm outh’s progress through the west o f 
England that summer to increase his popularity. On 3 October, Ormond informed 
Arran that he had arrived in Dublin the previous day having ridden all the way from 
Grangebeg, ju s t south o f Kildare town, to let all the people see that, despite the 
rumours, he could still sit on horseback and therefore ought not to be put out o f his 
place.50 It is also interesting that Ormond acquired or was certainly reading at this
47 This is paraphrased from the original account found in the following letters; Ibid., pp 470-1;
Ormond to Sir William Temple, 1 Oct. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 438-9.
48 Bodl., Carte 146, f. 298; Secretary Jenkins to Sidney Godolphin, 27 Sep. 1680, Cal. S. P. dom.,
1680-81, p. 42.
49 Examination of David Nash before Lord Lieutenant and Privy Council, 16 Oct. 1680, Ormonde MSS, 
v, pp 432-5; The two witnesses in question were David Nash and William Stokes; Ormond to Earl of 
Sunderland, 17 Oct. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 434-5; Ormond to the governor of Limerick, 9 Oct. 
1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 443-4.
This is paraphrased from the following letter; Bodl., Carte MS 219, f. 166.
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time an account o f another miraculous escape, Charles II’s flight from the 
parliamentarians after the battle o f W orcester in 1652.51
The pressure coalescing around O rm ond’s position is also evident in his 
attempts to work up his interest w ith courtiers and parliamentarians such as 
Burlington, Sir W illiam Temple and Edward Conway who were on good terms with 
leading Whigs. On his way to Dublin Ormond visited Burlington’s nephew, Captain 
Robert Fitzgerald, to reassure him that a grant o f  a commission out o f  the county o f 
Cork would mee+ with no delay on his behalf.52 Ormond saw these figures as 
moderating influences over his enemies. In his correspondence with them, he 
vigorously attacked allegations in vogue in London, that he favoured Catholics and 
served the French, as nonsensical when compared to his distinguished service during 
the 1640s and 50s. Fie elaborated further on this point to Conway stating
By the Irish papists I have suffered more than any man could do that 
escaped with life and is restored to fortune, having been scandalised, 
persecuted and betrayed by them at home and abroad, and that now I 
should grow fond or become reconciled to either of these interests is so 
incredible [...] that I should think fifty witnesses ought not to be believed 
in the case unless they bring other proofs than oaths, which are a cheap 
commodity in this climate.53
In what appears to have been his first letter to Fitzpatrick in over a year, Ormond 
urged him  to attest to this when amongst his new friends in London, reminding him
If you are a good witness in my concerns you could acquit me of being a 
papist or popishly affected [...] that is that I was not so when you left me, 
and since there has no great temptation appeared to change me.54
He concluded this letter by begging his brother in law ‘to be as instrumental as you 
can’ in improving his friendship with Sunderland.55 At the end o f  October, Ormond 
strengthened his hand further in London by despatching Arran and Sir Richard 
Stephens there, whilst in Ireland he attempted to do this by other means for instance
51 Bodl, Carte MS 219, ff 32-46.
52 Ormond to earl of Burlington, 31 Oct. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 470-1.
53 Ormond to earl of Conway, 1 Nov. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 471-2.
54 Ormond to Colonel John Fitzpatrick, 7 Nov. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 482-3.
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having Sir Henry Gascoigne extend the list o f those whose correspondence was being 
secretly opened.56
A rran’s presence in London was deliberately delayed until 29 October 1680 lest 
it be noted or remarked to his disadvantage that his arrival coincided w ith that o f the 
arch traitor, Oliver Plunkett, who, along with his guards had only been four hours 
ahead o f  him at Nantwich on 27 October.57 The following morning, Arran waited 
upon Charles II in his bedchamber and presented him  with a letter from his father. Its 
contents are now unknown, but after perusing it for several minutes, Charles retired 
with Arran into an inner room where they discoursed privately for nearly ha lf an 
hour. The importance o f  this meeting will be shown elsewhere in this chapter. The 
impact o f A rran’s arrival was immediate around W estminster and Whitehall. 
Longford noted to Ormond, ‘it has surprised your grace’s enemies, and I am
r  o
confident given a check to some o f their designs against you.’ Arran observed from 
discoursing with all the old lords o f  O rm ond’s acquaintance that they ‘are very glad 
that I am here to inform them better than they have been hitherto o f the state o f  affairs 
in that kingdom ’.59
During the following days exhaustive efforts were made to m obilise support 
for Ormond, his supporters club was re-established and at Longford’s instigation 
several old members such as Colonel Edward Vernon attended. M eanwhile Arlington 
and Sir Richard Stephens utilised their connections around W estm inster to discover
55 Ibid., pp 482-3.
56 Bodl., Carte MS 39. f. 210; One of those whose letters were being newly opened was Colonel 
Richard Lawrence, a former officer in Cromwell’s army in Ireland and the future writer of The interests 
o f Ireland in its trade and wealth slated (Dublin, 1682), This is almost certainly because reference was 
made to him in Edmund Murphy’s intercepted letter. Sir Henry Gascoigne was one of Ormond’s 
secretaries in Dublin Castle.
57 Earl of Arran to Ormond, 23 Oct. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 455-6; Same to same, 27 Oct. 1680,
Ormonde MSS, v, p. 462.
58 Earl of Longford to Ormond, 30 Oct. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 467-8.
59 Arran to Ormond, 30 Oct. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 469-70.
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the chief exceptions held against Ormond amongst ‘parliam entary m en’.60 Arran 
him self was endeavouring to ingratiate him self w ith and secure the support o f  
im portant courtiers and parliamentary notables. On 2 November, he came to an 
arrangement w ith W illiam Russell informing Ormond ‘he professeth great kindness to 
you’.61 That same day, he met and accepted Laurence H yde’s éclaircissement for his 
support o f Shaen during the summer, which was extremely prudent, as paradoxically, 
it was rumoured that Arran would be called before parliament to vindicate his father’s 
failure to call an Irish parliament in Dublin for as he wrote to Ormond later that day,
I find the main business if not the only one they will lay to your charge
will be the ill posture you are in to make a defence against an invasion,
for which supply expected from a parliament was propounded to you as a , 62 remedy.
Arran quickly ascertained that Orm ond’s enemies would attack him  along a 
more traditional avenue in light o f  their attempts to decimate the court majority in the 
Lords and inculcate a suitable atmosphere before an exclusion bill originating in the 
Commons could pass there.63 On 23 October 1680, Shaftesbury observed in the Lords 
that since the exoneration o f Sir George W akeman, the Popish Plot had been looked 
upon as a sham plot w hilst Thomas Dangerfield’s original revelations against h im self 
and Roderick Mansell had been readily believed.64 He desired therefore that a 
committee be constituted to properly prosecute it. The House grudgingly complied 
with this though with a reluctance born o f fear and ambiguity o f  their king’s humour. 
W ith the transfer o f Plunkett’s trial to London and the recent arrival o f  the earl o f
60 Earl of Arlington to Ormond, 30 Oct. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 465-6; Earl of Longford to 
Ormond, 30 Oct. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 467-9. On account of Vernon’s services Ormond 
intervened to halt legal proceedings by a certain Butler of Ruskoe in County Kilkenny to acquire some 
of Vernon’s lands despite initially supporting his relatives claim.
61 Arran to Ormond, 2 Nov. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 472-3
62 Ibid., pp 472-3; Longford did not give much credence to this threat and by the end of that same day 
Arran was in possession of abstracts of his father’s letters to Thomas Osborne, earl of Danby, Essex 
and Coventry, which contained clear proof of his constant representations of the need of parliament to 
remedy the defects of the Irish establishment
63 Haley, The first earl o f Shaftesbury, pp 593-5.
64 Ibid., pp 593-5; Col. E Vernon to earl of Arran, 23 Oct. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 456-7.
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Tyrone’s accusers, this committee was soon inundated with a herd o f Irish witnesses 
and a virtual mountain o f evidence. Therefore a special subcomm ittee consisting o f 
Shaftesbury, Essex, Burlington and Viscount Fauconberg was appointed to peruse 
and examine all the relevant papers and witnesses. Shaftesbury was appointed 
chairman and given special permission to report findings directly to the Lords. On 2 
November, after sifting through all the information against Plunkett and examining 
Hetherington, Murphy, Fitzgerald, MacNamara, Burke, Sampson and others at 
Burlington’s house, Shaftesbury’s committee was finally ready to give the Lords an 
account o f the Irish plot. Arran and the rest o f O rm ond’s supporters in London were 
perturbed by this decision, for it was also rumoured that Sir Henry Ingoldsby would 
accompany the witnesses.65 To add to their woes a complete narrative detailing 
O rm ond’s actions to date in regard to the plot had not yet arrived. This deprived them 
o f their best opportunity o f preventing m ischief by delivering the account to the Lords 
before the introduction o f witnesses. Longford believed that this would be proof 
enough o f their falsehood ‘if  they should vary from the truth o f  what they affirmed 
there [when they were examined previously in Ireland].’ 66
On 4 November, Shaftesbury reported to the Lords what the committee o f  
examinations thought fit for the House to hear at the bar concerning the conspiracy in 
Ireland. He divided his account into three parts, first, that concerning Oliver Plunkett,
67second, that concerning Lord Brittas and finally that concerning the earl o f Tyrone. 
The first witness to appear was Edmund Murphy, who was allowed swear to a written 
testimony composed for him  by W illiam Roberts, a school m aster in Southwark as he
65 Arran to Ormond, 30 Oct. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 469-70; Francis Gwyn to Ormond, 3 Nov.
1680, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 476; Newsletter to Roger Garstell, Newcastle, 2 Nov. 1680, Ormonde MSS, 
v, p. 76; Earl of Longford to Ormond, 2 Nov. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 473-5; H. M, C. House of 
Lords MSS, 1678-88, pp 168-9
66 Ibid., pp 473-5; Earl of Longford to Ormond, 30 Oct. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 467-8.
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was unable to express him self sufficiently in English. M urphy alleged that he had 
originally collaborated with Plunkett and Patrick Tyrell in what he believed was a 
plan to promote the interest o f  the Catholic Church by bringing in the French to 
maintain order, on the duke o f York’s behalf, in the event o f civil war between his 
and the duke o f M onm outh’s supporters in England. However in 1677, after 
discoursing with a certain father M aginn and examining copies o f  Plunkett’s 
correspondence in his possession, Murphy realised that the prim ate’s true design was 
to bring in the French ‘for no other purpose but to m urder all the Protestants in one 
w eek’.69 Thereafter he resolved to abet Plunkett no further in his designs and
70
correspond diligently with M aginn to discover his treason.
Murphy sought to incriminate Ormond along w ith York in his evidence. 
Plunkett had allegedly informed him that he had an allowance from the duke o f 
Ormond without which he could not subsist.71 Ormond had also advised the prim ate 
to find a Protestant justice o f  the peace to concoct accusations against M aginn and 
other discoverers, namely John Moyer and Father Anthony Daly, by which means he 
would have ‘a fair pretence’ for banishing them beyond the seas. Charles II did not 
escape censure for Ormond had sent M aginn to France by his command where he was 
mysteriously poisoned in  a priest’s house in Flanders.72 Murphy attempted to 
substantiate these accusations by referring to the letter found on Patrick Flem ing’s 
dead body in February 1678.73 He informed the House that one Phelim O ’Donnelly 
carrying letters from Plunkett to Father Manus O’Quinn (Patrick Flem ing’s parish
67 Journals of the House o f Lords, xiii, p. 632; P. G. Murray, ‘A previously unnoticed letter of Oliver 
Plunketts’ in Seanchas Ardmhaca, via (1975-76) pp 26-7; Laurence P. Murray, ‘Life and times of 
father Edmund Murphy, parish priest of Killeavy and Chanter of Armagh’, pp 339-40.
68 Ibid, p. 638.
69 Ibid, pp 633-8.
70 Ibid, pp 633-8.
71 Ibid, pp 635-8.
72 Ibid, pp 635-8; Arran to Ormond, 6 Nov. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 477-8; Earl of Longford to 
Ormond, 6 Nov. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 479-81; Journals o f the House o f Lords, xiii, p. 637-9.
164
priest) enlisted him to carry one such letter to O ’Quinn. However being suspicious o f  
its contents, Murphy opened it to find
That the said primate had been the day before with the great man 
[Ormond] and that he would give Patrick Fleming to understand that it 
was the duke’s desire he might go to Dublin, where he might safely 
remain with the primate till there was an opportunity to transport him for 
England where the duke of Ormond’s friends as well as the primate’s 
would send letters of recommendation with the said Patrick Fleming for 
France [...] which friend of the primate’s and the duke of Ormond the 
deponent [Murphy] was afterwards informed by the said Manus O’ Quinn 
to be the duke of York.74
Murphy also added that it was written that the said Fleming ‘needed not fear but to 
return to his country again with honour and preferm ent’ and this for a man who was
• • 75in his opinion ‘the chiefest rebel in Ireland.’
The Lords moved to examine Plunkett before listening to the other witnesses. 
Before them he admitted that he knew Murphy ‘too too w ell’ and to writing a letter
nr  i
‘to one Fleming styling him self by the name C ox’. However he stridently denied 
any knowledge o f  the plot in Ireland.77 Plunkett responded to the question o f  whether 
the duke o f Ormond had made him any allowance o f money by stating that he had 
received far less encouragement from Ormond than his predecessors Berkeley and
78Essex, ‘who had both given him money and been very kind and civil to h im ’. Arran 
observed that this comment brought an immediate alteration in Essex’s demeanour. 
Plunkett went further informing the House that M urphy’s tale was nonsensical 
because he would never disclose information to Murphy, ‘because he knew him  to be 
his professed enemy for depriving him o f his parish, in which he lived scandalously
73 Murray, ‘A previously unnoticed letter of Oliver Plunketts’ pp 26-8.
74 Ibid., p. 636; Murray, ‘A previously unnoticed letter of Oliver Plunkett’s’, pp 26-7; Ibid, p. 30 O’ 
Quinn was a priest in the parish of Creggan which takes in part of the counties of Armagh and Louth.
75 Ibid., p. 636; Ibid., pp 26-7.
76 Ibid., p. 636.
77 Murray, ‘A previously unnoticed letter of Oliver Plunkett’s’, p. 27 \ Journals of the House o f Lords, 
xiii, p. 638.
78 Arran to Ormond, 6 Nov. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 477-8; Earl of Longford to Ormond, 6 Nov. 
1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 479-81.
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and corresponded with the tories.’79 Arran was delighted by Plunkett’s performance 
and wrote to Ormond on 6 November that he ‘went beyond our expectation’. 
Longford was told that he relayed his story ‘with such plainness and simplicity that he 
[Plunkett] left an impression in the Lords to his advantage’, whereas the opposite was 
now the case for several witnesses, who took time during their examinations to appeal 
to Arran for proof o f  their characters and inform ation.80 The m ost potent weapon in 
Shaftesbury’s arsenal against Ormond had been publicly blunted and the exam ination 
o f the plot concerning Oliver Plunkett ended with a show o f approval from  the king,
who light-heartedly shouted to lords around him  that he did not believe that Ormond
81would be in any plot but with him.
Arran expected after all the witnesses had been heard that Shaftesbury would 
enlarge M urphy’s information against Ormond, in conjunction with a fresh disclosure 
made by David Fitzgerald. Fitzgerald had informed the Lords committee o f a great 
meeting o f plotters in Dublin in 1678 attended by Fitzpatrick, Sir Edward Scott, 
Oliver Plunkett and the Talbot’s. This failed to materialise for Fitzgerald’s 
information was no more than hearsay and as Longford concluded from all the 
disclosures before the Lords, ‘nothing appears (after all the strict scrutiny has been 
made) material against you [Ormond]’.82 The exam ination o f  the Irish witnesses was 
instead transferred to a free conference to be held with the Commons on M onday 9 
November. The House also ordered that Lord Theobald Brittas, Colonel Pierce Lacy,
83Sir John Fitzgerald and other alleged plotters be sent to London.
The witnesses and their masters in London were unable to connect Ormond to 
a supposed widespread Catholic conspiracy headed by the duke o f  York, but
79 Ibid., pp 477-8; Ibid., pp 479-81.
80 Ibid., 477-8; Ibid.,, p 479-81.
81 Ibid., pp 479-81; Ibid., pp 477-8.
82 Ibid., pp 479-81; Ibid., pp 477-8.
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indirectly they compromised him by connecting many o f his family and key allies to 
it. Murphy, Burke, Sampson and M acNamara had all railed against Sir John Davys 
for browbeating and discountenancing them in their examinations. Similar charges 
were lodged against M ichael Boyle, Sir W illiam Davys and C hief Justice Keating. 
Sampson affirmed on oath that when he informed Boyle that York was at the head o f 
the plot in Ireland, Boyle advised him to withhold his information; otherwise, ‘it 
would be to his ruin’.84 The presiding judge at Tyrone’s trial in M arch 1679, Sir 
Richard Reynolds was accused o f placing the defendant’s relatives and tenants on his 
ju iy  and o f finding a bill o f ignoramus in return for £1000. 5 Finally in the coarse o f 
shedding light on Plunkett’s attempts to coordinate his plot with the assistance o f  the 
Catholic clergy in M unster, Euctace Comyn revealed that they had met in the home o f 
John Walsh, Orm ond’s lawyer in Tipperary and later, after Plunkett fled from 
Clonmel, he lodged with another relation o f O rm ond’s, W alter Butler who attempted 
to kill Comyn.86 Ormond had further reason to be apprehensive as Shaftesbury’s 
committee allowed the witnesses to tell their stories anew in front o f the Lords
• • • 87neglecting their original examinations taken in Ireland.
Despite these setbacks, Ormond had emerged unscathed after the investigation 
by his peers o f a topic which had distressed him  greatly in the run up to parliament.
83 Francis Gwyn to Ormond, 3 Nov. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 476-7.
®4 Earl of Longford to Ormond, 30 Oct. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 467-9,
85 Journals o f the House o f Lords, xiii, pp 643-4. Thomas Sampson, A narrative o f the late popish plot 
in Ireland, for the subjugating thereof to the French king together with the proceedings against, and 
the trial o f the earl o f Tyrone and others who were accusedfor carrying on the same: containing the 
several examinations o f Hubert Burke, Edward ¡vie, Gent., late Steward o f  the earl Tyrone (London,
1680) pp 21-4.
SbJournals ofthe House o f Lords, xiii, p. 647; Euctace Comyn, The information o f Euctace Comyn, 
servant to Mr. Keadagh Magher treasurer to the papists in Ireland, o f their money to carry out this 
plot, who was barbarously murdered for discovering the same, and turning Protestant: given in writing 
to the honourable house o f Commons, the I5'h o f this present November, 1680 (London, 1680) pp 2-4.
87 Earl of Arran to Ormond, 6 Nov. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 477-8; Earl of Longford to Onnond, 6 
Nov. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 479-81.
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Longford attributed much o f the credit for this to A rran’s presence, informing 
Ormond on 6 November,
The truth of it is he [Arran] has in this little time of his being here so
bestirred himself, and is believed by all so well to understand the affairs
of Ireland, and so able to justify your grace in your conduct there, that
you enemies have been necessitated by their apprehension of it to take
new measures and change the method they had designed to run you down, 88by.
It certainly abated Ingoldsby’s mettle as he failed to present him self before the house
• 89with his stories o f Ormond’s extravagant proceedings. Furthermore, Thomas 
Sampson’s disclosures before the Lords did not concur with what he originally stated 
when he arrived in London, that his conversation with Boyle regarding York had 
taken place in O rm ond’s closet when he was present.90
A rran’s focus shifted now to the House o f Commons where the Irish witnesses 
were to be produced on 9 November. He zealously attended the conferences o f  both 
Houses on the m atter and gave a good account o f  him self in several skirmishes with 
its biased chairman, Shaftesbury. On 8 November, the latter had sneeringly observed 
when informed that two witnesses from Limerick, David Nash and W illiam Stokes 
disowned their previous depositions in Dublin that ‘he did not wonder at it when the 
Chancellor [Michael Boyle] and Sir John Davys took the exam inations.’91 Arran 
responded by highlighting Boyle’s absence during these proceedings and then 
alluding to Shaftesbury’s conduct at the Lords committee, he asserted ‘that all the 
depositions taken in relation to the plot were as impartially taken as ever his lordship 
took any’, to which Shaftesbury made no reply.92 Between 11 and 15 November, the
Irish witnesses appeared before the Commons with exactly the same inform ation as
88 Ibid., pp 479-81.
89 Earl of Longford to Ormond, 30 Oct. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 467-8.
90 Earl of Longford to Ormond, 6 Nov. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 479-81.
91 Arran to Ormond, 9 Nov. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 483-5.
92 Earl of Longford, 9 Nov 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 485; Arran to Ormond, 9 Nov. 1680, Ormonde 
MSS, v, pp 483-5.
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had been revealed before the Lords.93 They were accompanied by H etherington who 
accused Ormond o f being the ‘centre o f all the conspirators’.94 Evidently, it was a 
dismal showing, as they failed to even move the Commons to debate the plot in 
Ireland. There are several reasons for this; first, Hetherington’s inform ation was no 
more than hearsay obtained from Ingoldsby. Second, David Fitzgerald who had given 
‘great satisfaction’ before the Lords had praised Ormond regarding his discovery. 
Third, by compelling the Lords committee to transfer all the Irish examinations 
hitherto lodged with them to their counterparts in the Commons and instructing 
Longford to distribute duplicates amongst Orm ond’s friends there, Arran prevented 
the witnesses from embroidering their testimonies any further. Finally, and most 
importantly, by this stage, the Commons had more important matters to deal with, 
namely the exclusion o f  James, duke o f  York from the succession to the Stuart 
throne.95
On 15 Novem ber 1680, A rran’s ‘great’ friend W illiam Russell carried a bill for 
this purpose up to the Lords and that very day after a debate lasting over seven hours, 
it was rejected by 65 votes to 30.96 The Commons were surprised and angered at the 
miscarriage o f their bill, and the next day, as soon as their speaker took the chair, they 
immediately adjourned for a day. These developments frightened O rm ond’s 
supporters in London; Arran felt it was ju s t the catalyst desired by his enemies and 
informed him  on 16 November:
I am often alarmed with an impeachment to be brought in against you, but 
can find no certainty of the matter yet, but I am very confident that you 
will be attacked; for since the bill against the duke was thrown out, all
93 [W. C], The historians guide, or, Britain’s remembrancer... (London, 1690), p. 128.
94 Arran to Ormond, 13 Nov. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 486-7; Earl of Longford, 13 Nov. 1680, 
Ormonde MSS, v, pp 487-8
95 Ibid., pp 486-7; Ibid., pp 487-8.
96 Francis Gwyn to Ormond, 16 Nov. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 488-9; John Kenyon, Stuart England 
(London, 1978), p. 232.
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those who are looked upon as friends to him will be struck at, and of that
97number you are reckoned.
These fears were well grounded for the rest o f  Plunkett’s accusers; Moyer, Finan and 
Callaghan had finally arrived in London and were known to be under Hetherington’s 
influence. Longford’s agents discovered that they intended to reflect upon Ormond 
‘for not using them  w ell’ when they were originally called into England and treating 
them worse when they came back.98 Am idst this climate, Arran doubted his ability to 
defend even the means o f  disarming Irish Catholics in 1678, which were universally 
despised and unpopular. As such, he consulted with Arlington and both concluded 
that Ormond would be wise to write to Charles desiring leave to come over if  any 
accusations were lodged against him. Arran believed the onslaught would begin on 
Tuesday 23 November, the day appointed by the Lords to discuss expedients to 
prevent or restrain a Catholic successor stating, ‘then it is likely you may be brought 
upon the stage as a friend to the duke.’99
In Ireland, Ormond was closely monitoring proceedings and he wrote to Arran, 
‘yours o f  the 16th and 20th came together, and now we are im patient for those o f the 
23rd, supposing that every three days must produce something extraordinary.’100 These 
letters certainly occasioned a change in O rm ond’s opinion regarding the November 
1678 proclamation for disarming Catholics. Hitherto he had defended his decision to 
the point o f sending Arran the same justification that he had transm itted to Ossory one 
year previously, affirming ‘all I can say at present in justification o f the proclamation 
for disarming the papists is contained in the paper enclosed, saving that it was with
97 Arran to Ormond, 16 Nov 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 489.
98 Earl of Longford to Ormond, 16 Nov. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 490-1.
99 Arran to Ormond, 16 Nov. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 489; Arran to Ormond, 20 Nov. 1680, 
Ormonde MSS, v, p. 494.
100 Ormond to Arran, 28 Nov. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 509.
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the full approbation and advice o f a numerous Council at that time assem bled.’101 On 
1 December 1680 however, Ormond now informed Arran, ‘upon m y m otion a new 
proclamation for disarming o f  papists w ithout excepting those that had licences is set 
forth’.102 Similarly there was a marked change in O rm ond’s position vis-à-vis the 
letter found on Patrick Flem ing’s body after he received a leaked report o f Edmund 
M urphy’s disclosures before the Lords committee in early November. W ithin two 
weeks Ormond had an exact duplicate o f a letter he had been unable to locate for over 
six months set down, and then sworn to by all the parties involved in its discovery. An 
accompanying narrative was transmitted to Sunderland and Arran in an attempt to 
contradict the insinuations within M urphy’s new evidence.103 He informed 
Sunderland that Plunkett had acted as an intermediary between the Irish government 
and Fleming, negotiating the latter’s departure out o f  the country; hence the reason for 
his letter on Flem ing’s body. These negotiations came to an end when Fleming and 
his party were killed in February 1677 and for this reason the letter was m isplaced for 
as Ormond put it ‘there seemed to me there was no further use o f this letter’.104 
Ormond shirked away from what was advised by Arran and Arlington. His presence 
in London would only serve to turn what was a spark into a flame by drawing 
unwanted attention to him. It would appear that he had something to hide, for as 
explained to Arran ‘against accusations as they may be brought, I know not how  to be 
defended from appearing to answer, so that I think it best to leave m yself to god and 
the king.’105
101 Ormond to Arran, 19 Nov. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 493-4.
102 Ibid., pp 493-4; Ormond to Arran, 1 Dec. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 517.
103 P. G Murray, ‘A previously unnoticed letter of Oliver Plunkett’s’, pp 27-8.
104 Ormond to Earl of Sunderland, 23 Nov. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 500; Examination of John Banks 
relating to papers found on Patrick Fleming, 17 Nov. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 491-2; Examination 
of Sir William Tichbom relating to the papers found on Patrick Fleming, 18 Nov. 1680, Ormonde MSS, 
v, pp 492-3; Statement by Mr. Sergeant John Osborne, 20 Nov. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 498.
105 Ormond to Arran, 28 Nov. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 509; Bodl., Carte MS 219, f. 180.
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Despite the anxiety o f many in Dublin and London, no attack materialised on 23 
November, or in the days thereafter. On the day in question, Shaftesbury was 
supposedly laid sick with gout but this was a minor factor in O rm ond’s escape. Arran 
may have feared the possibility o f a parliamentary debate, but it was not due to lack o f 
material with which to defend Ormond, and it is w ithin a letter discussing such, that 
we derive the m ain reasons for O rm ond’s escape,
I [Arran] have been and am still ready to make the best use I can of those 
heads or topics you mention with some others when the accusation offers, 
but your enemies were aware of that and therefore would not bring any 
accusation before our house.106
Shaftesbury and his associates knew that the defeat o f  yet another attempt to hurt
Ormond would be a disaster. As on 15 N ovem ber 1680, when Thomas Dangerfield
failed to convince the Lords that John Mordaunt, earl o f  Peterborough had persuaded
him to kill the king on the duke o f  Y ork’s behalf, Shaftesbury decided ‘to let fall the
debate’ for fear o f  discrediting the plot and with it, his attempts to exclude York.
There was always the possibility that more credible evidence and informers would
appear in the future or o f Charles II removing Ormond once he had succumbed to the
principle o f  exclusion.107
The Lords and the Commons were otherwise engaged after the 16 N ovem ber 
and had little mind or time for Irish affairs. The Lords spent several weeks after the 
defeat o f  the exclusion bill working on alternatives to secure the Protestant religion to 
compensate for the rejected bill. The W higs were also anxious to reaffirm the plot in 
light o f  the disappointing performances o f  the Irish witnesses and Dangerfield. They 
fell upon W illiam Howard, Viscount Stafford against whom a new witness named
106 Arran to Ormond, 20 Nov. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 494.
107 Ibid,, pp 494; Earl of Longford, 20 November, 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 497-8; Same to same, 16 
Nov. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 490-1; Haley, The first earl o f Shaftesbury, p. 601; Ingoldsby would 
also have been in a position to advise Shaftesbury on Ormond’s various methods of defence. There is 
evidence to suggest that the Whig’s took this stance on the basis of evidence obtained during the 
tampering of Ormond’s correspondence.
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Edward Turberville had appeared to corroborate the evidence against him  o f Oates 
and Stephen Dugdale.108 In the meantime the Commons directed their frustration and 
anger towards those who had obstructed the passage o f their exclusion bill such as 
George Savile, earl o f  Halifax, Edward Seymour and the foremen o f county juries 
throughout England who had initiated addresses abhorring those who had petitioned 
the king to convene parliament earlier that year.109
Although Ormond was not brought into the political spotlight, needless to say 
he was not neglected. On 4 December, Longford informed him,
your enemies are maliciously industrious to cast all aspersions imaginable
to prepare the way for those riff-raff articles [...] designed to be brought
in against you into the House of Commons, who are not at leisure to
110receive them, having for the present work enough upon their hands.
In the era described by Sir Francis Gwyn as ‘the age o f print’, the press was 
undoubtedly the most potent and untrammelled weapon against O rm ond.111 Ormond 
him self acknowledged in regard to allegations that he was a Catholic,
Now though it may be as truly sworn that I was circumcised at
Christchurch [Cathedral], and that few of any brains that know me or
have but a superficial account of my life will give credit to so incredible a
forgery; yet if it get into a narrative thousands will swallow it as truth;
112and against this there is no fence.
London was littered with intelligences and narratives regarding the Irish plot and 
O rm ond’s character. The Irish witnesses had been ordered by the House o f  Commons
113on 13 N ovem ber to print their narratives and ‘choose their printers’. There was also
108 John Kenyon, The Popish Plot (London, 1972) pp 231-2. Edward Turberville, The information of 
Edward Turberville ofSkerr in the County o f Glamorgan, Gent delivered at the bar o f the House o f 
Commons, Tuesday the ninth day o f November, 1680. perused and signed to be printed, according to 
the order o f the House o f Commons, by me William Williams, Speaker, (London, 1680); Burnet, 
History o f my own time, pp 862-3; Kenyon, The Popish Plot, pp 231-2; Edward Turberville was a 
former Benedictine and Dominican monk who had also served in the French army. He alleged that 
Stafford had solicited him to assassinate Charles II in Paris in 1676.
109 Col. Edward Cooke to Ormond, 23 November. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 501-4; Hutton, Charles 
the Second, king o f England, Scotland and Ireland, pp 395-6; Haley, The first earl o f Shaftesbury, pp 
605-7.
110 Earl of Longford to Ormond, 4 Dec. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 520-1
111 Francis Gwyn to Ormond, 27 Nov. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 507-8.
112 Ormond to Arran, 1 Jan. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 543-4.
113 Earl of Longford to Ormond, 13 Nov. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 487-8.
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a collection in circulation o f all the libels accumulated against Ormond since he 
resumed office in 1677 and from earlier dates, for instance Peter Talbot’s Narrative o f  
the sale and settlement o f  Ireland .ll4 These tactics were to be replicated in Ireland for 
as Sir John Davys informed Ormond from London where he had journeyed to clear 
his name against the accusations o f the witnesses,
Though none of the printed votes have yet named me under any ill- 
character, my adversaries have not-with-standing written and scattered 
intelligences as if I had been voted a notorious stifler of the plot in 
Ireland, with other wild and false things which no doubt will be dispersed 
about in Ireland to blacken me.115
At the beginning o f  December, Longford managed to procure a copy o f  what 
articles had been drawn up against Ormond. They were constructed to attack him  on 
several levels. First, in regard to the Popish Plot and his own religion. Ormond was 
charged with assembling the Roman Catholic clergy in Dublin in 1666 and sending 
his secretary Sir George Lane to meet them. Furthermore that he had disarmed the 
Protestants in 1663 but given Catholics time to surrender their weapons after the 
discovery o f the plot by Oates. It was also alleged that D ongan’s regiment had been 
raised by O rm ond’s order and that he failed to properly secure the Talbot’s and the 
other leading conspirators in the Irish p lot.116 Second, to sour his reputation w ith the 
English Commons, Ormond was portrayed as an evil advisor in the mould o f Thomas 
Wentworth, earl o f Strafford, as he was made lord lieutenant ‘on his [Orm ond’s] 
undertaking to call a parliament to give money to raise an army to be sent into 
England to set up arbitrary government.’117
In Ireland, rigorous attempts were being pursued to reinvigorate the, as yet, 
largely unsubstantiated plot. Owen Murphy had Con M agennis o f  Newry apprehend
114 Earl of Longford to Ormond, 4 Dec. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 520-1.
115 Sir John Davy’s to Ormond, 8 Jan. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 546-7.
116 Articles against the duke of Ormond, 4 Dec. 1680, Cal. S. P. dom., 1680-81, p. 98; Earl of Longford 
to Ormond, 4 Dec. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 520-1.
117 Ibid., p. 98; Ibid., pp 520-1.
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sixteen witnesses against Plunkett before proceeding to M unster where a dozen more 
were collected around Carrick on Suir, County Tipperary, many o f them O rm ond’s 
own tenants.118 In Limerick, self-serving officials like John Odell and John Massie 
pushed the plot whilst elsewhere in Munster Orrery’s sister displayed a like zeal for 
the Protestant interest and hurting Ormond.119 On 14 Decem ber 1680, Arran informed 
him, ‘1 hear every post o f great apprehensions and new discoveries from M unster and 
that from my lords o f Essex and Burlington. I wonder your grace sends me no account 
o f it’.120 The powerful and extensive linkages o f the Boyle family both in M unster and 
England had been a thorn in the side o f many an Irish governor since the early 
seventeenth century and though Burlington was more sympathetic to Ormond than 
Orrery, possibly leaking M urphy’s disclosure before the Lords committee to 
O rm ond’s supporters, he was also responsible to supporters and kin in M unster who 
saw themselves as a threatened minority surrounded in uncertain times by a 
potentially treacherous Catholic m ajority.121 Arran was therefore in a very awkward 
position, unable to repudiate the most ridiculous o f  rumours w ithout clarification from 
Dublin. This had disastrous consequences in regard to perceptions o f  Ireland and its 
government in London for as Arran wrote on 14 Decem ber 1680, ‘my lord of 
Burlington’s talking o f a letter he had from his brother Shannon about some arms he 
seized upon, and saying it at the Committee has made a report about the town that
118 Ormond to Arran, 21 Dec. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 534-5; Eustace Comyn to Richard Denison at 
Clonmel, 1 Jan. 1681, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 541; Sir Hans Hamilton to Ormond, 18 Dec. 1680,
Ormonde MSS, v, pp 530-1.
119 Sarah Hutton, ‘Katherine Jones née Boyle, Viscountess Ranelagh (1615-1691)’, in Matthew and 
Harrison (ed.), Oxford D.N.B., xxx, pp 574-6.
120 Narrative of Donough Leyne, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 463-5; Arran to Ormond, 4 Dec. 1680, Ormonde 
MSS, v, pp 519-20; Arran to Ormond, 14 Dec. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 524-5.
121 S. J. Connolly, Religion, law and power: the making o f Protestant Ireland (Oxford, 1992), pp 30-1; 
John Vessy, Archbishop of Tuam to Ormond, 17 Dec. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 526; Vesey’s letter 
clearly illustrates the widespread fear prevalent amongst Irish Protestants in desolate isolated parts of 
the country that they would soon be massacred.
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Ireland is in rebellion.’122 To make matters worse, Sunderland was abusing his
position as principle Secretary o f State to hurt Ormond by w ithholding or neglecting
official information from Ireland. On 20 November Arran reported ‘I have reason to
believe that most o f the papers transmitted by the government were sent by the
1
principle Secretary o f  State to parliament w ithout his [Sunderland] perusing them ’.
Davys believed that the possible repercussions o f  Sunderland’s behaviour necessitated 
the transm ission o f duplicates to London, for as he affirmed:
I find nothing kept more a secret in certain places here than those 
accounts whereby people abroad do either see nothing of the proceedings 
in Ireland or understand nothing of them but by clandestine 
misrepresentations of some private and false hands, whereas by the other 
way of proceeding truth will appear and in the end will no doubt prevail 
and justify itself, your grace and all the rest of its followers.124
Ireland’s foremost conspiracy hunter, Henry Jones, was also busily about 
Shaftesbury’s business. He conducted exhaustive intrigues amongst the Catholic 
clergy in order tu procure new witnesses. On 4 Decem ber 1680 Arran informed 
Ormond ‘yesterday Lord Shaftesbury informed the House o f a titular bishop that 
would make great discoveries’.125 Jones prize target however was the infamous tory, 
Redmond O ’Hanlon. In 1680, O ’Hanlon with a £100 bounty on his head was in dire 
straits. The severe measures enacted by Ormond the previous year to suppress 
nurseries o f  discontent, in light o f  the plot hysteria in England, were increasingly
19 •
paying dividends as the army destroyed several bands o f  tories. On 12 June Sir 
George Rawdon informed Conway, ‘seven tories have been killed or taken within the 
last seven days [ ...]  and O ’Hanlon narrowly escaped’.127 In late September as the 
government forces closed in, O ’Hanlon made several approaches to the government
122 Arran to Ormond, 4 Dec. 1680, Ormonde MSS, pp 524-5.
123 Arran to Ormond, 20 Nov. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 494.
124 Sir John Davys to Ormond, 18 Dec. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 526-7.
125 Arran to Ormond, 4 Dec. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 519-20.
126 Ormonde MSS, vi, preface xvii-viii; Sir George Rawdon to the earl of Conway, 31 Jan. 1680, Cal. S. 
P. dom., 1680-81, p. 380.
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through the Annesley family o f Castlewellan, County Down, and Roger Boyle, the 
Church o f Ireland bishop o f  Clogher. I f  a pardon could be procured for h im self and 
his brother Laughlin, he would betray all the tories o f  his acquaintance between 
Downpatrick and the county o f  Monaghan. In December, these negotiations broke 
down when the majority o f the Irish Council overruled Ormond by refusing to 
sanction such an arrangement w ith a notorious criminal; instead they doubled the 
bounty on the heads o f both brothers. Jones refused to let the m atter rest especially as 
O ’H anlon’s addition as a witness against Plunkett would elevate the Irish plot in the 
minds o f  Protestants throughout the three Stuart kingdoms. On 9 December, Francis 
Annesley wrote to Katherine O ’Hanlon, Redm ond’s mother, to inform her that his 
father-in-law (Jones) was desirous to know ‘whether Redm ond O ’H anlon will be a 
discoverer o f the design for the French invasion here, and who in Ireland are the 
principal abettors’.129 Annesley assured her, ‘if  he doth this he need not doubt o f  
countenance, pardon and reward also for him self and his two brothers.’130
Ormond was alert to the growing manoeuvres against him  and attempted to 
offset them by conducting him self as he had against Orrery during the w inter o f  1678. 
First, he became extremely sensitive where the Protestant interest was concerned and 
towards this he sent many unfinished examinations to London before they were 
reported there to his disadvantage. On 13 December, he wrote to Arran ‘all that is yet 
come to me o f  the discoveries and fears in M unster you w ill find in the copies o f  the 
examinations enclosed.’131 O rm ond’s zeal proved well founded when magistrates in 
Limerick obtained information from two discoverers, M aurice Fitzgerald and M urtagh
127 Sir George Rawdon to the earl of Conway, 12 Jun. 1680, Cal. S. P. dom., 1680-81, pp 512.
128 Kevin McMahon, ‘The O’ Hanlon letter’ in Seanchas Ardmhaca, x (1980-81), pp 40-1.
129 Francis Annesley to Mrs Katherine O’ Hanlon, 9 Dec. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 536.
130 Ibid., p. 536; Kevin McMahon, ‘The O’ Hanlon letter’ in Seanchas Ardmhaca, x (1980-81), pp 40- 
1; Bodl,, Carte MS 39, f. 231.
131 Ormond to Arran, 13 Dec. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 523-4.
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Downey corroborating David Fitzgerald’s testimony and that retracted in October 
1680 by David N ash.132 Ormond also afforded Owen M urphy and what he regarded as 
other scurrilous discoverers scant reason to com plain that their work was been 
obstructed, furnishing M urphy with £50 when he complained ‘o f want o f  m oney’ and 
issuing letters o f safe conduct for Patrick Tyrell, bishop o f Clogher to repair to Dublin 
for one month after Murphy announced before Council that it was Tyrell’s desire to
• • 133come in and discover Plunkett’s treasons.
Ormond’s second strategy was to highlight his care in regard to the plot 
compared to those who were hostile to him. Their interferences were unwelcome, 
counter productive and ultimately damaging to the Protestant interest. He attempted to 
undermine the lurid scare stories emanating out o f  M unster by questioning the 
motives o f those i sporting them for instance, stating to Arran on 13 December, ‘I 
thought the heat and frequency o f alarms in that province had m uch abated since my 
lord o f Orrery’s death, but his sister has corresponded here as zealous as he was, but 
not so inventive.’134 On 21 December, he gleefully informed Arran that James 
Geogheghan, alias Dalton, a discoverer o f the plot in Ireland, sent over from England 
with ample recom mendation by Sunderland in October, had been stopped in career 
and arrested by order o f the Irish Privy Council. They deemed him  a rogue by dint o f 
his extravagant and extraordinary proceedings which ranged from horse stealing to 
extortion.135 Ormond confidently added that Owen M urphy ‘will likewise be found 
faulty’, for m ost o f the witnesses gathered in Tipperary had professed before him ‘that
132 Ormond to Arran, 18 Dec. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 533. Bodl., Carte MS 39, f. 225; Ibid., pp 240- 
2; Ibid., pp 243-4.
133 Bodl., Carte MS 39, f. 258.
134 Ormond to Arran, 13 Dec. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 523-4.
135 Bodl., Carte MS 39, f. 244; Ibid., pp 246-7; Ibid., pp 250-1; Ibid., pp 256-7; Gardner, The life o f 
James first duke o f Ormonde, 1610-88, ii, pp 318-21.
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they were able to say nothing o f the plot or plotters’. In late December officers with 
warrants from Sir Hans Hamilton searching for tories and their harbourers came 
across several letters o f Henry Jones’s illegal correspondence w ith O ’Hanlon. 
Ormond knew exactly what to do with such information and sent copies to Arran w ith 
the following advice ‘if  you find a fit opportunity it may be fit to show them  to the 
king who can best judge what use may be made o f the originals and when; in the
1 0 7
meantime the originals shall be safely kept.’
Indicative o f  the pressure that Ormond was under at this time was the large 
proportion o f letters dedicated to repudiating accusations he had answered many times 
previously. These accusations can be grouped into two categories: first that because 
most o f  his kin and supporters were o f the Catholic persuasion, he somehow favoured 
that confession. For instance the rumour that Sir George Lane sat in Council with the 
Irish Catholic hierarchy on his behalf. Ormond denied this accusation and confidently 
told Arran that it could be easily ascertained to be false as ‘the meeting that I am 
charged with, and all the transactions at it; are at large set down in a great book set 
forth by Peter W alsh’.138 He acknowledged that he had sanctioned a m eeting w ith the 
aim o f creating a division amongst the Catholic clergy in order to secure the 
Protestant interest. However he was thwarted by his removal from office and the 
actions o f his successors ‘some o f whom were too indulgent to the whole body o f 
papists [Berkeley], and others not much acquainted with either o f them, nor
136 Ormond to Arran, 21 Dec. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 534-5.
137 Ibid., pp 534-5. Bodl., Carte MS 39, f. 230; Ibid., f. 231.
138 Peter Walsh, The history and vindication o f the loyal formulary, or Irish remonstrance...received by 
his majesty Anno 1661 [...] in several treatises: with a true account and full discussion o f the delusory 
Irish remonstrance and other papers framed and insisted on by the national congregation o f Dublin, 
Anno 1666, and presented to [...] the duke o f Ormond, but rejected by his grace: to which are added 
three appendixes, whereof the last contains the Marquis o f Ormond [...] letter o f the second o f 
December, 1650: in answer to both the declaration and excommunication o f the bishops, &.
Jamestown (London, 1673); Ormond to Arran, 29 Dec. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 538-40.
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considering the advantage o f the division designed [Essex]’.139 The underlying 
message in this letter was simple. O rm ond’s removal in 1669 had been a disaster for 
the Protestant interest in Ireland as his successors failed to assert them selves with 
anything like his diligence vis-à-vis Catholicism. Thus it had been their negligence 
that had actually fostered the conditions that produced the Popish Plot.
Ormond was also compelled to address more serious accusations, for it was 
rumoured in London that he had received the sacrament in the Catholic form in the 
house o f  his sister, Ellen MacCarthy, countess o f Clancarty. Ormond regarded this 
libel as preposterous but perilous times necessitated a response. He inform ed Arran 
that he would be very foolish indeed to expose him self to ruin by going abroad for 
masses and sacraments when he could receive them in his own lodgings. Anyway as 
Catholic masses are held in the morning, it would have been im possible for him to 
have been present, ‘I defy anybody to prove that ever I [Ormond] was to see my sister 
this twenty years but in an afternoon.’140 Ormond was evidently afraid that this libel 
would be brought into parliament as an article for he enclosed a copy o f Titus O ates’s 
original deposition wherein he was named amongst those to be murdered. He added 
the following observation that if  he had been a Catholic, it would have been known to 
the plotters and therefore ‘they would not have contrived the death o f  one that might 
in such case have been useful to them .’141
O rm ond’s actions were justified as they prevented his enemies from 
constructing a suitable environment, one dangerously supportive o f  the case for his 
removal. It must be pointed out however that his opponents were also inhibited by the 
flow o f English politics after the defeat o f  the exclusion bill, as the intense struggle 
between the court and the disaffected commons consumed the attention o f  all in
139 Ibid., pp 538-40.
140 Ormond to Arran, 1 Jan. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 543-4.
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London. The main point at issue was that the Commons would do nothing for Charles 
until he abandoned his brother and ‘evil’ ministers like Halifax and Seymour. Charles 
ignored these demands for over six weeks until both sides were at a standstill. 
However on 15 December 1680 he was obliged to appear before parliam ent on 
account o f  his desperate financial position. He desired assistance for the beleaguered 
garrison o f  Tangiers, which was surrounded by the Berbers. On 21 December, the 
Commons responded by proposing to Charles that they would put him  into a 
condition to defend Tangiers, improve the fleet and pay o ff his debts only if  he 
relinquished his brother and removed his minions from court and office.142 That very 
night Arran wrote to Ormond ‘your grace will find by the last address from the House 
o f Commons that w ithin a short time we shall know how matters m ust go’, though he 
believed Ormond was secure for the moment ‘I believe you will not be meddled with, 
if  at all, until Christmas be over’.143
For nearly two weeks, Charles II made no reply to this address while the whole 
Stuart political nation looked on. Halifax believed no king o f England could ever 
comply with such an address for it was no more than ‘offering a man money to cut off 
his nose’; however' other onlookers were less assured o f their kings conviction. Sir 
John Reresby, governor o f York and a staunch Tory to boot com plained bitterly to 
Halifax ‘that if  the king expected his friends to be hearty in his cause, and steady to his 
person, he should consider with him self and encourage them a little.’144 This 
prevailing m ood o f  uncertainty prompted Shaftesbury and the Whigs to capitalise on
141 Ibid., pp 543-4.
142 Paraphrased from the following account; Browning (ed.), Memoirs o f Sir John Reresby (Jackson, 
1936), pp 108-9. Haley, The first earl o f Shaftesbury, pp 612-3; pp 614-5.
143 Arran to Ormond, 21 Dec. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 533-4; Hutton, Charles the Second, king of 
England. Scotland and Ireland, p. 397.
14,1 Browning (ed.), Memoirs o f Sir John Reresby, p. 112; Earl of Conway to Sir George Rawdon, 5 
Feb. 1680, H, M. C., Hastings MSS. ii, p. 391; Conway reported likewise to Rawdon that Charles kept 
his thoughts secret and as such the ‘people’ were ‘mightily divided in their conjectures’ though he 
believed that Charles would comply with the Commons desire.
181
the Irish plot to highlight the dangers o f Catholicism and as such heighten pressure on 
Charles to abandon James. On 24 December, the Commons met although the Lords 
had adjourned till 3 January. Shaftesbury had seven Irish witnesses presented, 
Sampson, Murphy, Moyer, MacNamara, Burke, Comyn and James Morley. They 
petitioned the House against Sir John Davys and declaimed heavily against M ichael 
Boyle for discountenancing their discoveries. The Commons assisted Shaftesbury by 
referring the m atter to its committee o f  examinations. Arran was perturbed by these 
developments and wrote to Ormond ‘I believe they have introduced this accusation 
only to usher in one against you.’145
A rran’s prediction was corroborated by the actions o f this committee. Its 
chairman was a biased Whig, Colonel John Birch who was rumoured to have noted in 
private amongst other members that Ormond and Davys were no better than Strafford 
and Sir George Radcliff.146 To observers like Sir Francis Gwyn, it was painfully 
apparent that this committee was following a predetermined course o f  action o f  which 
the first was ‘to vindicate the reputations o f the witnesses and receive nothing that 
shall contradict them ’.147 This view is reinforced in a letter from Davys to Ormond 
wherein the writer compared the manner o f his use to that o f a chained animal 
surrounded by dogs. They
only admitted me [Davys] to speak when the witnesses would give way to 
it, and not only suffering them to say what they pleased as they saw 
occasion by way of invention and addition to their examinations before 
given in, but leading them and encouraging them to it.148
Gwyn also believed that many in the said committee were determined to throw  all the 
dirt they could gather upon the government o f  Ireland and Ormond in particular and
145 Arran to Ormond, 25 Dec. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 537.
146 Sir John Davy’s to Ormond, 1 Jan. 1681, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 542-3; C. V Wedgwood, Thomas 
Wentworth: First earl o f Strafford, 1593-1641 (London, 1961),p. 139; p. 159; p. 181; 265; p. 315; p. 
319; p. 339; p 383. Sir George Radcliffe was a key associate of Strafford during the 1630s, being his 
Secretary when he was president of die north of England and his chief Secretary in Ireland.
147 Francis Gwyn to Ormond, I Jan. 1681, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 541-2.
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‘all this in the hearing o f crowds o f  people o f all sorts that thought fit to come in, the 
doors being laid open for that purpose’.149 Finally on 1 January after being publicly 
humiliated for several days, Davys was requested to respond to the allegations lodged 
against him  to which he answered by desiring a full copy o f  the charges against him 
and sufficient time to answer them. However Birch and his colleagues neatly 
bypassed this request by proposing instead to acquaint the Comm ons with his answer.
By 4 January 1681, the Commons Committee had still made no report 
concerning Davys business though Arran believed he would alm ost certainly be 
im peached.150 The examination o f  the Irish plot was removed for the m om ent to the 
Lords where Shaftesbury had the depositions o f Maurice Fitzgerald and M urtagh 
Downey read. The lords listened in astonishment as it was revealed from Fitzgerald’s 
information that in 1676 there had been a great meeting at the hom e o f Colonel Pierce 
Lacy for the purpose o f raising 20,000 m en in M unster to aid the French upon their 
arrival. This design had been hindered by the escalation o f war on the continent when 
the Empire and Spain allied w ith the Dutch against France forcing Louis XIV to 
divert the men and arms originally intended for Ireland. However w ith the 
reestablishment o f peace in western Europe after the Treaty o f  N ijm egen in 1679, 
Louis was determined that the Irish plot be brought to fruition and towards this 
commissions had been granted to leading Irish Catholics such as the earl o f  Tyrone, 
and powder and arms landed on the County Clare side o f  the Shannon. The Lords 
were now fully convinced o f  the reality o f the plot in Ireland and despite ardent 
denials by Lacy and Sir John Fitzgerald o f the charges; they passed the following 
resolution,
148 Ibid, pp 541-2; Sir John Davys to Ormond, 1 Jan. 1681, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 542-3.
149 Ibid., pp 541-2; Ibid., pp 542-3.
150 Arran to Ormond, 4 Jan. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 544-5.
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That there now is, and for divers years last past there hath been, a horrid 
and treasonable plot and conspiracy contrived and carried on by those of 
the popish religion in Ireland, for the massacring the English, and 
subverting the Protestant religion, and the ancient established government 
of that kingdom.151
The Lords concluded by desiring the concurrence o f the Commons. Shaftesbury, or 
‘your constant friend’ as Arran ironically dubbed him, decided that this was his 
moment to hurt Ormond, and he tried to enlarge and build on this vote claiming, ‘that 
papists were better armed in Ireland than the Protestants’. It failed and Arran 
appears to have been more than suitably equipped to counter this assertion, informing
Ormond, ‘I cleared that point and satisfied the House to the contrary, which he
1 ST[Shaftesbury] made no reply to .’
This however was as far as Shaftesbury managed to proceed against Ormond, 
for after 4 January 1681, the Whigs had reason to resume their sparring with Charles 
II, as he responded to their Commons address o f 21 December with the reply ‘that he 
[Charles II] persisted in his resolution not to disturb the immediate succession to the 
crow n’.154 This decision effectively diverted attention from Davys and the Irish plot 
as the Commons sought revenge on the ‘evil’ ministers who advised the king to reject 
their motion. The circumvolutions o f three kingdoms politics had again rescued 
Ormond and on 8 January Arran informed him:
The House of Commons have voted as you see against four lords and one 
commoner, so that it will be hoped that they will let Ireland alone for a
151 Hutton, Charles the second, king o f England, Scotland and Ireland, p. 397; Haley, The first earl o f 
Shaftesbury, pp 617-8, The several informations o f John MacNamara, Maurice Fitzgerald, and James 
Nash relating to the horrid popish plot in Ireland together with the resolutions o f the Commons in 
parliament upon the said informations and message from the Lords Spiritual and Temporal in 
parliament... (London, 1681), p. 3
152 Arran to Ormond, 4 January. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 544-5.
153 Ibid, pp 544-5; John A. Lynn, The wars o f Louis XIV, 1667-1714 (London, 1999), pp 153-7; R. W. 
Blencoe (ed.), Diary o f the times o f Charles the second by Henry Sidney, afterwards earl o f Romney: 
including his correspondence with the countess o f  Sunderland and other distinguishable persons at the 
English court; to which are added letters illustrative o f the times o f James II and William III, ii, p. 38.
154 Browning (ed.), Memoirs o f Sir John Reresby, pp 112-3; H. C Foxcroft, The life and letters o f Sir 
George Savile Is' marquis o f  Halifax (2 vols, London, 1898), i, p. 268.
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while, and that Sir John Davys will be safe, they having more 
considerable work of that nature upon their hands than his.155
This was certainly the case for on 6 January, when they took into consideration the
resolution passed by the upper house regarding the Irish plot, no assault was on
Ormond, their only addition being ‘that the duke o f York being a papist and the
expectation o f his coming to the crown hath given the greatest countenance and
encouragement [ ...]  to the horrid Popish Plot in this kingdom o f England’.156
Ultimately, the tension between the court and Commons grew to such a height that
Charles was forced to prorogue parliament on 10 January. This decision was
especially welcomed by Arran as news o f Geoghegan’s arrest arrived in London later
that same day. He pointed out to Ormond, ‘I am confident they would have resolved it
a discouraging o f the king’s evidence, especially in the hum our the House o f
Commons were yesterday in .’157 Parliament however would sit no more. On 18
January Charles ordered in Council that it should be dissolved and another called for
28 M arch 1681, to convene in O xford.158
In conclusion, Ormond’s position during the second exclusion parliament was
far from straight forward. There appear to have been several clear reasons why no
serious attempt was made to remove him. First the case against him  was not strong,
resting as it did on the unsupported accusations o f  several discredited witnesses,
whose potency was largely ruined by their ineptitude before the Lords at the
beginning o f November. Thus the W higs were reduced to attacking Ormond indirectly
by vilifying the reputations o f his associates in government. In Ireland, G eoghegan’s
155 Arran to Ormond, 8 Jan. 1681, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 547-8; Hutton, Charles the Second, king of 
England, Scotland and Ireland, pp 397-8; The several informations o f John MacNamara, Maurice 
Fitzgerald, and James Nash relating to the horrid popish plot in Ireland together with the resolutions 
of the Commons in parliament upon the said informations and message from the Lords Spiritual and 
Temporal in parliament... (London, 1681), p. 3
156 Ibid., p. 15
157 Arran to Ormond, 11 Jan. 1681, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 550-1.
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mission was a complete farce and Henry Jones, despite exhaustive intrigues, was 
unable to add fresh stimulus to the plot. Though Ormond was justifiably scared o f 
even the m ost preposterous rumours and libels floating around London, and went to 
great lengths to constantly re-emphasise his loyalty to the Protestant interest, he was 
far from impressed in January when he received a genuine copy o f  the articles drawn 
up against him, informing Arran, I ‘am o f your opinion that they will be better 
polished and put into method before they can with credit to the composers be made 
use of.’159
The second reason was O rm ond’s actions in Ireland before and during the plot. 
He was painfully aware o f  the trouble figures like Jones and Orrery had previously 
occasioned him and as such took immediate steps when allegations o f conspiracies 
and plots arose, so much so that he was able to point to them as clear proof o f his 
loyalty to the Protestant religion:
That I have Catholic relations is no more my fault that it was the first 
reformers that they had so, and 1 suppose that the vote that there has been 
and is still a horrid popish plot on foot is so resolved from the 
examinations and witnesses I sent over.
The decision to dispatch Arran to London was prudent and significant for not only
did he mobilise O rm ond’s supporters to telling effect, his understanding o f the Irish
kingdom plus his sheer presence intimidated his father’s enemies. Or as Longford put
it on 6 November 1680 ‘for since he [Arran] took his place in the House o f  Lords
there has not been one public flirt at your grace, whereas before it was every day’s
entertainm ent.’161 Finally Ormond had studiously refrained from alienating in any
way im portant Anglo-Irish notables like Burlington and Conway. In the case o f the
latter, he acquiesced to a request that he had formerly refused to both Granard and
158 Burnet, History o f my own time, ii, pp 865-6; ‘it was said [at court], men were now very bold about 
London, by their confidence in the Juries that the Sheriffs took care to return’.
159 Ormond to Arran, 9 Jan. 1681, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 548-9.
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Arran that one o f  his supporters, Sir George Rawdon, could devolve his troop to his 
son.162
Ormond was also saved by the timely eruption o f  the issue o f exclusion, which 
diverted attention away from the plot in Ireland, and in light o f the Commons 
obstinacy finally impelled Charles II to dissolve parliament. However after the 
complete breakdown in the relationship between the crown and the House o f 
Commons in early January 1681, coupled with the deepening atmosphere o f  anti 
Catholicism, the Commons became increasingly irrational in its actions as can be seen 
in regard to the proceedings against Davys. On 18 December, Davys had appeared 
before the English Privy Council who declared they were fully satisfied with his 
investigation o f the plot in Ireland and as such, he had undertaken a very unnecessary 
journey but in front o f  the Commons committee in January, he was publicly 
humiliated and only narrowly escaped impeachment. They were likewise ready to 
disregard Ormond’s endeavours to protect the Protestant interest and an address was 
readied against him (once they had seen to the duke o f York) ‘for not being vigorous 
enough against the papists occasioned by the many relations you [Ormond] have 
amongst them ’.163 They were only willing to proceed this far and no further for as 
Arran gleefully informed him on 11 January, ‘none o f  the sober men will allow o f any 
article o f  your being either a papist or in the plot.’164
Ormond failed to empathise with Arran’s delight. In his mind, an address was 
far worse than any impeachment, as ‘being commonly in general terms it affords no
160 Ormond to Arran, 18 Jan. 1681, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 557-8.
161 Earl of Longford, 6 Nov. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 479-51.
162 Arran to Ormond, 25 Dec. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 537.
163 Sir John Davys to Ormond, 18 Dec. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 526-7; Arran to Ormond, 11 Jan. 
1681, Ormonde, MSS, v, pp 550-1.
164 Ibid., pp 550-1.
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means o f vindication’.165 The question now remains what if  parliam ent had not been 
dissolved before an address or articles o f impeachment were passed against Ormond 
in the Commons. It is certain that any attack on Ormond would have been eventually 
defeated in the Lords, for on 7 January they granted bail to Sir W illiam Scroggs, Lord 
C hief Justice o f England, though he had been impeached before the lower house for 
treason.166 Furthermore it appears from Arran’s letter o f 22 January that during his 
private meeting with the king on 30 October 1680, the latter guaranteed that he was 
resolved under no circumstances to remove Ormond from his station and to protect 
his interests in London, ‘his majesty [...] continues the same commands to you as he 
gave me for you at my first coming hither, and sent your grace since by my lord 
Longford.’167 He may possibly have honoured this, but on the other hand, in 
contemporary terms Charles II was a master o f real politic. After the rejection o f  the 
exclusion bill, he attempted to win over many o f  the opposition, thereby obtaining the 
parliamentary subsidies he badly needed, by permitting the execution o f  W illiam 
Howard, Lord Stafford, who he knew to be innocent o f charges alleged against him 
and to the dismay o f the duke o f York declaring through Halifax that he would listen 
to alternatives to exclusion.168 In addition after the dissolution o f what is now  called 
‘the Second Exclusion parliam ent’, Halifax, who is generally believed to have been 
Charles II’s key minister during this crisis period, complained to Reresby, ‘that while 
he [Charles II] seemed perfectly to approve o f the Council you gave him, he
165 Ormond to Arran, 18 Jan. 1681, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 557-8.
166 Sir John Davys to Ormond, 8 Jan. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 546-7; Haley, The first earl o f 
Shaftesbury, p. 617.
167 Arran to Ormond, 22 Jan. 1681, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 559.
I<,s Miller, Charles II, pp 338-9; Hutton, Charles the Second, king o f England, Scotland and Ireland, pp 
396-7; Anon, The trial o f  William Stafford for high treason, in conspiring the death o f the king, the 
extirpation o f the Protestant religion, the subversion o f the government, and introduction ofpopery 
into this realm, upon an impeachment by the knights, citizens and burgesses in parliament assembled, 
in the name o f themselves and all the commons o f England: begun in Westminster-Hall the 30"' day o f  
November I6S0, and continued until the 7,h ofDecember following, on which day judgement o f high
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hearkened to others from a back door, which made him wavering o f mind and slow to 
resolve’.169 Ormond may have had a narrow escape from the tender mercies o f 
Charles’s loyalty.
treason was given upon him. With the manner o f his execution on the 29'h o f the same month (London,
1681).
l69Browning (ed.), Memoirs o f Sir John Reresby, pp 112-3.
CHAPTER FIVE
ROYALIST RESURGENCE AND REACTION, 1681-82
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This chapter examines how O rm ond’s position, undermined by the Popish Plot, 
the Whigs in London and those disaffected to his government in Ireland, was finally 
re-established during 1681-82. The dissolution o f  the Second Exclusion Parliam ent 
was followed by a new departure in royal policy whereby Charles showed his 
stubbornness over the issue o f exclusion by sanctioning a clear out from  court and 
Council o f  all who supported it. Such alterations did not faze the W higs, however, as 
Charles II’s financial worries were so pressing that they believed he could not subsist 
much longer w ithout a parliamentary grant. In the weeks and months before the 
Oxford parliament the W higs exerted huge pressure on him  to abandon his brother, by 
utilising what can best be described as ‘populist politics’. These endeavours also 
extended to Ireland, and soon London was full o f the m ost dreadful rum ours and 
pamphlets concerning the Protestant interest there. The apparent strength o f the W higs 
in England and the expectation that the duke o f  York would inevitably be deprived o f 
the throne and his supporters, including Ormond, removed from office encouraged 
many disaffected in Ireland to come out o f  the woodwork. As Burnet said during 
these times ‘the scent o f preferment will draw aspiring men after it’.1 However, when 
the Oxford parliament convened, no attacks were made upon Ormond. Again this was 
because o f  a mixture o f  good fortune and political skills. This chapter will examine 
these factors in detail. In the wake o f the Oxford parliament, the W hig cam paign was 
halted and quickly supplanted by a Tory reaction both in Ireland and England. Added 
to this the Irish plot was discredited by infighting amongst the witnesses and many 
quickly turned against Shaftesbury’s henchman, Hetherington, as they recognized that 
the political tide was fast turning against the Whigs. In light o f  these developments, 
Ormond avoided all contentious issues. He made no attempt to ascertain Oliver
1 Gilbert Burnet, History o f my own time (6 vols, London, 1823), ii, p. 873.
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Plunkett’s innocence and failed to reply to libellous allegations made by Arthur 
Annesley, earl o f Anglesey, regarding O rm ond’s conduct during the 1640s lest they 
resuscitate the dying plot or bring him once more into the political spotlight. In the 
long term  this was a prudent policy for Plunkett’s death officially brought the Popish 
Plot to a close because Charles II used the case o f another Irishman, Edward 
Fitzharris, to make it clear that there would be no more pardons for treason or 
concealing treason. Shaftesbury’s involvement w ith the Irish witnesses now  turned 
out to be a double-edged weapon as the Tories manipulated them  in order to destroy 
him and his allies. Ultimately, denied access to parliament, their main instrum ent o f 
power for bringing about the change they desired, they disintegrated as a political 
force. Amidst this atmosphere, Ormond finally was able to exert his authority over 
those who had circumvented his position and powers as lord lieutenant, in concert 
with his enemies in London. Ormond also had the privilege o f playing some part in 
the final coup de grace dealt to the Whigs when the offices o f sheriff and lord mayor 
o f London, which had sustained their assaults on the prerogatives o f  the crown, 
passed into Tory hands in the summer o f 1682.
The dissolution o f  the Second Exclusion Parliament was followed by a new 
departure in crown policy. Since April 1679 Charles had endeavoured to placate 
moderate W higs and as such ingratiate him self with the Commons; he now  showed 
his stubbornness over the issue o f exclusion by sanctioning a clearout o f  those who 
had voted for it. This immediately strengthened Ormond’s position. The schemes o f 
the duchess o f Portsmouth were halted and what political credit she had with the 
Whigs was exhausted by her failure to persuade Charles to abandon his brother. 
Sunderland who had been a thorn in O rm ond’s side as Secretary o f State lost his post 
and was, along w ith Essex, Sir W illiam Temple and the earl o f  Salisbury, removed
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from Council.2 Many who were amenable to Ormond filled the vacuum. Hyde was 
now the dominant personality at court, and Sunderland’s replacement, Conway, was 
no doubt grateful to Ormond for his many favours over the previous months. On 29 
January Arran informed Ormond that ‘he [Conway] professes the greatest kindness 
imaginable to your Grace [Ormond] and m yself [Arran]’.3 Conway also endeavoured 
to improve O rm ond’s position w ith others now entrusted w ith the running o f  public 
affairs especially his cousin Edward Seymour. He desired Arran to tell his father that 
‘M r Seymour will serve you faithfully in anything that concerns you or the affairs o f 
that kingdom if  you think fit to acquaint him  with them ’.4 Lionel Jenkins was 
promoted to the post o f senior Secretary o f State and like Sunderland’s predecessor, 
Henry Coventry; he was a staunch alley o f Ormond. Ormond immediately wrote to 
Jenkins to express his satisfaction ‘at his remove to a station that gives him  title to the 
despatches sent thither and to the advertisements from thence.’5 Ormond received a 
further boost when Charles and the English Board acquiesced to O rm ond’s suggestion 
that the controversial former English Secretary o f State, Sir Joseph W illiamson, be 
sworn an Irish Privy Councillor.6
Such alterations overshadowed the fact that the real danger to Ormond lay 
outside court and Council which by this stage were packed with innocuous Tories and 
all sorts o f  pliable journeymen. Charles’s action had effectively alienated a large 
segment o f the political nation forcing them into the arms o f  the Whigs. On 12 
Februaiy, Jenkins wrote to Ormond, ‘the elections are generally the same that they
2 Arran to Ormond, 22 Jan. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 557; H. C. Foxcroft, The life and letters o f Sir 
George Savile, T' Marques o f Halifax, (2 vols, London, 1898), i, p. 278.
3 John Miller, Charles //(London, 1991), p. 341; K. H. D, Haley, The first earl o f Shaftesbury 
(London, 1968), pp 620-2; Arran to Ormond, 25 Jan. 1681, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 563-4; Arran to 
Ormond, 29 Jan. 1681, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 565-6.
4 Arran to Ormond, 1 Feb. 1681, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 569; Earl of Conway to Ormond, 9 Nov. 1680, 
Ormonde MSS, v, pp 485.
5 Ormond to Leoline Jenkins, 11 Feb 1681, Cal. S. P. dom., 1680-81, pp 162-3.
6 Arran to Ormond, 22 Jan. 1681, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 559.
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were last parliament; where they have changed ’tis for the w orse’.7 In light o f Sir John 
Davys previous mistreatment, Ormond knew exactly what to expect from such a 
parliament and he commanded Arran to attend otherwise
whatever my lord of Shaftsbury shall say in the House [of Lords] 
touching Ireland upon the falsest information will pass for current truth, 
and hasty resolves may be made upon it such as may be of considerable 
prejudice to the kings service, if my reputation or continuance in this 
government be of any importance to it.8
To emphasise and gain support for the exclusion o f James, duke o f  York, the W higs 
made effective use o f  what John M iller terms ‘populist tactics’, the press, mass 
petitions and addresses o f instruction to M embers o f Parliament from W hig counties 
and boroughs.9 They also did not fail to neglect the potential o f Ireland as a fertile 
breeding ground for generating anti-Catholic hysteria.
The Whig press in England was flooded with reports o f  unrest and invasion in 
Ireland, Jenkins him self heard o f a report from Bristol that the French had been on the 
Irish coast at Youghal.10 On 5 February, a certain A. Stephens w rote to her cousin, 
Abigail Harley, at Brampton, ‘a world o f  news is daily cried about Ireland. Indeed 
they are under deadly apprehension, there being so great a party o f  papists.’11 There 
were other reports o f two companies drilling near Lord Clanrickarde’s hom e and o f a 
Catholic regim ent near Cullen on the road to Lim erick.12 In Ireland, Ormond 
perceived that such stories were sent out o f England ‘to fill sheets o f printed papers 
and the peoples heads with woeful apprehensions’, whilst Jenkins traced the root o f
7 Leoline Jenkins to Ormond, 12 Feb. 1681, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 579; Miller, Charles II, p. 343.
8 Ormond to Arran, 25 Jan. 1681, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 559-60.
9 Miller, Charles II, pp 342-3; Haley, The first earl o f Shaftesbury, pp 626-7.
10 Leoline Jenkins to Ormond, 5 Feb. 1681, Cal. S. P. dom., 1680-81, p. 155.
11 [A. Stephens] to her cousin, Abigail Harley, at Brampton, 5 Feb. 1681, H. M. C Portland MSS, iii, p. 
368.
12 Cal. S. P. dom., 1680-81, preface. James Carroll, A narrative of the popish plot in 
Ireland... discovered by me James Carroll in the year 1672. With an account o f my sufferings for 
discovering the same (Dublin, 1681).
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the problem to the Boyle family and their adherents.13 It is clear that correspondence 
between Orrery’s grandson, Captain Hem y Boyle, and Burlington got into print 
making it appear in London that the English in M unster were in great apprehension 
and desperately in want o f pow der.14 These fractious times bred even more direct 
attacks on Ormond not least because o f a letter recently published by Arthur 
Annesley, earl o f Anglesey, regarding the memoirs o f James Touchet, earl o f 
Castlehaven, which concerned Ormond in so much as his religion was brought into 
question.15 The French sympathies o f many o f his kin were also highlighted to his 
detriment, Arran informing him that ‘so many o f your nephews and near relations 
going for France at this time makes a great noise with us here’.16
By far the most scandalous pam phlet circulating around London wherein 
Ormond was concerned was Ireland's sad lamentation. Its anonymous author claimed 
to be a person o f honour and quality representing the Protestants o f Ireland who lived 
in a condition o f the greatest trepidation whilst Ormond remained as viceroy. To 
testify to this, the writer put forward several remarkable passages whereupon he 
desired his readers to be impartial judges. He claimed that Ormond toured the country 
in 1677 attended mostly by Catholic gentry at the same time as the Popish Plot was 
being planned. In 1679, when the Catholics assaulted Sir John Totty, a Dublin 
magistrate who mocked their religion during the demolition o f a M ass house, little 
notice was taken o f it at Dublin Castle, ‘than a sport to laugh at, how the poor
13 Ormond to Leoline Jenkins, 5 Feb. 1681, Cal. S. P. dom., 1680-81, p. 176; Leoline Jenkins to 
Ormond, 1 Mar. 1681, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 594-5.
11 Ibid., p. 176; Ibid., pp 594-5.
13 Arthur Annesley, earl of Anglesey, A letter from a person o f honour in the country written to the 
Earl o f Castlehaven ¿\ :ng observations and reflections upon his lordships memoirs concerning the 
wars o f Ireland (London, 1681 ); James Touchet, earl of Castlehaven, The memoirs of.James Lord 
Audley earl o f Castlehaven, his engagement and carriage in the wars o f Ireland, from the year 1642 to 
the year 1651 (London, 1680).
16 Arran to Ormond, 19 Feb. 1681, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 586-7.
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catchpole was served in his kind.’17 Colonel Richard Talbot had only been 
apprehended because he was dining at O rm ond’s table when the orders for his arrest 
arrived from England and when he secured his liberty upon surety, Arran was his bail. 
Furthermore he charged that O rm ond’s profession o f zeal in the wake o f  Titus O ates’s 
revelations was insincere for the m ilitia in Dublin were unable to arrest many Catholic
clergy who produced protections signed either by him or Colonel John Fitzpatrick;
• 18 instead their officers were reprimanded by Ormond for displaying too much zeal.
When the earl o f Tyrone was acquitted o f treason by a W aterford ju iy  in M arch 1679,
after his accuser Hubert Burke fled the county, Ormond would not suffer any m an to
say in his presence ‘that there was any such thing then on foot, or lately designed, as a
plot to invade this kingdom, extirpate the Protestant religion, and subvert the
government thereof.’19 Finally Orm ond’s inclinations were also visible in A rran’s
actions in London, ‘basely pledging his honour to acquit that most culpable and
undeniable traitor [Stafford]’.20 The author concluded by leaving readers in no doubts
o f O rm ond’s true character and the remedy that was required,
By this you may see the tender care that hath been taken of us; what 
strength the Protestants can have in a conscientious war, I mean, against 
the papist or foreign enemies; when we can judge no less but our leader is 
opposite; when we cannot enjoy the presence of our dread sovereign to 
awe those rebels who daily combine against us. We want an Essex again 
[...] I must tell you again, we want an Essex, a Shaftesbury, that is to say, 
a good and zealous Protestant that will stand up for us in this time of 
eminent and scarcely-to-be avoided danger.21
These fractious times encouraged many others throughout Ireland to 
demonstrate their zeal for the Protestant interest. In M unster, Daniel O ’Brien, 
Viscount Clare, had been endeavouring since December 1680 to endear him self to the
17 Anom, Irelands sad lamentation: some remarkable passages, which have happened since the 
discovery o f the horrid popish plot. In a letter from a person o f honour to his friend in London, upon 
the dissolution o f the late parliament (London, 1681) p 2; Sir Robert Southwell to Ormond, 3 May. 
1679, Ormonde MSS, iv, pp 508-9.
18 Ibid., p. 2.
19 Ibid., p. 2.
20 Ibid., p. 2.
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Whigs by sending letters to England accusing Arlington o f  stifling and punishing 
many like him self who were prepared to discover Catholic treasons in 1671. Ormond 
was perfectly aware o f these intrigues, writing to Conway on 20 February 1681, ‘I am 
persuaded he proceeds not at this time without direction out o f  England, from whence 
I conclude it is intended that some use shall be made o f him  and his letters in a fit 
conjuncture.’22 On 1 M arch however, O ’Brien caught Ormond o ff guard by directly 
importing a W hig tactic. He promoted a petition before the grand jury  o f Clare at the 
spring assizes in 1681 for parliament to sit in England. The contents o f this petition 
were highly contentious being nothing more than a direct condem nation o f  the king’s 
government in Ireland:
That whilst there is not a parliament sitting in England it cannot be 
expected any great discoveries can be made of the popish horrid plot, 
which v/as to destroy his majesty and all his majesty’s subjects of this 
kingdom as well as in England; the papists having taken an opinion (how 
unjustly so ever it is) that they are favoured, and that what orders or 
proclamations are issued to suppress popery are but a matter of form not 
to be executed, as the world has seen hitherto, and as if magistrates were 
likewise of their opinion, for who will be forward to punish those he 
thinks are favoured or who will leave a party he believes will govern.23
The M unster circuit began with County Clare and it was O ’Brien’s intention to
initiate similar petitions throughout the province. Towards this purpose he had copies
dispersed throughout the neighbouring counties, writing to Essex at this time ‘I
presume all the other counties will do the like’.24 This would have put Ormond in a
very difficult situation, forced to choose between presenting a petition libellous to
him self and the crown or rejecting it, thereby drawing the attacks o f  the W higs upon
him in parliament.
21 Ibid., p. 2.
22 Sir Robert Walsh to Henry Gasgoigne, 22 Jan. 1681, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 564-5; Walsh Informed 
Gascoigne, Ormond’s secretary that he had come across letters in England written by the Daniel 
O’Brien to Shaftesbury wherein he declared some things as being ‘plottish’. Ormond to Earl of 
Conway, 20 Feb. 1681, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 587-8
23 Petition of the grand Jury of Clare to lord lieutenant, 1 Mar. 1681, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 393-4;
2,1 Lord Clare to the Earl of Essex, 7 Mar, 1681, Cal. S. P. dom., 1680-81, pp 201-2; John Roan, Bishop 
of Killaloe, to Primate Boyle, 10 Mar. 1681, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 606-8
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In Ulster, John Skeffington, Viscount Massereene, returned after the dissolution 
o f the Second Exclusion Parliament and communicated inform ation to Ormond that 
prior to his return he had freely discoursed around London. This was that many 
Roman Catholics had lately crept into the army o f Ireland, particularly those who had 
been recalled from French service in 1678. He advised Ormond to appoint persons in 
every county and garrison to make inquiry and punish those who gave grounds for
suspicion. In the light o f Clare’s intrigues, Ormond was im mediately suspicious o f
M assereene’s proceedings and intimated to Arran:
you will judge by the copy I send you of my lord Massereene’s letter to
me that it is intended to proceed in aspersing the army here as if it
received many papists, but I hope the time will come when general and
25false reflections will not take place.
Ormond had been through such conditions before and took the requisite 
measures to batten down the hatches lest he go under before the oncoming tempest 
that was parliament. He took great care to refute Burlington’s revelations because he 
was the main focal point between Ireland and the rumour m ill in London. He sent 
Arran a list o f what arms and am munition had been lodged in M unster since 1679 
with the following observation:
I confess I wonder how my lord Burlington thinks it in his interest to 
procure and spread abroad such hot and incredible alarms out of Munster, 
and in the meantime is so ill informed as that the English in those parts 
cannot furnish themselves with ammunition, for so his intimation implies, 
or it can signify nothing, when it is well known to his brother [Viscount 
Shannon] that the enclosed proportions have been at Cork above a year 
and a half.26
Orm ond’s direct correspondence with Captain Henry Boyle, the main source o f 
Burlington’s gossip proved fruitful as he backtracked and now  corroborated the 
information sent to Arran. He reassured Ormond that
there is a report as if complaints should be sent out of this country by 
letters for England setting forth that the militia of this country had been
25 Viscount Massereene to Onnond, 2 Feb. 1681, Ormonde MSS, v, p 570; Ormond to Arran, 7 Feb. 
1681, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 573.
26 Ormond to Arran, 19 Feb. 1681, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 586.
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denied necessaries for their money [■..] they must be very ignorant of the 
condition of this country that do not know arms, etc., have been lodged at 
Cork for the militia to buy them at certain rates.27
Captain John Ffolliot, who had been ordered by Ormond to investigate the ram pant 
reports o f invasion and rebellion in M unster found the people there living under great
9 c
apprehensions for no other reasons ‘but by what they hear from England’. The only 
possible way o f alleviating their fears was by properly instituting the militia, but this 
was impossible as the M unster ‘grandees’ refused to allow the Comm issioners o f  
Array to raise money fearing their intentions would be misconstrued by the W higs in
9QLondon.
Burlington was annoyed by Orm ond’s counter claims and sought out Arran 
being ‘much concerned at the report that he should have said the m ilitia could not be 
furnished with powder and arm s’.30 The respite, however, was only temporary for 
Burlington, like all the Boyles residing in London, was also in a difficult position, in 
constant receipt o f letters from relatives and supporters in M unster which completely 
contradicted what Arran and the rest o f Ormond’s other supporters professed. On 12 
M arch 1681 more alarming news from M unster shook London, the Irish rebellion had 
started, the castle o f Dunmanway had been taken by force and the Irish were 
gathering in a great body.31 There was very little that Ormond could do but refute 
these reports which like previous ones would once again be used during another 
period o f anti-Catholicism. He did encourage Jenkins to take action against the 
libellers and rumour mongers commenting in regard to one such rumour, ‘if  possible,
27 Captain Henry Boyle to Ormond, 1 Mar. 1681, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 595-6.
28 Ormond to Arran, 12 Mar. 1681, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 608-9; Captain Henry Boyle to Primate Boyle, 
8 Mar. 1681, Ormonae MSS, v, p. 600; Capt. Jo. Ffoiliott to Ormond, 6 Mar. 1681, Ormonde MSS, v,
pp 601-2.
29 Ibid., pp 601-2; Francis Gwyn 12 Feb. 1681, Ormonde MSS, pp 579-80; The raising of money with 
intent to levy war was later to be deemed in the case of Oliver Plunkett an overt act of treason within 
the Statuate of Edward the third; Henry Boyle himself informed Ormond on 1 March that the 
Commissioners of Array had met on many occasions to decide whether they needed an Act of 
Parliament before they could levy money to improve the militia..
30 Arran to Ormond, 22 Mar. 1681, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 616-7.
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it were good the writer o f  that letter from whence were known or the forger o f  it on 
that side’.32 Ormond would also have been consoled by A rran’s patronage and 
intrigues among many o f London’s popular news-book printers:
if you [Ormond] have a mind at any time to have any letter put out here in
print relating to Ireland or yourself I [Arran] can get it put into one of
those news books by the favour of an active justice of the peace here who
is very much your friend; but he has a handsome youth for a son, which
• 33son he expects some employment for in Ireland.
Ormond was determined not to be found wanting by various recalcitrant lords in 
Ireland. He was livid with M assereene’s interference in his affairs especially as his 
advice, when joined with other factors, pointed to ulterior motives. He informed him 
on 5 February that his advice would have been more useful if  he had named his source 
and likewise instanced some Catholic soldiers and officers who had lately been 
accepted into the army, otherwise he would not have com municated such a report but 
looked upon it as a slander cast against the army and his government. Ormond pointed 
out to Massereene that his government had encouraged the discovery o f  disaffected 
religious in the civil and military establishment through various mechanisms such as 
proclamations, specific orders to the Commissioners o f M uster and m ost importantly 
the administering o f the Oath o f Supremacy and the sacrament according to the 
Anglican rite. Ormond later wrote to Arran that he had contemplated questioning 
M assereene’s position in relation to the last two as he was a well known Presbyterian, 
stating ‘if  they [Catholics] take them and frequent church service it is more than my 
Lord M assereene’s neighbours, pastors or family do’.34 He decided against this, as 
‘recrimination is seldom a convincing defence’. At the same time, he suggested to
31 Arran to Ormond, 12 Mar. 1681, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 609.
j2 Ormond to Lionel Jenkins, 7 Feb. 1680, Cal. S. P. dom., 1679-80, p. 176.
3j Arran to Ormond, 7 Feb. 1681, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 573-4.
34 Ormond to Arran, 7 Feb. 1681, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 573.
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Arran ‘if  the matter o f his letter shall be spread there, possibly my return ought to 
counter it in as many places as may be.’
Ormond’s decision to forestall aggressive action against M assereene was 
extremely prudent as after further correspondence it became clear that M assereene 
had no wicked designs. Ormond took steps to appease him by removing the soldier in 
question and impressing upon Massereene his duty as an Irish Privy Councillor by 
making the m ilitia in his area ready and accepting none that had not taken the 
requisite oaths, though Ormond knew the majority o f officers would more than likely 
be Presbyterians. He informed Massereene that he would have his work cut out for 
him for if  ‘Jesuits can get into pulpits in meeting houses and conventicles [ ...]  it may 
be as easy for popish lay soldiers to get into armies if  great care be not taken to 
prevent it’.36 At the same time, Ormond privately believed that M assereene had 
highlighted an embarrassing problem that could very well be used against him  in the 
upcoming parliament. On 1 M arch 1681, he informed Arran that after a preliminary 
investigation it had been found that many o f the foot soldiers in the Irish army had 
Catholic wives. Ormond defended him self by stating that the problem was not unique 
to his tenure as viceroy, a statement which contradicted the original purpose o f  a 
preliminary investigation if  he was already aware o f  these discrepancies in the army. 
During M arch Ormond set to work on reinforcing his position in regard to this defect, 
which he had hitherto ignored lest it be used against him in  parliament by having an 
account prepared o f  the numbers o f soldiers throughout Ireland with Catholic wives. 
On 8 March, Captain Thomas Bridges, captain o f  a foot company in the county o f  
Antrim, was cashiered out o f  the army for swindling his m en out o f  large sums o f 
money and forging certificates that many o f  them had received the sacrament
35 Ormond to Viscount Massereene, 5 Feb. 1681, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 571-2; Ibid., p. 573.
36 Ormond to Viscount Massereene, 15 Feb. 1681, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 583-4.
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according to the ‘discipline o f the Church o f  Ireland’. Furthermore on 23 March, 
Ormond issued new orders to the M uster M aster-General o f the Irish army whereby 
the sixty-fifth article o f the laws and ordinances o f war dealing w ith the exclusion o f  
disaffected from the military was altered and improved to m eet its purpose.
On the other hand, Ormond had concrete proof o f Viscount C lare’s 
waywardness as several o f his letters to Shaftesbury had been intercepted in January 
1681. Therefore even before he presented the County Clare petition, steps had been 
taken to undermine O ’Brien’s reputation. In his letters, Ormond depicted O ’Brien as a 
desperate and opportunistic individual ‘prepared for any change that he hopes to mend 
his condition by’.40 This was why he was m asquerading as a zealous Protestant, 
whereas Ormond was painfully aware o f his true character stating to Arran;
that sinc^ he became a Protestant he made his wife a papist and left her in 
a nunnery in France, that he had been in Spain and there went to mass, 
that his son is or was a page to the French king, with whom he treated 
with when he was in the Prince of Orange’s service, and shamed me 
[Onnond] that recommended him.41
Despite this attention, Ormond was taken aback and shaken at the news o f O ’B rien’s 
petition. ‘The petitions are not so come to me as that I need to take any notice o f 
them, but when they do I shall not know what to say to them .’42 This indecision was 
clearly induced by the times as Ormond stated that he knew ‘what should be said and 
done but cannot judge the season’.43 Ormond therefore took steps to insulate him self 
with the safeguard o f  the king’s directions, desiring Conway ‘how  to carry m yself 
upon so surprising an occasion I am to seek.’44 Arran was also commanded to impart
j7 Ormond to Arran, 1 March. 1681, Ormonde MSS, v. pp 592-3.
38 Sir William King to William Ellis, 15 Mar. 16 8 1, Ormonde MSS, v, p.  613; Sentence of Court 
Marshal upon Captain Thomas Bridges, 8 Mar. 1681, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 604-5.
39 Lord Lieutenant to the Muster Master-General, 23 Mar. 1681, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 221.
40 Ormond to Earl of Conway, 20 Feb. 1681, Ormonde MSS, vi, pp 587-8.
41 Ormond to Earl of Conway, 19 Feb. 1681, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 586; Ormond to Arran, 11 Feb. 1681,
Ormonde MSS, v, pp 576-8.
42 Ormond to Arran, 12 Mar. 1681, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 608-9.
43 Ibid., pp 608-9.
44 Ormond to Earl of Conway, 12 Mar. 1681, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 609-10.
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all the information he possessed regarding Daniel O ’Brien to Conway, and over the 
following days Ormond added more incriminating evidence to the list. He informed 
Conway on 14 M arch that the real purpose o f  O ’Brien’s petition was to divide 
Protestants to the advantage o f  Catholics as he had good reason to suspect him  o f 
holding correspondence with Bishop John M aloney o f  Limerick who had been 
implicated in the plot by Maurice Fitzgerald and other witnesses from M unster.45
Ormond was saved from the agony o f this position by factors over which he had 
no direct control. The judge who had received the address, C hief Baron Hene, kept it 
till the M unster assizes were concluded, by which time the Oxford parliam ent had 
been dissolved.46 In County Clare, various figures reasserted their authority over its 
jury and, although they could not force a retraction o f the first petition, they had a 
second short and more dutiful petition drawn up and endorsed. The other counties o f  
Munster did not follow the example o f  county Clare. O ’Brien put it down to the 
actions o f Protestants like Donough O ’Brien and Mr. Turner, the Recorder o f  
Limerick, who along with John Roan, bishop o f Killaloe, the archbishop o f  Tuam, 
Lord Chief Justice Sir W illiam Davys, and others frightened the jury by telling them  it 
was unlawful for them to petition. The danger had fizzled out as quickly as it arose. 
At the same time, Charles had acted decisively in supporting his lord lieutenant, 
commanding on 22 M arch that Daniel O ’Brien ‘be put out o f the Comm ission o f  the 
Peace and out o f the militia, and out o f  all other employments whatsoever, by order o f  
the Council Board in Ireland’.47
45 Ibid., pp 608-9; John Roan, Bishop of Killaloe, to Primate Boyle, 10 Mar. 1681, Ormonde MSS, v, 
pp 606-8; Ormond to Earl of Conway, 14 Mar. 1681, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 611-12.
46 Ormond to Earl of Conway, 12 Mar. 1681, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 609-10
47 Lord Clare to the Earl of Essex, 7 Mar. 1681, Cal. S. P. dom., 1680-81, pp 201-2; John Roan, Bishop 
of Killaloe to Primate Boyle, 10 Mar. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 606-7; Earl of Conway to Ormond,
25 Mar. 1681, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 1-2.
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W hen the Oxford parliament met at the end o f  March, no attacks materialised 
against Ormond. To discover the reason for this, his position in relation to the Irish 
plot at the beginning o f 1681 needs to be examined. By the end o f  the Second 
Exclusion Parliament many o f the Irish witnesses had become discredited by their 
incompetence, and infighting amongst them  soon escalated into a bitter quarrel
« 4-8between David Fitzgerald and W illiam Hetherington. On 4 February 1681, matters 
came to a head when Hetherington presented ten articles o f m isdem eanour to the 
English Board against Fitzgerald accusing him  o f stifling the witnesses against the 
queen, Ormond and Davys in return for £100 from Ormond, £500 from the king, a 
commission to be a captain and a grant o f  the commons o f  Rathkeale and Knock- 
Greary in the county o f Limerick.49 In an attempt to substantiate these claims 
Hetherington instanced Fitzgerald’s failure to accuse Colonel John Fitzpatrick and 
others o f being concerned in the plot before the Lords on 6 Novem ber and later in his 
printed narrative though he had previously submitted evidence to this effect before the 
Committee o f  the I ords examining the plot.50
From the onset o f this dispute in January, Arran and Jenkins had actively 
supported Fitzgerald against Shaftesbury’s henchman, Hetherington. On 15 January 
1681, Arran informed Ormond,
Hetherington and David Fitzgerald are at open wars before the board, and 
1 take part as much as 1 do appear with the latter, whom 1 am sorry has not 
all the proofs against that fellow he might be furnished with on that 
side.51
4S Arran to Ormond, 28 Dec. 1680, Ormonde MSS, pp 537-8; Sir John Davys to Ormond, 8 Jan. 1680,
Ormonde MSS, v, pp 546-7; Sir Francis Gwyn to Ormond, 29 Jan. 1681, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 566-7.
Fitzgerald was certain./ an ardent champion of Ormond’s cause for he was involved in several fracas
with Oates, lngoldsby and others on his behalf; newsletter to Roger Gastrell, Newcastle, 29 Jan. 1681, 
Cal. S. P. dom., 1680-SI, pp 150-1.
49 Anon, A true and brief account o f the proceedings between Mr. David Fitzgerald and William 
Hetherington before his majesty in council, on Friday the 1 I th o f February 1681 (London, 1681), pp 4- 
5.
50 Ibid., pp 4-5.
51 Arran to Ormond, 15 Jan. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 551-3.
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Ormond took the hint and on 11 February 1681, the day appointed by Council for 
Fitzgerald to respond to the charges lodged against him, Fitzgerald produced six 
articles framed by a lawyer who was well informed o f his accuser’s disreputable life 
and exploits. These articles along with the witnesses who accompanied Fitzgerald 
proved sufficient to expose Hetherington before the Council.52 It was established that 
he had pocketed large sums o f money collected around London for distribution 
amongst the Irish witnesses. Also he had endeavoured to suborn witnesses and tories 
like Redmond O ’ Hanlon to swear that the queen, duke o f York, Ormond and Michael 
Boyle were ‘all mdvy to and principally concerned in the plots in England and 
Ireland’.53 These proceedings encouraged many witnesses to abandon the self-styled 
‘manager o f the Irish evidence’. Many did not need much persuasion as the W higs had 
inadequate resources to maintain them all and Justice Edmund Warcup, the examining 
magistrate in m ost o f  their cases was now in the pay o f the crown.54 On 12 February, 
when a London Grand Jury including Sir W illiam W aller found a bill o f high treason 
against Sir John Davys, the Whigs were unable to prevail upon any witnesses to swear 
against Ormond. Instead on 26 February Sir Francis Gywn informed him  that
John Moyer, [Hugh] Duffy, and [Paul] Gormly came to the Council to 
accuse Hetherington of endeavouring to persuade them and others to 
swear against the queen, the duke and your grace [...] his majesty and the 
board inclining after the full hearing the matter to order Mr. Attorney 
General to prosecute Hetherington upon the said informations.55
The Irish witnesses were now a political liability for Shaftesbury and his allies, and as
such they refused to bring them upon the stage in Oxford lest they be used against
52 John Brady, ‘Oliver Plunkett and the popish plot’ in I. E. R., 5th ser, ixxxix (Jan-Jun 1958): xc (Jul- 
Dee 1958), p. 342.
53 Anon, A true and brief account o f the proceedings between Mr. David Fitzgerald and William 
Hetherington before his majesty in council, on Friday the II'1' o f February 1681, p, 12.
54 Arran to Ormond, 5 Feb. 1681, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 572-3; Arran informed Ormond ‘Justice 
Warcup has very friendly given me the copies of the examinations he has taken of the witnesses 
brought over by Owen Murphy’; Haley, The fu st earl o f Shaftesbury, pp 642-4. Ronald Hutton, 
Charles the Second, king o f England, Scotland and Ireland (Oxford, 1989), pp 406-7.
55 Arran to Ormond, 15 Feb. 1681, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 581-2; Newsletter to Roger Garstell, 
Newcastle, 15 Feb. 1681, Cal. S. P. dom., 1680-81, pp 169-70.
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them. Besides they had already found another mechanism to whip up anti-Catholic 
hysteria, in the person Edward Fitzharris.56
Fitzharris was an Irish Catholic employed by many about the English court as an
c n
informer. He was also on personal terms w ith Arran. A t the end o f  February 1681 he 
was caught like Thomas Dangerfield attempting to incriminate several W higs by 
planting a treasonous pamphlet called the true Englishman speaking plain English, in 
a Letter from  a friend to a friend.58 In an effort to save his own neck Fitzharris now 
claimed that he could make great discoveries o f the plot. Charles refused to pardon 
him, lodging him  instead in the Tower o f  London until he could be tried for treason.59 
The Whigs were determined to bring his fresh revelations before parliam ent by 
impeaching him once it met. They now believed that the rejuvenated plot in 
conjunction with Charles II’s financial worries would eventually force him  to abandon 
his brother. However the Whigs were grievously mistaken. By 19 M arch 1681 Charles 
had no need for parliament because he had signed a secret treaty w ith Louis XIV 
granting three m illion French livres over three years on the condition that Charles 
would summon parliament no more.60 On 28 March the Oxford parliament, or what is 
now called the Third Exclusion Parliament, was dissolved before a fresh exclusion bill 
could originate in the lower house, but not before a bill impeaching Fitzharris was
56 Hutton, Charles the Second, king o f England, Scotland and Ireland, p 400.
57 Ibid., pp 400-1; Arran to Ormond, 4 Jun. 1681, Ormonde MSS, vi, p. 74; Arran to Ormond, 5 Mar. 
1681, Ormonde MSS, vi, pp 598-9; Warrant for apprehending with his papers, Edward Fitzharris, 26 
Feb. 1681, Cal. S. P. dom., 1680-81, p. 184.
58 Edward Fitzharris, Treason in graine that most traitorous, or libel o f Fitzharris, whereby he 
designed to raise a rebellion amongst us the better to make way for a French invasion, and our utter 
destruction, as it was read in both Houses o f Parliament at Oxford, and upon which the House of 
Commons impeached him o f high treason. Falsely and maliciously called by him, the true English-man 
speaking plain English, in a letter from a friend to a friend (London, 1682).
59 Miller, Charles II, pp 343-4; Haley, The first earl o f Shaftesbury, 629-31.
60 Hutton, Charles the Second, king o f England, Scotland and Ireland, pp 338-9; Miller, Charles II, pp 
342-3; Haley, The first earl o f Shaftesbury, p. 622; John Kenyon, Stuart England (London, 1978), pp 
233-4.
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unceremoniously thrown out o f the Lords.61 On 8 April, Charles underm ined the 
already demoralised Whigs by attempting to entice those wavering amongst their 
ranks to gravitate towards his standard. He issued a proclamation stating that although 
the last three parliaments had been dissolved for ‘undutiful behaviour’, nothing could 
alter his affection for the Protestant religion as established by law nor his love o f 
parliaments.62
In Ireland despite the numerous scares and his own apprehensions in the months 
leading up to the Oxford parliament, O rm ond’s position in Ireland in regard to the plot 
had consolidated as the reaction set in. Many Protestants were repulsed by the insolent 
outrages o f rogue discoverers like Geoghegan who had beaten, plundered and 
imprisoned with unlicensed abandon. The discoverers who followed him  were no 
better. In O rm ond’s own opinion they ‘give more discredit than confirmation to the 
p lot’.63 Ormond sought to perpetuate this view, instancing to Arran a notorious Tory 
named ‘Henaghan’, who even the zealous plot hunter Orrery had sought to imprison. 
Regarding his story he sarcastically informed Arran that ‘he has put his tale as well 
together as any in this country’.64 In M unster, Viscount Shannon viewed his tale with 
scepticism, the accused ‘Dermot D onsworth’ being ‘a man o f  good means and 
reputation among the English where he lives.’65 Indeed from Shannon’s reply we can 
ascertain the distain and contempt with which the plot was now viewed. He informed 
Ormond o f  what petty vindictiveness really underlay many allegations involving the 
plot ‘for indeed swearing treason against men is now grown so com mon that many say
61 Richard, L. Greaves, Secrets o f the kingdom: British radicals from the popish plot to the revolution 
(Stanford, 1997), pp 22-3.
62 This is paraphrased from Burnet, History o f my own time, ii, p. 871.
63 Ormond to Arran, 29 Dec. 1680, Ormond MSS, v, pp 538-40; Ormond to the Earl of Arran, 25 Jan. 
1681, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 559-60.
64 Ibid., pp 559-60.
65 Ormond to Arran, 12 Mar. 1681, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 608-9.
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they dare hardly ask for their debts, or distain for their rents, for fear o f being sworn 
into the p lot.’66
Scepticism o f the plot and reaction against the W higs m anifested itself in other 
ways. In M unster, Daniel O ’Brien’s aspirations for a petition had m et widespread 
opposition and were rebuffed by local notables. On 4 M ay 1681, Richard Ryves, the 
Recorder o f  Dublin, informed Ormond o f the desire o f its citizens to make an address 
to Charles II thanking him  for his ‘gracious declaration’ upon the dissolution o f  the 
Oxford parliam ent.67 On 14 May, the corporation o f  Dublin declared the pam phlet 
Ireland’s sad lamentation to be ‘unchristian, false and scandalous’.68 O rm ond’s 
proceedings in regard to the plot were fully endorsed; furtherm ore they acknowledged 
Charles II’s wisdom in appointing him  as lord lieutenant because under his 
government ‘they have enjoyed freedom o f trade and commerce, the benefit o f the 
laws and quiet enjoyment o f their estates and fortunes.’69 By far the greatest 
encouragement which Ormond received at this time was a letter privately sent over by 
Charles on the person o f  Fitzpatrick. In it, Charles refuted court gossip by 
emphasising how important it was to the royal interest that Ormond remained in 
Ireland as viceroy,
The impertinent and groundless report being now revived again of your 
being recalled, is the pure invention of your enemies and mine; there 
never having been the least occasion given for such a report. For I assure 
you 1 value your services there too much to think of any alteration. The 
bearer Fitzpatrick, will tell you more at large, and give you a good
66 Ormond to Arran, 29 Dec. 1680, Ormond MSS, v, pp 538-40; Ormond to the Earl of Arran, 25 Jan. 
1681, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 559-60; Ibid., pp 3-4; Ormond to Secretary Jenkins, 31 Mar. 1680, Cal. S.
P. dom., 1680-81, pp 226-7.
67 Kilkenny Borough Council Archive: The White Book of Kilkenny Corporation 1656-88, fols 70v,
71, 119; it must be highlighted of course that this request on behalf of Dublin Corporation was being 
made by one of Ormond’s creatures. In a letter written from Clarendon House dated 20'1' of June 1671 
Ormond recommended to the mayor, aldermen and common council of Kilkenny that they appoint 
Richard Ryves as Recorder of the said city. This was a post which he was to retain until the 6th of May 
1680 when Ormond almost certainly had him appointed to the same position in Dublin. In 1690 Ryves 
became lord chancellor of Ireland.
68 Act of the lord mayor and corporation of Dublin, 14 May. 1681, Cal. S. P. dom., 1680-81, p. 281.
69 Ormond to Arran, 4 May. 1681, Ormonde MSS, vi, pp 57-8; Act of the lord mayor and corporation of 
Dublin, 14 May. 1681, Cai. S. P. dom., 1680-81, p. 281.
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account how all are here. And therefore I will say no more, only to assure 
you that you may be so much assured of my kindness to you, as I am of 
yours; which is all 1 can say. Charles Rex.70
It is in the light o f these developments that we can best understand O rm ond’s 
actions in the months before and after the Oxford parliament. He exerted a great deal 
o f prudence allowing matters to take their natural course and refusing to be drawn on 
contentious issues. He ordered Ryves not to bring up the issue o f  a loyal address 
without his consent because as he later pointed out to Arran ‘it cannot be expected but 
that some opposition will be given to it, and the number o f  the disaffected may be
• 71found to be greater than, whilst there is no discrimination, they are supposed to be .’ 
Arran agreed with O rm ond’s decision for there were m any ‘notable knaves’ amongst 
the citizens o f  Dublin willing to emulate the Whigs in England by prom oting counter 
petitions demanding that parliam ent should meet. Ormond first wanted to see how 
they would react to a Conventicle house set up near the Irish Council cham ber by 
W illiam Jacque, a Scottish Presbyterian minister who had been arrested for complicity 
in B lood’s plot in 1663.73
Ormond was equally cautious in regard to the revelations o f  the earl o f 
Anglesey his former partner in the govermnent o f Ireland in the 1660s. The crux o f 
their dispute revolved around the heated events o f  the 1640s and ’50s. The Popish 
Plot and the Exclusion Crisis had accentuated the tensions and divisions within the 
polity inherited by Charles II at the Restoration to such a degree that by the 1680s
7(1 Thomas Carte, An history o f the life o f James duke of Ormonde from his birth to his death in 1688, (3 
vols, London, 1736), appendix 1, letter xxii. Ormonde MSS, vi, preface ii.
71 Ormond to Arran, 4 May. 1681, Ormonde MSS, vi, pp 57-8.
11 Arran to Ormond, 14 May. 1681, Ormonde MSS, vi, p. 62; Haley, The first o f earl o f Shaftesbury, pp 
638-42; Miller, Charles II, p. 355.
73 Richard L. Greaves, God’s other children: Protestant nonconformists and the emergence o f 
denominational churches inlreland, 1660-1700 (Stanford, 1997), pp 120-1; Phil Kilroy, Protestant 
dissent and controversy in Ireland, 1660-1714 (Cork, 1994), pp 119-23; J. R. Hill, ‘Dublin corporation, 
Protestant dissent, and politics, 1660-1800’ in Kevin Herlihy (ed.), The politics o f Irish dissent (Dublin, 
1997), p. 31; Hill asserts that the partisan support which the Whigs received in the city of London 
during the exclusion crisis was not mimicked by the Corporation of Dublin largely because of the 
management skills of the adroit duke of Ormond.
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many contemporaries could not but see parallels with the British civil wars. This view 
is reinforced by the popularity o f histories o f this fractious period for instance Sir 
John Tem ple’s The Irish rebellion. W hat however prompted Anglesey as a m em ber o f 
the English Council to also regurgitate such a contentious subject in public? The 
Popish Plot had occasioned trouble for Anglesey as it was generally known in Ireland 
that he had reputation o f being sympathetic to papists because two o f his daughters 
were married to Catholics. One son-in-law was the earl o f Tyrone, accused by Burke 
and M acNamara.74 Pressure increased when he protested at the Second Exclusion 
Parliament agreeing to a bill that would have prevented Catholics from inheriting land 
and practicing ‘law, physic, or any trade’.75 He was subjected to savage abuse by the 
Lords and forced to sit down, w hilst on 26 October 1680, Dangerfield alleged before
n s
the Commons that Anglesey was also privy to the ‘Meal Tub P lo t’. On 6 November, 
Burke, M acNamara and Sampson swore ‘bloodily’ against him  especially 
M acNamara who revealed before the Lords that Anglesey had written two letters to 
the earl o f Tyrone from the duke o f York, ‘encouraging him to go on vigorously with 
the matter in hand’, and that his credit was so great among Irish Catholics ‘that they
77
prayed for him at M ass’.
Anglesey now sought to save him self by proving his zeal for the Protestant 
religion. On 15 November 1680, he voted in favour o f the exclusion o f James from 
the throne, whilst in Ireland his relatives were busily working in conjunction with 
Henry Jones to reinvigorate the plot. On 9 December, Francis Annesley told
74Michael Perceval-Maxwell, ‘The Anglesey-Ormond-Castlehaven dispute’ in Vincent P. Carey and 
Ute Lotz-Heuman (ed.), Taking Sides: colonial and confessional mentalities in early modern Ireland: 
essays in honour o f Karl S. Bottigheimer (Dublin, 2003), p. 216; Journals o f the House o f Lords, viii, 
pp 650-2.
75 — to Lord Lanesborough, 23 Oct. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 456; Earl of Longford to Ormond, 26 
Oct. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 461-2; Earl of Longford to Ormond, 6 Nov. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, 
pp 479-81.
76 Ibid., p. 456; Ibid., pp 461-2; Ibid., pp 479-81.
77 Ibid., p. 456; Ibid., pp 461-2; Ibid., pp 479-81.
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Katherine O ’Hanlon that if  her son Redmond became a discoverer o f the Irish plot ‘I 
also will improve my interest with the earl o f Anglesey and other friends there for 
their advantage.,’7>i It has also been argued by M ichael Perceval-M axwell that 
Anglesey persuaded the earl o f Castlehaven, a Catholic royalist with whom he had 
frequently corresponded regarding the 1640s, to write his memoirs so that he could
* * 79 •denounce them, and as such demonstrate his zeal for the Protestant religion. In this 
letter Anglesey not only attacked Castlehaven but also sought to ingratiate him self 
with the Whigs by providing them with ammunition to rail against the duke o f Y ork’s 
key alley, Ormond.80
Anglesey attacked the image that Ormond had cultivated o f  his actions during 
the 1640s, o f being a staunch defender o f  the Protestant religion and a loyal servant to 
the crown. He claimed that by negotiating the cessation o f  September 1643 and the 
two peace treaties o f 1646 and 1649, Ormond had strengthened the Confederates. 
W ith peace the Irish did the English more hurt ‘than ever they did or could do by open 
force after the first m assacre’, as the rebels had been w asting their stores upon 
unprofitable, fruitless marches before O rm ond’s intervention. They were saved, 
Anglesey was convinced, because Ormond ‘being related to so many o f them by 
blood and alliance’ had ‘compassionately designed’ the cessation and the peace 
treaties ‘with a great deal o f hardship and damage to the English.’82 Anglesey further 
charged that the peaces and cessations were against the law  and several acts o f 
parliament in both kingdoms, and also against the wishes o f  Protestants at the time:
it is not then to be wondered at, that the chief and most of the English 
nobility in Ireland, and the generality of English, Scotch and Irish
78 Francis Annesley to Mrs Katherine O’Hanlon, 9 Dec. 1680, Ormond MSS, v, p. 536.
79 Perceval-Maxwell, ‘The Anglesey-Ormond-Castlehaven dispute’, pp 215-6.
80 Ibid., p. 216.
81 Arthur Annesley, earl of Anglesey, A letter from a person o f honour in the country written to the earl 
o f Castlehaven being observations and reflections upon his lordships memoirs concerning the wars o f 
Ireland (London, 1681), pp 61-64.
82 Ibid., p. 66.
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Protestants of all qualities and degrees, sooner or later, opposed both the 
cessations and the peaces, as destructive to them, and derogatory to the
83crown.
Anglesey also insinuated that Ormond had deserted his Old English allies at the 
Restoration by helping him self to vast swathes o f  their land confiscated during the 
1650s.84 Finally, not content at besmirching O rm ond’s name and his actions in that 
letter, Anglesey invited Castlehaven to respond further to several queries, one o f 
which questioned O rm ond’s loyalty to the Protestant religion
One passage in your lordships memoirs I cannot but take notice of, for 
your honour, as an Englishman, that when the marquis of Ormond in his 
extremity, between the Nuncio party and the parliament of England, 
asked your lordship with which of his enemies he should treat. You 
answered that you were confident he had resolved that before, there being 
no question in the case; when it was no question with your lordship, I 
wonder how it came to be one with his lordship.85
On 19 February, Ormond received copies from Arran o f A nglesey’s 
observations. Fie misinterpreted the words o f  A rran’s letter: ‘upon the discourse I had 
with the secretaries before his majesty, your grace will, I hope, make some 
observations upon what my lord Anglesey has writ in answer to my lord Castlehaven’s 
m em oirs’, as meaning Charles II desired a response.86 However two weeks later, 
Ormond was still procrastinating stating to Arran that if  Charles II desired his letter to 
be answered, ‘it cannot be made so soon nor so short as may be thought, for I 
[Ormond] had rather say nothing to it than not enough to stop his [Anglesey’s] 
m outh.’87 Ormond had good reason for such behaviour as it was written from  London 
that ‘the lords o f xhe Cabal [Shaftesbury and his followers] say this letter [ ...]  m ust 
either do your [Ormond] work or his [Anglesey]’.88 On 8 March, Arran clarified to
83 Ibid., p. 65.
84Ibid„ pp 66-7.
85Ibid., pp 68-9.
86Arran to Ormond, 12 Feb. 1681, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 580-1; Arran to Ormond, 15 Feb. 1681, 
Ormonde MSS, v, p. 582.
87 Ormond to Arran, 1 Mar. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 592-3; Perceval-Maxwell, ‘The Anglesey- 
Ormond-Castlehaven dispute’, p. 216.
88 Ormond to Arran, 19 Feb. 1681, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 586; Arran to Ormond, 5 Mar. 1681, Ormonde 
MSS, v, pp 598-9.
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Ormond that Charles II had not read Anglesey’s letter.89 Unaware o f this Ormond was 
already at work having a narrative prepared fearing that Anglesey’s letter would be 
used against him in parliament.90 We can ascertain what Ormond intended to say from  
the contents o f a list o f ‘Q ueries’, which, though undated, were almost certainly drawn 
up in 1681. The most noteworthy o f these was that Anglesey had been a m em ber o f 
the Long Parliament until 1648 and had also sworn the ‘Solemn League and 
Covenant’, which was against both ‘the government and religion established in 
England by law ’ and that the Protestants who fought under Orm ond’s com mission 
from the year 1646 to the year 1648, and from 1648 to 1650 ‘were equal in number 
with those who with arms opposed him in those times and would not acknowledge the 
king’s authority.’91
By 31 March, it is clear that Ormond had received A rran’s letter o f  8 M arch, for 
he responded to his son that though his answer was ‘near finished’, it would not be 
sent over to be made use o f  during parliament ‘unless it prove longer than it is thought 
it w ill.’92 His hesitation was fitting, for three days earlier Charles had surprised 
parliament by dissolving it just as a new exclusion bill was prepared in the Commons. 
In the weeks and months after the final exclusion parliament, O rm ond’s position in 
relation to the plot continued to improve. He therefore refused to transm it his answers 
to Anglesey’s observations lest it revive the dying plot and occasion m ischief for 
himself. Instead Ormond desired Arran to get in touch with Laurence Hyde about 
papers he had formerly lent to his father Edward, stating ‘my lord o f  Anglesey’s book
89 Arran to Ormond, 8 Mar. 1681, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 602-3.
90 Ormond to Capt George Mathew, 5 Mar. 1681, Ormonde MSS, v, p. 599; Ormond to Arran, 12 Mar. 
1681, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 608-9.
*  Quaeres, undated, Ormonde MSS, v. pp 610-11; Perceval-Maxwell, ‘ The Anglesey-Ormond- 
Castlehaven dispute’, p. 217-8; According to Perceval-Maxwell, Ormond was mistaken is his assertion 
that Anglesey had been a member of the long parliament.
" Ormond to Arran, 31 Mar. 1681, Ormonde MSS, vi, pp 23-4.
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gave me occasion to look into the transactions o f those times, o f which I may perhaps
93find cause to give some account as far as my share comes to .’
Ormond was as cagey in his dealings with the Irish witnesses. On 10 M ay 1681, 
Arran informed him that (according to Sir James Butler) Edmund M urphy and other 
witnesses against Oliver Plunkett were prepared to confess who had set them  up to 
swear against Ormond. Ormond knew that most o f the designs against him  had already 
been proven before Council and therefore he advised Sir James Butler, ‘if  it can be 
driven no further than Hetherington or such infamous rascals as they are here known 
to be, I am in doubt whether the prosecution be worth the pains.’94 Ormond likewise 
made no attempt to intercede on behalf o f  Oliver Plunkett whom he knew  to be 
innocent apart from granting several passes for safe ‘egress and regress’ to witnesses 
going to England on his behalf.95 Instead it served Ormond well that Plunkett be 
executed, because his death would effectively signal the end o f the Popish Plot in 
Ireland. All the witnesses except Oates and Dugdale would then be deprived o f 
pensions and Charles had made it perfectly clear, in the case o f Fitzharris that no more 
pardons would be granted for treason or knowledge o f treason.96 On 1 July 1681 
Plunkett and Fitzharris went to the gallows together, and according to Arran, the 
former died w ith ‘great resolution’ whilst the latter ‘very pitifully’.97 If  Plunkett was 
the last victim o f the Popish Plot, Fitzharris had the unwanted privilege o f being the
93 Ormond to Arran, 13 Apr. 1681, Ormonde MSS, vi, pp 33-4.
94 Arran to Ormond, 10 May. 1681, Ormonde MSS, vi, pp 60-1; Ormond to Arran, 18 May. 1681, 
Ormonde MSS, vi, p. 65; Ormond to Sir James Butler, 28 May. 1681, Ormonde MSS, vi, p. 71.
95 The lord lieutenant and Council to Leoline Jenkins, 10 Jun. 1681, Cal. S. P. dom., 1680-81, pp 313- 
4.
96 Arran to Ormond, it> Apr. 1680, Ormonde MSS, vi, p. 36; Haley, The first earl o f Shaftesbury, p. 
631.
97 Arran to Ormond, 2 Jul. 1681, Ormonde MSS, vi, p. 89; Miller, Charles II, p. 358; Oliver Plunkett, 
The last speech o f Mr, Oliver Plunkett, Titular Primate o f Ireland, who was executed at Tyburn, on 
Friday the Is'. o f this instant July, ¡681 (Edinburgh, 1681). Edward Fitzharris, The confession of 
Edward Fitzharris, Esq. Written with his own hand, and delivered to Dr Hawkins, minister o f the 
Tower, July 1, 1681, being the day o f his execution: together with his last speech (London, 1681); 
Burnet, History o f my own time, ii, pp 875-8.
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first victim o f the Tory reaction.98 W ith such an action, as Kenneth Haley points out, 
Charles II had silenced in one stroke an informer the W higs needed to rejuvenate the 
plot and also their attempts to exclude the duke o f  York from the throne.99 The 
following day many o f the Irish witnesses and Stephen Dugdale were persuaded to 
seek alternative employment. They now accused their former patron, Shaftesbury o f  
orchestrating a Presbyterian plot against the crown. To Charles’s delight, the judges o f  
the K ing’s Bench deemed the matters sworn against the earl to be indeed treasonous. 
At one o ’clock the same day, Shaftesbury was lodged in the Tower o f  London.100
Over the coming months, the Whigs tried desperately to save Shaftesbury by 
invalidating the evidence against him  and others im plicated in the so-called 
Presbyterian plot. Their efforts also extended to Ireland. In late August, Sir Robert 
Ware, a close ally o f Henry Jones (and the future author o f  a fiercely anti-Catholic 
pamphlet) persuaded W illiam Smith, an indebted English-man in the M arshalsea Jail, 
to declare that a Catholic priest, Father Bartholomew St Lawrence had visited him. He 
promised to procure Smith his liberty if  he would accuse two Presbyterian ministers, 
Thomas Harrison, a former chaplain to Henry Cromwell during the Interregnum, and 
W illiam Jacque o f  attempting to suborn him  to the existence o f the Popish Plot. By 
these means the Catholic party in Ireland could concoct a Presbyterian plot and suborn 
witnesses against Shaftesbury and other W higs.101 This information was secretly 
despatched to England before Smith could be properly examined, in case o f  retraction
98 John Kenyon, The Popish Plot (London, 1972), pp 233-4.
99 Haley, The first earl o f Shaftesbury, pp 651-3.
100 Arran to Ormond, 2 Jul. 1681, Ormonde MSS, vi, p. 89; John Ellis to —, 2 Jul, 1681, Ormonde MSS, 
vi, pp 89-91; Richard Mulys to —, 2 Jul. 1681, Ormonde MSS, vi, p. 91; Newsletter to John Squier, 
Newcastle, 2 Jul. 1681, Cal. S. P. dom., 1680-81, pp 340-1; Newsletter to Roger Garstell, Newcastle, 23 
Jul. 1681, Cal. S. P. dom., 1680-81, pp 370-1; Warrant to Thomas Cheeke, Lieutenant of the Tower, 2 
Jul. 1681, Cal. S. P. dom.,1680-81, p. 339.
101 Robert Ware, Foxes and firebrands or a specimen o f the danger [...] ofpopery... (2nd edition,
Dublin, 1683); Kilroy, Protestant dissent and controversy in Ireland, 1660-1714, p. 40; pp 203-5; 
William Smith, Mr. Smyth's Discovery o f the popish sham plot in Ireland, contrived to correspond with
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or confutation by contradictory testimony. On 4 October 1681, Sir Robert Clayton, a 
former Whig lord mayor o f London who had patronised James M orley and other 
witnesses against Davys and Michael Boyle, presented the evidence before Jenkins on 
behalf o f the poor Protestants o f  Dublin who believed ‘that there is little justice to be 
had in Ireland against Romish priests.’102 W ithin days it was in print under the title the 
Irish sham plot. Arran informed Ormond, it ‘makes a great noise here at this tim e’.103 
Essex was rumoured to have declared upon this matter, that he had letters in his 
possession proving Ormond the architect o f the Presbyterian p lot.104 Elsewhere in the 
County o f Meath, W illiam Howard, Captain Stafford Lightburne, and Captain Garrett 
Wesley (an ancestor o f the duke o f W ellington) cajoled its Grand Jury to sign a 
certificate in favour o f  James Morley, recently impeached for treason on the strength 
o f examinations sent over by O rm ond.105 It read,
We whose names are underwritten do hereby certify that we have known 
James Morley these twenty years past and always knew him to be a veiy 
honest loyal faithful subject to his majesty and a great encourager of all 
those who are such, and on the contraiy a great discourager of all those 
who are otherwise inclined.106
Having remained dormant in spite o f the Tory reaction in England, Ormond was 
now forced by these developments to go on the offensive and finally come to grips 
once and for all with those disaffected to his government. Chief amongst these were 
two members o f his own Council, Captain Robert Fitzgerald and Captain Oliver St 
George. In Novem ber 1680, they had abstained from putting their signatures to a 
narrative endorsing Ormond’s actions since the first discovery o f the plot.
their sham-plot in England (London, 1681); Statement of William Smith, 14. Sep. 1681, Ormonde 
MSS, vi,pp 153-4.
102 Leoline Jenkins to Ormond, 4 Oct. 1681, Ormonde MSS, vi, p. 180.
103 Arran to Ormond, 8 Oct. 1681, Ormonde MSS, vi, p. 182.
104 Earl ofLongford to Ormond, 6 Dec. 1681, Ormonde MSS, vi, pp 249-50; Anonymous to Ormond,
14 Dec. 1681, Ormonde MSS, vi, pp 263-4.
105 The Lord Lieutenant to Leoline Jenkins, 21 May. 1681, Cal. S. P. dom., 1680-81, pp 290-1; Sir 
Leoline Jenkins to Ormond, 20 Sep. 1681, Ormonde MSS, vi, pp 159-60.
106 Henry Jones, Bishop of Meath—, 20 Sep. 1681, Ormonde MSS, vi, pp 158-9; Same to same, 24 Sep.
1681, Ormonde MSS, vi, pp 163-4.
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Subsequently both had maintained correspondence with Shaftesbury and other 
W higs.107 Fitzgerald had recently attended meetings o f disaffected in Dublin ‘to keep 
up the spirits o f  the party with assurances that the good earl [Shaftesbury] will come 
off in splendour.’108 Ormond summoned St George to Kilkenny where he was severely 
reprimanded for his infidelity and obliged to give assurances o f  future good 
behaviour.109 Fitzgerald was another story. Ormond recommended to Charles that he 
be removed from Council and stripped o f his command in the Irish army, to be 
replaced by the grandson o f Ulick Burke, one o f  his Old English allies from the 1640s, 
who had recently converted to the Church o f  Ireland. Charles had long since turned his 
back on reconciling him self to the W higs and was only too willing to acquiesce to 
such requests. He informed Longford that ‘he [Charles II] will turn out o f  the Council 
and army those whomever your Grace [Ormond] thinks there in the least 
disaffected’.110 He particularly marked out Henry Jones, Captain Henry Boyle and Sir 
Oliver St George, ‘the relics o f [...] Lord Orrery’s party’.111
Ormond was content with the example made o f Fitzgerald for the moment,
• •  ' 1 1 2  unless Jones could be removed from his bishopric as well as his seat on Council. In
the meantime he ridiculed Jones’s attempts, along w ith Francis Annesley, to
reinvigorate the plot with sightings o f  the French fleet off the coast o f Louth,
if he [Annesley] be as much mistaken in the number and quality of those 
ships as he is when he says Carlingford is but a good days march from 
Dublin,1, may please god we are safe from an invasion at this time.
107 Ormond to Arran, 16 Nov. 1680, Ormonde MSS, v, pp 489-90; Anon, Ireland's sad 
lamentation... some remarkable passages which have happened since the discovery o f  the horrid 
Popish Plot. In a Letter from a person o f honour to his friend in London, upon the dissolution o f the 
late parliament (London, 1681) p 2; Ormond to Arran, 9 Aug. 1681, Ormonde MSS, vi, pp 124-5.
108 Ormond to Arran, 15 Aug. 1681, Ormonde MSS, vi, pp 132-3.
109 Ibid., pp 132-3.
110 Arran to Ormond, 8 Oct. 1681, Ormonde MSS, vi, p. 182.
111 Ormond to Arran, 9 Aug. 1681, Ormonde MSS, vi, pp 124-5; Ibid., pp 143-5; Richard Burke, Lord 
Dunkellin, later to become the 8th earl of Clanricarde.
112 Ormond to Arran, 14 Sep. 1680, Ormonde MSS, vi, pp 152-3;
113 Ormond to Sir Hans Hamilton, 14 Jul. 1681, Ormonde MSS, vi, p. 99.
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Ormond acknowledged that Ware, Harrison and a member o f his congregation, John 
Page, had devised a massive propaganda coup for Shaftesbury, but was happy an 
investigation o f how  Sm ith’s discovery was put afoot would soon see them 
prosecuted.114 Yet Ormond was savage in his treatment o f Garrett W esley and other 
members o f the M eath Grand Jury. He brushed aside their apologetic explanations that 
they had been duped by M orley’s agents stating to Lord C hief Justice Keating, a 
relation o f  W esley’s:
They own they were surprised, but they do not say how or by whom, 
which it were good to know. In the meantime it will be worth the 
considering whether men subject to such surprises are fit to bear office for 
which there will be time enough.115
He added ‘I have hitherto laid great weight on the certificates o f  justices o f  the peace 
and Grand Juries, but I shall hereafter doubt more o f their value especially when they 
come out o f M eath.’116
The crow n’s efforts to decimate the W higs and bring about Shaftesbury’s demise 
got underway in Ireland. Ormond was instructed to find a certain Captain Brodnex, a 
tenant o f Sir W illiam Temple in County Limerick. During the Second Anglo-Dutch 
war, he had been an associate o f Lord Howard o f Escrick, the reputed author o f the 
libel for which Fitzharris lost his life. The crown believed Brodnex to have evidence 
that Escrick had engaged in activities during this period such as espionage and writing 
propaganda on behalf o f the Dutch Republic, which were not covered under an Act o f 
Oblivion issued at the end o f the w ar.117 W illiam Hetherington was hindered from 
doing Shaftesbury any service during his trial by a prosecution issued in O rm ond’s 
name under ‘the Statute o f Scandalum M agnatum’, whilst at the same time the 
majority o f  the Irish witnesses against Shaftesbury were despatched to Ireland under
114 Ormond to Arran, 18 Oct. 1680, Ormonde MSS, vi, pp 200-1; Ormond to Primate Boyle, 19 Oct.
1681, Ormonde MSS, vi, p. 203.
1,5 Ormond to Lord Chief Justice Keating, 10 Oct. 1681, Ormonde MSS, vi, p. 185.
116 Ibid., p. 185.
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the pretext o f prosecuting Sir John Days and others formerly accused by them o f 
treason.118 They were all ‘tainted in credit’ or expected to be during Shaftesbury’s trial 
as Whig agents had obtained records o f  previous indictments against them  in Ireland. 
It was suspected that others had been tampered with by Hetherington ‘and great offers
made, if  they would charge any o f the kings ministers or servants w ith bribery or
subornation’.119 Ormond was instructed to keep them in custody lest they be tampered 
with by ‘fanatics’ or Whigs. He could not hide his contempt for such rogues and their 
dishonourable profession, which burdened his establishment, and w riting to Arran on 
15 November, he stated
now that they [Irish witnesses] are discarded by the zealous suborners of 
the city [London Whigs] they would fain invent and swear what might
recommend them to another party, but as they have not the honesty to
swear truth so they have not the wit to invent probability.120
On 28 November 1681, a M iddlesex Grand Jury composed o f  W higs dismissed 
the evidence against Shaftesbury. The credit o f the Irish witnesses was now expended 
as both the Tories and Whigs had little or no faith in them .121 In December, Ormond 
finally received permission to wash his hands o f  those already in Ireland, Jenkins 
informing him,
his majesty [...] concurs absolutely with your grace that those fellows 
may do him wrong but never will be able to do him right or honest 
service, therefore his majesty would have them cease to be a burden to 
himself and a trouble to your grace as soon as can be possibly [sic]. His 
majesty leaves it wholly to your grace to rid your hands of them as you 
shall resolve to be the most convenient way.122
117 Earl of Conway to Ormond, 16 Aug. 1681, Ormonde MSS, vi, p. 133
118 Order ofthe king in council, 2 Nov. 1681, Ormonde MSS, vi, p. 217. The witnesses named for 
relocation are Murtagh Downey, Maurice Fitzgerald, John Arthur, and Owen Callaghan.
119 Earl of Longford, 8 Nov. 1681, Ormonde MSS, vi, pp 217-8; Reasons for sending to Ireland John 
and Dennis MacNamara, Thomas Sampson, Hubert Bourke, George and Bernard Dennis, Edmond 
Murphy Eustace Comins and Edward Ivey, the witnesses mentioned in the above petitions [Oct?],
1681, Cal. S. P. dom., 1680-81, p. 502; Greaves, Secrets o f the kingdom: British radicals from the 
popish plot to the revolution, pp 34-5.
120 Ormond to Arran, 17 Nov. 1681, Ormonde MSS, vi, pp 230-1
121 Hutton, Charles the Second, king o f England, Scotland and Ireland, p. 408; Miller, Charles II, p. 
358; Ormond to Col. John Fitzpatrick, 5 Dec. 1681, Ormonde MSS, vi, pp 248-9; Arran to Ormond, 29 
Nov. 1681, Ormonde MSS, vi, pp 240-1; Earl of Longford to Onnond, 29 Nov. 1681, Ormonde MSS, 
vi, pp 241-2; Haley, The first earl o f Shaftesbury, pp 680-1.
122 Leoline Jenkins to Onnond, 20 Dec. 1681, Ormonde MSS, vi, pp 271-2.
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The following month, Henry Jones, the greatest proponent o f  the Irish plots besides 
Orrery died. He was so miserably poor that Ormond had to contribute £100 towards 
his funeral expenses upon which he wryly commented to Arran, ‘I was willing to run 
the hazard to give some proof that god be praised, I can forgive enemies, at least when 
they can do me no more hurt’.123 O rm ond’s position steadily improved over the 
following months. He felt sufficiently confident to finally respond in print to 
A nglesey’s observations on Castlehaven’s m em oirs.124 His hold over the Irish Privy 
Council was strengthened with the inclusion o f supporters such as Sir Richard 
Reynell.125 The time was now right for Ormond to make peace w ith disobedient lords. 
Robert Fitzgerald was restored to the Irish Council in May but only after Ormond had 
presented him before the king at W indsor.126 Shaftesbury’s release was but a 
temporary set back for the Tories as the Whigs (and their main constituency, the 
dissenters) were gradually weeded out o f office by royal prerogative and the strict 
enforcement o f  laws against Protestant nonconformists. In A ugust 1682, Anglesey lost 
the Privy Seal and was removed from Council after Ormond wrote to Charles on 17 
June accusing him o f bringing into question his faithfulness and loyalty to Charles I 
and casting doubts over his religion.127 In June and July 1682, Ormond, now actually 
in England, played a prominent role in crushing the Whig stranglehold in London,
123 Ormond to Arran, 8 Jan. 1682, Ormonde MSS, vi, p. 287.
124 James Butler, duke of Ormond, A letter from his grace James, duke o f Ormond, lord lieutenant o f  
Ireland, in answer to the right honourable Arthur Annesley, lord privy-seal, his observations and 
reflections upon the earl o f Castlehaven’s memoirs concerning the rebellion o f Ireland printed from the 
original, with an answer to it by the right honourable the earl o f Anglesey, (London, 1682); Arran to 
Ormond, 6 Dec. 1681, Ormonde MSS, vi, p. 251; Sir Robert Reading to Ormond, ¡0 Dec. 1681, 
Ormonde MSS, vi, p. 253; Arran to Onnond, 10 Dec. 1681, Ormonde MSS, vi, p. 254;
125 Sir Richard Reynell (1626-1699), Puisne Judge of Common Pleas; appointed privy councillor of 
Ireland 26 July 1682. In 1690, William III appointed him Lord Chief Justice of Ireland.
126 Ormond to Earl of Longford, 4 Mar. 1682, Ormonde MSS, vi, pp 333-4; Ormond to Arran, 22 May. 
1682, Ormonde MSS, vi, p. 367.
127 Anon., A true account o f the whole proceedings betwixt his grace James duke o f Ormond, and the 
right honor. Arthur, earl o f Anglesey, late lord privy-seal, before the king and council and the said 
earls letter o f the second o f August to his majesty on that occasion: with a letter o f the now Bishop o f 
Winchester's to the said earl, o f the means to keep out popery, and the only effectual expedient to
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allowing the Tories to capture the key offices o f  sheriff and lord mayor. Shaftesbury 
and other Whigs quickly withdrew from England before the mechanisms which had 
sustained their assaults on the crown and its supporters for over four years could be 
turned against them .128
hinder the growth thereof, and to secure both the Church of England, and the Presbyterian party, 
(London, 1682), pp 1-2.
128 Hutton, Charles the Second, king o f England, Scotland and England, pp 4 18-20; Greaves, Secrets o f 
the kingdom: British radicals from the popish plot to the revolution, pp 38-40; Kenyon, Stuart 
England, p. 238.
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This thesis has furthered our understanding of how the model of the three kingdom 
mechanism worked in practice during the period 1677-82. In order to accomplish this, 
several political crises occasioned by contemporary fears of Catholic and Presbyterian 
plots to subvert the Stuart polity were examined. Their importance is that they 
corrupted the relationship between the kingdoms of England, Scotland and Ireland 
highlighting frictions and tensions which had brought war, devastation and regicide to 
these kingdoms forty years earlier. In examining these tensions, this thesis situated 
itself in a non-Anglo-centric position. The position in question is that of the Irish lord 
lieutenant at this time, James Butler, first duke of Ormond. The genesis of Ormond’s 
selection is simple. Ormond, crucially, transcends both the fractious period of 
internecine warfare that was the 1640s and the period generally but falsely regarded 
as little more than a hiatus between the end of the Cromwellian experiment and the 
final displacement of the last remaining bastions of Catholic influence by a Protestant 
monopoly. Moreover Ormond was more than just a simple crown servant. He was the 
head of one of the oldest and most distinguished noble families in Ireland. The first 
Irish lord lieutenant in over a century. He became a dominant figure at the 
Restoration on account of his sufferings and unwavering fidelity to the crown during 
the preceding decades. Allied to his political status, his special position in regard to 
Catholicism and <he peculiar structure of the Irish kingdom on account of the 
immense political, religious and social upheavals of the previous fifty years 
determined that Ormond was the main figure in Ireland around whom coalesced the 
political and religious frictions emanating from England and Scotland on account of 
these late Restoration crises. By mapping out how Ormond undertook to manage such 
tensions and re-establish his position vis-à-vis the Stuart political nation, this thesis
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has rectified a hitherto ignored aspect of the history of late Restoration Ireland—that 
of how politics between all three kingdoms was seen from the perspective of the Irish 
government.
The pressures that Ormond faced and managed during the Popish Plot and 
the Exclusion Crisis have been categorised chronologically in this thesis into five 
chapters. The first has provided a proper reappraisal of the effect of Titus Oates’s 
revelations on the kingdom of Ireland and Ormond in particular. The plot occasioned 
an enormous amount of distress for Ormond because of his special position in regard 
to Catholicism and the sheer fact that the duke of York, who promoted his 
appointment, was generally suspected to have designed the hellish plot discovered by 
Oates. His position in regard to the Stuart political nation was further accentuated as 
many Protestants including Orrery openly criticised, in letters to London, the course 
of action undertaken to defend the established order and religion in Ireland. As such 
Ormond was compelled to defend and re-establish his position against his enemies in 
Ireland and England. He attempted to do this by demonstrating to Protestants in 
Ireland and eminent figures in London that his security measures had properly 
safeguarded the Protestant interest whilst on the other hand convincing them that 
Orrery’s zeal was misplaced and, in fact, detrimental to the Protestant interest. 
However these measures could only be partly successful during a period of intense 
anti-Catholicism and hysteria and the real improvement in Ormond’s fortunes only 
occurred at the end of 1678 when Oates and the plot were discredited after his 
accusations against Queen Catherine of Braganza were proven to be false.
In the second chapter it was found that Ormond’s situation in relation to the 
court, parliament and king in London and to Protestants in Ireland was distorted 
because of unforeseen political occurrences in England and Scotland. Of these the
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most significant were firstly, the disgrace, fall and imprisonment of Charles IPs chief 
minister since 1674, Thomas Osborne, earl of Danby; secondly the ramifications of 
the escalation of political and religious rivalry in Scotland prior to the battle of 
Bothwell Brig in June 1679; and finally the sharpening of the exclusion crisis 
following James, duke of York’s brusque behaviour towards those who had 
previously sided with his opponents in favouring the imposition of limitations upon 
any Catholic successor to Charles II. Though Ormond and his allies adopted various 
stratagems in order to insulate his position from' the effects of these alterations in 
England and Scotland, ultimately they were of little value, for the re-establishment of 
his position in the autumn of 1679 actually resulted from the contrivance of political 
events over which he had little control.
In the third chapter Ormond’s supposed Catholic sympathies were again a 
major issue, first, in the wake of the Meal Tub plot and Charles II’s rash decision to 
prorogue parliament in October 1679 without informing his own Council. These 
proceedings led to the political resurgence of Shaftesbury and other antagonists of his 
patron, James, duke of York. Furthermore these developments put the crown, upon 
which Ormond depended for the security of his position, into a very awkward position 
whereby Charles II was compelled to negotiate with the Whigs. The second crisis was 
a direct result of the complete breakdown in the relationship between the crown and 
the opposition following Charles II’s refusal to accede to Whig attempts to pressurise 
concessions (namely that parliament be allowed to meet) through the use of mass 
petitions. This was accompanied by the growing prestige of the Tories following the 
duke of York’s return to England in January 1680. As such the Whigs were compelled 
to use unconstitutional means to reassert their position. A key facet of their desperate 
strategy was to damage the duke of York by proving that his key ally Ormond was
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party to or had suppressed evidence about an Irish Catholic plot hatched by Oliver 
Plunkett, archbishop of Armagh, to introduce the French into Ireland to massacre the 
English.
In late 1680 the fragility of Ormond’s position in relation to political 
occurrences in England and Scotland is exposed once again as the investigation into 
the Irish plot previously hatched by his enemies in England and malcontents from 
Ulster was taken out of his hands and transferred to London, where parliament at that 
time was convening. Such proceedings added credence to previous accusations that he 
had stifled those who were endeavouring to expose Catholic treasons in Ireland and 
that he was himself somehow tied up in their schemes. These developments were a 
godsend for the Whigs in their efforts to bring about the exclusion of the duke of
York. However Ormond once again escaped removal or worse for a variety of
reasons. Firstly, the potency of the witnesses against him was largely ruined by their 
ineptitude before parliament in November and during the subsequent weeks no one of 
any quality from the kingdom of Ireland appeared to buttress the Whigs, attempts to 
marshal pressure against him. Secondly, his position in London was now extremely 
resilient, as the earl of Arran had mobilised his supporters in both houses of
parliament. In addition many lords outside his circle of allies and regular
correspondents were successfully brought on side during this time. Thirdly, the defeat 
of the exclusion bill was crucial as it completely diverted the attention of the Whigs 
from Ireland to those who had frustrated their designs. Finally Ormond was saved by 
the complete dissolution of any vestiges of good will between the crown and the 
Commons which compelled Charles to dismiss parliament on the 18 January 1681; 
crucially this was just before they could impeach more of his ministers, including 
Ormond, despite the sparse evidence, if any, that was against him.
226
The final chapter has shown how Ormond’s position in regard to the Popish 
Plot, to the Whigs in London and those disaffected to his government in Ireland was 
finally re-established during the period 1681-82. In common with many of his 
previous recoveries from periods of crisis, Ormond was relegated to the role of 
onlooker whilst these crucial events were played out around him. The panacea to his 
problems arrived with the dissolution of the final exclusion parliament. In its wake 
there was a turnaround in the crown’s fortunes as a secret financial treaty with Louis 
XIV allowed Charles to finally escape from his dependency on parliamentary 
subsidies, freeing him to exact revenge against those who had sought to usurp his 
brother’s prerogative. Furthermore he had made it clear in the case of Edward 
Fitzharris whom the Whigs had sought to impeach and use for their own purposes that 
there would be no more pardons for treason or the concealment of treason. This was 
the death knell for the already discredited Irish plot and after playing their part in the 
judicial murder of Plunkett, many witnesses found alternative employment by turning 
against their old patrons. Amidst this climate of reaction and revenge Ormond finally 
came to grips and exerted his authority over those who had contemptuously 
disregarded his position and powers as lord lieutenant in concert with his enemies in 
London.
The significance of this thesis lies in its shift of perspective. Whilst most 
histories of the relationship and interaction of the three kingdoms of the Stuart 
monarchy have been from the perspective of London, this study has attempted to 
remedy this defect by examining the process from the perspective of James Butler, 
duke of Ormond. This holistic approach to the interaction of British and Irish history 
reveals a fluid, highly personalised nexus of relationships, which was the interwoven 
history of the three kingdoms in the late seventeenth century and as such it allows us
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to better understand both the importance of British events in an Irish context and of 
Irish events in a British context. To build on this approach it is necessary to go outside 
the orbit of Anglo-centric and new British history and realise that history must be 
studied in the same complexity in which it was lived. This calls for a greater emphasis 
and appreciation of local, national, three-kingdom as well as European sources and 
approaches, as ways of understanding the multilayered role and position of Ireland in 
the wider world of the late seventeenth century.
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